University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations
2013

Long Live the Revolutions: Fighting for France's Political Future in
the Long Wake of the Commune, 1871-1880
Heather Marlene Bennett
University of Pennsylvania, heathero@sas.upenn.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations
Part of the European History Commons

Recommended Citation
Bennett, Heather Marlene, "Long Live the Revolutions: Fighting for France's Political Future in the Long
Wake of the Commune, 1871-1880" (2013). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 734.
https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/734

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/734
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Long Live the Revolutions: Fighting for France's Political Future in the Long Wake
of the Commune, 1871-1880
Abstract
The traumatic legacies of the Paris Commune and its harsh suppression in 1871 had a significant impact
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and cultural developments of this phenomenal decade, which is frequently mislabeled as calm and stable,
established the Republic's longevity and set its character. Yet the Commune's legacies have never been
comprehensively examined in a way that synthesizes their political and cultural effects. This dissertation
offers a compelling perspective of the 1870s through qualitative and quantitative analyses of the
influence of these legacies, using sources as diverse as parliamentary debates, visual media, and
scribbled sedition on city walls, to explicate the decade's most important political and cultural moments,
their origins, and their impact. Within the interplay of electoral messaging, national political culture, and
factional schisms, republicans wrested control of the state away from monarchists seeking to subvert the
Republic, but they also sustained bitter internal divisions over the meaning of the Republic and its
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monarchists and their republican rivals but had to vigorously defend their nascent power--much of which
depended on their narrative projections of the Third Republic's foundation, the assimilation of French and
republican national identities, and their claims to the revolutionary heritage. The passage of a neargeneral amnesty for Communards, the official adoption of La Marseillaise, the movement of government
assemblies back to Paris, and the designation of Quatorze Juillet as the Republic's national holiday were
not simply natural consequences of the republican political victory. Rather, the Moderates deliberately
undertook each initiative to project the liberal Republic's triumph, to merge the identities of France and the
Republic, and to implicitly close the revolutionary era.
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ABSTRACT
LONG LIVE THE REVOLUTIONS: FIGHTING FOR FRANCE’S POLITICAL
FUTURE IN THE LONG WAKE OF THE COMMUNE, 1871-1880
Heather M. Bennett
Thomas Childers

The traumatic legacies of the Paris Commune and its harsh suppression in 1871
had a significant impact on the identities and voter outreach efforts of each of the chief
political blocs of the 1870s. The political and cultural developments of this phenomenal
decade, which is frequently mislabeled as calm and stable, established the Republic’s
longevity and set its character. Yet the Commune’s legacies have never been
comprehensively examined in a way that synthesizes their political and cultural effects.
This dissertation offers a compelling perspective of the 1870s through qualitative and
quantitative analyses of the influence of these legacies, using sources as diverse as
parliamentary debates, visual media, and scribbled sedition on city walls, to explicate the
decade’s most important political and cultural moments, their origins, and their impact.
Within the interplay of electoral messaging, national political culture, and factional
schisms, republicans wrested control of the state away from monarchists seeking to
subvert the Republic, but they also sustained bitter internal divisions over the meaning of
the Republic and its relationship to the Revolution’s heritage. By 1880, the Moderate
republicans had triumphed over the monarchists and their republican rivals but had to
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vigorously defend their nascent power—much of which depended on their narrative
projections of the Third Republic’s foundation, the assimilation of French and republican
national identities, and their claims to the revolutionary heritage. The passage of a neargeneral amnesty for Communards, the official adoption of La Marseillaise, the
movement of government assemblies back to Paris, and the designation of quatorze
juillet as the Republic’s national holiday were not simply natural consequences of the
republican political victory. Rather, the Moderates deliberately undertook each initiative
to project the liberal Republic’s triumph, to merge the identities of France and the
Republic, and to implicitly close the revolutionary era.
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PREFACE
This dissertation focuses on the years between the defeat of the Paris Commune in
May 1871 and the first celebration of the new French Republican nation on July 14,
1880. Historians and scholars of the French Third Republic have frequently overlooked
the importance of this period, dismissing it as a time of relative peace and stability. Yet
these were formative years for the Republic, and their study provides great insight into
the factors at work in the establishment of the fledgling regime and the Moderate
republicans’ rise to power in 1879. This preface assists the reader in this examination by
providing context about the roles that rivalries among different republican factions, the
legacies of the Paris Commune, and the social climate of the time played in the highly
misunderstood decade that gave birth to France’s longest-lasting Republic.
Republican Rivalries
One of the most important analytical components of this dissertation is exploring
the divisions among the republican groups of this decade. The major fault lines that
separated these factions involved two burning issues: the type of Republic each
envisioned and the lengths to which they were prepared to go to bring their ideals into
reality. In the last years of the Empire and the first decade of the Third Republic, three
main republican camps battled for power:
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Conservatives
Conservatives theoretically
opposed the Empire but
sometimes supported the
Emperor’s machinations—for
instance, by voting “yes” for his
liberal plebiscites. Conservative
republicans did not support the
anti-clerical agenda of their
colleagues to the Left. In the
1870s, the previously Orleanist
Adolphe Thiers was the epitome
of a Conservative republican
politician.

Moderates
As the largest, most powerful
bloc, Moderates opposed
violence as a means to end the
Empire. They sought to construct
a liberal-constitutional regime to
safeguard general republican
ideals, including universal male
suffrage, free press, free
assembly, and laicization. After
1871, the previously Radical
Léon Gambetta became the most
notable Moderate.

Radicals
Radicals were a powerful
minority that ardently opposed
clericalism and sought to
establish a social-democratic
Republic based on equal justice
and social responsiveness. Some,
like Georges Clemenceau,
eschewed militancy, while
intransigents such as Eugène
Varlin and Auguste Blanqui
maintained the viability of
revolutionary violence as a means
of change.

Shifting Tactics and Alliances after September 4, 1870
After the Republic was declared on September 4, 1871, two of the new regime’s
most influential politicians underwent important tactical and ideological transitions. The
long-time Orleanist Adolphe Thiers accepted the Republic of 1870 but used his electoral
mandate to ensure its establishment along conservative lines. Conversely, Léon
Gambetta, who cut his teeth as a Radical republican lawyer under the Second Empire,
moved into the Moderate camp. By mid-decade, Gambetta was arguably the most
influential Moderate republican politician, and he ultimately guided this faction to power
by January 1879. Such transitions contribute to the confusion about and
misunderstanding of this time period. For example, Gambetta’s shift to the Moderate
faction did not end royalist castigations against his supposed radicalism, nor has it led
historians to consistently label him as a Moderate, despite his prominence within that
faction.
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Many Radicals transformed their image and adopted new strategies after the fall
of the Second Empire. Some men who had taken an active part in the Revolution of 1848
and had been considered Socialists under the Empire, such as Louis Blanc, became
ensconced in the parliamentary Radical bloc. Others remained more constant in their
stances, like Auguste Blanqui, who had been in the vanguard of every revolution since
1830, and Eugène Varlin, who had worked to bring the labor movement under the
auspices of the Socialist International during the last years of the Second Empire.
Throughout the decade, they consistently supported the use of direct, even violent, action
to achieve their goal of a social-democratic regime.
Origins of the Paris Commune
This dissertation does not focus on the Paris Commune as an event, but rather on
the varying narratives of its legacies and the incorporation of these viewpoint-based
assessments into competing political strategies during the decade after its demise. The
historians of the Commune who have most significantly influenced this dissertation
include Robert Tombs, Jacques Rougerie, Stewart Edwards, and David A. Shaffer.1 All
of these scholars have registered compelling arguments regarding the Commune’s
origins, its brutal defeat, and the issues underpinning the diverse use of its legacies.

1

Robert Tombs, The Paris Commune 1871, Longman, New York 1999; Jacques Rougerie, Jacques
Rougerie, Procès Des Communards, Juliard, 1964, 1871: Jalons pour une histoire de la Commune de Paris,
Presses universitaires de France, 1973, Paris insurgé: La Commune de 1871, Découvertes Gallimard, Paris
1995; Stewart Edwards, The Communards of Paris, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1973; and David A.
Shafer, The Paris Commune: French Politics, Culture, and Society at the Crossroads of the Revolutionary
Tradition and Revolutionary Socialism, Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2005.
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Three factors played a particularly important role in the Commune’s birth: the
sense of mutual mistrust among Radical, Socialist, and Blanquist leaders in Paris and the
Moderate-led Government of National Defense; the Parisian experience of the Prussian
Siege and the government’s callous treatment of the post-Siege Parisian population; and
the election of a monarchist majority to the National Assembly in February 1871.
Within days of the Republic’s declaration, discontent began to emerge from the
working-class and progressive political circles in Paris’s north and east districts. On
September 15th, the Central Committee of the Twenty Arrondissements plastered “Red
Posters” informing citizens of its objectives all over the city walls. The Central
Committee was a consolidation of various independently organized vigilance groups
whose functions overlapped with the 20 appointed mayors of the arrondissements. Its
establishment indicates that left-wing political and patriotic groups were already
contesting the authority of the government six months before the Paris Commune.
Moreover, its creation casts light on the division within the republican community of the
time. The Red Posters made the terms of the Committee’s unrest and intentions explicit:
they called for a levée en masse to meet the Prussian Siege and for a total and permanent
transformation of “political, social, and economic systems.”2

Tombs, The Paris Commune, Op. cit., pp. 44-45: “abolition of the police and bureaucracy, election of all
officials, the National Guard to be made responsible for public order, expropriation of all foodstuffs, equal
rationing, distribution of weapons, and a total mobilization of the population, ‘Republican Paris being
resolved, rather than surrender, to bury itself beneath its ruins.’”
2
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The Blanquists offered even more direct affronts to the government. On October
9th and 31st, 1870, and again on January 28th, 1871, the Blanquists took part in three
marches on the Hôtel de Ville to protest the official handling of the war effort. They
contended that the government was only half-heartedly defending the nation while
covertly making peace overtures. Beyond wounding national pride, this convinced leftwing circles that, like the first two Republics, the Third was doomed to fail because of the
weakness of its Moderate republican leaders in their dealings with committed
monarchists, who held an alarming share of power in the government.
For the Moderate republican leaders of the Government of National Defense, their
ability to form a liberal regime after the war greatly depended on the successful
continuation of the war, which only Paris wanted to sustain by the end of the winter of
1870–1871. They found themselves in a precarious position, having to “maintain the
left’s support for its handling of the war effort while, at the same time, creating the
conditions for an orderly, stable, and secure Republic.”3 Adding fuel to this hostile flame,
from mid-October onward, the government began to move itself piecemeal to Bordeaux
in an effort to avoid the dangers associated with the Siege and popular uprisings. This
hardly engendered support for the regime in the Parisian population, radical,
revolutionary, or otherwise—all of whom were suffering through a terribly traumatic
moment in French history.

3

Shafer, p. 32.
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Parisians endured a particularly harsh winter during the Siege, compounded by
serious deprivations due to the Prussian blockade of the city, which prevented regular
shipments of food and limited the communication between the capital and the provinces.
The Prussians allowed people to exit the city, and those with means did just that, leaving
behind a largely working-class population whose survival grew increasingly tenuous. The
government resisted rationing food, letting market prices prevail. This led to a serious
disparity in how the different classes experienced the Siege, which highlighted the
realities of French social hierarchies. Food was available but expensive, meaning poorer
Parisians were forced to endure bouts of starvation while witnessing their wealthier
counterparts eat mouthwatering dinners in sidewalk cafes and buy copious amounts of the
food that remained prominently on display in grocers’ windows.
The working-class experience of the Siege was horrific: queuing in long lines for
subpar food including rats, cats, and elephants from the city’s zoo; watching their
children die of malnutrition and disease; and, for many women, a desperate turn to
prostitution. Parisian men could survive on the National Guard rations and their 30-sousa-day salary, but women and children were left adrift. These traumas stiffened Paris’
patriotic resolve to defeat the invader and ratcheted up Parisian hostility toward a
government that had escaped such realities by moving its offices to Bordeaux.
The Prussian bombardment began on January 5, 1871, with the understanding that
Paris alone was the bulwark against peace. In contrast to Paris’ total commitment to war,
some members of the government were privately pursuing a truce and the beleaguered
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provinces eagerly supported this option. This divergence of opinion over the war effort
instigated mutual enmity between Paris and the government, and between the capital and
the provinces. In Paris, the radical and revolutionary forces perceived the government’s
unwillingness to use the National Guard regiments to defend against the Siege as
indicative of its class bias and lackluster commitment to France’s victory. This idea
merged with popular suspicions about the political intentions of the new regime’s mixture
of

Moderate-republican

and

Monarchist

leaders.

Meanwhile,

the

provisional

government’s republican leaders shuddered at the militancy and revolutionary passions
underpinning the Third Republic’s 1871 declaration that it viewed itself as potentially
“standing in the shadows of Jacobinism.”4
The National Guard was deployed for the first and only time during the Siege on
January 19, 1871—just over a week before the armistice—in an attack on the German
headquarters at Versailles. According to the historian Stewart Edwards, the goal of this
maneuver was “mainly to placate popular opinion as a prelude to a truce…[and] even
then, either out of fear or military prudence [and class prejudice], only the bourgeois
battalions were allowed to see any action.”5 On January 28, 1871, the French
government’s now-open appeals for peace prevailed, and the armistice was signed.
Radical factions organized a third march on the Hôtel de Ville that night, but it was

4
5

Shafer, p. 31.
4,000 were killed or wounded against only 600 German casualties. Parenthetical remarks are Edwards’.
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sorely under-attended.6 Nevertheless, Paris’ dismay at the government’s capitulation was
not isolated to revolutionary circles. Many Parisians felt betrayed and viewed the
government as chimera that thinly masked the reality of France’s political future:
monarchical restoration. The election of the new National Assembly took place during
the 21-day armistice. By that time, close to 900,000 people were relying on National
Guard salaries for subsistence; approximately 42,000 Parisians, mainly babies and the
elderly, had died of starvation and communicable diseases; and revolutionary
intransigents had marched on the Hôtel de Ville three times.7 While the coup attempts
were dismal failures, they alerted provincial voters to the great unrest brewing in
recalcitrant Paris.
On February 8, voters elected a monarchist majority to the new Republic’s
National Assembly in a single-ballot voting system under universal male suffrage. The
Revolutionary Socialist Party, having campaigned on renewing the war effort and
governing “without compromise with the bourgeoisie,” received 15% (roughly 50,000) of
the national vote, all of which came from Paris, specifically from the working-class north
and east arrondissements.8 Yet even in its strongholds of La Roquette, Gobelins, La
Villette, and Belleville, the revolutionary-Socialist candidates won only a quarter of the

6

On the same day a third Blanquist-led march on the Hotel de Ville occurred; it was a complete disaster
with the leaders lamenting that sworn adherents never showed up.
7
It is generally known, by historians of the Commune that during the Siege of Paris when the National
Guard battalions were extended, the 1.50 franc a day these men earned became a type of welfare provision.
As Tombs, p. 54, points out this was a vital necessity but a paltry sum given that “by Christmas, a rat cost
50-75 centimes; an egg 2 francs; a cabbage, 5 francs; a rabbit 40 francs.”
8
Jacques Rougerie, ed., 1871: Jalons pour une histoire de la Commune de Paris, Op cit., pp. 41-44.
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districts’ combined votes. The Moderate republicans, who had led the Government of
National Defense, became the minority faction. The Radicals fared little better; in Paris,
these “pro-war” candidates and veterans of the Revolution of 1848, including Louis
Blanc and Victor Hugo, won nearly all of the city’s 43 seats, but they remained the leastpopular choice among republican constituencies nationwide. These results highlight the
chasm that existed between Paris and the provinces at that point.9
Gambetta, who had served as the war-time Minister of Interior and War, only
reluctantly accepted the armistice and emerged at the top of the Paris election alongside
the Radical republican Victor Hugo. But Gambetta won just one of his provincial bids:
the Radical republican stronghold of Marseilles. Conversely, Adolphe Thiers, who had
pushed for peace from the beginning and especially after September 4th, “finished
twentieth out of 43 deputies elected in Paris” but won an unprecedented victory in 26
departments. The Assembly selected him to be the first President of the Third Republic.
When the body convened for the first time on February 13th, 1871, in Bordeaux, it was
firmly conservative: 400 of the 583 who took their seats were monarchists (214 Orleanist
supporters and 186 Legitimists), and the remaining seats went to 15 Bonapartists, 18
Independents, and 150 republicans (whose Parisian Deputies were nearly all Radicals).10

9

Tombs, The Paris Commune, Op. cit., p. 62.
Figures for this election vary. For example, Shafer, p. 56, cites 675 elected, 400 of whom were
monarchists; R.D. Anderson, in France 1870-1914: Politics and Society, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.,
London 1977, p. 6 and pp. 163-164, estimates that 650 were elected: 180 Legitimists, 214 Orleanists, 20
Bonapartists, 80 Center Left (conservative republicans), 110 Moderate republicans, 40 Extreme Left
(Radical republican); according to Robert Gildea in Children of the Revolution: The French 1799-1914,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2008, 768 deputies were elected. The only estimate that remains
10

xviii

The Monarchists won their majority by campaigning on peace with Prussia and the reestablishment of national stability, and by capitalizing on the negative rural reaction to
the recent rebellions in Paris and the pro-war campaign of the Radical republicans. Their
triumph, however, did not correspond to a nationwide desire for the restoration of any
branch of the French monarchy. Nonetheless, the Monarchist majority, confident in its
mandate, began operating under the assumption that restoration was close at hand—a
supposition validated by historical precedent.
On March 1, 1871, France and Prussia signed a preliminary peace pact and
confirmed the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. Radical Deputies in the Assembly read
aloud protest letters signed by members of their bloc, including Léon Gambetta.
Immediately afterward, Gambetta and 27 of his colleagues resigned their seats, thereby
bolstering the Monarchist majority’s power. According to the terms of the Treaty of
Frankfurt, executed on May 10, 1871, France ceded two provinces to the new German
state, whose greater population, natural resources, and geographic size compounded
France’s post-war anxiety. Over the course of the next seventy years, the fears that the
loss of Alsace and Lorraine raised regarding France’s supposed national degeneration and
revanchisme would lead to France’s aggressive colonization and inform its peace terms

consistent is the roughly 400 for elected royalists. This inconsistency is related to the multiple elections for
men such as Thiers, the resignation of deputies that rejected the peace, including Victor Hugo, and Henri
Rochefort, and the loss of seats by the annexation of departments according to the Treaty of Frankfurt. See
Jean-Marie Mayeur and Madeleine Rebérioux, The Third Republic From its Origins to the Great War,
1871-1914, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1984, p. 8 and fn.1.
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with Germany after World War I.11 But after 1871, such responses to the nation’s defeat
were submerged into a different set of cataclysms: the Paris Commune and its brutal
suppression.
President Thiers’ immediate post-election plans were to secure peace with
Germany and end German occupation, to re-establish the nation’s financial and military
power, and to restore social and political order. All of these objectives required bringing
unruly Paris into line as quickly as possible. Thiers and the monarchist majority in the
National Assembly were far from conciliatory toward the discontented post-Siege, postelection Parisians. As described by David Shafer and alluded to by numerous other
Commune historians, “Thiers appeared determined to provoke Paris into a fight.”12 On
March 11th and 12th of 1871, during its last session in Bordeaux, the National Assembly
passed four bills that served to sustain Radical and revolutionary antipathy and generate
tacit support for the Paris Commune, which erupted merely six days later.
The first bill ended the payment of the National Guards’ salaries and any further
compensation to the illegitimate children and spouses of fallen soldiers. The second bill
halted the suspension of rent payments and the sanctioned selling of pawned items,

Rachel Chrastil, “Who lost the Franco-Prussian War?: Blame, Politics, and Citizenship in the 1870s,”
Proceedings of the Western Society for French History, Vol. 32, 2004. Chrastil convincingly asserts that
revanchisme was not the immediate response of French politicians or that of the majority of the electorate.
12
Shafer, p. 60.
11

xx

“which affected all classes except the most wealthy.”13 As Edwards highlights, this
decree hit “the numerous small shop owners” (i.e., the petit bourgeois) particularly hard;
as a result, while the “small manufacturers did not throw themselves into the
revolutionary movement, at least they said to themselves that it was not worth defending
the government.”14 The third bill declared that all overdue debts would be made
immediately payable, with interest. The final bill proclaimed that the Government’s
offices would be located in Versailles, the symbol of monarchical power, instead of Paris,
the traditional home of the French Republics. This move was a cautionary response to the
recent uprisings in Paris, but it also sent a powerful message to the people. Choosing
Versailles underscored the Assembly’s monarchist bent and heightened tensions between
Paris and the government. Once the bills passed, the next order of business was disarming
a hostile population in Paris.15
The government seized the armaments of only three Guard regiments: those of
Montmartre, La Villette, and Belleville—the same working-class areas that had hotly
denounced their regiments’ forced wartime idleness, and home to the same citizenry who
frequently took part in anti-government demonstrations.16 Historians of the Commune
widely regard the targeted disarmament of these three working-class areas as evidence

13

Edwards, p. 23, internal quotes cited as the post-Commune remarks of a police chief, originally located
in E.P. Enquête parlementaire sur l’insurrection du 18 mars, 3 volumes, Versailles, 1872, vol. II, pp. 120121.
14
Edwards, p. 23.
15
Shafer, p. 66.
16
There were 171 cannons in Montmartre, 75 in Belleville and an unknown figure in La Villette; probably
close to 300 in total.
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that Thiers was deliberately seeking to provoke revolutionary forces in Paris in order to
subvert their movement before it gained wider support. Thiers’ own reflections support
this highly probable theory. Regardless of his intentions, the seizure of the National
Guard cannons from these working-class districts was the immediate catalyst to the
outbreak of the revolutionary Paris Commune.
The Paris Commune
At 3:00 a.m. on March 18, 1871, President Thiers, several of his ministers, and a
regiment of 6,000 gendarmes and mobiles led by General Claude Lecomte entered Paris
to seize the cannons of the National Guard regiments of Belleville and Montmartre. At
5:30 a.m., all seemed to be proceeding according to plan. The soldiers were simply
waiting on sufficient horse power to remove the cannons from the neighborhood. By 8:00
a.m., however, the peaceful situation had unraveled: more National Guardsmen had
arrived to safeguard the cannons; women in the growing crowd had begun fraternizing
with the government’s soldiers; and the Radical republican Mayor of Montmartre,
Georges Clemenceau, had failed in his attempts to negotiate between the troops of
Versailles and the protesting Parisians. General Lecomte ordered his soldiers to open fire
on the people. They refused. Instead, the crowd seized Lecomte. By 10:30 a.m., Thiers
had fled the city, directing the army to follow. That evening, Generals Lecomte and
Clément-Thomas (the detested leader of the Parisian National Guard during the Siege)
were executed by a mob that included some of Lecomte’s own soldiers. By 10:00 p.m.,
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the National Guard regiments and the citizens who had risen to support them had taken
control of Paris.
The Central Committee of the National Guard took up headquarters at the Hôtel
de Ville that night, cheered on by a riotous crowd. Eager to establish its power but
hesitant to accept the overwhelming responsibility of leading a revolutionary
government, the Central Committee asked the city mayors who had remained in the
capital to call for elections. So began the revolutionary Paris Commune, a regime
characterized by a fluctuating mix of political and economic timidity, progressive social
legislation, extreme democracy, and aggressive displays of intransigence, mingled with
popular festivity within the city center—now free for re-taking by the very social classes
that Haussmannization had out-priced just a decade earlier.17
The Commune lasted only 72 days before the Versailles troops recaptured the
city. This was not a great awakening of the working class; it was a spontaneous revolt
and its initiatives were haphazard. The Commune’s leadership consisted mostly of
journalists and manual laborers from the small craft industries that still dominated Paris’
economy, most of whom had no prior political experience.18 The 229,167 ballots cast in
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the elections that the Parisian mayors held on March 26, 1871, established the orientation
of the revolutionary government. The Commune, a title that evoked the insurgent heritage
of 1792 and echoed Proudhonist ideas of local autonomy, consisted of ninety-three
representative seats—one for every 20,000 residents per arrondissement—elected on the
basis of proportional representation.19 Nearly all of its members hailed from the Radicaland Socialist-republican Left: “nine were Blanquists; 14 were members of the Central
Committee; 17 can be classified as militant-activists in the International; 11 were
socialists…; [and] four were ‘old beards,’ veterans of the Second Republic.”20
Consequently, the Commune was deeply divided in ideology, which made its
administrative functions disorganized and its military defense chaotic at best.
The Commune quickly took on the identity of a revolution rather than a municipal
revolt. It directed city functionaries to ignore directives coming from Versailles, thereby
superseding the orders of the national government. It also countermanded the National
Assembly’s decrees by prolonging rent control and declaring an end to the sale of
pawned items at the monts-de-piété. Furthermore, the Commune established commissions
on Public Service, Finance, Welfare, War, Justice, General Security, and even Foreign
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Relations. From the start, the Commune was much more than a declaration of civil
autonomy; it was a defensive revolution aimed at upholding a social-democratic Republic
against the machinations of the Assembly’s monarchist majority and the Moderate
republican minority that was pandering to it.21
The Commune did not limit its social and political experiments to issues that were
specific to Paris. For instance, it unleashed extreme anti-clericalism: churches, religious
schools, convents, and monasteries were closed; nuns were removed from their roles in
hospitals and prisons; and a number of priests, including the Archbishop of Paris, Msgr.
Darboy, were executed. However, its social and economic initiatives were generally
“reformist rather than revolutionary, taking up demands that had been formulated by
Radical and Socialist republicans and the labor movement during the preceding twenty to
thirty years.”22 For instance, the Commune was protective of private-property rights,
which reveals a lack of ideological coherence, namely of the Marxist variety. But it also
reflects the reality that the Commune needed the support of more than its most committed
adherents and sympathizers; it could not afford to alienate Paris’ middle and lowermiddle classes, which were likely to balk at threats to private property. Thus, while some
members advocated the nationalization of industries, the Commune’s Commission of
Labor Exchange instead permitted trade unions and workers’ co-operatives to take over
idle factories with the earnest promise that their owners would receive compensation for
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them if they returned.23 Outside of its socially progressive initiatives, the Commune was
simultaneously liberating for its partisans and horrifying to its detractors.
Chief among the factors that generated censure of the Commune and anxiety
regarding its legacies were its breakdown of gendered social norms, the inclusion of
working men in its administration, its festivity, and the re-conquest of the city’s center by
a working-class population.24 Conservative politicians and their constituencies quaked at
the phantom of a working-class revolutionary awakening, while Moderate republicans
feared that the uprising revealed militant support for a social-democratic Republic as
opposed to a liberal one.25 Most republicans disdained the Commune because the
“lessons they had learned during the Second Republic and the Second Empire” made
them leery of violent confrontation, which they deemed a serious risk to the Republic’s
survival.26 However, Radical republicans, such as Georges Clemenceau, Camille
Pelletan, and Louis Blanc, refused to repudiate the Communards or their political
objectives; they “sympathized deeply with the sentiments of affronted nationalism and
ardent, popular republicanism which fueled the Commune” and blamed Thiers’
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government for instigating the revolt in order to crush Parisian insurgency
preemptively.27 These contextual concerns are of great significance to the analysis
conducted throughout this dissertation.
The Commune was too short-lived to see most of its initiatives come to fruition,
but as Edwards aptly argues, “more important than any particular measure was the very
existence of the Commune as a government that included a substantial proportion of
working men.”28 This fact expresses an important truth. The severity of the Commune’s
suppression and the Moderate republicans’ consistent refusal to amnesty its participants
stemmed in large part from divisions among the republican factions: the liberalconstitutional Moderates, the social-democratic Radicals, and their revolutionary
colleagues within the Blanquist and Socialist movements. During the 1870s, these
tensions fueled a continuous thread of disagreement over the legacies of the Commune
and the meaning of the Republic.
The Paris Commune was defeated between May 21 and 28 of 1871—days that
would be known as la semaine sanglante, or the Bloody Week. A significant debate
exists within the modern historical community regarding the exact number of people who
were killed during the last week of the Commune. In 1994, Tombs revised the estimate of
the 20,000–30,000 deaths that he and Rougerie had put forth in the 1970s, asserting that
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the death toll was probably closer to 6,500–7,000.29 Equally established scholars of the
Commune have hotly contested this revision. Despite his adjustment, Tombs still
described la semaine sanglante as the “bloodiest ‘White Terror’ in French history” and “a
‘great sweeping out’ that would restore ‘order’ by eliminating disruptive elements from
society” in his 1996 monograph “France 1814–1914.”30 This dissertation is not a retelling
of the Commune’s history or its suppression. Rather, it focuses on the first decade of the
Third Republic, when politicians began establishing the Commune’s legacies and using
them to influence battles over the Republic’s survival, republican rivalries, and voter
messaging. For this purpose, it is simply enough to recall that contemporary witnesses,
including the Commune’s detractors, labeled the suppression la semaine sanglante. In
doing so, they gave witness to a shockingly high death toll—a suppression so brutal that
it bore its own legacy.
Defeating the Commune offered the Versailles Government an opportunity to
purge the revolutionary-republican Left and communicate a doubly symbolic message to
French citizens: any future uprising would meet with equally severe repression, and it
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would do so at the hands of a republican government that could, and would, defeat a
revolution at least as inexorably as any monarch ever had. 31 This engendered significant
support for the young Republic among rural voters, who historically abhorred the
rebellious nature of the capital city.
By the summer of 1871, the Commune was just a memory. Fleeing Communards
were hunted down, executed, imprisoned, or forced into exile in France’s penal colony of
New Caledonia. Around 40,000 men, women, and children were arrested. There are no
definitive estimates of how many Communards were able to flee or how many managed
to remain in Paris, although the extent of the post-Commune hunt for insurgents indicates
that the latter number must be miniscule. Marc Vuillumier estimates that 800 escaped to
Switzerland and P. Martinez contends that around 3,500 were living in London by
1873.32 However, London and Geneva were only two of many hubs for the fleeing
Communards, and self-exile, like Communard arrests, continued long after 1873. In fact,
it was not until 1878 that new arrests and trials ceased to occur. Because of this
prolonged persecution and the frequent amnesty proposals the Radical republicans
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introduced, the memory of the Commune and disputes over its legacies permeated civic
and cultural debates and initiatives throughout the first decade of the Third Republic.
These factors significantly influenced the images and voter appeals of the period’s
politicians, and therefore the impact of their competing goals for the Republic’s future.
Demographics and Socio-Political Realities at the Dawn of the Third Republic
In 1871, the population of France was close to 37 million. Paris, the nation’s most
populous city, was home to two-million people, 70% of whom were of the working class.
The Parisians were incredibly diverse in terms of living conditions, wages, and political
participation, and while most of Paris consistently voted republican, only a minute
fraction was revolutionary, even on the eve of the Commune. Throughout France, the
working-class population was not an industrial proletariat.33 Instead, the term “working
class” applied to anyone who survived by his or her labor, including white-collar minor
clerks, in-home piece workers, and employees in the large factories (of which only 15
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existed, employing less than 100 people, in 1872). Even as late as 1880, the agricultural
community employed the vast majority of workers.34
The reforms envisioned by French laborers, including those in the industrial
sector, reflected an artisanal perspective. For all of the statistics regarding the impact of
the International Workingmen’s Association on the outbreak of the Commune, the group
had only 245,000 members nationwide in 1870. “In Paris [there were] 20 branches with
50 to 100 members per branch.”35 In addition, socialism and membership in the
International meant something different for the French adherents. French socialism in the
late-nineteenth century was more immersed in economic reformism and mutualism to
counter bourgeois individualism than in class antagonism or the creation of any type of
proletarian dictatorship.36 Michel Winock aptly views the Commune and the enterprises
of the socialist movement thereafter in terms of the “revolutionary spirit.” He asserts that
the Commune was not a manifestation of revolutionary Marxism, as its contemporary
detractors alleged, but “a typical French movement, nourished on republicanism,
revolutionism, and anticlericalism.”37 Furthermore, according to Michelle Perrot, “the
various socialist ‘schools’ tempted the working class very little” as late as 1893.38
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Effective voter appeals that had garnered support among laborers under the Empire
continued to bolster the working class’ preference for Radical republicanism and
reformist agendas.
By the 1870s, such messaging was reaching a larger and more diverse (i.e., not
simply urban) audience because of greater access to print media and climbing literacy
rates. According to A.R. Gillis, “rates of illiteracy decreased from over 40% in the middle
of the nineteenth century to just below 3% at the beginning of World War I. Males
displayed higher rates of literacy throughout this period, but the gender gap was all but
eliminated by 1914.”39 Between 1871 and 1879, the audience for the French political
press doubled due to such factors.40 Jeremy D. Popkin and Jonathan Sperber have
asserted that the French media began reaching out to the laboring class long before this;
as early as 1848, “workers’ journalism was already a well-established and increasingly
intellectual genre before the outbreak of [this media] revolution, a reflection of the more
liberal press laws of the July Monarchy and the…political experience of the lower
classes.”41 Those who remained illiterate during the early Third Republic still had access
to newspapers via other routes that they had employed throughout the nineteenth century.
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They could listen to a literate friend, family member, or colleague read the paper, or they
could visit cafés that subscribed to newspapers based on the political proclivities of their
proprietors and customers. Patrons of these establishments would read articles aloud, and
the resulting debates inspired Balzac to coin the term “parliaments of the people” in
1844. In addition, political caricature remained a prominent tool for disseminating
political opinions and influencing the choices of illiterate voters.
The republicans proved the most adept at using print media for mass messaging,
primarily for a bourgeois and petit-bourgeois audience. As Philip Nord observes, in “the
business of publishing and distributing texts, republicans outpaced all rivals…the
circulation of the political press in Paris expanded from 470,000 to 640,000 in the 1870–
1880 period, and republican newspapers…outsold the conservative competition by a ratio
of three to one.”42 In the absence of organized, well-funded, and united political parties,
most of the leading politicians owned, operated, or had reliably close ties to one or more
of the major press organs.43 Partisan reporting in the French press is therefore a major
point of analysis in this dissertation. Such opinionated sources, however, require a
discerning eye and significant understanding of competing factional agendas. With these
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cautionary realities in mind, examining the media of the period reveals much about the
political propaganda and partisan messaging at work in the 1870s. This dissertation uses
the French press as part of a wide variety of sources that offer insight into the formative
political divisions of this decade, including memoirs, parliamentary debates, archival
documents, tourist guidebooks, and even political graffiti.
The pages that follow expose and analyze the complex origins of the Moderaterepublican regime and the Third Republic’s consequential longevity. This dissertation
shows how various political factions used their assessments of the Commune and their
versions of its legacies to influence voters and discredit their rivals. From their schisms,
triumphs, and defeats, France’s most enduring Republic took shape and the era of
revolutions in France began to fade into history.

1

INTRODUCTION
“Ah! How beautiful the Republic was under the Empire.” This comment, made
by the Radical republican journalist Edmond Durranc, stands in stark contrast to the bitter
disappointment that the early Third Republic brought to many of its proponents by falling
far short of the goals for which they had spent years—even lifetimes—fighting.44 The
Third Republic, which was founded in the midst of the Franco Prussian War and the
revolutionary Paris Commune of 1871, was under the control of monarchist politicians
for most of its first decade. While new nation-states were forming in Italy and Germany,
France was permanently establishing its republican system of governance. During the
1870s, French republicans wrestled with royalists to ensure the Republic’s survival and
prevent a restoration of the monarchy. Though united against royalists in times of crisis,
the republicans were deeply divided within their own group: the Moderates favored a
constitutional-liberal agenda, while the Radicals championed a social-democratic one.
These divisions, which surfaced during the First Revolution and escalated during the
Second Republic, played a critical role in the consolidation of France’s ironically durable
Third Republic in the wake of the Paris Commune’s demise. This dissertation
investigates how competing political groups leveraged their divergent assessments of the
Commune’s legacy to sway their constituents and undermine their opponents. In doing
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so, it shows that such maneuvers were vital to the Moderate republicans’ rise to power, as
well as the consequent solidification of their regime by the summer of 1880.
The Paris Commune and its defeat generated multiple legacies. These events were
remembered and interpreted differently by the short-lived administration’s supporters and
detractors. Manipulating the popular memory and interpretations of the Commune was a
highly useful tactic in the battle for control of the French government. This controversy
pervaded the civic landscape, echoing throughout the cultural projects and political
debates of the 1870s. The political antagonisms that decided the fate of the Republic were
intertwined with the popular perception of the Commune and its downfall. As the
Moderate and Radical republicans utilized these narratives to steadily expand their
electoral mandate, their rivals reacted in ways that led to such developments as the
repressive social and political measures of the regime of the Moral Order (in power from
1873 until 1879) and the reentry of the Socialist republicans into the electoral fray.
Politicians in and outside of power used the Commune’s legacies to characterize
themselves and to rebuke their opponents. Their interpretations of the event and its
repercussions were influential in the image-making and voter-outreach efforts of each of
the decade’s chief political players: the republicans, the monarchist supporters of the
Bourbon and Orleanist dynasties, and the Bonapartists. As this dissertation demonstrates,
these divergent analyses of the Commune also had a substantial impact on the competing
republican factions’ portrayals of their revolutionary heritage. These assessments were
key components of the post-1871 images of the Moderates, Radicals, and Socialists alike,
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and a significant point by which they differentiated themselves and solicited votes. The
Republic’s establishment of universal male suffrage meant that cultivating faithful
constituencies was integral to gaining political clout. By 1880, the Moderate republicans
had successfully wrested control of the government from their monarchist enemies, and
were jealously protecting their power from their Radical and Socialist colleagues. They
accomplished this by projecting an image of themselves as both the party of order and the
truest heirs to the Revolution. This dissertation reveals that such factors drove the
Moderate government’s consecration of some of the revolutionary era’s most indelible
symbolic and ritualistic touchstones between 1879 and 1880.
The Moderate republican regime’s designation of La Marseillaise as the national
anthem, its pronouncement of quatorze Juillet as the national holiday, and its
reinstatement of Paris as the seat of government were not simply the natural
consequences of the republicans’ rise to power. Rather, they were calculated responses to
the Radicals and Socialists, who based their own electoral bids on their competing claims
to the revolutionary heritage. Indeed, the Radicals and Socialists denigrated the
Moderates for being politicians who opportunistically invoked that heritage when they
were actually betraying it (in favor of a liberal regime based on the politics of exclusion).
The passage of the July 1880 amnesty of the Communards and the coinciding designation
of the revolutionary touchstones were undertaken by the summer of 1880 because of the
looming exigency of the general elections of 1881. The Moderates employed these
maneuvers to undercut the electoral appeal of the Radicals and Socialists and to convey a
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powerful message: the Third Republic, with the Moderates at the helm, was the truest
embodiment of the revolutionary era’s triumphant conclusion.

The underlying theme of this study is the relationship between electoral
supremacy and political legacy. Controversies regarding the legacies of the Paris
Commune permeated the developments that made the French nation a solid Republic.
The Moderate republicans rose to power through their successful leverage of this legacy
in their national electoral campaigns and their incorporation of revolutionary symbolism
and ritual into the mainstream political culture.

Between 1871 and 1879, the Moderate republicans cultivated a solid constituency.
A large measure of the faction’s influence stemmed from the manner in which it
presented itself. It claimed to be the party that would guarantee stability while
simultaneously celebrating its revolutionary past. Yet the Moderates were far from alone
in these assertions. The monarchists also declared themselves to be the party of order and
the Radicals and Socialists vied with the Moderates for ownership of the revolutionary
heritage. During the 1870s, each of the major political groups battled for control over the
Republic by using these claims, which were complicated by memories of the Commune,
to encourage the development of faithful constituencies. To secure voter allegiance, they
undertook competing cultural projects that were developed with electoral contests in
mind.
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Political ritual and symbolism were excellent tools for strengthening a party’s
voting base by promoting its leadership and agenda. They were also highly useful for
capitalizing on the legacies of the Paris Commune in order to garner constituent support
and criticize the intentions and goals of rival factions. Even in projects designed to erode
the memory of the Commune, such as rebuilding monuments that the insurgents had
destroyed, the motive remained the same: to control this contested terrain in order to
acquire or sustain political power.

The invocation of memories of the Commune pervaded rivalries on the cultural
level, as well as the political. The Moderate republicans’ success in cultivating national
electoral allegiance derived from their willingness to form temporary parliamentary
alliances and their adroit use of festivity and visual media. This enabled them to project a
modern image as a party that promised order while celebrating its revolutionary heritage
to a national audience. By correlating the political schisms that underpinned monument
constructions, festivals, and commemorations with the decade’s political debates in the
legislature and the press, this dissertation reveals how the foundation of the French
republican nation was substantially informed by the Commune’s legacies.

The 1870s are typically described as a calm and relatively stable decade for
France.45 The defeat of the Paris Commune is often cited in support of this assessment;
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many scholars and contemporaries point to an absence of revolutionary foment for at
least a generation following its collapse. However, the following chapters make clear that
the 1870s were far from tranquil. The downfall of the Commune did not silence
republican or revolutionary militants, nor did it cow the regime’s surviving proponents.
In France and abroad, the Communards and their supporters continued to rebuke their
Moderate republican adversaries and deny that the Republic’s triumph was a
manifestation of the revolutionary era’s success. Modern scholars of the early Republic
often overlook or downplay this aspect of the decade. Jean T. Joughin’s The Paris
Commune in French Politics, Philip Nord’s The Republican Moment: Struggles for
Democracy in Nineteenth-Century France, and James R. Lehning’s To Be a Citizen: The
Political Culture of the Early Third Republic are most representative of the works that
have influenced the findings of this dissertation.46
Jean T. Joughin’s two-volume series, which was published in 1955, explores the
Commune’s impact on French politics through an investigation of amnesty-politics
during the first decade of the Third Republic. This series is the closest antecedent of the
type of political analysis conducted in the chapters that follow, despite the passage of
many decades since its publication. This lengthy time gap indicates the persistent lack of
scholarly acknowledgment of the Commune’s political legacies beyond their import for
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Internationalist factions. Joughin convincingly describes the impact that the dispute
regarding amnesty for the Communards had on French election results during the
foundation decade, using records of parliamentary debates and the writings of the Leftwing press of the time to support her arguments. In doing so, she comes to the significant
assertion that controversies over amnesty triggered the reemergence of the revolutionary
Left in French electoral politics by 1878. Her contemporaries did not contest this
important observation—and, surprisingly, undertook no further investigation into the
renascence of the Socialists at a time much earlier than commonly believed by scholars of
the 1950s.47 The research for this dissertation corresponds with Joughin’s, but also carries
it further. Whereas Joughin limits her analysis to amnesty-related politics, this
investigation broadens the scope of inquiry to include factional politics and political
culture writ large during the 1870s.
In The Republican Moment: Struggles for Democracy in Nineteenth-Century
France, Nord examines the republican struggle to create a solid regime with strong
national allegiance. He analyzes the movement’s approach to culture, politics, and
ideology in a quest to explain how democratic institutions took root in France during the
1870s. To accomplish this, Nord tracks the slow march of republicanism on social,
political, and cultural levels. He investigates the “origins of France’s democratizing
elites,” their institutions (especially the Union Nationale du Commerce et de l’Industrie),
47

For examples, see Mayeur and Rebérioux, The Third Republic from its Origins, Op. cit., p. 75; Perrot, p.
156. An important exception to this general rule is found in the work of Michel Winock but he only alludes
to the renascence of the socialist movement in the late 1870s; see Winock, La Gauche au pouvoir, Op. cit.,
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and their ability to engender the allegiance of French voters. 48 Yet this seasoned
historian’s familiar top-down approach neglects the rich variety of the archival sources
that demonstrate important popular resistance to the republican elite. Nord rightly
contests the old trope that the Republic was a stagnant product of alliances—what
Stanley Hoffmann identified as a “republican synthesis” leading to a “stalemate society.”
In his conclusion, for instance, Nord asks: “If the regime was so rotten, why did its
institutions survive a full seventy years and its political myths and rituals even longer?”49
This dissertation illuminates that the Republic endured largely because of the way its
political leaders modified and promoted political myths and rituals. The competing
factions of the 1870s capitalized upon such propaganda and voter outreach methods for
political aggrandizement in schisms that were deeply enmeshed in the conservatives’
rebuke of the revolutionary past, including the Paris Commune. Also surfacing in these
realms were debates among Moderates, Radicals, and Socialists about the nature of the
Republic—once it was secured from the acute threat of restoration—and their rival
claims to the party’s revolutionary heritage. Nord’s investigation is typical of standard
historical accounts of the early Republic in the scant amount of significance he attributes
to the Commune’s legacies. Nord adroitly narrates the event and identifies its agendas,
but his silence in regards to the Commune’s political influence is characteristic of
historical studies that describe French politics during the 1870s.

48
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9

James R. Lehning’s To Be a Citizen: The Political Culture of the Early French
Third Republic examines the Moderate republicans’ attempts to foster a nonrevolutionary citizenry in the wake of the new extension of voting rights. Like Nord,
Lehning is mute on the topic of the political impact of the Commune’s legacies, except
with respect to the familiar acknowledgement of the debt owed to it by the revolutionary
Left. However, he does illuminate an important division that the consolidated Republic
faced: the antipathy between the new republican elite and the “Jacobin representation of
the people, the crowd.”50 Lehning locates this tension in the institutions of the time and,
significantly, in the realm of political culture, “which may be read in…elections and
universal manhood suffrage, newspapers, speeches, the state bureaucracy, and the streets,
workshops, and cafes of Paris, the provinces, and the colonies.” Within this framework,
Lehning chronicles the use of political culture by republican politicians to elicit
compliance from those marginalized by the existing concept of citizenship, as defined by
Lehning.
The research undertaken for this dissertation has culminated in a concurring
analytical framework. Significant sites of factional debates occurred beyond France’s
institutions and the walls of its government assemblies in the 1870s. However, this study
extends this approach by emphasizing the primacy of the Commune’s memories and
legacies within these tensions. These motifs influenced each major political skirmish and
nearly every cultural and civic enterprise throughout the decade, including events as
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diverse as the Crisis of 16 May, 1877, the Universal Exposition of 1878, and the first
celebration of quatorze juillet in 1880. Controversies over the political impact of the
Commune’s legacies buttressed each of these events, which were themselves submerged
in arguments over the heritage of the revolutionary era. These conflicts were instrumental
to generating electoral consent for a variety of factions spanning the political spectrum,
from the royalists to the Radical republicans.
Modern investigations into the Commune’s influence during the early Third
Republic frequently center on its cultural import. Even when trying to establish its
political impact, scholars ultimately become entangled in cultural frameworks. Colette E.
Wilson’s Paris and the Commune 1871—1878: The Politics of Forgetting illustrates this
problem well.51 Wilson constructs a binary analysis of politicians who wanted to forget
that the Commune ever took place versus the persistence of the Commune’s image in
literary and artistic productions of the 1870s. Her work is a unique contribution to
scholarship on the early Third Republic, particularly because of her analysis of concerted
governmental efforts to bury the Commune’s existence in reconstruction projects. Wilson
emphasizes the persistence of the event’s memory through an investigation of the literary,
artistic, and photographic projects of the decade. Yet this choice makes her title
misleading; Wilson is not concerned with the political repercussions of the Commune’s
legacies, but rather with their cultural significance. Moreover, her source base consists of
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the work of the artistic and educated elite and her analysis remains confined to familiar
cultural considerations, without explicating the equal influence of the Commune on
French political developments. This dissertation does concur with Wilson that the French
populace and their government could not—and, ultimately, chose not to—forget the
short-lived administration, but it goes beyond an examination of the Commune’s cultural
import. In doing so, it provides a more thorough understanding of the forces that ushered
in the Moderate republican government in 1879—the same forces that helped establish a
republican national allegiance that allowed the French government to safely navigate
through many of the turbulent episodes of the 1880s and 1890s. 52 The marginalization of
the 1870s extends to the cultural historiography of the Third Republic, as well. Maurice
Agulhon, Mathew Truesdell, and Sudhir Hazareesingh have contributed insightful and
path-breaking analyses of the political capital provided by cultural enterprises,
particularly in the use of festivals and statuary symbolism during the years between the
July Monarchy and the Second Empire, but also venturing into the Third Republic and
beyond.53 Similarly, in the past twenty years, Jacques Rougerie, Hollis Clayson, Gay
Gullickson, and Kristen Ross have imparted a clear understanding of the festivity
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surrounding the Commune, as well as its didactic use of culture, symbolism, and the
democratization of public spaces.54
During the 1870s, competing political actors orchestrated an abundance of
celebrations and monument construction (and reconstruction), all with their contemporary
rivalries in mind. This aspect of the decade is a driving focus of analysis for this
dissertation. These projects were chiefly a vehicle of political maneuvering by those
ensconced in power, who sought to encourage and sustain electoral allegiance in order to
continue their opposing agendas of subverting or saving the Republic. Yet they also
provided Radicals and Socialists with opportunities to contest the political status quo;
these groups endeavored to establish their own constituencies through a counter-political
culture that manifested itself mainly in the realm of what Patrick H. Hutton describes as
the commemoration-based cult of the revolutionary tradition.55 Thus, a cacophony of
political voices reached out to voters through campaign messaging, cultural projects, and
symbolism in visual media. Such efforts were so common that the term “statuomania”
emerged as a pejorative hurled by contemporaries to mock the politicized proliferation of
statue construction, particularly during the 1870s. The expression was coined by Pierre
Larousse, who pointed out that these monuments were erected in great haste, indicating
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that meeting completion deadlines set by electoral exigencies was the true goal, rather
than artistry.56
In La “statuomanie”et l’histoire, Maurice Agulhon concurs with Larousse’s
assessment and remarks that the statuomania that characterized the Third Republic was
more politically than ideologically oriented.57 Similarly, in analyzing the festive
celebrations during the early Third Republic, Charles Rearick has noted the presence of a
joyless revelry that often masked the sometimes depressive and unstable reality of the
“belle epoch” in terms of their organizers’ intentions and the popular reactions to them,
which changed over time.58 Because of such scholarship, the manner in which the Third
Republic’s political leaders used statues and festivals as cultural tools to perpetuate and
instill competing ideals and narratives is well understood. Yet, as Kristin Ross observed
in 1988, “[t]he 1870s in France is but hastily dealt with, if not skipped over entirely in
most standard, traditional histories of France.” Nearly a decade later, Olivier Ihl likewise
noted: “The period between the fall of Napoleon III and the election of Jules Grévy to the
presidency…ten years later, has little interested historians of fêtes.” These assessments of
the lack of scholarly inquiry into the Republic’s first decade remain accurate.59
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This perception is only now being remedied—and at a very slow pace.
Unfortunately, the silence on this issue has created a significant gap in our understanding
of the cultivation of electoral allegiances and the use of competing republican narratives
in France during the 1870s. Historians have overwhelmingly focused on the motivation
behind the statues, monuments, and celebrations employed for state aggrandizement in
the post-1880 period. Furthermore, these studies neglect the republican rivalries and the
revolutionary-Left’s disputes, which were embedded in their organizations and
constructions. In doing so, they overlook the fact that the use of such methods to cultivate
political allegiance, in terms of the emergence of the Republic and the regime’s
consequential longevity, was most decisive during the first decade of the Third Republic.
Exceptions to Ihl’s argument are found in the works of Albert Boime and Janice
Best. In Art and the Paris Commune: Imagining Paris After War and Revolution, Boime
asserts the primacy of the Commune’s influence on the cultural life of France by
analyzing Impressionist—and, in an epilogue, Post-Impressionist—painters. Drawing
upon these sources, he presents a convincing and ground-breaking (in its depth)
demonstration of the indelible influence of the Commune on Impressionist artists.60 His
overarching argument is that the Moderate-republican leanings of most of the
Impressionists led them to seize upon the reimaging of France that took place during
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1870s as a means of subverting the socially revolutionary character of the Commune, to
the benefit of their fellow bourgeois-Moderate republicans. Boime’s careful contrast
between Monet and Manet, for instance, unpacks the differences that existed among the
competing republican camps and makes a persuasive case against historians’ monolithic
characterization of republicanism during this period.
Janice Best displays greater interest in the political context operating within the
realm of visual media. In Les Monuments de Paris sous le troisième République:
contestation et commémoration du passé, Best focuses on the ideological rivalries
embedded in the Third Republic’s statuomania, specifically with respect to how these
monuments tie into the nation’s revolutionary past and the Commune’s legacies. 61 Her
analysis relies heavily on the debates of Paris’ municipal council, a Radical-dominated
body that was frequently at odds with the initially conservative and subsequently
Moderate-republican National Assembly. Examining that source base is itself an
important contribution, given the paucity of scholarly inquiry into it, as is her explanation
of the ability of statues to serve as sites of contention and counter-narrative rallying
points. This study similarly investigates monument construction, festive celebration, and
commemoration, each of which was underpinned by the legacies of the Commune. It then
correlates these undertakings with the electoral campaigns that both contributed and
showed resistance to the Moderate-republican faction’s rise to political power.
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This dissertation further illuminates how clashes over the Commune’s legacies
influenced the cultural projects and campaign techniques through which the Moderates
gained control of the Republic, the Radicals became a powerful representative minority,
and the Socialists recaptured their political position as an extra-parliamentary menace to
their mainstream republican rivals. In addition, this thesis pays close attention to the
interplay of culture and campaigns during the fluid period of the Republic’s foundation
(from before the 1875 constitution consolidated the Republic to the summer of 1880).
That summer, the Moderate Republic celebrated the newly designated national holiday
quatorze juillet for the first time in purposeful conjunction with the return of the
amnestied Communards. The following chapters investigate the most significant
decisions, events, and elections of these years from multiple analytical perspectives,
presenting them in a loosely chronological but clearly defined thematic order. This
dissertation is a comprehensive account of voter messaging in an era of mass politics in
which the media often foretold reality and political factions began to solidify into the
parties that would be formalized in later decades.
The pages to come will examine the establishment of the Moderate Republic
through the lens of the Paris Commune’s political legacies. The first three chapters focus
primarily on cultural developments and their political origins and consequences, tracking
them from the summer of 1871 through the summer of 1878. For most of this period, the
republicans held the minority of representational power but were steadily making inroads
during by-elections and the general election of 1876.
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Chapter One, The Haunting, shows how the Commune’s legacies emerged and
their immediate social and political significance, including the beginning of what would
become a decade-long campaign for amnesty for the Communards. The chapter’s
analysis relies on eye-witness accounts of the la semaine sanglante and police
surveillance records of Commune strongholds just after the regime’s defeat;
contemporary social-science interpretations of the Commune, along with their
applications to concurrent social and political agendas; and government debates on the
early amnesty proposals.
Chapter Two, Visions of the Past, examines the imaging of the Commune through
the pro- and anti-Commune photographs and historical narratives that flooded the
consumer market during and shortly after the event. These sources expose the early
perception among the competing political blocs of the usefulness of the Commune’s
legacies. For these factions, the photographs and histories presented both opportunities
for political gain and potential risks to their agendas.
The third chapter, The Emergence of a Mediacracy, focuses on political struggles
between republicans and conservatives, as well as internal conflicts among republicans,
which manifested themselves in various cultural initiatives. Such politicized enterprises
include statue and monument construction, as well as the Universal Exposition of 1878
and the coinciding celebration of the Republic on June 30th of that year. Each of these
media-centered projects occurred prior to and immediately following the republican
triumph. By examining a wide array of sources, such as the writings of the French press,
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parliamentary debates, and contemporary tourist guidebooks, this chapter clarifies how
the struggles that took place during the 1870s over the Republic’s fate and character were
enmeshed in diverse assessments of the revolutionary era and negotiated in a mediacentric battlefield.
Chapter Four, The Republican Triumph, is a transitional section that shifts the
dissertation’s focus from cultural and political events and messaging to electoral politics
par excellence. It concentrates on the Crisis of 16 May, 1877, from its origins to its
outcomes. This chapter asserts that the primary significance of the Crisis is the manner in
which the republicans defeated the monarchists in the October 1877 elections, which
were precipitated by the Moral Order government’s dissolution of the Chamber.
Conservative politicians ran a negative campaign during these elections, attributing
revolutionary ambitions—specifically, and the coming of the “next Commune” — to
their republican rivals. Conversely, the republicans organized a highly unified campaign,
led by the Moderates, in which they presented themselves as the protectors of order,
prosperity, and peace. Simultaneously, they portrayed the Republic as the manifestation
of the revolutionary era’s triumphant conclusion. As this chapter demonstrates, by 1877,
linking republican candidates to revolutionary militancy and violent social upheaval no
longer translated into electoral success for conservative candidates. The republicans’
campaign platforms highlighted their revolutionary heritage, but with an articulation that
lauded only those legacies of the era that were the least controversial: universal suffrage,
free press and assembly, and laicization. Chapter Four’s analysis incorporates such varied
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sources as parliamentary and editorial debates, political manifestos, and seditious graffiti.
These records validate the chapter’s assertion that the legacy of the revolutionary era—
especially memories of the Commune—played a critical role in the origins and outcome
of one of the most important and contentious elections in French history.
The final two chapters analyze the formative disputes among the Moderates,
Radicals, and Socialists that emerged during the Crisis of 16 May and escalated after the
Opportunist Republic was established in 1879. These schisms involved the nature of the
Third Republic and the extent to which it upheld the legacy of the revolutionary era.
While the antagonisms were familiar, they were more important than ever after 1879,
when the Moderate republican regime came to power. The rivalries among these groups
shaped the period’s electoral contests, commemorative politics, and vigorous
parliamentary and editorial debates, as well as the continuing battles over the public’s
perception of the Commune.
Chapter Five, Reigniting the Revolutionary Flame, reveals how the Crisis of 16
May spurred the reemergence of the Socialists in the arena of electoral politics. It then
analyzes the repercussions of the political wrangling among the Moderates, Radicals, and
Socialists between 1877 and 1880. Their contests manifested themselves in campaign
literature, press reports, the 1879 “Socialist Workers’ Congress,” and parliamentary
debates of the time. The chapter uses such sources to track the messaging and electoral
appeal of the Radicals and the Socialists during and after the establishment of the
Moderate Republic. These records illuminate the political capital that the factions were
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able to generate by invoking memories of the Commune, as well as the role that the
Radicals and Socialists played in the development of the Moderate Republic.
The tile of the final chapter, A Revolution Comes to Port, refers to François
Furet’s conclusion that “the revolution was coming in to port” when the republican
government moved from Versailles back to Paris. This chapter argues that the Moderate
Republic responded to the re-emergence of the Socialist factions as a representative
alternative to mainstream republicanism by using legislative and symbolic gestures—
such as this change in location—to strengthen its claims to France’s revolutionary
heritage. In addition, it demonstrates that the regime’s leaders undercut the growing
appeal of the Radicals and the Socialists by solidifying their image as the party of order
and prosperity, and by merging these qualities with a less threatening iteration of the farLeft’s interpretations of the Commune and its revolutionary legacy. This strategy, which
combined the political interests of very different groups, helped the Moderates rise to
power by 1879 and the strengthening of their position before the next general elections in
1881. As this chapter reveals, the positions of Radicals and the Socialists thereby
influenced the image and legislative priorities of the Moderate regime that they opposed.
These cultural and political battles shaped not only the development of the French
republican nation-state, but also its most indelible legislative and symbolic touchstones.
Taken together, these chapters offer a thorough historical analysis of the
formative political and cultural developments within France during the decade that gave
rise to its longest-lasting Republic. In order to merge the examination of these
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developments with a cohesive investigation into the political impact of the Commune’s
legacies, this dissertation relies upon a mostly qualitative and interdisciplinary
assessment of sources not normally considered germane to analyses of the Crisis of 16
May or the triumph of the Moderate Republic. Such sources—including police
surveillance records, contemporary social-science journals, Beadecker Travel Guides,
and the voter messaging that took place during parliamentary debates and national
festivals—provide invaluable insight into the widespread political impact of the
Commune’s legacies and its influence on the Moderate republicans’ rise to power
between 1871 and 1880. As this dissertation reveals, this period was no peaceful
decade—no calm repose between revolutionary outbursts and sensational scandals. The
ghost of the Commune pervaded the political maneuverings and republican images of this
decade. Its legacies informed dramatic disputes over both the Republic’s revolutionary
heritage and the nation’s future, and kept alive the accomplishments of an era that the
mainstream political factions, the monarchist camps, and the parliamentary Radicals alike
were eager to put behind them.
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CHAPTER 1: THE HAUNTING
The Paris Commune of 1871 was one of France’s most traumatic experiences.
The popular uprising made the phantom of working-class rebellion a nightmare reality for
the majority of conservative, moderate, and rural populations and exposed some of the
nation’s deep social and political divisions. The memory of the Commune and its
incredibly brutal defeat during the last week of May 1871 haunted French society and
politics for decades. Key among the divisions it exposed were the geographic and social
isolation of the working-class population of Paris and the political rivalry between
Moderate, Radical, and Socialist republicans, which had become acute during the last
years of the Second Empire and in the first months of the Republic’s existence. The
Commune’s utter destruction was deemed necessary by the vast majority of French
political leaders and citizens, some of whom seemed to relish the opportunity to suppress
the political machinations of the French working class—a group that many blamed for
instigating and leading the Commune’s social-revolutionary initiatives. At the same time,
the recent establishment of universal male suffrage forced politicians to carefully
consider the political predilections of the working-class vis-à-vis the Commune’s legacies
and the nearly decade-long campaign to amnesty its insurgents.
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In 1866, the working class comprised 70 percent of Paris’ nearly 2 million
inhabitants, but it was by no means an organized and politicized proletariat.62 Rather, this
group encompassed an economically and socially heterogeneous population. While the
majority of its members were manual laborers who worked in both the traditional craft
industries and the new factories, the class included minor clerks, café waiters, and
shoemakers. Nearly all of them lived precariously close to destitution despite an overall
rise in quality of living from that of the 1830s and 40s.63 During the last years of the
Empire, the bookbinder Eugène Varlin toiled determinedly to organize French workers
into a labor movement under the auspices of the International Working Man’s
Association, founded in 1864. However, on the eve of the Commune’s establishment, the
organization remained fairly small and its rank-and-file members were primarily
interested in economic reform, rather than political militancy. Most of them were far
from revolutionary and consistently voted for republican-opposition deputies in each
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election of the Empire and in the National Assembly elections in February 1871, despite
the existence and active campaign of the Revolutionary Socialist party.64
The Commune’s origins, as described in the preface to this dissertation, lie well
beyond working-class economic or political emancipation.65 This revolt was the product
of frustrated patriotism and a nearly city-wide mistrust in the new monarchist majority of
the National Government. The war-time administration’s dubious defense efforts,
combined with the National Assembly’s draconian economic decrees following the peace
with Prussia and its obvious antagonism toward an armed working class, instigated the
revolutionary action of the Parisians and the popular National Guard regiments. 66 This
same antipathy toward and distrust of the monarchists engendered a sense of
complacency about—and, therefore, complicity in—the insurrection among Paris’ petitbourgeois, who chose not to rise in defense of the National Government on March 18th.
Once the revolt commenced, every conservative, rural, and middle-class (i.e., Moderate)
republican nightmare of working-class empowerment seemed to come alive in the
64
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Commune’s social legislation, anti-clerical violence, and popular festivity—a
phantasmagoric frenzy right in Paris’ reconquered center.67

From Jules Raudnitz’s series: Le Sabbat rouge, 1871.68

The stereograph above illustrates the type of fantasies that the period’s conservative and
moderate leaders had about the Commune. The demon-like figures on the left are
liberally pouring and consuming alcohol and the female monsters appear to be immodest,
crazed, and in the vanguard of the revolutionary carousing. Each of these beasts
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68
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embodies the dominant fears that seemed to come to life during the Commune, such as
working-class alcoholism, the invasion of women into the public sphere, and overt class
antagonism.
As a result of these anxieties, suppressing the Commune was deemed a military,
political, and symbolic necessity, not only for the monarchist majority in the new
National Assembly, but also for the Moderate republican minority, who looked to the
rural population—ever hostile to rebellious Paris—as a vital constituency needed to
secure the Republic’s survival. It is imperative to consider this context when trying to
comprehend why the Commune was so brutally subdued and why this veritable purging
of a significant segment of the Parisian population continued long after the la semaine
sanglante.
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The Commune was defeated during the last week of May 1871. Over the five
years following its fall, Communards continued to be arrested, court-martialed, exiled,
and even executed. The first motion for granting them amnesty was proposed as early as
September 1871 by a Radical republican deputy of the National Assembly, which
launched a nearly decade-long campaign for the official pardon of the revolutionaries.
The unending prosecution of the Communards and the perennial battle over their amnesty
ensured that the Commune’s presence remained at the forefront of French politics
throughout the 1870s. Court-martials continued beyond the middle of the decade, and
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those sentenced to exile were deported to Algeria and the penal colony of New
Caledonia. Accounts of arrests, prosecutions, executions, and occasional escapes of
Communards were widely published in French and International newspapers and were of
great concern to French citizens of all political orientations. The ongoing retribution and
its media coverage kept the specter of the Commune and its violent demise alive; even
those who advocated sweeping the episode into history and moving forward were unable
to escape its haunting presence. By 1876, “the penitentiary system in France contained
1600 persons condemned for participation in the Commune, and the number of transports
[to New Caledonia] rose to about 4400.”70 Communards were tried and convicted, even
in absentia, as late as June 1876, when President MacMahon finally ended the practice in
a letter to his Minister of War: “Henceforth, no more prosecutions are to take place unless
commanded by the unanimous sentiment of honest people.”71 His declaration reflects the
political and social tensions that these events had engendered and hints at the negative
effect that the trials and deportations had begun to have on the stability of MacMahon’s
ultra-conservative regime of the Moral Order.
This chapter analyzes the establishment of the controversy over the Commune’s
legacies as a lingering motif during the first half of the 1870s and asserts that they had a
substantial impact on the formation of social and political propaganda, initiatives, and
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image-making for republicans and conservatives alike. The first section focuses on
identifying the Commune’s utter destruction as a driving force behind the endurance of
the event’s legacies. This section presents first-person accounts of Paris during and
shortly after the suppression, along with police surveillance records of working-class
activity in the wake of the Commune. These sources demonstrate that the Parisian
proletariat viscerally experienced the Commune’s suppression, which cemented its
memory in their minds. The defeat politically stupefied but did not subjugate them. After
1871, the areas of Paris that sustained the greatest antipathy toward the conservative
Government and its police agents were the same regions where the Commune had
enjoyed the most support: the working-class districts of Montmartre and Belleville.
The second section analyzes the efforts—and their political implications—of
many of the doctors and social scientists of this time to pathologize the social and
political behavior of the French laboring class. As this section reveals, the post-Commune
foray into diagnosing the revolt and its partisans recast the image of its suppression as the
excising of a deadly social and political malady in order to heal the sick nation. Such
analyses abounded in the nation’s medical, social, and psychological journals and
illustrate an important aspect of the penetration of the Commune legacies into French life
and society. For example, the literary efforts of Emile Zola were deeply influenced not
only by the events of the Commune and its suppression, but also by contemporary
theories regarding working-class idleness, corruption, and barbarity and the dangerous
potential of the unruly masses. As the reports and recollections of contemporary
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witnesses indicate, the prolonged hunt, prosecution, and punishment of the insurgents
began to generate popular sympathy for the Communards. Conservatives justified the
brutality of the Commune’s suppression by portraying the event as the work of alcoholics
and social malcontents, thereby discouraging serious consideration of the grievances the
Communards had expressed in the spring of 1871.
The final section of this chapter begins to address the emerging political tactic of
invoking the Commune’s legacies, which serves as a driving analytical concern for each
of the chapters that follow. The monarchists and Radical republicans quickly grasped the
potential for political gain in endorsing or denouncing amnesty for the Communards,
while the Moderate republicans consistently avoided entanglement in the controversy.
The Monarchists refused to support an amnesty because it would imply forgiveness for
insurgents on whose firm rebuke they were staking a significant portion of their political
legitimacy. Furthermore, they earnestly feared that the pardoned Communards would
promptly enter the political fray as fomenters of revolutionary vengeance. For the
Radicals, amnesty became a defining priority due to their personal and professional ties
to members of the Commune and their constituents’ growing support for the cause. This
section is largely informed by National Assembly and Chamber of Deputy debates on
amnesty proposals, along with the biographies and memoirs of republican political
leaders who supported amnesty, such as Georges Clémenceau and Victor Hugo. These
sources illuminate the immediate politicization of the specter of the Commune and
Communard-amnesty proposals and rejections. This section introduces these motifs as
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powerful political weapons that the competing factions of the 1870s employed in the
battle over the Republic’s survival against the threat of restoration and—should it
survive—the creation of a liberal versus social-democratic Republic. Taken together, the
sections of this chapter reveal that the legacies of the Commune were visceral
touchstones for French political and social influences and agendas, an integral component
of the Republic’s foundation, and a tool by which political leaders engaged in mass
messaging and national aggrandizement during the unstable beginnings of France’s third
attempt at republican governance.

The Hunt: The Social and Political Reality of the Commune’s Suppression
The last week of the Commune was labeled by contemporaries as la semaine
sanglante, which indicates that they registered the death toll of the Commune’s
suppression as particularly high.72 As described by Edmond de Goncourt a contemporary,
though no friend to the Commune, the “bloodletting was a bleeding white; such a purge,
by killing off the combative part of the population defers the next revolution by a
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generation.”73 This statement exposes the alarming degree to which the Commune was
defeated and the political and symbolic capital that such suppression could portend. The
street-to-street combat that characterized the final stand of the Communards, and the utter
brutality that the French troops led by Marshal MacMahon delivered unto the
Communards and even non-Communard citizens of Paris left an indelible mark on the
city. Those who bore witness were not likely to forget the ghastly images of dead bodies
and burning buildings that became everyday parts of the city’s landscape during and
immediately after the Commune’s demise. Witnesses of the events have furnished
evocative descriptions such as the following by Reverend Gibson:
We have seen from St. Denis this day a sight which we shall never
forget…If we had not during the last sad few weeks seen how little
comparative damage had been done by what has appeared to be a
tremendous conflagration, we should have thought that all Paris was on
fire…We distinctly saw a terrible fire at La Chapelle and Montmartre,
which seemed to be either at La Villette or in the interior of the city in the
direction of the Tuileries and the Hôtel de Ville, a smouldering [sic] fire
on the right of Montmartre, apparently in the direction of Vaugirard. The
heavy roll of cannon broke on our ear as we looked on the frightful sight.74

Long after la semaine sanglante, contemporaries sited the destruction of some of Paris
most important and famed buildings and monuments by the Communards as proof that
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the event’s leaders were a menace to not only contemporary France but also obliterators
of the nation’s history. As these evocations make clear, witnesses were sickened by of
what they saw; it was gruesomeness itself that bore a legacy. In the acute period of the
Commune’s defeat, however, the repression bolstered the anti-Commune sentiments held
by the majority of France.
Beyond the sight and sound of cannon blasts and the heat of the fires felt
throughout the city, far more gruesome, yet seemingly necessary sights and smells
became all too commonplace:
The ground is strewn with dead bodies. The frightful spectacle will serve
as a lesson, it is to be hoped, to the foolish people who dared to declare
themselves partisans of the Commune…75

This passage reveals an underlying consideration held by royalist and conservative
republican politicians, such as the future Prime Minister, Albert duc de Broglie and the
current President, Adolphe Thiers, that the Commune’s ruthless defeat was a necessary
object lesson to deter any future revolutionaries. Yet even after the Versailles troops had
successfully taken the city, the spectacle of vanquishing the Commune continued:
Whiffs of earthly odours of decomposition meet you here and there,
especially near the quondam barricades, and a strong oily smell, which
they say is not unhealthy, but certainly is sickening…The weather,
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fortunately, may I not say providentially, is cool…; otherwise we might
expect pestilence.76

Indeed, nearly a month after the Commune’s defeat, Gibson writes:
As I passed the Pont de la Concorde on Monday morning last, I saw
grave-diggers exhuming bodies from the quays, and two large vans in
waiting to receive the putrid deposit and transport it to one of the
cemeteries. It is sad indeed to see occasionally a poor fellow marched off
between soldiers, for search is still being made in the houses for hidden
insurgents… On Monday morning in the Rue St. Honoré I saw, conducted
by a soldier, a walking figure above whose shoulders there was nothing of
the ‘human face divine,’ but a mass of bruised and swollen flesh covered
with blood. My blood ran cold as I passed.77

The prevailing opinion among Parisians and provincial populations was that such
suppressive severity was necessary; there was no registered outrage by the population atlarge publicly or privately. Moreover, individuals from the “respectable classes” took the
opportunity to vocalize their anger and fear behind the safety of the Versailles troops
many times during the early summer of 1871. Dumas fils’ description of a Versailles
crowd’s reaction to witnessing the transport of Communard prisoners in June of 1871
attests to this:
An instinctive crowd, ignorant, cowardly and cruel, hurled itself on the
line of the prisoners, insulting both men and women, some guilty, some
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innocent, all stupid and haggard, and trembling equally from the added
hate of their soldier escorts.78

It is well-documented that in the immediate aftermath of the Paris Commune,
anti-Commune partisans of the Versailles Government were quenching a thirst for
revenge against the violence of the Communards and their perceived gall in attempting to
displace the social, political, and economic status quo.79 However, as the carnage
mounted, all sides began to turn against the violence.
This transformation was poignantly recorded by the London Times, a newspaper
not noted for a pro-Commune stance:
The burning of Paris was diabolical; the shooting of hostages “a deed
without a name.” But it seems as if we were destined to forget the work of
these maddened savages in the spectacle of the vengeance wreaked upon
them. The wholesale executions inflicted by the Versailles soldiery the
triumph, the glee, [and] the ribaldry of the “Party of Order,” sickens the
soul.80
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Indeed, the spectacle-like image of defeating the Communards is acknowledged by
contemporaries and later scholars of the time period and topic. The cremation of fallen
insurgents occurred most often at Buttes Chaumont and the executions at the Bois de
Boulogne. Both of these parks are within the city boundaries of Paris which made the
smell of petroleum and burning flesh along with the startling shots of firing squads a
persistent reminder of the city’s recent calamities and continuing retribution. Eventually,
as the gruesomeness began to turn the stomachs of even the most ardent antiCommunards, the executions and cremations were conducted out of view; leading
circulation at the Bois de Boulogne, for example, to be tightly regulated: “one is
forbidden to enter there, unless accompanied by a platoon of soldiers, and still more
forbidden to come out again.”81
As the year progressed, those arrested were transported to their hearing and
sentencing in the early hours of the morning, in order to avoid any possible unrest. The
executions that took place after 1871 were strictly removed from public view. In
September 1872, the Times described the following procedure for executions:
As usual in such cases, the time fixed for their execution was not made
known to them till the very morning of the event had arrived… Just before
the word was given to the troops to fire, Deschamps, in a clear ringing
voice, shouted out twice, ‘Vivre la République démocratique et sociale—à
bas les traitres!’ Denivelle cried ‘Vivre la Commune!’… It was five
minutes past six when the troops began marching past with bands playing.
Although the morning was exceptionally fine, there were but a few
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spectators of the strange scene, the police rigorously refusing civilians
access to the ground.82

The police kept close surveillance of the transportations and noted any related
demonstrations or disturbances, but more often than not their fears of crowd disturbances
proved unfounded. For example, at five in the morning on the day after the first
anniversary of the proclamation of the Commune, the police documented a convoy of 58
Communards transferred by mounted Infantry guards from Saint-Lazare train station to
their hearings; the officer reporting on the transport dutifully noted that their arrival and
transport was without incident.83 Such an account, even on the anniversary, is typical.
Perhaps this was due to the timing of their transport, the heavy guard of the prisoners, and
the equally strong police presence. However, the most consistent image that these reports
provide is one of a population, at least in the early 1870s, that had not rebounded from
the Commune’s repression.
The workers of Paris that survived the Commune and its suppression are an
elusive population to study for the years just after the Commune. Publically pronouncing
on behalf of the Commune and against the Government at Versailles risked prosecution

82

From a clip of newspaper found in Archives Nationales: 14AS, 99bis: Blanqui File: News Clippings. The
name of the newspaper unknown, article titled “Execution of Communists” Paris, Sept 18. The event can be
cross-referenced in Lissagaray, p. 438.
83
Archives de la Préfecture de Police (hereafter, APP), Ba 373 Amnesty. “Arrivée de fédérés à la Gare St.
Lazare,” 8eme Arrondissement, M. Leclerc, Officier de Paix, 19 Mars 1872. This file contains numerous
reports on Communard arrests, Court Martial transportations, and forced-exile departures. Without
exception, each report takes care to note that these transports were without incident even when large
crowds had gathered to witness them.

38

and even death. As a result, their opinions can be located in contemporary, and most
often anti-Commune observers, and an unpacking of police surveillance records which
themselves require double scrutiny: first because the agent would want to project an
image of control over his terrain and thereby risked downplaying indications of popular
discontent and second because they too were hostile to the Commune a fact that
frequently creeps up in their reports.84 The image that these sources reveal is one of
chaos, disillusion, and social isolation.
What was left of the revolutionary political circles, those who had not been in
Paris during the Commune or had avoided capture, had effectively been deprived of their
leadership.85 Moreover, the people who might have taken part in calls for vengeance or
renewed action, namely in the districts of Belleville and Montmartre, appear subdued to
the point of political stupor. Edmond de Goncourt foreshadowed this protracted reality in
Paris Under Siege, 1870—1871 in which he describes his visit to the Communard
stronghold of Belleville just days after la semaine sanglante. He recalls “people drinking
in cabarets with faces of ugly silence [and] the appearance of a vanquished but
unsubjugated district.”86 Several years later, this assessment remained current. The
descriptions provided by police spies listening in on conversations amongst the working
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class and supposedly pro-Commune districts of Paris illicit an image of a population that
had been restrained. For example, in August of 1873, following up on reports of
government denunciations overheard in the laundry houses of Paris, a police spy reported
the following assessment of the wives of Communard deportees:
All of the laundry houses of Paris were visited. The owners and their
employees were not aware of the reported remarks. They assure [us] that
not more since the 24th of May than before, the wives of the convicted
political prisoners don’t draw attention to themselves. That does not mean
that some sharp words were not said. They do their work quietly and do
not appear to count on a future amnesty.87

These descriptions, especially considering that they involve persons deeply affected by
the arrests and trials, are a far cry from the wild women of the Commune described
during and after its suppression, a description that nonetheless persisted in the press,
political debates, and conservative historical analyses, as the decade progressed.
This is not to say that resistance to the quasi-Republican regime had vanished
completely.88 Many people who had managed to escape the sweep of condemnations
continued to express support for the Communards and hostility toward the severe
repression meted out by the government still operating from Versailles. Their sentiments
were recorded by French police agents who tracked their operations in London, Brussels,
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and Geneva, in the newspapers they founded from abroad, and many of them, including
Alphonse Lissagaray as early as the fall of 1871, published their stories from exile.89 In
Paris, during the last six months of 1871 insults to public authority reached the secondhighest level ever recorded by the police. Two years after the defeat “approximately 20
percent of these epithets were similar to…the following explicit remembrance: ‘Do not
be so proud! We know you have fled before the Prussians; you are cowards, because if
you have conquered Paris, it’s because you were thirty to one.’”90
The retention of hostility over the Commune’s bloody suppression and defiant
expressions of support for its supposed martyrs were found all over the city walls in the
form of graffiti and seditious placards. These writings increased in frequency (at least in
terms of their discovery) when the anniversary of the Commune’s proclamation
approached. Such messages defended and celebrated the Commune and some, like the
one below, insolently expressed support for the International, especially after the law that
proscribed French membership, and a social-democratic Republic:
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“It is not enough to have betrayed and murdered the people: one year later the royalist Assembly still wants
to prevent the union of anger and hate by the specter of the threat [of the Commune]. To the law on the
International, [we] respond by the formation of secret societies, and be sure that with continued efforts, we
will achieve our goal, the great Social Revolution”

Similarly, it was frequent to find “Vive la Commune” scribbled on city walls in red
pencil; laments such as: “Vive la Commune. Honneur aux bons Ferré, Rossel, Crémieux
& Dombrowski, qui sont morts pour la Commune;” or more violent diatribes: “Mort aux
gendarme ! mort aux gardiens de la Paix ! et aux traites en aux Versailles ! et à Thiers !
Vive la Commune ! et l’Internationale ! et le Comité Central! et la République Rouge!”91
Upon their discovery, police agents quickly removed or covered them up, but their
reappearance throughout the decade indicates a sustained hostility against the
Commune’s suppression and an unrelenting allegiance to the causes and movements
ascribed to it. Furthermore, the very act of writing such diatribes exposes a willingness to
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express hostility and seditious political opinions even if carried out anonymously and
surreptitiously:
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These documents reveal at least a nucleus of a population that, while stunned and cowed
remained present and un-subjugated. Such messaging sustains the assertion that for
everyone who had borne witness to the tragic event and survived its defeat, the ongoing
court-martials stoked embers of mourning and the flames of hostility.
For supporters of President MacMahon’s Moral Order government, in power from
May 1873 until January 1879, such sedition and the on-going arrests and transports
helped to sustain a visceral antipathy towards the apparently unrepentant Communards.93
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This perspective was an integral aspect of a growing bourgeois-anxiety about the
insubordinate lower classes, all of whom were likened to the Communards and more
generally the monolithically-described “crowd”, and their potential for menacing the
order imposed by the Versailles Government in May of 1871. In this light, it becomes
clear that the Court Martials were a powerful tool used to maintain the conservative and
especially rural fear of insurrectionary Paris, a sub-population that apparently required
MacMahon’s diligence to eradicate, something so pervasive that it took five years of
hunting to root out.

Pathologizing Political Behavior: Crowd Fear and Mass Politics
While the fate of the Communards was being discussed within the political and
judicial arenas, their vanquished uprising became part of a wider obsession regarding
social ailments and a pervasive bourgeois-fear of the working classes which was
increasingly becoming an independent political identity and a solid constituent base for
the Radical republican faction. The experience of defeat in the Franco-Prussian War and
the intrepidness displayed during the Paris Commune, “turned the frustrations of liberal
supporters of the ‘juste milieu’ to outright pessimism, and encouraged their continued
evolution toward the right wing of the political spectrum.”94 Social science theories of the
irrationality of collective behavior and national degeneration, which were frequently
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ascribed to unruly women, alcoholism and diseases (physical and mental) of the poor,
flooded the reading market, testifying to the fact that France was eager to make sense of
the nation’s recent calamities.95 Fortified by their professional credentials, French
physicians, psychologists, and social scientists, including, Hippolyte Taine, ascribed
France’s cyclical revolutionary turns to the alcohol-fueled degeneration of its working
classes:
Now one can understand the bestial and savage faces of the workers in the
uprising, the thefts, the massacres, and the arsons; the insanity, imbecility
and idiocy which affected such large numbers of them; their vicious
instincts, their lack of morality…in short, it is not surprising to see that
each new revolution brings an increase of atrocities and degeneration.96

The sense of national degeneration was not a new phenomenon after 1871 nor was it
unique to France. However, “it took national defeat by Prussia and the Paris Commune to
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seal the importance of the word [degeneration] in historiography, social diagnosis, [and]
cultural critique.”97
In the first three years after the Commune, “Doctors Lunier, Bouchereau,
Magnan, and Laborde published accounts in the important medical journal Annales
medico-psychologiques purporting to prove the pathology of the Commune.”98 The
standard characterization of the Communard that emerged from these reports and readily
affirmed by the majority of conservative France projected an image of an irrational
dipsomaniac, not a disciplined political agitator.99 Thereby alcoholism could be equated
with revolution and the continued prosecution of the Communards could be assimilated
to medical notions of cure by extraction. As a result, former Communards and social
degenerates were cast as the product of a social sickness which doctors and social
scientists became determined to investigate and root out.
As Inspector-General of France’s prisons and insane asylums and a founding
member of France’s Temperance Society, Dr. Lunier took care to observe and document
ex-Communard asylum patients and provided “detailed family trees of the debauched
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ancestry of armed children seized at the end of the uprising.”100 By perpetuating this
image, “any painful discussion of social, economic, or political origins of the Commune
could be dismissed and the “Communards vision of social justice,” could be cast aside as
“the wild hallucination of a dipsomaniac [or degenerate]… On a conscious and
unconscious level, the new myth of the proletarian drunkard provided comforting
resolutions to the anxieties of the men of order.”101 This characterization, coupled with a
generalized fear of “the crowd” meant that after the Commune, anxieties proliferated
about public ceremonies in which the lower classes might be part of, or worse constitute,
the crowd of spectators and participants.
The government took care to designate a military and police presence for all
public events to prevent or intervene in any possible political unrest that they feared the
moment might give rise to. The occasion of Adolphe Thiers’ funeral in 1877, for
example, seemed to warrant a police and military presence of more than three thousand
armed men. During and after such events, the police and press, regardless of political
affiliation, were always certain to take note of the behavior of the masses. Le Siècle
correctly foreshadowed the mood: “All of Paris will be in the adjacent streets calm and
respectful determined to repress whoever, by hatred of the Republic, would dare to cause
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disorder.”102 The journalist was correct. There were no disruptions caused by monarchist
or extreme-Left enemies of the Republic, and the few workers that showed animosity,
simply by refusing to remove their caps, were quickly admonished by the crowd itself. 103
On each public occasion throughout the 1870s, the crowd was commended for its
comportment.104
Despite the composure of spectators during such events, social scientists,
psychologists and physicians continued to highlight their potential for violence. The
notion that violent social unrest was a pathological condition was widely published about
and pontificated. Gustave le Bon, the most widely-read propagator of such treatises,
specifically determined to use these theories as a didactic tool for politicians grappling
with the new rules of mass politics.105 First published in 1895, Psychologie des foules
represents a culmination of the previous decades’ obsessions. Rather than being a
forerunner of this area of social science, Le Bon’s contribution should be understood
through his agenda to merge science with democratic politics. A considerable portion of
his book deals specifically with the irrationality of crowds and their propensity toward
violence. He echoes the work of his peers while specifically seeking to address
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contemporary politicians. Le Bon writes: “knowledge of the psychology of crowds is
today the last resource of the statesman who wishes not to govern them…, but at any rate
not to be governed by them.”106 He also gives the statesmen concrete instruction on how
to take control of the crowd for their own purposes: “when it is wanted to stir up the
crowd for a short space of time, to induce it to commit to an act of any nature…, the
crowd must be acted upon by rapid suggestion.” the leader should provide concise
messages, “the more destitute of every appearance of proof and demonstration, the more
weight it carries.”107 Le Bon’s suggestion is thus to use rhetoric and immediacy in order
to direct the crowd. These ideas were already in practice throughout the 1870s and 1880s
and can be identified in the political messaging of politicians across the spectrum.
The Presidency of Adolphe Thiers and especially that of his successor MacMahon
gave political expression to the pathology of revolutionary political behavior and the
unrelenting fear of the lower classes among the upper and middle classes. Their
presidencies were marked by a successful invasion into the private sphere of the working
classes in efforts to control the new political landscape of mass politics in the postCommune era. An example of the institutionalization of such invasions is the “loi
Rousell” of 1874. Ostensibly aimed at protecting French youth, it “extended
governmental surveillance to include the everyday activities of France’s ordinary
people… aimed at a kind of total control over individual and collective behavior which
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might have been unthinkable before the Commune.”108 The law was first introduced by
Dr. Théophile Roussell and established surveillance of wet nurses by local committees
and medical inspectors. The legislation provided a new means of monitoring the private
lives of the working classes and should be viewed in light of France’s loss of the FrancoPrussian War and the pervasive sense of national degeneration, in the wake of the War
and the Commune. During the early 1870s, the government relied heavily on the Imperial
decree of 1851 that placed all drinking establishments under the direct control and
supervision of the prefects of police giving them the right to immediately shut down any
establishment suspected of political orientation or engagement. The 1870s also witnessed
the passage of the first law against public drunkenness and in the debates that preceded
the law, the Commune figured prominently.109
A number of temperance societies were founded which sent missionaries into the
working-class districts of Paris to advocate against drinking and in favor of conforming
to the social norms of the Moral Order. While there were some figures that sought to look
beyond the simplistic explanation of alcoholism as the cause of the social unrest
demonstrated during the Commune, the majority of Parisians and French broadly adhered
to the curtailment of freedoms and supported the conservative social turn, specifically in
light of the Commune.
Contemporary writers, psychologists, social scientists, and conservative
politicians in this period tended to view the Communards as an irrational crowd eager to
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express violent and unfounded hostility. For example, there is a strong analytical
proximity between, Taine’s account of the Revolution which he chose to analyze only
after the experience of the Commune, and contemporary social science theories of crowd
behavior, working-class alcoholism and violent women.110 Only a small minority chose
to show a more nuanced view of the Parisian working class.
Emile Zola wrote L’Assomoire in 1876, which solidified his place in France’s
literary community. He chose to write this story after becoming radicalized by the politics
and social mores of the Moral Order.111 Zola’s intention was to expose the nuanced
reality of working-class lives as dependent upon heredity and milieu. This was at a time
when the ultra-conservative Moral Order regime consistently raised the specter of the
Commune and assimilated it to the supposed bestial ravings of an unfortunately
enfranchised population in an effort to thwart the republicans’ electoral advance.
Conversely, according to Zola, whose political sympathies were solidly republican and
increasingly Radical, the Commune was “a futile, hopelessly idealistic rebellion of those
who had ‘real’ and ‘serious’ grievances.”112 This view assimilated neatly with the
republican assessment, especially the Radicals’. However, Zola’s tragically realist
depiction of the rise of the anti-heroine, Gervaise Macquart, and her fatal descent into the
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abyss of alcoholism projected a sense of inevitable debauchery associated with poverty.
This included alcoholism and general waywardness. As a result, it unwittingly
perpetuated notions of working-class depravity and defeatism, thereby helping to
perpetuate the Third Republic’s general lack of ameliorating social legislation. The
analysis of medical professionals, such as Dr. Lunier, Zola’s literary efforts, Taine’s
pseudo-scientific historical analysis, and the emergence of formal crowd psychology and
sociology theories were significantly generated as part of the anti-Commune legacy. They
were part of, and validations for, a wider and politically motivated effort to understand,
control, and manipulate “the crowd” following the seeming depravity of the lower classes
attributed to the Commune. This was hastened by the fact that the (frightful) masses were
politically activated through universal-male suffrage.

The Commune as a Political Pawn: social control and early amnesty politics
After 1871, the specter of the Commune was consistently raised as a legitimating
source for initiatives designed to control voters and the social life of the nation. Writing
in June 1871, Jules Favre, a conservative republican and Thiers’ Minister of Foreign
Affairs, wrote that it was not enough to detest the Commune and to prosecute the
Communards, it was essential

“to introduce into the laws the severities which social

necessity demands and to apply these laws without weakness are novelties to which
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France must resign herself. For her, it is a matter of safety.” 113 This statement from a
republican Minister (albeit conservative) goes far in illuminating republican political
complicity with the restrictive social policies of the Theirs, and especially, the
MacMahon regimes. Throughout the 1870s, restrictions on the public sphere came after
lengthy debates which included repeated references to the Commune and the
Communards.
Once the Thiers government took control of the capital city, a series of measures
were initiated in an attempt to restore order and maintain control. In addition to
maintaining Martial Law, in place since the Prussian siege, throughout France, Thiers
initiated a purge of all public establishments that had supported the Communards or that
allowed denigrating remarks against the government. Police prefects were thus charged
with the surveillance and repression of all sites wherein “obscene songs, smutty sketches,
and all other items that might compromise morals or the public order” where tolerated. 114
On August 7, 1871, Thiers introduced a bill making membership in the International
Workingmen’s Association a crime. This became law after it was strongly recommended
in the report made by the Commission of Inquiry on the causes of the Commune which
cited it as the chief culprit in the spread of socialist ideas through free press, popular
sovereignty, and public education.115 On December 28 of the same year, a decree banned
any materials that might disturb the public, and this opened the door to severe press
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regulation. That February, in light of the parallel identity of Communard and alcoholics,
the National Assembly enacted the first French law against public drunkenness; with “a
complex gradation of fines for each new infraction, [which] gave the police a means of
minutely monitoring working-class café behavior.”116
After MacMahon became president in May of 1873, a more stringent curfew on
drinking establishments was added to the martial law already in place. 117 MacMahon
went on to maintain martial law in 42 of France’s 90 departments throughout his
presidency and refused to lift it during times of election, despite the Prussian occupying
forces having set an example of this during the National Assembly election of February
1871. Republican politicians and journalists were opposed to these restrictions and some
of them voiced concern, most notably Victor Hugo who refers to these measures in the
introduction to his collection of poems, L’année terrible.118 Republicans largely complied
with the restrictions in the effort to position their image as being the best representatives
of order and stability, especially in the eyes of rural voters, as they set their sights on the
Moral Order’s defeat through electoral conquest.119 Once republicans secured political
control over the Republic, they undid much of the work of the Moral Order but for most
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of the decade their focus was on obtaining that power and here too the legacies of the
Commune, specifically the issue of Communard-amnesty, played an important role.
Official attempts to amnesty the Communards began to be made by members of
the National Assembly as early as September 1871. Amnesty proponents reasoned that it
would be far more comprehensive than a pardon because the latter would leave those not
yet apprehended, due to their self-exile, un-protected and therefore still problematic for
the life of the nation. Furthermore, pardon implied guilt and for the most progressive proamnesty proponents, such as Georges Clemenceau and Louis Blanc, this was
unacceptable. The first amnesty bill was introduced by Henri Brisson, a committed
adherent of the republican Left and was signed by forty-eight members of the republican
opposition. Brisson’s argument to the National Assembly in support of his measure
involved the following rhetoric: “is it only in France… that liberal governments do not
feel sure enough of themselves to clear the atmosphere by forgetting about our
differences?”120 Such a question highlights the insecurity of the early Republic, a fact that
would lead to continual efforts to renegotiate the memory of its contentious origins. At
the same time, it was misleading because each time the issue of amnesty was brought
before the political consciousness of France controversial memories of the Commune
were resurrected.
On all sides, the issue of amnesty was not about forgetting the past; but rather
using public memory to legitimatize one agenda over another. Conservative republicans
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including Adolphe Thiers and Jules Simon and the forces of the Moral Order consistently
rejected amnesty, citing the threat returning Communards posed to the Republic and to
the social order. Politicians of the Moral Order such as Eugène Caillaux, Duc de Broglie,
and Camille de Meaux, used the various amnesty proposals to validate their claims that
social and political calamity was always just a republican vote away from disrupting
France once again. It fit the bill for their political messaging through which they sought
to maintain electoral consent to govern and even to restore a monarchy if and when the
right moment presented itself.
For the Moral Order government, the Commune became a rhetorical symbol for
the threat that the working classes seemed to pose for order and morality. Amnesty was
resisted in-part because to absolve the Communards of guilt for criminal offenses, would
deprive the men of the Moral Order of a powerful fear-based political weapon. If the
Communards became citizens and the Commune forgiven, much of the legitimacy of the
Moral Order might be effaced. The issue of amnesty, for the monarchist conservatives
ultimately became an integral campaign tool. Conservatives solicited votes among the
anti-Communard constituents by consistently assimilating republicans with the
Communards and arguing that any republican electoral success “threatened the very
foundations of present society… [it would necessarily herald a return] to the acclamations
of amnestied supporters of the Commune.”121
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Throughout MacMahon’s regime, monarchists on all sides relied on the specter of
the Commune in their political machinations. Any association with the Commune or
support for amnesty provided the politicians of the Moral Order with leverage that could
be used to circumvent the mounting electoral support for republicans. For example, upon
being appointed Prime Minister, under MacMahon’s presidency, Duc de Broglie, took
advantage of press laws still in effect from the Second Empire to prosecute Assembly
member Arthur Ranc, a journalist briefly sitting in the government of the Commune
before excusing himself, in less than a month, in opposition to the Commune’s
revolutionary ambitions. Having already been elected to the National Assembly in
February of 1871 the Radical deputy for Lyon was targeted in June 1873. Ranc was
denied parliamentary immunity, tried for having participated in the Commune and
ultimately given a death sentence, though he prudently fled to Brussels before being
arrested. A similar a fate and course of action transpired for his fellow deputy MelvilBloncourt in 1874. For conservatives and their constituencies, social order was being
preserved and the political status quo being restored by stamping out any remains of the
Communards, even amongst members of the government, not by amnestying them; on
the contrary, by prosecuting them as criminals.
This was a tactic reliant upon the conservative narration of the Commune as a
criminal insurrection and how it had menaced the nascent regime and French society. In a
report for the National Assembly that definitively ended all debates on amnesty in May
1874, Emile Carron argued that amnesty was out of the question that it would only
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“encourage unhealthy ambitions, inspire the déclassé with culpable expectations, [and]
revive criminal hopes everywhere.”122 In response to the committee’s calls to end the
period of arrests and prosecution by court martial, he cited that “the record of the military
courts was excellent; and the special Commission on Pardons was doing its work
conscientiously and thoroughly, so that amnestying was, in fact going on all the time.”123
For republicans, the issue of amnesty, much like the Commune itself, exposed
major rifts that had been in development since 1789. The schism within the republican
camp was fundamentally an issue regarding the role of the state. Essentially there were
two republican agendas, one that was liberal and proposed a laissez-faire state and the
social-democratic side that sought an interventionist state. The liberals (i.e., conservatives
and moderates) maintained that once a Republic and its accompanying institutions of free
press, assembly, and secular education were secure, social and economic problems would
naturally be ameliorated. The Radical republicans demanded an interventionist state that
would enforce the egalitarian nature that both sides claimed to support.
The experience of the Terror had stained the term “Republic” with connotations
of violent radicalism, and the June Days of 1848 added to this the stigma of workingclass militancy. The Second Empire inadvertently renewed support for a liberal Republic
by strengthening the material and social security of the middle class and subduing
organized labor, while at the same time suppressing the political freedoms that the
invigorated middle class wanted: freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and
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unfettered universal male suffrage. By 1871, the schism between republicans was so deep
that their only point of unity was the emergence and survival of the Third Republic. The
republican division over the orientation of the Republican State, which had been an
important factor in the outbreak of the Commune, resurfaced during the political battles
of the early 1870s, including those in which the issue of amnesty played more than a
symbolic role.
Amnesty was a problematic topic for Moderate republicans, who consistently won
the majority of republican electoral victories. The Moderates, led by Léon Gambetta,
assessed exonerating the Communards as a serious risk because it could alienate the rural
vote, which they knew was vital for the Republic’s survival. Furthermore, it threatened to
endanger their establishment of a liberal Republic by paving the way for the reappearance
of the most extreme-Left candidates. In the latter half of the decade, the idea of an
amnesty began to gain support among French voters, notably in the provinces—and not
just the historically Radical strongholds of Lyon and Marseilles. In Paris, the momentum
was most apparent after the Radicals’ general election campaign of 1876.124 It then
became a major topic of debate in subsequent elections. Whenever amnesty was
discussed, the Radicals insisted that such an act could provide valuable healing for a
divided nation. They contended that it would mend the wounds of the past and enable
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everyone to move into the new era as a united, republican nation. No matter how often
they cited such eloquent goals, however, amnesty was above all a means of drawing and
identifying political lines.
The issue became a matter of opportunity for the Moderates. Indeed, this
republican faction was ultimately labeled “Opportunist” because of its fluctuating stance
on amnesty. An article published in 1876 in the Left-leaning newspaper Les Droits de
l’homme identifies the political choices offered to French voters at the time: Legitimists,
Orleanists, Bonapartists, and Republicans. However, the author (himself a refugee
Communard-supporter) asserts that the voters actually have another option: to side with
the Opportunist, “that tender-hearted candidate who, deeply touched by the evils of the
civil war and full of solicitude for the families it has deprived of their means of support,
declares that he is a partisan of an amnesty, but that he reserves to himself the right to
vote it ‘at the opportune time.’”125 This is an accurate assessment of the Opportunist
republican stance on amnesty throughout the 1870s—one that the career of Léon
Gambetta exemplifies.
Gambetta, who was considered a Radical of the Jacobin tradition during the
Second Empire, served as the Minister of War and the Interior in 1870 and 1871. He
retreated from France following the monarchists’ victory in the February 1871 elections
and while the Commune was in control of Paris, and vociferously denounced the regime
during and after its suppression. His political acrobatics regarding the issue of amnesty
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provide the best representation of Opportunism in this period. After 1871, Gambetta
assumed a position of neutrality on the matter, never taking a definitive stance in his
campaign speeches or in his newspaper, La République française.126 Pro-amnesty
supporters generally assumed that Gambetta was against amnesty, at least while the
republicans were in pursuit of full political control. His political opponents on the Left
frequently leveled this accusation against him. Gambetta’s refusal to clarify his position
reveals the growing support for amnesty among solidly republican voters and his
understanding that openly supporting it could alienate rural voters. He urged his fellow
republicans to avoid the topic during the campaigns of 1876. Even after the Radicals
proposed delaying the amnesty that they had promised during their campaign—with the
tacit agreement that the Opportunists would support it—Gambetta and his followers
remained mute.127 After taking his seat in the Chamber of Deputies, he abstained from
voting or registering an opinion on the two amnesty bills that the Radicals Hugo and F.V.
Raspail simultaneously introduced in the newly elected Senate and Chamber on March
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21, 1876.128 His silence was deafening for the prospect of amnesty. By the mid-1870s,
Gambetta’s politics were firmly and unapologetically in the liberal camp, and he was in
full pursuit of the rural vote. This meant that he doggedly tried to avoid the topic of
amnesty, which the Radicals carried on their mastheads.
Radical candidates framed their political messages within the context of
confidence in a social-democratic Republic that was inclusive of French citizens from all
points of the spectrum. The issue of amnesty fit well within that framework. In addition,
many of the Radicals had strong relationships with the Communards, some having even
briefly participated in the event. In this burgeoning era of mass politics, the Radical
message engendered the sustained support of their working-class constituencies, which
the men of the Moral Order feared and detested. By advocating on behalf of amnesty for
the Communards, Radicals were also able to dilute some of the attraction that socialism
continued to hold within the urban strongholds of Paris, Lyon, and Marseilles. This
became particularly important after 1877, as Socialist candidates began to make serious
electoral bids with some success, especially in the symbolic sense.
The Commission of Inquiry into the causes of the Paris Commune had explicitly
linked the event to the internationalist Left. The Socialists received this association
positively and cultivated it throughout the 1870s. Their involvement in the Paris
Commune, which the public generally viewed as a Socialist uprising, afforded them an
128
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enduring celebrity that was enmeshed in stories of proletarian bravery and martyrdom in
the face of the overwhelming force of the Versailles (i.e., the bourgeois) Government.
This image translated into political purchase among urban workers, particularly in local
elections after 1877. In London, Brussels, and Switzerland, Communards formed refugee
societies as early as the fall of 1871 in order to aid each other in exile and to provide
relief for those captured and deported by the Republic. Throughout the 1870s, they
published a variety of attacks against the Versailles Government of Thiers, President
MacMahon, and the timidity of republicans on the issue of amnesty. Many times, this
meant denouncing republicans as charlatans for cultivating working-class votes based on
their support for amnestying the same Communards with whom they had refused to join
arms in 1871.
Even for this diverse group of the extreme-Left, however, amnesty was a
controversial topic. Early on, a sense of unity existed among the surviving Communards
on the subject of amnesty. Elisée Réclus, an anarchist participant in the Commune,
expresses this harmony aptly in a letter he wrote to his wife while in hiding (prior to his
ultimate arrest): “I wish to be only as free as my comrades, without any conditions, and
without my wounded honor’s being compromised…. I will not be indebted to generosity
for my freedom.”129 The united front that many Communards initially expressed
unraveled as time progressed. In 1872, division began to surface, specifically over
disagreements as to why the Commune had failed, leading exiled Communards such as
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Bernard Landeck to cry: “No amnesty for those who would again compromise the people
by their divisions and their malice... for all the leaders of the vanquished Revolution... for
the inept leaders who lost the Revolution!”130 In fact, some Communards urged their
compatriots to reject an amnesty altogether. They argued that the government of
Versailles had no right to grant such a thing, declaring that that very words “grace,
amnesty, [and] clemency repulse us because for us, they are synonymous with
treason.”131
Despite such divisions, these groups had an important impact on the elections and
campaigns for amnesty that took place throughout the 1870s, thereby influencing the
political development of Republican France. For the most part, the exiled Communards
lent an important element of support to the Radicals, especially during the 1876 elections.
Their persistence in reaching out to voters within France through risky public speeches
and the transmission of their publications from abroad gave the surviving Communards a
voice in the nation’s affairs. This provided an acutely emotional factor to the amnesty
campaigns that the Radicals led during the decade. It elevated the appeal for amnesty
beyond the rationale of confidence in the French nation; amnesty became a moral
imperative that elicited genuine sympathy for the exiles and their families among a
growing segment of the French electorate. This mounting compassion is an important, yet
commonly underestimated, factor in the demise of the Moral Order.
La Fédération, journal révolutionnaire, socialiste, française – anglaise, London, September 28, 1872.
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Gambetta’s avoidance of the amnesty issue was infuriating but ultimately useful
for the Radical republicans. In the general elections of 1876, it enabled them to
differentiate themselves from their political opponents on the far-Left, who were still
recovering from defeat and living mostly in exile. The two amnesty bills of 1876 were the
first items on the agenda when the Chambers reconvened after the Easter recess.
Unsurprisingly, they sparked vigorous debates. In the Chamber, Radical Republican
Georges Clemenceau delivered an impassioned parliamentary speech in support of these
latest attempts:
The people whom you are afraid of alarming, will be sufficiently reassured
if you tell them that there is nothing to be alarmed about in the amnesty.
But if your politics are hesitant and uncertain, if you are only half
successful, when you present yourselves before the electors in 1880, the
year to which the monarchists will postpone the elections, your opponents
will not lack the political ammunition to use against you even if you have
refused the amnesty a hundred times. I ask you to have confidence in your
country, I ask you to have confidence in yourselves; you cannot give more
striking proof of confidence in yourselves and in your stature than by
voting for the amnesty…. I ask you to take account at the same time of the
so-called lower classes, who must also be reconciled and conciliated. I tell
you that it is only through the reconciliation of all classes and all citizens
that you will achieve the social peace we all want.132

By striking a conciliatory tone to advocate on behalf of the amnesty, Clemenceau was
able to satisfy his constituents in the working-class district of Montmartre by validating
their need for recognition as accepted and important members of the citizenry. He also
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placed his political opponents on the defensive: he not only equated a vote against
amnesty to a lack of confidence in the Republic, but also angled for the support of the
more affluent classes by framing his appeal in terms of social peace.
Both amnesty bills of 1876 were soundly defeated that May. Despite the
impassioned pleas of the Radicals and even a petition drive to drum up voter support, the
members of the Chamber overwhelmingly voted against it (392 to 50, with 58
abstentions), and the Senate rejected it almost unanimously.133 The failure of the bills on
March 18 and May 22 coincided with the anniversaries of the proclamation of the
Commune and the Bloody Week. This was no accident; Hugo, who proposed it in the
Senate, had purposefully chosen this date for its poignancy. Yet his decision backfired
because it only increased the radical tenor of the idea, which made the Opportunists even
more leery of supporting it.134 Although only the most naïve of spectators had believed
the bills would pass, their defeat was bitterly received by voters who had gone to the
polls specifically to elect candidates campaigning on amnesty.135 Over time, these
disappointments grew into a mass movement with sufficient electoral influence to bring a
Radical Republic into existence in 1899. But this eventuality was never certain and, in the
interim, other proposals would prevail. The lesson that amnesty supporters took from the
1876 votes was that the issue required the support of the majority of French voters, which
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they could gain only through clever presentation and an amelioration of the controversies
surrounding the Commune’s legacies.
Amnesty was a defining issue for politicians from all sides of the spectrum and
was one of the many factors that influenced the emergence and character of the Moderate
republican regime. The quest to ensure the survival of the Republic and the conflict
regarding its orientation meant a continuous battle over its heritage and contemporary
image. The Third Republic was established in an age of mass political participation—one
in which politicians and social scientists were keenly aware of the vicissitudes of the
populace and their potential to bring great power or great peril. In this era, the media
began to foretell reality. In both the civic and cultural life of the early Third Republic,
political actors of all ideologies continuously strove to narrate the past, each in an attempt
to influence the present and the future. Thus, the historicizing of the Commune was
inextricably tied to important contests over controlling its interpretation and its legacies.
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CHAPTER 2: VISIONS OF THE PAST
The politicians of the early Third Republic realized that they would have to
employ new techniques in response to the nationwide expansion in political participation
and the increasingly important role of the French media. The stories and images that the
media passed along to the people could dramatically sway voter allegiance. Thus, each of
the major political parties of the 1870s seized any opportunity to convince the citizenry
that their interpretations of the past were the most accurate and that their plans for the
nation’s future were the most desirable. In particular, they sought to control memories of
the Commune and its defeat, which held great emotional currency in a Republic that was
still reeling from those events. Photographic representations and reflective monographs
proved to be very effective tools in the effort to historicize the Commune.
This chapter analyzes the imaging of the Paris Commune by examining the
profusion of photographs and historical narratives that flooded the consumer market both
during the regime and soon after its downfall. The first section focuses on the
proliferation of photographs of the Communards and the Commune’s dramatic last week,
with an emphasis on the divergent narratives they imparted, consumer interest in them,
and the politics behind the government’s eventual decision to suppress their sale. In the
nineteenth century [especially after the events of 1870–1871], photography became a
means of witnessing and reflecting “the social and political values and history of
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France.”136 Both anti-Communards such as Eugène Appert and more neutral
contemporaries like André-Alphonse Eugène Disdéri produced and published these
photos, and the images they captured reflect their differing assessments of the regime and
its downfall. Similarly, consumers collected them for disparate reasons: as cherished
images of heroism; as dangerous revolutionary propaganda; or as graphic displays of
savagery and barbarism that condemned the insurrection and forewarned against any
future attempts of that nature.
The authorities understood the importance of these interpretations, and their
censorship of Commune-related photographs reflects their desire to control the memories
of the event. Anti-Commune images, which often depicted the Commune’s execution of
hostages or the incendiary destruction of Parisian buildings, homes, and monuments,
were considered useful sources of visual propaganda. The government hoped that such
pictures would validate the severity of the Commune’s suppression and serve as a
didactic tool to discourage any lingering support for the insurrection, thereby mitigating
the perpetuation of its legacy. However, as it became clear that these photographs were
popular and cherished commodities of Commune sympathizers, their potential dangers
began to outweigh their benefits. Officials responded by forbidding their sale in an effort
to efface the memory of the Commune—much like their attempt to erase its physical
legacy by reconstructing Paris’ damaged monuments and buildings.
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While these photographs had the mere potential to influence public opinion, the
published histories of the Commune were specifically written with such an agenda in
mind. The second section of this chapter examines the multiplicity of historical narratives
published by both the anti-Commune historians, such as Maxime du Camp, and the
Communards themselves, including Hippolyte Prosper Olivier Lissagaray. This section
gives specific attention to the privileging of the anti-Commune perspective within France
and the efforts of the defeated regime’s partisans to combat this message. The
propagation of this viewpoint took place not only through published histories, but also
through campaign speeches and Assembly debates involving the issue of amnesty. The
French press reprinted these speeches and debates, which significantly increased their
power. The anti-Commune narrative characterized the Communards as barbaric, criminal,
and alcoholic malcontents whose insurrection was without political purpose or validity.
Conservatives were not alone in spreading this opinion. Moderate republicans, sometimes
tacitly and often overtly, used it to defend themselves against the conservatives, who had
launched a rhetorical campaign that linked the republicans to the Communards in an
attempt to subvert the Republic in favor of a restoration. Conversely, the veritable neglect
of pro-Commune histories by republican politicians and intellectuals—especially the
Radicals, who were in the vanguard of the movement to provide amnesty to the
Communards during the early 1870s—assisted, inadvertently or not, in the privileging of
the anti-Commune perspective.
Taken together, these sections enable an analysis of the competing political
viewpoints and agendas operating during the Republic’s foundation years, which were
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submerged within the photographs and historical narratives of the time and employed by
a myriad of political leaders in their quest to actualize their goals for France’s future.
During its first decade, the Third Republic’s survival was far from certain. Rival political
factions with widely different objectives were battling for control of the Republic. The
conservative majority in the National Assembly, composed of monarchical and imperial
aspirants, was intent upon ending the Republic and restoring the monarchy. Republicans,
both Moderate and Radical, were united in their desire to secure the Republic’s longevity
but divided over the character the Republic would assume if it survived. For each of the
political groups, the photographs and histories of the nation’s recent traumas provided
opportunities for political gain while posing risks to their endeavors.
To accomplish their goals, the Legitimists, Orleanists, Moderates, and Radicals all
propagated competing national foundation narratives that reflected their divergent
assessments of France’s political history, including the Paris Commune. The
conservatives employed negative photographic and monographic representations of the
event to bolster their efforts to justify the Commune’s severe repression, to link the
identities of the Communards with that of the republicans, and to prevent the passage of a
general amnesty. For the republicans, the very assessment of the Commune was a source
of great division; the Moderates and the Radicals took divergent stances on the
revolutionary past and the Republic’s fulfillment of revolutionary ideals. The Commune
acted as a foil in these disputes, which was particularly problematic for the Moderates.
During the 1870s, the Moderate republicans were intent upon generating a new image for
themselves—one that positioned the group as the guarantors of order and national
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prosperity. Photographs of destroyed public and private property and historical narrations
of debauched, alcohol-fueled republican revolutionaries posed a substantial threat to
maintaining that modern image. The Moderates were therefore quite willing to downplay
such accounts and to censor such photographs.
In the wake of France’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian War and the Paris
Commune, political identities were being reformulated and solidified. As each of the
factions vied for a majority of the national electorate’s allegiance, the politicians and
writers of the time considered photographic and historical recollections of the nation’s
recent upheavals to be highly influential in terms of public opinion. Thus, contemporary
political exigencies informed the treatment of these commodities: their sanction or
censure, and their celebration or marginalization. As varying groups fought over the
survival and the character of the Republic, the regime’s heritage and contemporary image
remained in constant dispute. The photographs and histories generated during and
immediately after the Commune preserve this battle in striking detail.

Camera Obscura: Visions of the Commune and its Legacy
The determination to record the Paris Commune, for posterity’s judgment and
contemporary influence, began with photographs taken while the event was unfolding
and after its suppression. Throughout the period of the Commune, numerous photographs
were made of Communards mounting their barricades. Baudelaire famously hated
photography, citing it was artifice, not art and many agreed that the photographers’
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presence during the Commune was itself an appeal to the baser elements of society.
Anti-Commune social analysts, such as Maxime du Camp, sneered at such acts,
concluding that the Communards couldn’t resist the vain impulse to record their deeds,
and then “as insignificant actors,” view themselves again in the faded fineries of their
successful role.137 Apparently the impulse to review the spectacle of the Commune was
also prolific, “contemporary accounts had them cluttering the windows of engraving and
stationary stores [and] displayed proudly over the mantelpieces of homes in the
faubourgs.”138 For the most part these were staged reenactments or foreshadowing of the
actual moments of defense and insurgency, a fact that undermines the contemporary
assumption that they could be used by historians of the Commune as factual
documentation.139 Nevertheless, photographic images of the Commune and Communards
are an incredibly rich source of commentary and like the Commune exists poignantly at
the juncture between France’s revolutionary past and the Republic’s turn toward the
modern age.
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Figure I. Anonymous, Barricade 18 March 1871.

Figure II. André Adolphe Eugène Disdéri, Destruction of the Vendôme Column during the Paris
Commune, May 1871.
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Figure III. André Adolphe Eugène Disdéri, Communards in their Coffins, May 1871.

The images above are three of the most indelible of the Communards. The first conveys
their prideful intransigence during the outbreak of the Commune, the second depicts them
in a moment of revelry just after destroying the Vendôme Column, and the third
graphically displays their uninspiring demise in May of 1871. In addition to pictures of
the insurgents, there were also images of the supposed extreme destructiveness of the
Communards.
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Figure IV. Anonymous, Paris Street, with ruins of buildings, 1871.

Figure V. Panorama of the Fires of Paris by the Commune, nights of 23, 24, and 25 May 1871, Musées de
la ville de Paris.

In their recollections, the Communards frequently vacillated between two positions. On
the one hand, they defended the actions of accused incendiaries by insisting that these
fires were a military tactic used during a very real war. On the other, they blamed the
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government of Versailles for setting most of the blazes as a means of hiding their
penetration into the city and their ferreting out of survivors.
This discrepancy hints at the multiplicity of interpretations that Commune-era
photographs could validate. For the anti-Communards, this presented a narrative
opportunity for condemnation of the event and justification for its awful suppression.
Likewise, the photographs were potentially risky because of the same measure of
narrative assistance that could be used by Communard sympathizers in their efforts to
mitigate the negation of the ill-fated event and to defend its partisans. Prior to the
Commune’s defeat, both types of photographs, insurgents and landscapes, were already
in circulation. Indeed, both sides, the Communards and the government of Versailles,
used these images for propagandistic and logistical support. For the Communards, many
of the photographs enabled a search for fallen comrades and self-revelatory impressions
of the power they had been able to wield. For the government of Versailles, the images
enabled the capture of numerous insurgents after the deluge of the Semaine sanglante and
served as a galvanizing weapon of propaganda to sustain anti-Communard sentiments as
the Versailles troops re-took the city. During, and especially after the Commune, these
photographs were considered incredibly influential by the authorities at Versailles and
their detractors who began to rebuild their lives in Paris or forge new ones in exile. This
was a new medium for propaganda and historical documentation, and its emerging use as
a tool of war, whether tactical or ideological, was only just becoming apparent.
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The photographs of the Commune preserve the event and the participants
engaging in insurgency and well-rehearsed revolutionary street theater. The Commune
was, after all, a self-conscious restaging of the revolutionary tradition and an effort to
bring many of the unfinished goals of 1793 and 1848 to fruition.

Communard

photographs, like those of the American Civil War, were among the first attempts to
document history in the eye of the beholder.140 Not only did many insurgents take an
opportunity to pose for posterity, but the government of the Commune in Paris employed
photographers as a means to investigate the identity of fallen national guards men and the
“authorities of Versailles made photography profitable in the identification and
documentation of the Communards’ operations.”141 The Communards’ choice to record
their actions and intentions with the emerging technology of photography is salient. It
underscores the universal desire for the insurgent to be unequivocally acknowledged and
the representational politics of both the barricade and the photograph. 142 By taking a
stand in front of the lens, the Communards were not only enjoying the novelty of the
modern age’s new technology, they were also instantly recording a memoire and their
historical moment; a choice that had mortal consequences for many of them long after the
semaine sanglante. For the Versailles Government, the utility of the photograph for social
control was immediately recognized. As Maxime du Camp conceded, “the experience in
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this regard was not in vain,” from that time on, a photographic studio was installed at the
Prefecture of Police.143 The legacy of these images exists in the politics involved in
narrating the Commune during the early Third Republic and the foundation of the
modern police mug shot.
After the Commune’s suppression in May 1871, Ernest Eugène Appert gained
exclusive rights to reproduction in exchange for photographing Communards as they
were processed in the Versailles prisons. In this capacity, Appert recorded famous and
often cherished images of Louis Michel, Félix Pyat, and Louis Rossel among hundreds of
others.144

Figure VI. Appert, Louise Michel.
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Taking his lens beyond the prison yards, Appert recreated some of the more horrific
moments of the Commune and its aftermath. In his 1871 series Crimes de la Commune,
Appert staged a number of scenes designed specifically to promote the anti-Commune
perspective of the conservative government. These included the execution of Archbishop
Darboy and other hostages and the executions of some of the more notorious
Communards, including Louis Rossel, using hired actors and then pasting the
photographed faces of the real persons into place; even gluing “a tiny white blindfold”
over the eyes of Rossel’s image taken in the prison yard just a few months prior.145 In
Appert’s Crimes of the Commune series, he provided visual images of some of the most
scorned factors of the Commune.

Figure VII. Appert, Crimes de la Commune: Assassination of 62 hostages, 26 May 1871 at 5 (in the
evening), 83 and 85 rue Haxo, Belleville.
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Figure VIII. Appert, Execution of Rossell, Bourgeois, and Ferré, 128 November 1871 at Satory.

For example, in Figure VII above, the crowd of executioners includes women, highly
armed and in position for the kill, giving a visual to the wide-spread derision against the
Commune’s collapse of traditional gendered social divisions and alluding to dreaded
persona of the pétroleuse. Moreover, as Figures VIII demonstrates, Appert’s photographs
not only recorded the initial violence meted out to the captured Communards, but are
themselves a re-perpetration of that violence and shrewdly demonstrate the proportional
threat that would be incurred by future insurgents. These photographs were among the
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post-Commune commodities to be purchased by consumers still craning their necks at the
wreckage of the recent past.146
While Appert’s work clearly sustained the anti-Communard critique of the event
as both horrifying and defeated, others were less clear. The photographs of fallen
Communards, many of which were published anonymously, and those of AndréAlphonse Eugène Disdéri (figure III above), the Désastres de la guerre series by J.
Andrieu, and the 109 photographs taken by Bruno Braquehais, which were bound into an
album for commercial sale, were often considered to be objective documentation, if not
“propaganda, which generally denounced the reprisals against the Communards.”147
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Figure IX. Anonymous, Chapel of the Tuileries (Palace) after the fire.

Figure X. J. Andrieu, Desasters of the war, The Tuileries, main façade, 1871.
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Figure XI. Braquehais, Vendôme Column after its Destruction, 1871.

Figure XII. Young victims of the Versailles: two dead children, Phothèque des musées de la ville de Paris,
France.
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The difference in these photographs versus those of Appert’s is not only conveyed by the
images the photographers chose to capture, but also, in the titles of their series, whereas
Appert chose Crimes de la Commune, for example, J. Andrieu’s Desastres de la Guerre
demonstrates impartiality and a sense of the overarching trauma endured by Parisians
between 1870-1871, in other words l’Année terrible in its entirety and does not single out
the Commune for rebuke.
The images of the destroyed buildings, dead children, and the pre-defeat joviality
of the Communards imparted a vastly different characterization of the Communards and
the event. In Braquehais’ numerous group photographs of the Communards, a sense of
gaiety is displayed. In figure XI, for example, the men in the upper left corner appear
happy, even welcoming, the shaking of hands by the men just below displays fraternal
camaraderie, and the comingling of men from different socio-economic milieus
complicates the anti-Commune characterization of the insurgents as working-class
imbeciles. The inclusion of the children in the photograph’s right-center hardly supports
the anti-Commune characterization of alcoholic savages any more than the matronly
woman to their right invokes the dreaded image of the coquette pétroleuse. Moreover, by
capturing images of the Communards as they lay dead in their coffins, Disdéri enables a
glimpse of the insurgents that was far from menacing, rather they appear defeated and
vulnerable and like the images of the children (figure XII), possibly victimized by the
circumstances of life generally and their historical moment particularly. The posthumous
image of the children would not have sustained the assessment that the brutality involved
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in the Commune’s suppression was necessitated and immediately conjures the sentiment
of one London Times reporter that “the ribaldry of the ‘Party of Order’ sickens the
soul.”148 Furthermore, Andrieu’s landscape images of Paris in ruins, reflects the
fetishizing of destruction and ruins that many contemporaries took part in.
Many of the destroyed buildings that Andrieu captured were already sources of
denigration, specifically among people who tended toward republicanism in their
political outlook. For example, rather than capturing the “massacre” of clerical hostages,
the destroyed chapel of the Tuileries Palace (figure IX) imagines the destruction of
clericalism and monarchism in one shot, the necessity both of which were propagated by
republican candidates and representatives. The popularity of the photographs of the
Commune, its partisans, and the ruins it left in its wake is unquestioned. The wide spread
interest in these photographs and the duality of the narratives they sustained or mitigated
meant for authorities that their continued sale would need to be controlled and,
ultimately, prevented. While exact figures that might detail their sales and their buyers’
demographics are unknown, their proliferation is evidenced by the recollections of
contemporaries who described them as occupying prominent places in many gift shops,
books stores and kiosks, in the decision to ban them, and in the court cases that ensued by
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sellers who decided to ignore the ban indicating that the legal and financial risks were
worth the expected profits.149
Immediately after the Commune, the

photographs of Paris in ruins, dead

Communards, and the “thousands of carte de visite portraits of those deemed to be
responsible for the destruction…was seen as a deterrent to further insurrection.”150 Very
quickly, however, it became apparent that “quite the reverse was true and that
Communards were fast acquiring a reputation as heroes and martyrs.”151

This was

politically dangerous for the conservative majority in the National Assembly because
their condemnation of the Commune as a criminal insurrection, led by unruly
dipsomaniacs was not wholly accepted by the French population and especially not by
constituencies in Paris where the Commune had found its most ardent supporters. As
mentioned in the previous chapter, during the summer of 1871 insults to police, with
references to their treatment of the Communards, accelerated after the Commune, and at
same time Radical republicans had already begun what would become a near ten year
battle to grant the insurgents a general amnesty.
While Communards were being ferreted out from hiding and executions were
mounting, domestic and international opinion began to turn against the severity of the
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Commune’s suppression. As described by Edmond de Goncourt just days after the
Commune’s defeat, the Belleville had “the appearance of a vanquished but unsubjugated
district.”152 As early as June, 1871, while executions of the Communards were still
prevalent, the London Times wrote that the “wholesale executions inflicted by the
Versailles soldiery, the triumph, the glee, [and] the ribaldry of the ‘Party of Order,’
sickens the soul.”153 Furthermore, as described by William Scott Haine, “Parisians
remained remarkably bold in their allegiance to the Commune, despite [or perhaps
because of] the ferocity of the Versailles troops, their itchy trigger fingers, and their often
drunken propensity to flaunt their victory.”154
On September 13, 1871, Henri Brisson introduced the first amnesty bill in the
National Assembly which was signed by forty-eight fellow deputies including Léon
Gambetta. This amnesty would apply to anyone “convicted or prosecuted for political
crimes or lesser offenses, at Paris and in the provinces, during the past year.” 155 Jean T.
Joughin, explains Gambetta’s support as a reaction to the investigation of “his own
actions since September 4, 1870 [as head of the Government of National Defense], by a
hostile assembly.”156 However, this is also a reflection of the fact that Gambetta’s
radicalism, witnessed in the 1860s and embodied in his support for the Belleville
Manifesto of 1869, had not yet been displaced by his turn toward the Moderate camp. In
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an era of universal (male) suffrage and with by-elections providing an opportunity for
republicans to win seats in the Assembly, proposing such a bill reflects an awareness of
constituent opinion. This is an important contextual component of the September amnesty
bill and Gambetta’s support, especially in light of his later antipathy towards amnesty
proposals. By signing on to Brisson’s bill, the deputy from Belleville was not merely
registering a rebuke to “a hostile assembly,” he was also representing the opinions of his
constituency in order to retain their electoral support.
While Belleville’s support for the Commune, even after its defeat, would not have
depended on photographs of the vanquished Communards, these images certainly
sustained it. Moreover, they risked encouraging such posthumous support among other
constituencies that had been less invested in the event. With the popularity of the
photographs rising at the same time that sources as varied as the London Times, Edmond
de Goncourt, and Police records reflect a backlash against the severity of the event’s
suppression, limiting public exposure to the photographs, like the decision to limit the
executions from the general population, became a priority for the conservative majority
in Versailles.157 Moreover, in the wake of defeat, politicians, from all sides of the
political spectrum, were eager to present France as a unified nation, a goal that was
jeopardized by the continued popularity of images that not only reminded national and
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international audiences of France’s disunity but also, as witnessed in Belleville, helped to
prolong it.
The first step to censoring images of the Commune was taken by the Paris police
as early as May 1871, when they began to apply a law established under the Second
Empire in Article 22 of the Decree of April 17, 1852. This required all images to be
authorized by the Ministry of Interior or a departmental prefect prior to sale or
distribution.158 The enforcement of this law diminished the wanton sale and distribution
of Commune related images in Paris, over the protests of many merchants and peddlers,
while at the same time officials continued to sanction those of overtly anti-Communard
photographers such as Appert. With thousands of photographs still being sold legally and
on the growing black market, however, the Ministry of Interior expanded the Paris
controls to limit sales nation-wide. In his instructions to local officials, the Minister of
Interior directed them to “exercise the most rigorous surveillance at this time; do not limit
yourself to requesting the exhibition of the permit, but search the packs, boxes, and
wagons of the peddler.”159 Despite such efforts, the market for the images proved too
tempting. Likewise, the restrictions led to protests and conflicts. Merchants, for example,
argued that to stop selling them would be detrimental to their business, while
photographers that had gained permission from the Ministry of Interior, such as Appert,
used the restrictions to seek prosecution against those who reproduced their works
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illegally, and, persons falsely identified as Communards filed law suits citing public
defamation.160 As a result, General Ladmirault, the Military Governor of Paris took
advantage of the power he still had since the state of siege to issue a decree that banned
the photographs from the city of Paris on December 18, 1871, including Appert’s and
others previously given permission, stating that “especially forbidden are portraits of
individuals under prosecution for their participation in the insurrection.”161
The decision to ban the photographs was politically motivated, with the intent of
diminishing any lingering sympathy for the insurgents. As Donald English notes, “the
images that were said to ‘disturb the peace’ included those scenes depicting the actions
by the Commune, its defenders, committee meetings or demonstrations by the
Communard government, and all the images of the repression by Versailles.”162 In fact
the only images that the decree ignored were ones deemed “purely artistic” such as those
of the ruins and fires. This decree became nationwide after November of 1872. The
censorship was an effort to stem the tide of legal proceedings against copyright
infringement and mistaken identity. Yet the decision to allow the continued sale and
distribution of the landscape portraits of Paris in ruins should also be understood as a
means of controlling the image of France and curtailing the glorification of the
Communards among significant segments of France’s working-class population. By

160

For example, Pierre Petit was successfully sued by one of his former subjects, Henri Dombrowski and
ordered to pay his former subject 3,000 francs because of his willful selling of Dombrowski’s image as that
of the fallen Communard Ladislas Dombrowski a fact which became known to Henri when “he saw his
image displayed in several shop windows labeled as the dead Communard general.” English, p. 66.
161
Gazette des Tribunaux, « Chronique », December 31, 1871, p. 911.
162
English, p. 68.

91

permitting only those images that showed the wreckage of Paris, the government
implicitly sanctioned an official narrative of the Commune’s destructive power and its
transgressions against private property. Simultaneously, the continued availability of
these photographs and the symbols embedded within them validated the brutal defeat of
the regime and the ongoing efforts to capture and punish its fleeing insurgents. After all,
the images of the Communards and their machinations represented “important alternative
visions to the Republic at a time when numerous French citizens, newly enfranchised,
were being alienated…as such they are fundamental photographic contributions to the
politics of protest.”163 The decision to ban them, which was affirmed by most republican
politicians, was an effort to “socialize the disparate classes of France into a single
nation,” by removing the image of disunity.164 The sanction given to the aestheticism of
the ruins “was yet another attempt by those hostile to the Commune to deny the political
and social causes underlying the uprising by depicting the events of May 1871 as
apocalyptic and tragic.”165 With this image, politicians could campaign on a platform of
rebuilding France and restoring the nation’s grandeur from the wreckage of the Paris
Commune and defeat in the Franco Prussian War.
In the case of Commune-related photographs, the narrative intent, with the
exception of Appert, was often a question of the audience’s interpretation; an audience
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that was much wider than that for written publications because while literacy rates were
rising, they were still far from universal. This was not the circumstance for the
Commune’s contemporary historians. On the one hand, the genre of historical non-fiction
was not popular thus the messaging they were undertaking was twice removed from the
general population: first by literacy barriers and second by the genre itself. On the other
hand, these writers were explicit in their narrative agendas, even when they made claims
to the contrary, and their writings were accordingly celebrated or ignored by authorities.
For writers such as Maxime du Camp, the Commune was an awful lesson of the dangers
of political empowerment of people that lacked the social and educational acumen to
handle such responsibility and verification of the need to limit their political
participation. For Communards, such as Lissagaray, the Commune provided an important
lesson on the failings of revolutionary movements which could be corrected for the
future, and an example of the barbarism of the authorities and the duplicity of mainstream
republicans which should call into question their fitfulness to govern in the name of the
Republic and the triumph of the revolutionary past.

The lesson to be learned: Competing narratives and agendas
The Paris Commune of 1871 left an acute memory of crisis in its wake and “it
immediately provoked durably important ideological interpretations…so much so that it
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has often been suggested that the Commune’s myth is more important than its reality.”166
The proliferation of historical narratives of the Paris Commune during the first decade
after its defeat should be viewed as competing efforts to efface, condemn, or rehabilitate
the memory of the event within the context of contemporary political exigencies and the
opportunities presented by an increasingly literate mass consumer society.167 The writers
sought to construct histories of the recent past in a way that could inform a present and
future in line with their politics. Opposing narrations published by Maxime du Camp and
Prosper Olivier Lissagaray provided the most resilient interpretations of the Commune
and thus are of primary consideration in this section.168
Certainly, there is an important distinction to be made between popular historical
accounts, such as Lissagaray’s History of the Paris Commune of 1871, versus those of
professionals such as Hippolyte Taine, emanating from the French academy. Professional
historians of the so called “École Méthodique” chose not to “overemphasize their
religious or political preferences…they were not ideologically flexible; they were simply
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ideologically distinct as individuals, and they tried not to let their ideological
entrenchment influence their work.”169 Nonetheless, nineteenth-century historians
including positivists such as Hippolyte Taine, “all claimed that historical narrative is
close to poetry, a form of free verse which is used to describe past events in a language
which is both easy to understand and which does not bore the reader.”170 Taine even
asserted “history is art,” and as Hayden White describes, historians of that time were
concerned with producing images of history free from abstraction.171
This meant that, like the realism developed by contemporary novelists, many
historians, popular and professional, used a narrative style that blurred the distinction
between historical and fictional genres, a practice that also made the authors’ ideological
position, even when they claimed to be “free from all bias,” much more persuasive.172
Indeed, there was a great amount of creative license in how the history of the Commune
was recalled. Many authors, including professionals such as Taine and Du Camp,
contrived dialogue they could not possibly have witnessed, with the understanding that
such narration, made the historical account more accessible to the reader. In the last
decades of the nineteenth century, the importance of the historical discipline was
increasingly recognized as one that had a political role to fill.173 Taine’s conservatism, for
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example, is a well-established fact and the vitriolic anti-revolutionary perspective
expressed in Les Origins de la France contemporaine, must certainly be understood
within the context of its post-Commune completion and publication. Taine is rarely
explicit in his references to the Commune of 1871, but his brief reflections are only
slightly less colored by his ideological suppositions, than Lissagaray’s overtly
opinionated pro-Commune narrative.174 Maxime du Camp initially made a similar choice
to obscure the Commune from his historical narration; however, after mid-decade, in
light of changing political circumstances, he published a four-volume series focused
squarely on the Commune that was rife with a level of condemnation that matched, if not
surpassed, Lissagaray’s pro-Commune partisanship.
Du Camp’s Paris, ses organs, ses fonctions et sa vie dans la seconde moité du
XIXe siècle, published between 1869 and 1875, is a six-volume collection written prior to
the Franco-Prussian War and the Paris Commune. The publications of volumes III and IV
were delayed by the events of that year; however, they were not revised in the aftermath.
According to Du Camp, the goal was simply to describe Paris under normal conditions,
not its life during the terrible events of 1870 and 1871. The choice to leave the image of
France intact might illustrate the effort to assuage the embarrassment of defeat and
territorial loss, the Commune, and its tortuous conclusion. It can also be read as the
narrative equivalent to the rebuilding of the Vendôme Column and other sights destroyed
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during the Commune and its defeat—an effort to efface the memory of l’année
terrible.175 This was an agenda aimed at guiding the national narrative and image to fall
in line with Du Camp’s conservative ideology, expressed not only in his contempt for the
Commune but also in his warnings against universal suffrage. Just as Ernest Lacan
envisioned the historical value of the Commune photographs, Commune “historians”
constructed their narratives with an educational utility in mind.
Maxime du Camp was not a professional historian, yet he employed an appeal to
factual data that gave his account an impression of reliability—one that implies the
growing expectation of professionalism in such narrations. Du Camp’s four-volume
series Les Convulsions de Paris relies upon contemporary documents to trace the origins,
machinations, and fate of the Commune. Although he explicitly asserts that the work is
not a history of the Commune per se, he is quick to highlight the factual basis of his
analysis and his ability to speak with restraint whenever the documents in question do not
quite support his convictions. He assures the reader that, despite the indignation that often
overwhelmed him as he wrote, he was able to remain impartial, impressed by the need for
simple honesty in his task.176
Du Camp intended Les Convulsions du Paris to be a follow-up to Paris, ses
organs in which he could combat the pro-Commune narratives. His account affirms the
anti-revolutionary perspective that the Commune was “a violent, chaotic, drunken spree,
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without political meaning or justification,” and presents the insurgents as “a disgusting
sub-proletariat of criminals, madmen and drunks.”177 Du Camp’s work is full of literary
devices that would encourage a confidence in and an emotional reaction to his analysis
among the lay readership. He speaks directly to his audience and refers to the
Communards as “traitors to the wounded nation”—an epithet that was sure to conjure
images of France’s humiliation and defeat, thereby inciting vitriolic contempt for the
partisans on the eve of their amnesty.178 Conversely, he describes the victory of the
Versailles Government as the “victoire de la légalité.”179 Such a tome was sure to earn
the support of conservative politicians who were trying to curb the growing
republicanism of the late 1870s, and is a salient example of the use of history to support
the viewpoint of the ruling class.
Published between 1878 and 1880, Les Convulsions was both caustic and timely.
Contemporaries described Du Camp’s narration of the Commune as a polemic. Although
Du Camp denounced this characterization, he betrays his bias with such remarks as “the
facts of the Commune escape politics and belong exclusively [to the field of]
criminality.”180 The publication of the series occurred amid the republicans’ conquest of
political power, which began in 1876 and culminated in the election of Jules Grévy to the
presidency in February 1879. In fact, the appearance of its first chapter in Revue des
Deux Mondes came just two weeks prior to the Crisis of 16 May, which was the direct
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result of intense political warfare between the government of the Moral Order and
republicans in the Chamber and Senate.181 Du Camp’s decision to critique the Commune
in a four-volume series—a departure from his initial tactic of diminishing it through
silence—should be understood as a response to shifts in popular perceptions of the
Commune and the political agendas submerged within the anti-Commune histories.
During this period, conservatives held a majority in the National Assembly. In echoing
and propagating the party’s portrayal of the Commune as an explosion of the alcoholinfused vituperation of malcontents, writers like Du Camp and Taine were reacting to the
rising appeal of republican candidates and the persistence of the Radical republicans’
initiatives to generate popular support for amnestying the Communards.
Despite the impact of these anti-Commune narratives, republicans secured a
majority in the Chamber during the October 1877 elections, which the Crisis of 16 May
precipitated.182 The next general elections were just a year away, and republican electoral
appeal showed no signs of abating. Furthermore, the call for amnesty was becoming
increasingly popular, as demonstrated by the success of Radical candidates who ran on
amnesty-focused campaign platforms in by-elections and local races.183
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Anti-Commune histories sought to dilute, if not demolish, the growing electoral
appeal of pro-amnesty politicians by insisting that the return of the insurgents would
result in renewed revolutionary upheaval. To that end, Du Camp cites the numerous
journals and pamphlets that the exiled Communards wrote, especially those threatening
revenge and promoting a revolutionary agenda: “one day will come, you know this,
where we will once again be masters of [Paris]. There will be no more grace, [no] more
mercy for the killers of June 1848 and May 1871.”184 Du Camp plays on the fears of his
audience by declaring, “those who are free [in exile], those who are detained have the
same ideal: to destroy a whole class of society that they were expelled from by
laziness.”185 In addition to sustaining the negative characterization of Communards, this
argument was germane to the political and social dialogue in France at that time,
particularly among republicans.
Workers were an integral part of the Radical republicans’ electoral base
throughout the 1870s. The faction’s methods of appealing to this constituency were at
odds with the Moderate republicans’ persistent denial of the existence of social and class
tensions. Furthermore, during the Crisis of 16 May, the revolutionary Left re-emerged as
a vociferous threat to mainstream (Moderate and Radical) republicans. After 1877, the
Socialist candidates began to target, not unsuccessfully, working-class and progressive
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peasant constituencies by running candidates on amnesty-based platforms.

186

Conversely, Gambetta and the Moderate republicans refused to acknowledge class
distinctions in campaign and legislative speeches as part of their effort to unite the nation
under the republican (tricolor) banner, which they insisted negated social hierarchies and
inequities. By presenting the Commune in terms that raised the specter of class discord
and revolutionary violence, Du Camp targeted the nerve center of the republican disputes
over both the general character of the Republic and the specific issue of amnesty. At the
same time, his dire warnings ratcheted up the anxiety that conservative politicians and
voters felt about amnesty and the growing republican electoral majority. In this way, Les
Convulsions not only influenced the contemporary political climate but also helped
sustain the anti-Commune narrative amid growing support for the return of the
Communards.187
Du Camp’s December 1880 election to the French Academy, which was assured
by Duc de Broglie and Dumas fils, underscores the importance of his perspective to
conservatives.188 Despite his reliance on counter-factual and manipulated data and his use
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of bias-laden omissions, Du Camp was admitted to the conservative body purportedly on
the strength of his historical analysis. In fact, the French Academy declared that “Les
Convulsions displayed…all the scholarly credentials and gravitas demanded of a
historical account and…the text served to consolidate the constructed anti-Communard
memory of Paris and the Commune.”189 Similarly, the philosopher Elme-Marie Caro
reminded his audience in his speech welcoming Du Camp that “while humanity may
forgive and politics may forget the past, it is history’s task to remember and to act as the
conscience of the nation and the human race in general.”190 Such a statement was a
rebuke of the recently approved amnesty and an affirmation of the conservative
commitment to sustaining the anti-Communard sentiment, even as the government reembraced the insurgents.
Du Camp’s narrative provides a synthesis, rather than the establishment, of the
anti-Commune narration; his assertion that the revolt was the work of alcoholic social
malcontents and an expression of working-class antagonism was hardly new.191 When the
last volume was published, President Freycinet’s Moderate republican government was in
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the process of ending a near-decade-long division over amnesty within the republican
ranks.192 Consequently, republican messaging efforts did not incorporate Du Camp’s
work. Indeed, by the time the first volume was published in 1878, and particularly after
1880, it was contrary to the Moderates’ rhetorical campaign to lay claim to the impending
amnesty. It was for exactly this reason that his text endorsed the existing conservative
denouncement of the Commune and its partisans. His acceptance to the Academy on the
strength of his historical narrative gave Du Camp’s assessment an added level of
authority that helped validate his opinions to French citizens beyond the boundaries of
academia.
Because each volume of Les Convulsions cost 7 francs 50 centimes, they were
largely bought by individuals from the upper class, people with a healthy appetite for
anti-Commune prose, and large institutions, such as the new historical library of Paris.193
Les Convulsions also had to compete with similar and opposing accounts in a saturated
market for Commune histories. Throughout the four-volume series, Du Camp
continuously juxtaposes his purportedly factual historical analysis with the allegedly
inaccurate work of the Communards and “les apologistes de la Commune.” He
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admonishes that “the slander they have printed in their little books and spread in
abundance [is] not believable,” declaring that such writers had to be delusional to think
that their works would gain “the credulity of the masses.”194 This is clearly a mixture of
opinion and hope, because many of the pro-Communard accounts were also being
circulated in France. They must be considered a factor in the growing atmosphere of
forgiveness that ushered in the passage of general amnesty during the same year that the
fourth volume of Les Convulsions was published.
Immediately after the Commune, many of its partisans fled to exile and worked to
combat the negative image of the Commune as one of drunken folly and insidious
violence. Numerous pamphlets, circulars, and published articles came into France
surreptitiously and were widely available to the French public seeking to make sense of
the cataclysm. The Communard journalist, Prosper-Olivier Lissagaray entered the
contentious market of commodified history early on with a short book titled Les Huit
Journées de mai derrière les barricades published in Belgium in September 1871. The
purpose of this piece, according to Lissagaray, was to provide the “true story of the days
of May [that] have so far only been told by the victors. We had hoped that some
connection from behind the barricade would protest against the ridiculous accounts. After
four months, no one raised a voice. It is a duty, we believe, to provoke an
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investigation.”195 Over the course of the book, Lissagaray recounts the events of the
Semaine sanglante from the Communard perspective. Like Du Camp, Lissagaray adopts
a narrative fashion that claims to provide an eyewitness account of all the events of that
last week of the Commune. Like his counterparts, Lissagaray conjures up dialogue and
applies a literary style sure to not only maintain the reader’s attention, but hopefully to
secure their concurrence with the pro-Commune perspective.
According to Lissagaray, and many other pro-Commune writers, the goal in
writing their histories was to show the “other side” of the story and to generate sympathy
with the plight of the fallen and exiled or to at least mitigate the contemptuous view of
the Communard as criminal. In contrast to Du Camp, who declared that he chose not to
chronicle some of the more heinous acts of the Commune in consideration of the
sensitivities of his readers and as a consequence of the repugnance it generates for
himself, Lissagaray provides gruesome details of the ill treatment of fallen communards,
describing their demise in a way that elicits a sense of tragic martyrdom. His description
of the death of Raoul Rigault is an excellent example of his literary efforts to mitigate
conservative contempt for the Communards:
Taking such a figure was too important for Versailles [he] was put to
death immediately. But he disdained to ask for a respite that he himself
would not have granted. In a clear voice he responded ‘Vivre la
Commune! A bas les assasins!’At once he was cornered against the wall
and executed by firing squad. His body, dressed in black trousers and an
officer’s tunic open and revealing a black waistcoat, was abandoned for
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twenty-four hours at the entrance of la rue Royer-Colard, lying in a pool of
mud and blood. His head, framed by the hair and beard where the blood
had coagulated, was terrible to see. The entire left side of the wound
where the left eye and the brain mingled in a blackish mixture; the right
eye opened [and] haggard maintained a terrible fixity. Not until ten days
after was his body delivered by soldiers and buried in the Montmartre
Cemetery. His end will be counted as brave….But those who [are all
powerful] will be forever responsible for the acts of their dictatorship. Not
far from where he died the army massacred forty nationalguard prisoners
in a street near the Pantheon.196

The close connection Lissagaray makes between Rigault’s death and the “massacre” of
forty unidentified national guardsmen personalizes the treatment of the thousands of
Communards whose executions were often obscured when they became mired in
statistical accounting or essentialized in epitaphs such as “apostles of absinth,” both of
which served to distance their humanity as they became vilified figures in a tally sheet.
The persistence of the conservative assessment precipitated a follow up to Les Huit
Journées de mai derrière les barricades; in 1876 Lissagaray published a complete history
of the Commune.
Lissagaray’s more prolific monograph, History of the Paris Commune of 1871,
was published on the eve of the republicans’ initial political triumph and at the height of
the Moral Order’s power. With this book, Lissagaray continued to combat the antiCommune narrative and the conservatives’ caustic characterization of the Communards
as drunken and barbaric. More than this, he used the book to hold mainstream republicans
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up to unrelenting scrutiny and spun his analysis in a way aimed at deconstructing their
claims to the revolutionary past and their professions of loyalty (namely on the part of the
Radicals) of fidelity to its social-democratic ideals. This monograph remains the most
significant of the Communards’ narrations due to its wide readership and continued
relevance for historians of this period. The book is “passionate, caustic, often unreliable,
coloured by his own views, friendships and enmities, yet detailed, documented and
readable.”197 Most importantly, and what Tombs does not specify, is that this book, more
than any other, consolidated and helped to propagate the pro-Commune narration,
specifically that the origins of the Commune were grounded in a belief that the new
Republic was in danger of being subverted and that the Communards were seeking to
rescue it from monarchists as well as the same republicans who had betrayed the Second
Republic after June 1848. More immediately, however, Lissagaray was seeking to
influence public opinion in a way that would facilitate the success of the on-going
amnesty proposals. In order to achieve these goals, promoting a more sympathetic
understanding of the Communards, calling into question mainstream republican fidelity
to the Revolution’s legacy of social-democratic ideals, and generating popular support for
Communard amnesty, Lissagaray needed to reach a readership beyond the already
committed adherents of the extreme Left.
In order to reach beyond a readership of committed Communard supporters,
Lissagaray was keen to declare his professionalism. He claims to have avoided hyperbole
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at all costs and continuously relies on “official” (i.e., government) documentation to
support his claims. In his preface, Lissagaray asserts that “for the past five years [I] have
sifted evidence [and] not ventured upon a single assertion without accumulated
proofs.”198 This was essential to Lissagaray because the victor is always “on the look-out
for the slightest inaccuracy to deny all the rest.”199 With that in mind, Lissagaray provides
numerous footnoted citations and a thirty-three page appendix in which many documents
are reproduced. Moreover, Lissagaray argues that he “knows no better plea for the
vanquished than the simple and sincere recital of their history…he who tells the people
revolutionary legends, he who amuses them with sensational stories, is as criminal as the
geographer who would draw up false charts for the navigators.”200 With such assertions,
Lissagaray was hoping to avoid being cast aside as just another intransigent,
romanticizing his insurgency and/or lamenting his defeat in the vacuum of exile. Based
on the multiple publications of his text, and its early translation into English and German
editions, he did reach and has sustained a large readership.201 Indeed, while Du Camp
takes aim at all Commune “apologists,” Lissagaray is clearly his main target which
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implies the popularity of Lissagaray’s work and the rivalry between their competing
narrations of the event and the impact authors hoped to have on contemporary politics.
One of Lissagaray’s essential aims when writing History of the Paris Commune of
1871 was to reframe the image of the Communard in a way that exceeded his earlier
work and mitigated the castigation that the event was no more than a phantasmagoric
Bacchanalia. In contrast to these dismissals, Lissagaray makes a diligent effort to detail
the progressive social and political initiatives that operated during the Commune and the
legal avenues they took in order to meet the pressing needs of Parisians still recovering
from the Prussian siege. These accounts were implicitly intended to be evidence of the
Communard’s clarity of purpose and scrupulous actions. Yet in his quest to present a
reliable and balanced history of the Commune, he is also highly critical of his fellow
Communards, not for their ambitions, but for their inability to carry them out. Whereas
Du Camp focuses his analysis on the personalities of the Communards and their
machinations with the government of Versailles, consistently devolving into a critique of
the Communards lack of political gravitas and acumen, Lissagaray describes the
Commune from a structural and ideological perspective and is intent on exposing its
partisans’ political sophistication and humanitarian ambitions.
Lissagaray begins by reminding the reader of the “three hundred thousand persons
without work, without resources of any kind, [who] were waiting for the thirty sous upon
which they’d lived for the last seven months” and then details how on the day after the
Commune’s proclamation, “Varlin and Jourde, [Communard] delegates to the finance
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department, took possession of that Ministry.”202 He recites their inability to open the
“coffers” due to the keys being in Versailles, their unwillingness to illegally force the
locks, and their supplication to the Rothschild Bank which ultimately gave them a credit
of one million francs that were immediately, according to Lissagaray, “distributed in all
the arrondissements.”203 Similarly, in chapter eighteen of his History, Lissagaray
describes how the city’s inhabitants were provisioned. Not to miss an opportunity to
contest the anti-Commune narration of the forthrightness of the government of Versailles,
Lissagary remarks that the city was provisioned “through the neutral zone, where M.
Thiers, however anxious to starve Paris, could not prevent a regular supply of food.”204 In
the same chapter he details the existence and labors of the Commune’s “four
delegations—Finance, War, Public Safety, [and] Exterior [which] required special
aptitude [and] the three others, Education, Justice, and Labour and Exchange, [which]
had to propound the philosophical principles of this revolution. All the delegates save
Frankel, a workman, belonged to the small middle-class.”205 The last clause is a
noteworthy example of Lissagaray’s attempt to nuance the demographics of the
Commune and to demonstrate the Communards’ serious efforts to govern.
The image that Lissagaray presents is a sharp contrast to the carnavalesque
revelry described by the Commune’s detractors and his is one that recent historians
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perpetuate.206 Whereas Du Camp, for example, never describes the four delegations in
terms of their origins or intentions but rather mentions them within the context of their
delegates’ personalities and machinations, Lissagaray is devoted to illuminating the
Commune’s administrative operations and their intentions. By Lissagaray’s account, the
Communards were quite interested in the social questions of their day and quite capable
of managing the government and bureaucracy. In fact, most historians agree that this is
potentially one of the weaknesses of the Commune; that is to say, rather than securing
their position in the battle field they were held up in committees which themselves lacked
effective leadership. Lissagaray provides ample evidence of the Commune’s comparative
lack of military strength and capable leadership: “compared with the Finance department,
that of War was a region of darkness and utter confusion.” Likewise, he denounces the
Commune’s maintenance of the Place Vendôme as being “in the teeth of common sense”
and decries that “attempts at creating a central park of artillery, or even learning the exact
number of ordinance pieces, were made in vain.” In conclusion, he states, “in this
concert without a conductor, each instrumentalist played what he liked, confusing his
own score with his neighbors.”207
Such chaos was confirmation for anti-Commune narrators like Du Camp who
asserted that alcoholism and socio-political irrationality were to blame for the
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Commune’s defeat. In contrast, Lissagaray states “in the midst of all these faults, the
humanitarian idea revealed itself; so thoroughly sound was this popular revolution.”208 To
illustrate this point, Lissagaray describes the commission created to organize secular
primary and professional education and another for the education of girls in order to:
To teach children to love and respect their fellow-creatures, to inspire
them with a love of justice, to teach them that they must instruct
themselves in the interests of all, such are the principles of morality on
which the future communal education will be based.[Going further he
writes that the municipality of the seventeenth arrondissement declared
that] The teachers of the schools and infant asylums will for the future
exclusively employ the experimental and scientific method, that which
always starts from facts, physical, moral, and intellectual. But, [he
bemoans,] these vague formulas could not make amends for the want of a
complete programme.209

Indeed, the Communards as presented by Lissagaray, earnestly sought to re-make society
in a way that ensured a secular education, and an equitable quality of life. Their faults,
according to Lissagaray, are to be found in their inability to carry their goals to fruition
during the two months of opportunity that they had. This he argues was not because a
lack of revolutionary purpose, sincerity, or seriousness, but because of ignorance among
the leaders, which he insists is “to a great extent… the offspring of past oppression.210
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Lissagaray was seeking to provide a thorough and balanced history of the Paris
Commune and with that to reshape its memory and legacy in such a way as to affect
contemporary politics including the issue of amnesty and the machinations of the
republicans who were in the process of taking control of the Third Republic vis-à-vis
monarchist and imperial conservatives. To that end, he is forceful in denouncing some of
the most widely accepted charges levied against the Communards by his anti-Commune
counterparts.
His analysis of the role of women during the Commune and the burning of Paris
during its final days are particularly salient. In the few times that the role of women is
considered, Lissagaray presents them as tragic heroines, who on March 18 “were the first
to act…, hardened by the siege—they had a double ration of misery—[and] did not wait
for the men.”211 His assertion that the Siege had hardened them is a telling qualifier to
their notorious aggression on the day of the Commune’s proclamation. Even in a rare
passage in which he explicitly acknowledges their insurgency they are represented as
noble and devoted mothers and wives:
This woman, who salutes [the communard] or accompanies
the true Parisienne. The unclean androgyne, born in the
Empire, the Madonna of the pornographers, the Dumas
Feydeaux, has followed her patrons to Versailles or works

them, she is
mire of the
fils and the
the Prussian
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mines at St. Denis. She, who is uppermost, is the Parisienne, strong,
devoted, tragic, knowing how to die as she loves. A helpmate in labour,
she will also be an associate in the death-struggle.212
The role of women in the Commune was a significant source of anxiety for the antiCommune conservatives and analysts who saw their contribution as evidence of the
Communard intention to destroy traditional gender divisions in society.
In the French and international press the anti-Commune narrators famously
denounced these women as “les pétroleuses,” the instigators of fires that destroyed Paris’
monumental buildings, which was an image that merged with their contention that
Communard women were debased, wild, and, most likely syphilitic prostitutes.

Figure XII. Bernard, 1871; Figure XIII. LeCerf, Emancipated Woman Enlightening the World, 1871.
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The conservatives perpetually highlighted the role of the “pétroleuses” in their diatribes
against the Commune. They did so not only to rebuke the upheaval of gendered norms
attributed to the Commune, but also to criticize and degrade the entire event. Such
conservative narrative constructions sought to link the Commune’s supposedly ignorant,
wild, and morally depraved women (as depicted in Figures XII and XIII above) to its
members and working-class adherents in general. It thereby helped validate the
conservatives’ denigration of the Communards’ agendas and initiatives.
Lissagaray contests this important assessment. His narration inverts the anticommunard perspective by placing the Parisian prostitute in Versailles, and similarly
accuses the anti-Communard women of working for the Prussians. Moreover, in
Lissagaray’s account of the fires that engulfed Paris during the last week of fighting, the
women of the Commune are significant in their absence. In his concluding remark, his
image of the woman barricader is transformed when he writes to the women directly:
“women, you whose devotion sustains and elevates [the exiles’] courage, let the agony of
the prisoners haunt you like an everlasting nightmare.”213 Not only does this statement
belie the fact that many of the captured Communards were women, it also reifies
Lissagaray’s image of the women of the Commune as that of supporters to, rather than
partners with, the insurgents and thereby casts them in a more traditional and thereby less
threatening role.
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Lissagary’s defense of the burning of Paris was also in direct contrast to Du
Camp’s conclusion that this was evidence of social envy and popular imbecility.
According to Lissagaray:
What men this handful of combatants, who, without chiefs, without hope,
without retreat, disputed their last pavements as though they implied
victory! The hypocritical reaction has charged them with the crime of
incendiarism, as if in war fire were not a legitimate arm; as if the
Versailles shells had not set fire to at least as many edifices as those of the
Federals; as if the private speculation of certain men of order had not its
share in the ruins. And that same bourgeois who spoke of ‘burning
everything’ before the Prussians, calls these people scoundrels because
they preferred to bury themselves in the ruins rather than abandon their
faith, their property, their families, to a coalition of despots a thousand
times more cruel and more lasting than the foreigner.214

In this tone, which is repeated throughout his 465 page history of the Commune,
Lissagaray diligently works to provide a context for the decisions and events that were
used in the Commune’s aftermath to denounce the event and its partisans as immoral and
unforgivable. In fact, he frequently turns the anti-Commune critique on its head, for
example by denouncing the partisans of Versailles as appeasers to the Prussians, in
contrast to the frequent denouncement of the Commune as an embarrassing show of
disunity in front of the victorious foreign enemy. Moreover, he reverses the republicans’
anti-Commune stance by asserting that the Commune’s very existence was an effort to
save the Republic from the monarchist ambitions of its political leadership. This
argument is significant, because not only did it proclaim that the Commune was integral
214
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to the survival of the Republic, which cast the Commune in the role of its protector, but
also because it was used by Lissagaray in his quest to influence republican politics, even
from exile.
Lissagaray was intent on countering the republican appeal to a would-be socialist
constituency through their advocacy of amnesty. He asserts that the betrayal of the
extreme Left gave Thiers’ the ability to crush the Commune in the name of the Republic.
His contempt is palpable and he repeatedly argues that the Commune was initially
proclaimed not to destroy the Republic that was declared on September 4, 1870 but to
protect it from a monarchist coup. Chapter 23 is subtitled “M. Thiers’ Policy with Regard
to the Provinces—The Extreme Left betrays Pars,” and in the introductory paragraph
Lissagaray rhetorically asks: “On 19 March, what remained to M. Thiers where-with to
govern France? He had neither an army, nor cannon, nor the large towns…A word and a
handful of men. The word was Republic; the men, the recognized chiefs of the
Republican party.”215 He goes on to assert that it was in his quest to defeat the Commune
that Thiers courted the Republic:
Though the dull rurals barked at the mere name of the Republic, and
refused to insert it in their proclamations, M. Thiers, more cunning,
mouthed it lustily, and distorting the votes of the Assembly, gave it out as
the watchword to his underlings. Since the first risings all the provincial
officials had the same refrain: ‘We defend the Republic against the
factions.216

215
216

Lissagaray, History of the Commune, Op. cit., p. 271.
Ibid., pp. 271 – 272.

117

With passages such as this, Lissagaray alludes to a notion that the Republic exists
because of the Commune by way of the negative integration that its suppression created.
Moving beyond this provocative foundation narrative, Lissagaray focuses the reader’s
attention on contemporary political concerns. In a particularly vitriolic rebuke against
Gambetta and his associates, Lissagaray writes, “Opportunism is not of yesterday’s
growth. It was born into the world on 19 March 1871, had Louis Blanc and Co. for
godfathers and was baptized in the blood of 30,000 Parisians.”217 He goes on to chronicle
Thiers’ invocation to the republican elite to help in in safeguarding the Republic:
M. Thiers met them in their lobbies, told them they held the fate of the
Republic in their hands, flattered their senile vanity, and inveigled them so
successfully, that, from the 23rd, they served him as bottle holders. When
the small middle-class republicans of the provinces beheld the profound
Louis Blanc, the intelligent Schoelcher, and the most famous grumblers of
the radical vanguard fly to Versailles, and insult the Central Committee [of
the Commune], and, on the other hand, received neither programme nor
able emissaries from Paris, they turned away, and let the flame enkindled
by the workmen die out.218

By reprimanding the Commune for its lack of political leadership and media savvy
Lissagaray tries to honor his promise to provide a balanced perspective while at the same
time he illuminates the manner in which the conservative Republic became a weapon
against the social-democratic Republic envisioned by the Communards and purportedly
supported by the Radicals.
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The remainder of this highly evocative chapter is spent on exposing the
machinations of the Opportunist and Radical republicans who, in 1876, were enjoying
electoral success in the absence of a truly oppositional labor party. It was in consideration
of their election campaigns that Lissagaray writes to the French voters not to be become
facile constituents. He reminds the reader that the court-martials continued for years after
the Commune was defeated and that even as of 1876 only a few prisoners of New
Caledonia had seen their sentences reduced and given full pardon, that in fact “the
Caledonian reservoir remained intact.”219 He takes aim at Opportunist and Radical
republicans, incensed by the irony that the Commune was being used by its detractors for
political gain and reminds the voters that after the elections of 1876, when amnesty was
once again voted on by the Chamber of Deputies, the results were “396 noes against 50
ayes… [and] Gambetta did not vote.”220 Indeed he writes that during the general election
of 1876 “the Radicals, tears in their eyes and their hands on their fraternal hearts, pledged
themselves to ask for a free and complete amnesty; even the Liberals [Moderates]
promised to ‘wipe out the last traces of our civil discords,’ as the bourgeoisie is wont to
say when it condescends to have the paving-stones cleaned which itself has reddened
with blood.”221
Lissagaray scolds republicans for not supporting the Commune but also for their
collusion in its misrepresentation. He alludes to the contemporary misrepresentations of
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the Commune by the republican press and anti-Commune historians by highlighting their
role during the event. According to Lissagaray, the press was directly responsible for
numerous denunciations during the last days of the Commune. His accusation is
remarkable for its explicitness and detail, “some journals had the specialty of false orders;
false autographs, of which the originals could never be produced, but which
were…admitted as positive evidence by the courts-martial and honest historians.”222 In a
mock dialogue between the Communards and the republican elite, he writes:
What! the whole Bonapartist and rural press may inundate the departments
with infamous articles, in which they affirm that at Paris murder, violation
and theft reign supreme, and you are silent!.... M. Thiers may assert that
his gendarmes do not assassinate the prisoners; you cannot ignore these
atrocious executions, and you are silent! Ascend the tribune; tell the
departments the truth, which the enemies of the Commune conceal from
them. But our enemies, are they your enemies too? A useless appeal,
which the cowardice of the Left knew how to elude…One only, Tolain,
asked for an explanation…Louis Blanc, Schoelcher, Greppo, Adam,
Langlois, Brisson &c., the Gérontes and the Scapins, sanctimoniously
contemplated their bombarded electors, and, fully aware of the facile
forgetfulness of Paris, dreamt of their future re-election.223

By writing their own histories, the Communards and their supporters labored to prevent
such forgetfulness and even in exile sought to induce republican constituencies to adopt a
more critical perspective of their candidates, who were at that moment campaigning
largely on the issue of amnesty for the Communards they, according to Lissagaray,
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betrayed in 1871. The use of pro-Commune narrations for contemporary political
exigencies continued long after Lissagaray’s first attempt.
In the aftermath of the 1880 amnesty, many exiles returned to France and
continued the work of nullifying the anti-Communard perspective using their personal
narrations to impact contemporary political alignment. La Commune, written by Louise
Michel, presents a salient example of the continuation of these endeavors. Michel was
one of the most notorious women of the Commune whose epithets included the Red
Virgin, the High Priestess of Anarchy, and the Angel of Petrol. Her celebrity status was
manifest upon her return to Paris from New Caledonia in November 1880, when a crowd
of 8-20,000 people excitedly and, for authorities, anxiously awaited her arrival at SaintLazare station.224 Her prestige was apparent as she was immediately greeted there by
leading Radical and Socialist Deputies and journalists; including, Georges Clemenceau,
Louis Blanc, Olivier Pain, Clovis Hughes, and Henri Rochefort who personally paid for
her expenses during the next several years.225
After the amnesty, Michel was a highly sought after celebrity of the revolutionary
Left, doggedly pursued by police spies (more than one followed her daily activities for
the remainder of her long life) and journalists. Upon her return, she was pressed by every
faction of the Left, Radicals, Blanquists, Socialists, and Anarchist circles alike, to speak
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at their public meetings; to energize their base a fact that led to unsettling competition.
For example, “Clemenceau drew on their old friendship and asked her to join the
campaign he was leading against Opportunism…; Anarchists and collectivists who hoped
to carry her off for themselves, looked with great disfavor at his friendship with a
“moderate.”226 She remained loyal to her personal friends while striving to stay above the
factional fray, consistently asserting “I want the focal point to be not my own personality,
but the Social Revolution and the women of that Revolution.”227 Indeed, she was a selfdescribed anarchist, but never refrained from insisting that anarchism, socialism,
feminism, etc., were all constituent parts of a larger movement: the Social Revolution,
which, she argued, should never be lost sight of through doctrinal intransigence. As a
consummate orator with a sensational Communard history: unyielding before the War
Council, refusing early personal amnesty, and enduring long penal servitude in New
Caledonia, Michel would ultimately “become a prisoner of her public image. She was the
incarnation of the Social Revolution, and her fame crossed national boundaries.”228
Michel propagated her social and political views through journalism and a never-ending
round of speaking tours in and outside of France, ceaselessly seeking to spur the social
revolution.
Her first speaking appearance in 1880 was at the Salle Elysée-Montmartre at a
meeting organized by the Social Study Circle of the eighteenth arrondissement. Her

226

Ibid., p. 171.
L’Intransigeant, November 12, 1880.
228
Thomas, p. 187.
227

122

audience of over 2,000 including workers, amnestied Communards, and reporters packed
a room filled with symbolic touchstones of the Commune and the Social revolutionary
movement: Marianne draped in a red kerchief and sash, black and red flags, and a kiosk
selling copies of the anarchist paper, Ni Dieu ni maître. This choice reflects Michel’s
over-arching and life-long commitment to the Commune, its legacy and its “martyrs”, but
also the social-democratic Republic it aspired to. For example, during the speech she
asserted:
It is not enough to be the party of liberty, equality, fraternity; we must also
be the party of justice;” and we shall fight those who oppose us and social
justice…We must put an end to an age when mothers go mad with grief
and children die.229

These arguments are in direct continuity with the principles she and others espoused in
1871 and which she endeavored to clarify by writing her own account of the Paris
Commune in 1898 at which time her influence remained high among the extreme Radical
and revolutionary circles.
La Commune was published just one year before Alexandre Millerand became the
first socialist Minister in Pierre Waldeck-Rousseau’s cabinet. Millerand’s inclusion
tipped off serious controversy within the socialist movement ultimately leading to the
emergence of the opposing socialist parties, Parti socialiste français and the Parti
socialiste de France. While these events are beyond the scope of this dissertation, a brief
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analysis of her post-amnesty narration enables a useful illustration of the perpetuation of
the Commune’s legacy among revolutionary intransigents. Writing after the republican
triumph and at the time when Radical republicans began to displace the Moderaterepublican political mandate, Michel’s La Commune also provides an expedient contrast
to Lissagaray’s earlier narrative.230
Michel perpetuates Lissagaray’s account that the Commune was initially
established to protect the Republic from monarchist aspirations and in protest to the
capitulation to the Prussians. Indeed, she recalls that on September 4, 1870, “we thought
we would have with the Republic victory and freedom. Anyone who spoke of surrender
would have been crushed.”231 Like her contemporaries, she goes on to recount how
quickly this image of Republican France faded in the wake of the Prussian Siege, the
capitulation, and the uncompassionate treatment of the people of Paris by the new
Republican government. However, unlike her contemporaries she is not concerned as
much with the past per se as with what that past can induce for the future.
Michel, like Lissagaray, denounces the image of the villainous Communard and
similarly asserts that “the dead on the side of Versailles were a minute handful, each one
of which [had sacrificed thousands of victims and that] on the side of the Commune, the
victims were without name and without body,” scoffing that “the official lists
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acknowledged 30,000 but 100,000 would be” closer to the truth.232 With such tracts she
affirms the pro-Commune narration of the projected image of the Versailles Government
as depraved in contrast to the anti-Commune imagery of the Communard criminal. But
unlike Lissagaray, Michel was writing as an anarchist in the post-amnesty period. Thus in
contrast to Lissagaray, who was a committed (albeit Socialist) republican, Michel
presents the Commune as the martyred first awakening to the revolutionary potential of
the French working-class population. With passages in which she exclaims: “as if
anything could prevent the eternal attraction of progress! You cannot kill the idea with
cannon fire….the end hastens more as the real idea appears, powerful and beautiful, more
than all the fictions which preceded it,” Michel sought to induce with print the same
revolutionary action she worked for throughout her life.233
Michel, who converted to anarchism en route to exile in New Caledonia, was less
concerned with penning an un-biased account of the Commune that might mitigate the
negative image of the event and its participants; instead, her mission was to incite the
next revolution. For Michel, “past and future were indissolubly linked.”234 La Commune
represents the retention of the revolutionary dream among Communards in the aftermath
of the amnesty. Her publication was an attempt to propagate the myth of the Commune
with the goal of igniting the next revolutionary movement. By 1880, the republican
narrative of the foundation of the Third Republic and the Commune’s place within that
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history had begun to take hold. The republican perspective affirmed and “sympathized
with the Commune’s republicanism, but disapproved of its revolutionary acts, [it]
accepted the Versailles Assembly as the legal authority, but deplored its royalism which
[like Lissagaray,] they blamed for the crisis.”235 In La Commune, Michel is up front about
the revolutionary agenda at work in her recollections.
In the preface she asserts that “this time is the prologue of the drama where the
axis of the human societies will change…I especially sought in this book to revive the
drama of 71.”236 She concedes that the “Commune at the present time is a point for
history; the facts, at this distance of twenty-five years, take shape…in their true
perspective [but] in the distances of the horizon, the events are piling up in the same
manner today with this difference, that then, above all France awoke, and that today it is
the world.”237 This perspective is representative of her affinity with internationalism in its
anarchist form. For Michel, the time was at hand to not only avenge the “slaughter” of the
Communards, but to endeavor revolutionary change once more. Indeed her narration,
unlike Lissagaray’s, is intimate and sometimes emotional. According to Edith Thomas,
this was Michel’s writing style in general; Thomas highlights for example that Michel
would follow “a perfectly reasonable statement—‘We wish all to receive a state

235

Tombs, The Commune, Op. cit., p. 204. See, for example, Louis Fiaux, Histoire de la guerre civile de
1871, Charpentier, Paris 1879 ; Camille Pelletan, Le Semaine de Mai, AMS, Paris 1976 ; and later
publications including Lavisse and Rambaud, Histoire generale du IVe siècle à nos jours, Vol. 12, Librairie
Armand Colin, Paris 1901 and Charles Seignobo, Histoire de France contemporaine, Vol. VIII, Hachette,
Paris 1921.
236
Michel, p. 10.
237
Ibid., p. 9.

126

education’—with a relapse into her preferred maudlin terminology: ‘May the fields no
longer run with blood and muddy streets no longer throng with prostitutes.’”238 However,
La Commune seems to have been written in a particular state of catharsis. For example,
Michel describes “advancing in the writing [of the book], I loved to relive that time of the
struggle for freedom which was my real life.”239 With such a passage she imparts a sense
of only momentary dormancy for in her final sentence she writes “the hour has come, for
a free and just humanity, it has grown too old to return to its bloody cradle.”240 Writing in
the last years of the nineteenth century, Michel believed that so-called final struggle for
the French proletariat was close at hand; she envisioned revolution on the horizon.
In fact, the political realities of France were unknown to Michel upon her return
from New Caledonia. Moreover, “the persons who had risen to power and influence in
radical circles had no interest in relinquishing their position to any legend.” 241 She was an
ambiguous figure with the revolutionary parties. She proclaimed herself to be an
anarchist, but resisted the idea of terror, always advocating instead for “a spontaneous
uprising of the people.”242 Her loyalty was to a utopian future; a future that never came
for Michel or any of the internationalists that advocated revolutionary change for France.
Between the suppression of the Paris Commune and the return of the amnestied
insurgents, Moderate republicans worked diligently to transform the political culture of
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the nation. They were successful in their endeavors to erode the traction for a
revolutionary movement, as envisioned by intransigents like Michel. By 1880, the
Moderate republican’s regime had appropriated the revolutionary tradition so effectively
that its leaders deemed the presence of the Communards to be a manageable risk. As the
following chapters describe, the key to this accomplishment was mitigating the
Commune’s memory by reclaiming the capital city’s image and presenting France as a
nation that had fully recovered, both domestically and internationally—that was “herself
again.”243
As the eager market for Commune-related narratives and photographs reveals, the
event featured prominently in the nation’s perception of its recent past. Many leaders and
social analysts of the time initially sought to disassociate the memory of the Commune
from the national political narrative. They feared the effect that its persistence might have
on the imagination of the French working class. In addition, they were concerned that a
display of national disunity would further weaken a defeated France in the international
community. Such concerns are apparent in the historical narrations that present the
Commune as a criminal insurrection or an aberration in the normal life of the nation. But
historical narration extends beyond the pages of monographs; it is also inscribed in city
landscapes, brought to life in commemorations, and implied in national presentations. In
France’s case, these ambient devices were borne out by the December 1871 decision to
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ban all photographic representations of the Commune, the rebuilding of the Vendôme
Column by January 1875, the presentation of France to the international community
during the Universal Exposition of 1878, and the national celebration staged in Paris on
June 30, 1878.
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CHAPTER 3: THE EMERGENCE OF A MEDIACRACY
Edmond de Goncourt coined the term “Médiocraté” on September 4, 1870, using
it to disparage the competence of the political leaders that presided over the birth of
France’s newest Republic. Pierre Larousse echoed that sentiment when he described the
rampant construction of statues in the years following 1871 as a veritable
“statuomanie.”244 While he acknowledged their important role in uplifting the French
people after disaster, Larousse asserted that the statues were built with so little care that
one could only consider them a celebration of mediocrity. However, “Mediacracy” is
perhaps a more appropriate label for the Third Republic’s media-focused political
character—a product of the era of mass politics in which it emerged. Throughout the
Republic’s existence, monuments, fêtes, and expositions, whether ostensibly political or
not, were uniformly seized as venues ripe for political messaging by actors with
competing agendas and ideologies from all shades of the political spectrum. Politics
during the first decade of the Third Republic operated firmly within the context of this
“Mediacracy.” Both the conservative government leaders and their republican rivals
sought to garner consent through the symbolic use of public spaces and cultural events.
During the 1870s, each of the leading political factions—the monarchical and imperial
conservatives and the Moderate and Radical republicans—used visual culture and
festivities in their competing efforts to secure control over and determine the future
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governance of the new Republic. Their distinct perspectives came through in their
divergent celebrations and expressions of modern France as a recovered, united nation.
This chapter explores examples of Mediacracy during the period prior to and
immediately following the republican victories in the Chamber elections of October
1877, with a particular focus on the Moderate republicans’ media engagement as they
were poised for victory. Each of these events displays intricate connections to the
legacies of the Commune, as well as claims to the Revolution’s heritage that Moderate
republicans were simultaneously emphasizing and seeking to tame. The first section
describes the French festive tradition and the political use of culture and visual media
during the early Third Republic. Most scholars who study the Third Republic’s festivity
and “statuomania” limit their analysis to the period following the establishment of the
Moderate republican regime in 1879. The general neglect of earlier years has resulted in a
misunderstanding of the foundation of the Third Republic. This section begins to close
that gap in knowledge by examining earlier expressions of Mediacracy within the
conservative and republican political rivalries of the 1870s. In doing so, it clarifies the
importance of such endeavors to the republicans’ grasp of political power and the
consequential longevity of the Third Republic.245
The next section analyzes the reconstruction of the Vendôme Column and the
reburials of the first victims of the Commune, Generals Lecomte and Clément-Thomas,
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on December 27, 1875. These events occurred on the very eve of the first general
elections following the Republic’s consolidation under the 1875 constitution.
MacMahon’s Moral Order regime conducted both of them, but with very different
intentions and in very different manners. This section pays specific attention to the
Column’s history of construction and deconstruction, the legacies of the Commune, and
the impact that the rebuilding and the reburials had on political rivalries and
aggrandizement prior to the republicans’ first major success in the general elections of
1876.
The final section focuses on the Universal Exposition of 1878 and the coinciding
celebration of the Republic during the Fête of June 30th. Both took place during the
height of the battle between republicans and conservatives for control of France’s
political fate. The Exposition came after the 1877 republican electoral victory but prior to
MacMahon’s resignation—in other words, in the midst of the republican rise to power
and its resulting political tensions. The purpose of the Exposition was to announce
France’s recovery from its defeat in the Franco-Prussian War and its unity after the
downfall of the Paris Commune. The official theme of the Exposition was “Paix et
Travail” (“Peace and Work”). This image of a resurgent France gained wide acceptance,
yet deep conflict lurked beneath the façade. The republicans and conservatives were
engaged in a heated battle for the Republic’s survival and significant political fissures
were resurfacing among the republicans. This section closely examines these political
realities, which contemporary observers and participants often obscured—and which
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modern historians have marginalized by focusing on the cultural impact of events like
these without connecting them to the nuanced political contests that both generated and
were affected by them. The Fête of June 30 is an excellent example of this interplay. This
celebration of the Republic occurred during the Exposition at the insistence of the
republican majority in the Chamber and was a moment in which republican revelry was
at its highest point since the birth of the Republic in September 1870. During the festival,
the republican-conservative rivalry was palpable. With conservatives controlling the
Senate and MacMahon doggedly holding on to his presidency, such an event was quite
subversive despite being officially sanctioned. The republican élan is evident in this fête,
but so too is the triumph of the Moderate republican faction over their Radical
counterparts, even on the heels of an electoral victory that propagated an image of
republican unity.
Festivity and Statuary: Constructing the Past According to the Present
The use of festivals and visual culture for aggrandizement and the cultivation of
loyalty had, by the 1870s, a long history of being used by French governments to varying
degrees of success. During the early Third Republic, celebrations, monument
construction and reconstruction were carried out in abundance by competing political
actors with contemporary rivalries in mind. Analyzing the inauguration of Emmanuel
Frémiet’s statue of Joan of Arc, the reconstruction of the Vendôme Column, the
Universal Exposition of 1878, and the Fête of June 30, within the context of
contemporary political rivalries and concerns, mitigates a significant lacuna within the
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existing historiography. Moreover, examining these constructions and events, greatly
assists in locating the political impact of the Commune’s legacies in the symbolic realm
of political culture. This chapter alternates between two analytical perspectives: the
legacy of the Commune as an influential factor of not merely French culture, but as a
more immediate and impactful feature of French politics during the Republic’s most
insecure period, and the successful attempts of the Moderate republicans to absorb the
revolutionary legacy in a way that privileged a liberal national foundation narrative which
consequentially helped the legacy’s perpetuation.
At the beginning of the Third Republic, much of what conservatives and
republicans understood about and expected from statuary constructions and festive
celebrations was informed by their experience in opposition under the Second Empire.
During the Second Empire, the use of commemorative and visual culture reached a
climax and demonstrated a significant impact in terms of garnering and retaining political
power and popular allegiance. Louis Napoleon Bonaparte’s reign lasted for twenty one
years, a feat not accomplished by any monarch in the post-Revolutionary era. As Mathew
Truesdell has shown, this longevity was owed “not to military might or personal
charisma,” but rather to “a canny politics of image and what we might call today
‘marketing’ which he pursued, in large part, through spectacles.”246 Bonaparte’s fête
Impériale, however, was not the only vision on the offer during his reign. Opposition
groups also engaged in this type of spectacular politics; in fact, the republicans’
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“oppositional festivity reached a crescendo in Paris after the liberalization of 1868 and
helped to make [them] the most dynamic political force of the day” thus presaging
republican supremacy in mediacratic-political tactics.247 The experience of the Second
Empire also influenced the monarchist-Right who, even as their electoral majority began
to wane, took care not to ignore the political capital that could be gained by operating
within a context of Mediacracy.
The elections of February 1871 resulted in a solid conservative majority with 400
of the 768 deputies being royalists including two of Louis-Philippe’s sons. The majority
of votes were given to candidates who promised to sue for peace, reflecting the
electorate’s war-weariness. However, between January 1872 and May 1873, republicans
won 31 of the 38 by-elections, thereby steadily eroding the conservative majority. In the
face of growing support for republican candidates the Moral Order rushed to embrace
Mediacracy tactics. This is witnessed in the completion of Emmanuel Fremiet’s
equestrian statue Joan of Arc at Place des Pyramids in 1874 and the sanction given to
building the Sacré-Coeur in July of 1873; just two months after MacMahon replaced
Theirs as President.248 Both of these endeavors were informed by conservative memories
of the Commune and carried out in an effort to assert the Moral Order’s conserving
agenda through their appropriation of public space and the propagation of their
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condemnation of the Commune, which they assimilated to the revolutionary past and
contemporary republicanism.
Frémiet’s statue ultimately served as a rallying point for conservative
manifestations. The statue became “the first commemorative monument of the new
Republic” and despite it being commissioned by the conservative-republican Jules Simon
in 1872 as a means to “express France’s valor and resilience," its unveiling in 1875 was
carried out as a Moral Order initiative.249 As the initiative for the statue passed into
conservative hands, it was reconceived as a symbol of liberation for restoration to shine
as a golden reminder of past monarchal glory. 250 Yet the Comte de Chambord’s
intransigence, displayed in his speech on October 29, 1874, meant that when it was
unveiled, several months later, the monarchists were indeed commemorating a dream.251

249

Frederick Brown, For the Soul of France: Culture Wars in the Age of Dreyfus, Alfred A. Knopf, New
York 2010, p. 81. According to Brown, following the Comte de Chambord’s refusal to rule under the
tricolor flag and his “sanctimonious” declaration that he would never become “the legitimate king of the
revolution” and “inaugurate a restorative regime with an act of weakness,” the Moral Order regime
“commemorated their dream at the place des Pyramids with the inauguration of Emmanuel Frémiet’s
equestrian statue of Joan of Arc.” Neil McWilliam, “Conflicting Manifestations: Parisian Commemoration
of Joan of Arc and Etienne Dolet in the Early Third Republic,” French Historical Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2,
2004, p. 388.
250
Sergiusz Michalski, Public Monuments: Art in Political Bondage 1870—1997, Reaktion Books, London
1998, pp. 14-15. As Michalski highlights, “Bishop Dupanloup of Orléans, who was the driving force
behind the Joan cult, was also the chief mediator between the” Bourbon and Orléanist factions.
251
Brown, p. 46. This is the speech in which the Comte de Chambord stubbornly insisted he would only
rule under the white flag of the Bourbon dynasty.

136

Figure I. Emmanuel Frémiet, Joan of Arc on Horseback, 1874. Bronze, 1899. Place des Pyramids.

The crusading statue depicts a uniquely militant version of Joan gazing not at the
heavens but rather, confidently focused on and marching her mount in the direction of the
Tuileries Palace from the site of its installation at Place des Pyramids. 252 The statue’s
subject, pose, and the timing of its inauguration in 1874 are all loaded with references to
the contemporary political context and the Commune. At the time of the statue’s
construction and unveiling, the prospect of an impending restoration—even if not under
the leadership of Comte de Chambord—was the strongest it had been, and would ever be,
since the Republic’s declaration. As described by Michalski, “Joan’s pose, and the role
the statue was to play, can be understood properly only when we recall her mission: to
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liberate and enter French cities on behalf and in the service of her legitimate monarch.”253
The statue’s place was chosen because it was “near the site where [Joan] was wounded
during battle against the English invaders.”254 However, the location and orientation
enabled another symbolic meaning: Joan is charging toward the burnt out remains of the
Tuileries Palace—on of the only sites the Communards never contested setting ablaze.255
In this light, the statue can also be read as a permanent conservative rebuke to the
Commune, and specifically its destructive capacity.
At the statue’s February 19th unveiling, political fissures were palpable. The
unveiling came less than a month after the Republic’s constitution narrowly passed with a
majority held with the sway of just one vote.256 During the months of February and
March that followed, the constitutional laws on the Senate and the organization of
government were voted upon following serious partisan battles. Underpinning all of this
was the fact that through by-elections, Bonapartism was demonstrating an uptick in
popularity and the Prince-Imperial had just come of age precipitating plans for
Bonapartists to make a pilgrimage to Chislehurst in his honor.257 Thus the unveiling of
Frémiet’s statue served as a flashpoint where political and ideological rivalries might
explode into violence.
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In the 1870s multiple political factions from the Right and Left had adopted Joan
of Arc as a national symbol.258 By the dawn of the Third Republic Joan’s republicaninspired image as “heroine of national liberation and as a victim of the treachery of
church and crown,” was being displaced as Catholics began to “reclaim Joan as a saint
and martyr whose humble origins and patriotic credentials could be exploited to enhance
the church’s appeal in rural communities.”259 This contestation over Joan’s image was
itself symbolic of the religious and social tensions between republicans and conservatives
during the Republic’s foundation. The unveiling in 1874, was unofficial and not
publicized. According to McWilliam and Best, the lack of ceremony and publicity was
“ostensibly to avoid offending the German government.”260 However, the conservative
government was generally reluctant to stage ceremonies that invited potentially unruly
masses to participate; moreover in light of contemporary political and ideological debates
over Joan’s legacy, the possibility that an inauguration ceremony might lead to political
violence probably influenced the decision to mute the unveiling at least as much if not
more than diplomatic concerns regarding the German government. Indeed, only 150
attended the inauguration and the only skirmish came when “an animated discussion of
France’s recent defeat prompted police intervention” but the mere kerfuffle was hardly
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noticed by the press.261 After the inauguration of Fremiet’s statue, the importance of Joan
of Arc began to fade within the republican cache of symbolic martyrs. On May 30, 1878
the conservative-Right’s appropriation of the statue, as a site for counter-demonstrations
against republican authorities, began in earnest.
By 1878 republicans held a majority of seats in the Chamber following the Crisis
of 16 May. May 30, 1878 was Voltaire’s centennial, coinciding with the Universal
Exposition during which republican triumphalism was prominent. However, the
centennial also coincided with Joan of Arc’s martyrdom and, as a rebuke to the
republican display of reverie for the Enlightenment and anti-clerical principles embodied
by Voltaire and pursued by the republicans who were apparently taking control of the
Republic, a counter-demonstration at Frémiet’s statue was planned. In contrast to
celebrations in honor of Voltaire, the counter-demonstration at Frémiet’s statue was
banned. This reflects the shifting locus of political power from monarchical to republican
factions and consequently the republicans’ ability to carry out mediacratic-politics even
more effectively.
During the majority of the first decade of the Third Republic, republicans retained
their oppositional role against the regime in power. Throughout this period, Moderate
republicans worked to cultivate the allegiance of as broad a constituency as possible
meaning they reached out to voters who transcended socio-economic borders. To this
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end, they presented themselves as the political leaders that would protect the needs and
desires of agricultural and small town communities and maintain a peaceful and
prosperous nation. But they also engaged in an important campaign to singularly claim
France’s revolutionary heritage. Each of the republican factions were legitimately and
undeniably “children of the Revolution” and this heritage, especially in the wake of the
Commune, was controversial and a potential political liability. During the 1870s, the
conservative regime persistently denigrated that past in their political speeches,
parliamentary debates, and journalism seeking to negatively unite the nation behind the
banner of restoration. Unable and unwilling to denounce their revolutionary origins,
republicans, but especially the Moderates propagated a counter-narrative of the
revolutionary past and the Republic’s revolutionary origins wherein they distanced
themselves from the Terror and the Commune but upheld the liberal tendencies of the
pre-1793 period, the July Monarchy, and the early phase of Second Republic. While this
narrative had been engaged by the Moderate republicans under the Second Empire, by the
1870s, this aspect of their political messaging was an effort to provide historical
legitimacy for their contemporary republican political agenda, a way of countering the
growing popularity of the Radicals and a means by which to effect the closure of the
revolutionary era by upholding its triumph as embodied in the liberal Republic that their
electoral success would secure.262 With martial law in place in Paris until 1876 and the
nation-wide restriction imposed by MacMahon’s Moral Order party on free assembly and
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press, these campaigns were necessarily waged by taking advantage of the levers of
culture and visual and commemorative media. This led republicans to seize moments
deemed ripe for political messaging, such as the funerals of key republican figures.
The use of funerary reverie for political aggrandizement and subversive
messaging has been extensively researched and analyzed, most notably by Ben-Amos.263
Such politically advantageous cultural expressions were part of the republicans’ mediabased electoral and national narrative messaging conducted during the Moral Order’s
repressive regime which the elections of October 1877 had yet to completely demolish.
Ben-Amos describes the republican use of funerals in terms of giving “luster and
legitimacy to a republican form of government born in revolution and opposition to the
Catholic Church.”264 His analysis enables the deduction—it is never explicitly stated—
that this long-honed tool (the public funeral) was a practice that was beneficial to the
permanent reclamation of public space as a means to effect the republicanization of the
nation. Ben-Amos’ account sheds minimal light on intra-republican rivalries that these
events hosted and impacted and when he does it is not until the case of Hugo’s funeral in
1885, which was long after such rivalries had begun to be politically impactful.
Furthermore, with the exception of Thiers’ funeral in the summer of 1877, he neglects to
examine their relation to electoral campaigns, but Thiers’ funeral provides only the most
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obvious (and most cited) correlation. In fact, these funerals were frequently used as tools
through which the different republican factions tried to differentiate themselves in front
of the voting public. When Thiers was buried, this rivalry was muted which was in
accordance with the campaign of the 363. Conversely, François-Vincent Raspail’s funeral
just four months later, which Ben-Amos does not analyze, witnessed significant factional
contestation.265
F.V. Raspail’s funeral took place when republicans were seeking to gain a Senate
majority and the republican unity, vociferously claimed in 1877, was disintegrating. His
funeral provides an excellent example of how such moments were used to propagate a
specifically temperate republican image and at the same time were flashpoints of intrarepublican rivalries and events during which the revolutionary Left began to bring their
perspectives before the court of public opinion. By the time of his death, Raspail had a
long history of arrests, trials and imprisonment for violent political action. However,
Raspail had not been politically active in the time leading up to and during the
Commune.266 This, coupled with his dual status as a celebrated man of science, meant
that in 1878, Raspail’s political history could be appropriated by the Moderates who
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obscured his violent past and highlighted instead his status as an elected official of the
Third Republic, his life-long dedication to science, and his work to alleviate the lives of
the poor. Nonetheless, Gambetta chose not to attend the funeral and instructed his
followers to do the same, reflecting his political estimation that attending the funeral of
such a radical figure, despite the event’s moderate tone, might endanger the republican
electoral élan. In 1878, the republican Republic had yet to be achieved. Republicans held
a majority in the Chamber but had yet to capture the Senate and Presidency. From the
Moderates’ perspective, the republican movement couldn’t suffer republican division or
an overt association with militant republicanism. Yet, as a Radical republican, Raspail’s
funeral was potentially useful with respect to projecting republican unity; “with certain
strategic omissions, [his legacy] could be sculpted into the exact kind of material the
republicans wanted to claim the Third Republic was made of.”267 Moreover, as a
republican with nothing but the issue of amnesty to connect him with the Commune,
honoring Raspail lent the Moderates a good measure of popular support.
During Raspail’s widely attended funeral on January 13, 1878, only two orators
made reference to his revolutionary past: Louis Blanc, his friend and comrade from 1848,
who used it to assert the closure of the revolutionary era and Emile Gautier who was not
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invited to speak, but seized the platform in order to make a bid for amnesty and to
promote the “immortality of Rasapil’s example” as inspiration for future social
revolutionaries. In his unsanctioned speech, Gautier alluded to the Communards stating
that like Raspail, they were merely guilty of “having loved the Republic too much…that
it fell into the hands of the younger generation to honour this forefather…, by gathering
up the flag of social revolution from the blood of its martyrs and raising it on Raspail’s
half-opened tomb.”268 Gautier’s impudence reflects the revolutionary Left’s impatience
with mainstream republicanism and their growing unwillingness to stifle their opinions
for the sake of republican unity in the name of safeguarding the Republic. Despite
Gautier’s uninvited and revolutionary oration, Raspail’s 1878 funeral was far from a call
to collective action. Instead, the sanctioned speeches were moderate and the funeral was
repeatedly compared (by the republican press) to Thiers’ funeral staged just four months
prior, as a further example of the republicans’’ ability to govern a peaceful nation.
Despite the moderate tone of the sanctioned eulogies and the tranquil
comportment of the crowd, the conservative press excoriated the funeral. As Dodd’s aptly
points out, the conservatives’ denunciation of the event should be understood within the
context of the Moral Order’s declining electoral appeal in contrast to the recent
affirmation of the republican majority in in the Chamber. Conservative journalists
specifically lamented the exploitation of the event to promote anti-clericalism. For
example, Le Français decried “the absence of prayers, the bouquets of immortelles, the
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delegation of freemasons, and cries of ‘Vive la République!’” According to the
conservative journal, this “amounted to a revolutionary atmosphere.”269 The apparent
pro-amnesty sentiment of the attending crowd was also a source of conservative
contempt. The pro-amnesty view was clarified in Gautier’s unsanctioned speech as well
as by Bouchet, who “reminded the crowd that one of Raspail’s sons was still living in
exile after having been condemned for promoting amnesty,” recalling Raspail’s own
recent imprisonment for “suggesting, in the name of national unity, the republicans
forgive and forget the civil conflict that marked the Commune.”270 But such a remark was
incredibly moderate compared to the radical and revolutionary sentiments on display at
several previous and future funerals of Radical and revolutionary leaders, including
Victor Noir’s in January, 1870 and Blanqui’s in January, 1881. Furthermore, the
conservative journalists did not distinguish between sanctioned speeches such as those of
Blanc and members of the Raspail family versus Gautier’s. This of course would have
nuanced the republican position on amnesty and negated the on-going conservative
campaign to assimilate the republican and Communard identities. Instead, by castigating
the funeral’s anti-clerical tenor and its amnesty supporting participants, the conservative
press was sustaining the electoral messaging of the Moral Order.
The funeral officially ended with Raspail’s son Benjamin’s directive: “after this
calm and imposing ceremony, all that is left, citizens, is for us to draw inspiration from
the sentiments of François-Vincent Raspail, and to work for the complete triumph of
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republican institutions.”271 Indeed, Louis Blanc’s “message that Raspail’s association
with political violence belonged to the heroic—but finished—past” of republican
militarism, became the dominate motif in the republican press’ recollections of the day.
The following month, Blanc underscored the closure of the era of militant
republicanism at the unveiling of the monument to Ledu-Rollin on the thirtieth
anniversary of the Second Republic by paying “homage to [the 1848er’s] advocacy of
universal suffrage which embedded the Republic not by riot but by fraternal popular
will.”272 For Rollin’s funeral, the family insisted upon respecting his stated wishes; the
event did not host the type of republican political orations witnessed at so many others.
Blanc’s pronunciation before the monument, inaugurated three years after his death,
enabled the opportunity to pontificate on republican values enshrined in their
safeguarding universal suffrage during the promulgation of the 1875 constitution. Within
less than a year before the 1879 Senate elections, but after the republicans had reaffirmed
their electoral mandate in October 1877, the timing of the monument’s construction and
the pointedness of such a pontification should not be underestimated by attributing them
to Rollins legacy alone.
Whether during the monument inaugurations, reburials, or funerals, electoral
messaging was of paramount importance to the events’ organizers. As previous scholars
have made clear, these moments served as venues through which to propagate competing
ideologies and political agendas. At the same time, acute electoral concerns were

271
272

Le Rappel, January 9, 1878.
Gildea, Children of the Revolution, Op. cit., p. 253.

147

significant and these events, such as the case of Thiers’ funeral in 1877, could be quite
beneficial to more explicit electoral addresses. The following sections, are devoted to the
most outstanding examples of politics operating within the context of competing
Mediacracies wherein statuary construction and fêtes, designed to symbolize France’s
resilience and recovery where venues in which the character of France’s reconstruction
and political consolidation were being negotiated.

Demolition of the Past: Reburials and Reconstructions
During the Commune, the city of Paris was not only a literal battle ground but
also a symbolic one. The demolition of some of Paris’ most famed and important
buildings such as the Hôtel de Ville, the Tuileries Palace, the Palace of the Legion of
Honor, the Palace of Justice, as well as more than two hundred homes, including that of
Adolphe Thiers, were among the events most lamented by the Commune’s detractors.
Arguably the most significant act of destruction was the toppling of the Vendôme
Column on May 16, 1871. This was carried out as one of the last acts of the Commune
just days before the Versailles troops entered Paris. The Column’s destruction was
important because of the symbolism involved in both the Column itself and the act of
tearing it down.
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Figure II. Vendôme Column circa 1860; Figure III. Vendôme Column’s destruction in 1871.

This tortured column, in fact, had a long history of destruction and re-construction
with the figure on top often changing to reflect the leadership or intended spirit of
governance. The column was erected during Napoleon Bonaparte’s reign as the Colonne
d’Austerlitz in commemoration of his 1805 victory in that battle and modeled after
Rome’s Trajan Column. In 1814 Napoleon I’s statue at the top of the column was
destroyed and replaced by a statue of Henry IV in celebration of the Bourbon restoration.
The Fleur-de-lys took Henry IV’s place when Louis XVIII fled the capital during
Napoleon’s “cent jours.” Then, in 1830 Louis-Philippe replaced this symbol once again
with the figure of Napoleon I, this time donning a frockcoat and hat, in reflection of his
“bourgeois monarchy.” During the Second Empire, Napoleon III changed the statue of
his great uncle to one more commemorative of the great days of the First Empire with
Napoleon wearing the attire of a Roman Emperor. Hence, this monument had endured a
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long struggle in battles for public space and national commemoration. It’s no surprise
then that it would become a target for the latest revolutionary upheaval in 1871.
According to the Communards, the entire Column was torn down as a symbolic
blow to a “monument to barbarity, a symbol of brute force... a permanent insult to the
vanquished by the victor.”273 The day after it was destroyed, the revelry continued in the
pages of the Journal Officiel: “the date of 26 floréal will be glorious in history, because it
consecrates our rupture with militarism, that bloody negation of all human rights.”274 In
reflection from exile, Lissagaray asserts that the demolition was an “inspiration, popular,
humane, profound, showing that a war of classes was to supersede the war of nations,
[adding without apparent irony, that it] aimed at the same time a blow to the ephemeral
triumph of the Prussians.”275 At the same time, the Column’s destruction had a more
immediate catalyst and intention than the generalized notion of asserting human rights or
antimilitarism. According to one Communard witness, its toppling was a symbolic
statement of the demolition of the contemporary French State and society: “I saw the
Vendôme Column fall, it collapsed all in one piece like a stage décor on a nice bed of
trash…This colossal symbol of the Grand Army—how fragile, empty, miserable! It
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seems to have been eaten out from the middle by a multitude of rats, like France itself,
like its old tarnished glory.”276
Kristin Ross convincingly assimilates the Commune’s attack on social and
political verticality with their demolition of the Column.277 Furthermore, she concurs
with Jacques Rougerie that the Commune itself was a response to the Second Empire’s
years of social and political (not to mention geographic) marginalization of workers who,
in tearing down the Column, signified one of the most important underpinnings of the
Commune: the retaking of the city’s center by the “exiles” who had been displaced and
subjugated under the Empire.278 The demolition of the Column was indeed a “final
spectacle of memory and resistance played out in a ceremony of destruction…bringing
down an idol to proclaim a euphoric new order, shattering bronze to rupture time and
history… [it was] an act of anti-commemoration.”279 According the Janice Best, many of
the rebuilding projects and new statuary constructions testify to the Third Republic’s
endeavor to reestablish order and legitimacy, often times, by “emphasizing historical
continuity.”280
Rebuilding the Column, and restoring Napoleon I in the Roman attire
commissioned by Napoleon III, was an act that not only effaced the recent past but also
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glorified the days of monarchal governance that the conservative majority strove to
resurrect. Therefore, even if one considers the Column’s restoration within the longue
durée of French history, it necessarily, as the conservative regime intended, ruptured the
reality of continuity. Furthermore, David A. Shafer astutely points out a fact that scholars
who describe the Column’s reconstruction often ignore which is that that the destruction
of the Column was not an original idea.281 The Column was hardly a sacred monument
for the legitimists and while Orleanists may have retained some of their conservativeliberal adherence to the cult of Napoleon, it had been seriously eroded by the advent of
the Second Empire and its recent demise.282 Similarly, “upon the fall of the Second
Empire …even Moderate republicans like Jules Simon suggested more suitable uses for
the Column’s bronze,” in fact, prior to the Prussian siege, Courbet’s “spirited campaign
to destroy the entire column” was hardly controversial.283
The multiplicity of political factions that had no great admiration for the Colonne
d’Austerlitz, testifies to some of the misunderstandings regarding the Commune’s origins
and the royalist initiative to reconstruct the imperial monument. The Commune did, as
Rougerie asserts, have significant origins in the social, political, and geographic
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displacement of substantial segments of the French working classes and petit-bourgeois
during the Second Empire. Yet it was also the manifestation of intra-republican rivalry,
between Moderate, Radical, and Socialist-republicans, which had begun to resurface
during the last liberal years of the Second Empire.284 None of the republican factions
were partial to the Column’s continued presence yet the fact that it was the Communards
who took the initiative to tear it down, gave the act an unacceptable legacy. This is also
why royalist leaders of the early Republic endeavored to rebuild it. As surely as the
Column’s destruction was a symbolic manifestation of demolishing French social and
political verticality, the rebuilding of the Column was an equally important act for the
government of the Third Republic. For republicans and royalists alike it was the
reclamation of the city’s center for the privilege of its pre-Commune inhabitants and an
effacement of the ostentatiousness of the revolutionary-republican faction, which neither
the Moderates nor the Radical republican factions were opposed to in the early 1870s.
The decree for the re-building of the Column was passed in May 1873, just after
MacMahon replaced Thiers as the President. For the conservative leaders of MacMahon’s
government, this was indeed part of the physical erasure of the Commune’s legacy; and
just as the Communards sought to shatter history, these politicians endeavored to rebuild
the past. Taking the initiative to re-build a Napoleonic monument, the Moral Order
government, in control of the Republic, no doubt exemplifies Ross’ assertion that “an
awareness of social space, the example of the Vendôme Column makes clear, always
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entails an encounter with history—or better, a choice of histories.”285 Yet, the rebuilding
of the Column, undertaken by royalist leaders, regardless of MacMahon’s personal
military history under the Second Empire, had far less to do with honoring the
Napoleonic past or the Grand Army, rather its restoration had more immediate concerns
in minds of the French voting citizenry.286
Rebuilding the Column and the funeral procession for Generals Lecomte and
Clément-Thomas from the Invalides to Père-Lachaise cemetery provided an opportunity,
on the eve of the general elections, to make a conservative-reclamation of Parisian public
space, a fact that was made explicit by the conservative press. The rebuilding, which was
completed in December 1875, especially in light of its coinciding with the reburials of the
first victims of the Commune, was primarily an act of negative commemoration of the
conservative Republic’s physical suppression of the Commune and its symbolic erasure
of its legacy. Indeed, according to contemporary press reports, on December 27th, several
thousand people of the “orderly class of citizens,” came to marvel at the installation of
Napoleon’s bronzed statue.287 As described by Le Figaro, the only act of sedition carried
out during the statues’ placement was the unfurling of a white flag, much to the surprise
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of the reporter who had apparently expected, if anything, the appearance of a red flag.288
In recalling the funeral procession for Generals Lecomte and Clément-Thomas, Le
Constitutionnel’s coverage uniquely mingled the reburials with the statue’s installment:
there, in the midst of great dignitaries of State, surrounded by many
troops, they were lifted from the bloody disgrace their tormentors
[subjected them to]… the procession passed through the entire
city…where the red banners of the Commune and the immortelles of the
free-thinkers had cynically triumphed, the national flag and the religious
draperies took their revenge… After five years spent in mourning and
concern, terrorized by an insignificant minority…it will give…confidence
in the mandate of the conservative cause all the strength it had lost.289

This was the newspaper’s leading article that day, which itself was a rare place of
prominence not given in most of the other newspapers and it uniquely merged the
impression of the statue’s installment with the reburials. The fact that the (unnamed)
author took this opportunity to venomously describe the meaning of the day’s event in
terms of conservative reclamation of social and cultural predominance and the restoration
of confidence in the conservative mandate should come as no surprise given the
forthcoming elections and the newspaper’s Bonapartist sympathies.290
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The timing of the Column’s completion both with respect to the reburials and the
Christian holiday, gave a permanent physical expression to the maintenance of the city
center’s conservative social, political, and moral order. Consider, for example, the choice
to construct the expiatory Basilica of the Sacré-Coeur on the high hills of Montmartre
which not only demonstrates the reclamation of what Ross describes as social and
political verticality, was also intended to be a permanent rebuke of the actions taken by
the recalcitrant population of this peripheral arrondissement. This was a penitent
monument, designed to expiate the sins of the Communards. Conversely, the Vendôme
Column, which reoccupied one of the most conservative spaces in the center of Paris,
symbolically reclaimed that space for conservative respectability and rather than to
expiate, it was designed to uphold a glorious military past.
The re-burials of generals Lecomte and Clément-Thomas and their juxtaposition
with the capping of the rebuilt Column with Napoleon’s bronzed statue, provides an
important element of the contemporary political context that has been underappreciated
by historians. In Molding the National Memory: The State Funerals of the French
Republic, Avner Ben-Amos provides a brief account of the reburials and he highlights
their association with the Column’s inauguration but does not take the political context of
the promulgation of the 1875 constitution or the forthcoming general elections into
account. Similarly, Boime juxtaposes the rebuilding and reburials but also, makes no
mention of the political context, choosing like Ben-Amos to remain confined to cultural
and ideological considerations as though politics and culture are mutually exclusive, or as
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if national memory construction and ideological edification were the only elements at
stake in funerary or other cultural initiatives.291 Furthermore, despite the sub-title of his
monograph, Brown never mentions the rebuilding or the reburials. More recently, David
A. Schafer analyzes the rebuilding of the Column in terms of the use of visual media to
influence perceptions of the Commune but does not make the connection between this
agenda and electoral messaging. 292
The reburials and the statue’s reconstruction occurred just under a year after the
Republic was narrowly consolidated by the January 1875 constitution, and on the very
eve of the first general elections.293 These events occurred at a time when anti-Commune
sentiments were still intense, and therefore potentially exploitable, among the electorate.
At the same time, this was the election cycle in which Radical republican candidates and
deputies had become insistent upon pushing for a general amnesty for all
Communards.294 The reburials and the reconstruction were components of the Moral
Order’s rhetorical campaign to assimilate the political agenda of all republicans to that of
the Communards as a negative warning about the supposed revolutionary intent of all
republican factions. The events should be viewed as constituent parts of the Moral
291
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Order’s on-going electoral campaigns. While later scholars might not appreciate the
connection between such events and acute electoral exigencies, in an era of mass politics,
and with an incredibly important election just one month away, contemporary politicians
certainly did. The conservatives’ use of Mediacracy and therein their projections of an
alternate vision of France’s history, one that was counter-revolutionary, pious, and not
republican were grounded in the context of their ideological contestations against the
republicans, but more acutely, carried out with an immediate electoral outcome in-mind.
The political climate during the winter of 1875—1876 was incredibly contentious.
The last session of the National Assembly occurred between November 4th and December
31st. Within that time frame “conservatives rushed through an astonishing amount of
legislation, which included their controversial bill authorizing the establishment of
Catholic institutions of higher education.”295 On the other end of the spectrum, On
December 20th, the Radical deputy, Alfred Naquet, who would soon be embroiled in a
heated electoral battle against Gambetta, introduced a new general amnesty bill for “all
political crimes and lesser offenses committed since September 4, 1870.”296 The bill was
quickly voted as out of order but not before it tipped off a serious uproar in the
Assembly.297 Within this divisive context, the 75 life-senators were elected. In the
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aftermath of serious ideological acrobatics wherein Bonapartists, led by Raoul Duval, and
the most extreme members of the legitimist factions, the Chevau-léger led by La
Rochette, colluded with republicans, led by Gambetta, at the expense of the center-Right,
generally, but more pointedly, against Broglie and Buffet.298 Furthermore, as the winter
break was approaching, one of the most contentious issues was decided, against the
wishes of the republican minority; a joint bill to relax press controls and lift the state of
siege was not to be disjointed and was ultimately rejected, meaning the general elections
would be carried out under martial law. This was a condition that the Prussians
themselves lifted for the February 1871 elections and illustrates the degree to which the
Moral Order regime sought to retain social and political control on the precipice of their
electoral decline. By Christmas Eve, MacMahon along with most other members of
government, as well as the Imperial Prince, Jerôme, had returned to Paris in time to take
part in constituent meetings, the reburials of generals Lecomte and Clément-Thomas and
to venture a glimpse at the newly rebuilt Vendôme Column. The official closure of the
National Assembly would not occur until December 31st but the election season had
already been declared open by the Minister of Interior on December 10th.
The venomous political situation in which the Radicals were continuing to
promote amnesty, the conservatives, when not fighting amongst themselves, were giving
serious sanctions to the clerical contingent, and the men of the Moral Order were
accurately perceiving a fight for their political lives on the immediate horizon, is made
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abundantly clear when reading contemporary news reports.299 The press reports on the
reburials and the Column were submerged between vociferous accounts of the on-going
political battles and what Le Temps referred to as fièvre électorale.300 For the most part,
the accounts of the events were sterile and matter-of-fact, if not simple reprints of the
official description. However, political alignment certainly colored some of the
impressions, especially in the case of more politically pronounced journals such as Le
Consitutionnel, La Presse and Le Figaro.
On December 27, Le Figaro published a lengthy diatribe written by Saint-Genest
in which he laments the lack of ceremony involved in the column’s reconstruction. In the
article he asserts:
If we were a different people, it [the columns completion] would be an
immense event, an immense expiation. Expiation for all the [acts carried
out between] the men of September 4th up to the pirates of the Commune
who should be arranged at the base of the column so every French person
can shout to them while passing: Wretches, return our honor! … but the
government ordered that [the completion] was done in darkness and
silence…and he was right to act this way; he had [good] reason since the
Colonne d’Austerlitz no longer belongs to France… it belongs to [the
Bonapartist] faction, and to speak of it would be to play into the hands of
that faction’s game.301
While the assertion that the Column’s completion was carried out in darkness and silence
was a gross overstatement, Saint-Genest highlights a significant incongruity, why was

299

The rejection of both Broglie and Buffest in their quest to secure life positions in the Senate, along with
the republican contingent which was much stronger than MacMahon’s cabinet had anticipated, meant that
the Senatorial elections were viewed as paramount to the retention of their position and thereby the
possibility of a restoration in the future. For a representative sample, see Le Figaro, L’Univers, Journal des
Débats, Le Constitutionnel, La République Française and La Presse December 26-29, 1875.
300
Le Temps, December 26, 1875.
301
Saint-Genest, Le Figaro, December27,1875.

160

there no re-inauguration ceremony, why was the reconstruction not celebrated? On the
one hand, the government rebuilt the Column “in exactly the same style as before,
[which] was meant to efface the Commune from history by removing all visible signs of
it from Paris.”302 Its reappearance without fanfare was a subtly symbolic cleansing of
recent events; as though they had never occurred. Furthermore, to have staged a great a
re-inauguration ceremony would have opened the possibility for a republican counterdemonstration and potentially generated a debate on the merits of the Commune’s action,
especially in light of the multiplicity of pre-Commune advocates of tearing it down. On
the other hand, Saint-Genest gets right to heart of the electoral context when he states that
to mention it or celebrate it would be to play into the hands of Bonapartist factions.
Similarly, La Presse underscored potential political gains in their lengthy description of
the reburials of Generals Lecomte and Clément-Thomas.
Generals Lecomte and Clément-Thomas were killed before nightfall on the first
day of the Commune, despite being under the protection of the Paris National Guard
following Thiers’ retreat from the capital.303 Lecomte had led the 6,000 Versailles troops
into Paris on March 18th, under Thiers’ orders to claim the cannons at the Butte of
Montmartre. General Clément-Thomas however, was not involved in the Army’s mission
that day. Rather, the unpopular former commander of the Paris National Guard was
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spotted wearing civilian clothes in the vicinity of the melee that afternoon.304 According
to the Communards, and later scholars, Lecomte was killed for having ordered his troops
to fire on the crowd on the morning of March 18th, whereas Clément-Thomas was killed
in retribution for his part in suppressing the insurgents of June 1848. Their deaths were
immediately referred

to,

by conservatives

and

republicans,

as

martyrdoms.

Commemorating their deaths offered propitious images to each of the mainstream
factions. For example, Clément-Thomas, the self-described Moderate republican could
stand as a useful foil against conservative castigations that all republicans were in league
with the Communards; the republicans who attended his reburial perceived a useful tool
of propaganda.
In contrast to the Column’s reconstruction, the reburials occurred with great
publicity and pageantry. As described by the Moderate-republican newspaper, La Presse:
The [Generals’] funeral took place yesterday with great pomp… All the
reactionary papers, which stop at nothing for election purposes, are
exploiting this sad ceremony and shamelessly take advantage of the
mournful circumstance to agitate, once more, at the eve of the elections,
their famous red specter. The Bonapartist papers distinguish themselves
above all… It’s a lost cause. All these outdated clichés can still impress
those in Versailles; but France can no longer be moved… Its good sense
does not confuse the Republic with the Commune, the republicans with
the assassins of 18 March, the slaughterers and the incendiaries of May. At
the funeral that was celebrated at Invalides there were many Left-wing
deputies; the people representing the republican opinion insisted on
protesting in such a way [to demonstrate] their sympathy for the two
victims and their feeling against the coward killers. Let the Bonapartist
papers present the republicans as the friends of the Commune…, the
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[country] knows where the true friends of the Commune are [based on the
reports of the War Council].305

La Presse was particularly keen on denigrating the Communard-republican assimilation,
which conservatives, as the following chapter will make clear, repeatedly asserted. In
messaging that painted republicans as Communards, conservatives sought to raise the
specter of revolution and social degeneration as being the necessary outcome of the
growth of republicanism. Conservatives muddled the distinctiveness between men such
as Jules Simon, who repeatedly rejected the multiple amnesty proposals, with that of the
Radicals such as Louis Blanc or Victor Hugo, who were repeat proponents of the
amnesty bills and, quite literally, friends of the Communards.306 Simply taking part in the
reburial ceremony enabled republicans to belie such a crude characterization. For
example, La Presse did not explicitly point out these intra-republican distinctions. This is
indicative of the Moderate-republican quest to project a unified image of republicans,
especially before the next Senate elections, and to represent the republican movement in a
way that was as distant as possible from any supportive association with the still-widely
condemned event.307 However, Le Figaro’s and La Presse’s coverage converge with
respect to the political context of these events being of primary concern.
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Le Figaro and La Presse position the Bonapartist factions as the most auspicious
political actors seeking benefit by the Column’s reconstruction and the reburials of the
Commune’s first victims. As true as this assessment may have been, the journals’
denigration of Bonapartist opportunism should be considered within an electoral context.
The electoral support given to Bonapartist candidates between 1873 and 1875 in reverse
proportion to candidates from either of the monarchist factions meant that for republican
and monarchist candidates and journalists, the Bonapartists were considered an
immediate threat to their electoral chances and thereby to the political future of the
French nation each side was seeking to secure.

The recollections of foreign

correspondents, reveals yet another aspect of the days’ events.
Whereas La Presse and Le Figaro both highlighted the political exploitation of
the funeral, an exercise in hypocrisy on the part of La Presse given the republicans’ own
use of funerary manifestations, the Paris correspondent for The Standard brings to light a
different perspective and one not tendered by any in the French journals that have been
reviewed. According to their Paris correspondent who witnessed the events:
Two features came under my notice which I did not think prudent to
mention in my dispatch … that nothing could have been more disgraceful
than the behavior of the police in the churchyard and at its gates, it would
in all probability never have found its way across the Channel…. [At the
cemetery, around 500 persons entered after troops and mourners had left]
but they were prevented from getting near it by a strong body of
policemen, whose roughness and language were most insulting…. I have
no hesitation in saying that the behavior of M. Léon Renault’s satellites
was eminently calculated to bring about a breach of peace.308
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While this might have been hyperbolic and/or designed to embarrass the recovering
French position, it also hints at the level of social and political control being pursued by
the government of the Moral Order. This control was particularly manifested by the
Column’s unceremonious completion, which reflects an unwillingness to cede political
capital to the Bonapartists despite the Column’s reconstruction.309 Conservatives took the
calculated risk of resurrecting the Column because it provided the quickest effacement of
the Commune in relation to other damaged sites. Furthermore, in light of the Moral
Order’s scandalous conduct during the Crisis of 16 May, the accusation of provocation,
while not corroborated in the French press, is also entirely plausible.
Based on contemporary accounts then, the capping of the Column with
Napoleon’s statue was a muted affair and not only was the completion carried out without
ceremony, it was (and perhaps because of this factor) hardly reported on. Conversely, the
reburials of generals Lecomte and Clément-Thomas, whose legacy none of the competing
political factions could definitively claim, witnessed an immense amount of grandeur
and, comparatively, greater attention in the press.

dispatches submitted to the Home Office prior to transmission. Given the tight control of political press,
that had only recently been reaffirmed, the correspondent was being prudent; this could also explain why
none of the French press reports describe police belligerence, even [or especially] the Left-wing journals.
309
According to one contemporary observer, the Bonapartist, Evariste Bavoux, Fremiet’s statue and the
Column’s reconstruction were indicative of the nation’s recovery following the disasters of 1870—1871.
Evariste Bavoux Les monuments à Paris: La colonne Vendôme et Jeanne d’Arc, Paris 1871, p. 21 ; quoted
in McWilliam, p. 395.
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These differences are entirely in-line with rhetorical campaign of the Moral Order
government. Whereas effacing the physical reminders of the Commune’s existence, as
quickly as possible, was a paramount concern, the Vendôme Column was chosen more
out of necessity than affinity. This is made evident when the forthcoming elections and
the Bonapartists’ calculated maneuvering during the election of the life-Senators is borne
in mind. A muted completion of the Column enabled the Bonapartist faction only a
diminished occasion in which to bask in any sort of post-humus glory. On the other hand,
the reburials of the Commune’s first victims provided a spectacular event by which to
give corporeal form to the characterization of the Communards as criminal malcontents
and murderous incendiaries rather than intransigent political actors. The reburials were
carried out as a potentially politically profitable affair in which to underscore the
criminality of the Communards, during legislative election campaigns in which the Moral
Order government consistently assimilated the Communards with contemporary
republicans. The impact of these events on the general elections can never be quantified,
but they should be considered as integral parts of the conservatives’ election efforts. The
1876 legislative elections gave rise to the startling, if ephemeral, success of Bonapartist
factions, but foreboding results for the conservative factions as a whole.
In the January 1876 Senatorial elections, the monarchists retained their majority
but the victory was still-born. The royalist factions combined could claim 119 seats and
the Bonapartists won 40, much to everyone’s surprise. In fact the general elections
marked the peak of the Bonapartist resurgence. Indeed by the Chamber elections that
took place between February and March, Bonapartists won more seats than either of the
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royalist factions.310

However it was the republicans, particularly by the Chamber

elections, who came out on top. Conservative republicans, such as Jules Simon and
Albert Grévy, alongside Gambetta’s Republican Union candidates added 92 seats to the
55 already held by republican-life-Senators and won 360 seats in the Chamber. The
general elections of 1876, which closed within three months after the Commune’s victims
were reburied and the most spectacular evidence of its destructive power was effaced,
were certainly a surprising coup for the Bonapartists yet the Moral Orders’ propaganda
efforts failed to capture the type of emotional allegiance that republicans did when they
took similar steps. Certainly the privileging of the rural vote, the diminished
representation for “red” cities including Paris and Lyon and the very nature of the
Senate’s indirect voting system were all factors in the conservatives’ Senatorial victories;
however, so to was their propaganda which included the Column’s somewhat muted
reconstruction and the reburials which occurred with great pomp and fanfare.
In terms of effacing the memory of the Commune and asserting the image of a
France that was at once stable and embracing of an illustrious past, the rebuilding of the
Column was, to some measure, successful; at least with regard to the battle “over the
meaning of physical space of the revolutionary city” during the 1870s. 311 The rebuilding
of the Column was carried out with comparative swiftness largely because it was an
integral symbol of the conservative regime’s restoration of power and France’s glorious
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military past. Moreover, “since the Tuileries palace…was not [and would never be]
rebuilt, and the reconstruction of the destroyed Hôtel de Ville went on until the 1880s, the
column’s restoration was intended to symbolize the re-establishment of the ‘public moral
order.’”312 At the time, the Column’s reconstruction was not only welcomed by most of
the French population and conservative politicians, but also by tourists grateful to have a
reprieve from their tour of Paris in ruins.
Immediately after the Commune’s demise, “tourists flocked to the eerie beauty of
the burnt-out ruins, as though Paris were a modern Pompeii.”313 According to
contemporaries, as early as June 1871, people from the provinces, including many who
had fled Paris during the time of the sieges, descended upon the city in awe: “‘To the
ruins of Paris!’ The pleasure trains have begun, Paris is overflowing with people. The
provinces—curious but not angry—are coming to see the burned capital.”314 Indeed,
tours of Paris in ruins were so prolific that numerous guide books were hastily published

Michalski, p. 14. The two inaugurations of the Hotel de Ville occurred in 1882 for the exterior’s
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to accommodate consumer interest.315 By early June of 1871, the famous London travel
agency of Thomas Cook began to provide trips designed specifically to tour the ruins of
Paris and its environs.316 The rebuilding projects of the early Third Republic undercut this
macabre genre of sight-seeing. Dickens’s Dictionary of Paris writes: “most of us know
that this column was pulled down by the Communists in 1871, and was afterwards so
well restored that it now presents exactly the same appearance as before its downfall.”317
The Bædeker Guide of 1884 asserts that “for several years after the war, many of the
public works were necessarily suspended, but the municipal authorities have done their
utmost to remove all traces of the Communist outrages.”318 Thus, while the Commune
remained at the forefront of political journalism, debate, and legislation, the conservative
leaders of the early Third Republic sought to efface its physical traces and in its place
assert their authority. Such acts were reassuring to a population still coping with their
defeat in war and the destruction of revolt. Of course, Commune sympathizers did not
rejoice at the column’s reconstruction. Lissagaray lends his voice to this group when he
writes:
One of the first acts of the victorious bourgeoisie was to again raise this
enormous block, the symbol of their sovereignty. To lift up Cæsar on his
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pedestal they needed a scaffolding of 30,000 corpses. Like the mothers
under the First Empire, may those of our days never look upon this bronze
without weeping!319

As the guidebooks attest, Lissagaray’s hope that the Column would hold a countermemory was not entirely in vain. In 1874, Karl Baedeker states:
It would of course be beyond the scope of the Handbook to record all the
momentous events of 1870 – 71, to describe the sieges of Paris by the
Prussians and by the French, to give an account of the Communist
insurrection, or to enumerate in detail the terrible disasters and revolting
crimes which characterized the second ‘Reign of Terror’ in May [20th –
28th], 1871. Frequent allusions, however, to these events will be found in
the Handbook, and these may be here supplanted by a brief enumeration
of the buildings, public and private, which have suffered most severely.320

With each entry for a monument or location touched by the events of the Commune, the
authors are careful to remind the reader of its history. Describing the not yet rebuilt
Vendôme Column Baedeker does not describe its history of construction and destruction,
rather he cites it was built by Napoleon I “in imitation of the Trajan’s column…it was
taken down by the Communists in May, 1871, but is now in process of being re-erected,
the fragments having been preserved.”321 In the Dickens entry for the Palace of Justice,
the author writes “very much of it had to be restored after the willful destruction by the
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Communists in May 1871.”322 Thus, the rebuilding projects didn’t have quite the
obliterating narrative outcome its proponents had envisioned. Despite the efforts to wipe
away its physical traces, and even in the new monuments built to commemorate the
Republic, the moment of the Commune remained etched into the city’s sites of memory
and reflection.323
The rebuilding of the Column did not dissolve the Commune’s legacy. Instead, it
served to remind France and the international community of the Third Republic’s
triumph, a fact which ironically served republican interests despite the mission having
been pursued and carried out under the direction of MacMahon with an eye toward
restoration. As the republicans gained political power, rebuilding efforts largely gave way
to new constructions designed to herald the republican triumph and significantly, to
present the Third Republic as the final victory of the Revolution. In the interim, however,
the battle for France’s political future continued and was largely fought, during the 1870s
within the domain of France’s politicized mediacracy, using political culture,
propaganda, and the promotion of the Republic as the engine of stability and peace.

322

Dickens, p. 181.
This is also borne out by the reclamation of sites of the Commune which for the most part occurred
during the twentieth century. Some examples include the placement of the plaque inscribed with “Aux
Morts de la Commune 21-28 Mai 1871” on the Mur des Fédérés (1909); the re-designation of the city land
located just below the Basilica of the Sacré-Coeur from Square Willette to Square Louise Michel (1927)
and more recently the French Senate’s commission of the installment of another plaque in the Jardin du
Luxembourg where other summary executions took place during Semaine sanglante which reads: “Le
Sénat en homage aux insurgés de la Commune de Paris fusillés contre ce mur le 25 mai 1871,” (2003).
323

171

Recovered and United Revelries: Presenting Modern France
During the legislative elections of 1876 and 1877, republicans from all sides
campaigned with a message of peace and “maintaining the status quo between
monarchists, who would disrupt the government yet again,” and the revolutionary Left
who revered the Commune.324 For their part, conservatives themselves “rarely made
explicit references to the War.”325 Politicians that did reference their war-time
experiences “found that this strategy was by no means a guarantee of success.” 326 A
prosperous and stable France was what voters wanted in 1876 and especially in October
1877.327 Recognizing that revanche was politically unprofitable in terms of securing
elections or uniting (even if negatively) the nation, behind a white or tricolor banner,
politicians from all sides of the political spectrum estimated that France’s best option in
terms of generating national unity, political allegiance, and, at the same time,
international esteem, was to present, to the French and the foreigner, a peaceful,
prosperous and united nation. 1878 was the first year in which this image could
effectively be presented.328
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At the Universal Exposition of 1878 very different versions of modern France
were being projected. One version presented France in the process of recovery and
restoration, including a possible political restoration; another version highlighted a
confident and specifically republican nation. This tension existed during the Universal
Exposition of 1878 and especially during the Fête of June 30, even if it went unnoticed or
was consciously obscured by contemporary observers, so happy to see France herself
again.
In the early 1870s, intellectuals and politicians began to debate about the efficacy
of national celebrations and the messages that they should impart. France had a long
history of festive commemoration and national celebration. For the French, the term fête
encompasses a “fuller emotional experience of joy and celebration.” 329 As Charles
Rearick points out, “in the old tradition of offering more circuses than bread, the kings’
public fêtes were intended to benefit the rulers as much as the public, ‘they tighten the
peoples’ ties to their princes and make them forget, for a brief time, the misfortunes and
cares inherent in their weak humanity.’”330 In the 1870s, republicans sought to resurrect
the tradition of national fêtes and commemorations as a means to assuage the political
divisions and to unite the French people under the banner of republicanism in a way
never accomplished before.
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One of the earliest contributors to these discussions was economist Henri
Baudrillart who asserted in 1873 that the festivals of the new Republic should avoid the
“character of frivolous banality” which he perceived in the past; instead the Republic
should look to create ones that imbue “utility and moral grandeur.”331 This assertion
echoed the ones made at the end of the Second Empire by Jules Michelet and originally it
found purchase among republicans.332 In July 1872, Gambetta had similarly asserted “a
free nation needs national fêtes. But in order that these fêtes have a morality and meaning,
that they be worthy of liberty, they must be spontaneous.”333 However, by mid-decade, as
their electoral success was mounting, republicans began to work for the establishment of
an annual national celebration. This, it was perceived, would enhance the appeal of
republicanism and republican candidates because it echoed popular sentiment and was
projected to mitigate apprehension “that the spontaneity of gay crowds will break out of
its playful bounds and that celebration will become contestation.” 334 Just as civil burial
ceremonies were perceived, by republicans, as important tools by which to create a
national consensus for their contemporary agenda based on their particular version of the
revolutionary past, so was the impetus of establishing a national holiday. This is made
evident by the fact that republicans were advocating for a national holiday, quatorze
juillet most vociferously, even before their successful grasp of political control.
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The recent memories of the Commune’s festive early days were too acute to leave
any openings for disaster.335 Instead, following in the tradition of Rousseau, Robespierre,
and David in the eighteenth-century and Comte as well as Michelet in the nineteenth
century, the republican proponents of a national celebration advocated for “the careful
engineering of festivities to educate, unite, and morally uplift the people, especially by
presenting symbols of historic greatness, the glories of science, and orderly progress.”336
These were precisely the themes on display during the Universal Exposition of 1878 and
the national celebration held on June 30th, both of which were undertaken to announce the
recovery of France and the successful return to her place among great nations. Both also
served to display the Third Republic’s political stability and, specifically with the June
30th national celebration, to promote the Republic’s longevity. No other cultural moment
in the 1870s better demonstrates the tension between the will to forget Paris’ tormented
past and the persistence of its presence and no other moment better highlights the
rehabilitation of the Commune prior to 1880 within France’s Mediacracy.
Anxieties about popular participation and unruly crowds in Paris were prominent
before and during the Exhibition of 1878, whose official theme was “Paix et Travail.”
The police were instructed to apply special surveillance and caution in the districts where
the Commune had found its most ardent supporters.337 Nonetheless, as noted by even
conservative newspapers, the crowd was peaceful and arrests made during the Exhibition
335
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were related to petty crime and public drunkenness, not political agitation, despite it
coinciding with the anniversary of the Semaine sanglante.
There were groups within France that urged their followers to boycott the
Exhibition, they included catholic groups, parishes, and the Socialists. The Catholics
were outraged by the lack of religious sentiment. For example, the opening day did not
commence with a prayer as all past Exhibitions had. This was viewed as yet another step
toward the public separation between church and state, which the republicans were
outspoken about pursuing. The Socialists, via their press organ: L’Égalité, labeled the
Exhibition “L’Exploitation Universelle” and lobbied for its working-class readers to
avoid celebrating such a capitalistic display of materialism. The socialist antipathy,
however, was largely muted when after seven years of solemnity it appears, based on the
attendance figures, that workers were not persuaded to stay away. This is something that
republicans took care to ensure by offering free admission on several days throughout the
Exposition as a means to educate them, by example, on the values of citizen comportment
and the liberties the republican system provided them; even while “bartering their social
heritage” by forging a liberal Republic.338 Gambetta, in fact did not miss the opportunity
to impress upon a workers’ delegation the following declaration of liberal and nationalist
republicanism:
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There is only one thing that the government owes everyone: justice. Since
everyone is his own master, it is proper that everyone should make himself
happy or unhappy by the good or bad use of his liberty. The State limits
itself to the guaranteeing of equal rights to all, rich and poor…What we
want is not an aristocratic, or bourgeois or plebian republic, but a national
one.339

The workers participation was a means to promote a sense of unity in a deeply divided
nation wherein social divisions were considered supremely important. The Universal
Exposition and the June 30th national celebration were valued, among numerous other
factors, as a way to overcome, at least temporarily the isolation of social groups when in
“the heightened shared feeling of celebration, the crowd would become the united living
France” expressing “joyful reverence in the ‘religion of la patrie.’”340
The Universal Exposition began on May 1, 1878 and was ultimately attended by
more than 16 million visitors, nearly double the numbers for France’s previous World’s
Fair held in 1867, more than the figures for Austria’s hosting in 1873, and surpassing
Philadelphia’s in 1876. Throughout the Exposition, Paris appeared healthy, economically
prosperous, and harmonious. By all accounts, the sense of unity and pride that the
organizers hoped the Exposition would induce among the French population was
achieved. As reported by L’Univers Illustré:
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The first of May, the solemn opening day of the exhibition, will remain for
all the French, especially for the Parisians, an ineffaceable memory…the
emotion was profound and unanimous…this was not just an ordinary
festival, a simple deployment of pageantry, it was the whole country who
claimed to live, after seven years of silence and resignation…Streets,
boulevards, [were] filled with a huge but calm and tranquil crowd. Some
sought to forget the sorrows of the past, to rekindle memories of the
festivals of their youth…what a lesson this evening! It must not be
lost…we can drive out of our minds the petty disagreements which
seemingly if deeply separate us and remove all traces of our civil discord
as quickly as we repaired the disasters of our material losses.341

The overwhelming attendance figures, which enabled the 1878 Exposition to be the most
successful World Fair to date, demonstrates the interest among the French and the
foreigners in experiencing a recovered and apparently stable France. During the
Exhibition, the modern marvels of electricity and engineering took prominent places in
the Palace of Industry with the recently completed head of Auguste Bartholdi’s Statue of
Liberty displayed just outside.
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Figure IV. Charles Marville, Statue of Liberty Under Construction, on exhibit at the Universal Exposition
of 1878.

Having repaid its five billion franc war indemnity early in 1873, and with a keen sense of
tactful diplomacy, the Republic invited German artists, to participate. However,
depictions of the Franco-Prussian War, like images of the Commune, were not allowed.
In this way France projected an image of itself scrubbed clean from defeat and civil
turmoil and necessitated a focus on a resurgent republican France.
The Exhibition was a political triumph for France. Paris was once again the
capital of modernity and in the vanguard of cultural expression. Despite the Exhibition
being a financial loss of 28,704,765 francs, “most people and government officials agreed
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that the price paid for the confirmation of confidence in the new Republic was not
excessive.”342 George Augustus Sala was a frequent visitor to Paris and no stranger to its
political vicissitudes having been present during the revolution of 1848, the outbreak of
the Franco Prussian War, and the Paris Commune. In 1878 he wrote: “Paris [is] Herself
Again—comelier, richer, gayer, [and] more fascinating than ever. And happier? Que saisje? That is no business of mine.”343 Yet beneath the jubilant veneer, political fissures
were widening. The Exposition of 1878 and the national celebration staged on June 30th,
despite all projections of national unity, were also battle grounds for promoting
competing political agendas and ideologies. This is most apparent with respect to the
dichotomous symbolism between Vive la France! sung as part of the Exposition’s
inauguration ceremony and La République, a new statue inaugurated on 30 June in honor
of the national celebration.
Vive la France! was written by Paul Déroulède, the zealous republican nationalist
who was injured while fighting to suppress the Commune in 1871 and in the 1890s
founded the revanchist organization League des Patriots. The song imparts a message of
French resurgence that is ripe with militarism and revanche. In verses such as “Gravelotte
and Borny are not defeated; the living have avenged the deaths of Champigny…And
starving Paris never faltered,” France’s resilience is presented in far from reassuring
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tones.344 The hymn was delivered in the presence of MacMahon and should be
understood as an act of defiant patriotism. It was less than subtle and also inconsistent
with the muted revanchist politics of the 1870s and the Exposition’s theme of peace. It is,
however, perfectly in line with MacMahon’s image as a war hero and a way in which
France could acknowledge its losses in 1870—1871, and at the same time projects an
important image of resilience and strength while the nation occupied the world’s attention
in 1878. The fate of the song is prescient with respect to the victory in the war for the
Republic’s future, fought within the realm of representational media. In an article
published on May 2nd, Le Petit Parisien, recalled “we wondered what military music
would replace the Marseillaise, which is not officially the national anthem…the new
military march: Vive la France! is destined, it seems to replace the Marseillaise for the
[ceremonies] of tomorrow.”345 This was not to be the case. The song, published in Chants
du Soldat which went through numerous publications, became a popular military song
and during the 1890s a revanchist rallying-cry. However, in 1880 after securing their
political success, republicans designated the Marseillaise, the famous song of the
Revolution as France’s national anthem.346 This is a fact that highlights the republicans’
victory in the battle for symbolic representation and national identity. In 1878, flush from
their victory in the October 1877 election yet prior to their conquest of the Senate and
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MacMahon’s resignation, republicans engaged in this contest by inaugurating a statue of
the Republic on June 30th.
After their requests to hold the national celebration on July 14 in commemoration
of the storming of the Bastille, republicans accepted the offer to hold the celebration on
June 30; an otherwise completely innocuous date. Jean-Baptist Auguste Clésinger’s
statue, La Républic was inaugurated during the day’s opening ceremony.

Figure V. Auguste Clésinger, La République, 1878 Paris, Universal Exposition.
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The statue depicts a seated, Athena-like republic, holding an unsheathed sword in one
hand and the 1875 constitution in the other hand. During the inauguration, Emile
Marcère, the Moderate republican and Minister of Interior gave a rousing speech in
which he recalled the history of republican declarations followed by monarchical
restorations. In the course of his speech Marcère proclaimed the Third Republic to be
“beyond the era of revolutions!”347 Then, in reference to Clésinger’s statue he proclaimed
“here [is our Republic], under the form given to it by the great artist, and with the
attributes that we desire for ourselves. She is noble and simple, calm and strong, she is
sitting and reposed.”348
Clésinger’s La République is a clear embodiment of the political tensions
operating just under the surface of the Fête’s and Expositions veneers. The statue’s vision
of a fortified yet reposed and constitutionally bound republican France is a significant
contrast to the image presented by Déroulède in Vive la France! at the inauguration of the
Exposition presided over by MacMahon. It is also precisely the type of imagery that
Moderate republicans looked to in their efforts to edify and council the newly
enfranchised in regard to citizen comportment. That is to say, remain within the
boundaries of the law, celebrate France’s glorious past, and work to strengthen her future
through unity and patriotism. This was a liberal-republican allegory, not the Phrygian
capped Marianne of the Radicals or the bare-breasted faubourienne of the Communards.
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Figure VI. Jules Dalou, Triumph of the Republic, Place de La Nation. Figure VII. , E.D., Paris handed
over: the Capitulators.349

Clésinger’s La République reflects the electoral majority of the Moderates and presents
their vision of the character that the Republic should assume. As described by journalists
from all political persuasions, the crowd lived up to the republicans’ expectations and the
statue’s vision. According to the Journal des Débats, Politiques et Littéraires, “never had
a fête given less of an appearance of a protest party” and even to the end it never
degenerated into one.350 Instead, the Journal’s author highlights that “the attitude and
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conduct of the Parisian population did not belie the serious and pure design the sculpture
Clésinger had given to the Republic."351
To add to the tone of reciprocal comportment and largess, factors relating to the
rehabilitation of the Commune, and its absorption into the mainstream of republican
political culture, were intentionally juxtaposed with this celebration of the Republic. As
reported by the Times of London:
Twelve hundred and sixty nine Communists, who had earned indulgence
by ‘contrition, submission, and diligence,’ have been allowed remission or
commutation of punishment in honor of the fête. Since the present
[Republican] Cabinet took office 800 prisoners had previously been
objects of clemency, 435 of them receiving a full pardon.352

By granting the pardons in honor of the fête, Republicans tied the politics of the
Commune directly to a celebration honoring the Republic, on a day initially designed to
commemorate the Revolution. Acts of clemency were traditionally granted during times
of national celebration. However, this should be viewed as less a reflection of Moderaterepublican sympathy than a conciliatory nod to the Radicals at a time when the
republican unity on display during the Crisis of 16 May, was dissolving and Radicals
were once again campaigning on amnesty-led platforms. With the Senate elections on the
horizon, Moderates were certainly keen on retaining a united front so as to appeal to as
broad a constituency as possible.
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To that effect, in addition to the acts of clemency, the admission price was
reduced from 1 franc to 25 centimes, which ensured the inclusion of the lower classes in
the day’s events. With this inclusion, republicans were seeking to “create a new
representation of the Parisian crowd: it was not to be reduced to isolated individuals, but
transformed into an assembly of peaceful citizens.”353 Such gestures, coupled with the
silence from the men of the Moral Order, would result in another republican electoral
triumph in the 1879 Senate elections and served to mitigate the vitriol still being
expressed, throughout France, for the Commune.354 These were acts of forgiveness and
inclusion, carried out in order to demonstrate confidence in the Republic and to signal the
Revolution’s conclusion.
The fête was an immense success. The date’s lack of historical legitimacy did not
deter its proponents either. On the contrary, some argued it was successful because the
date did not require a recollection “that could offend anybody; the unanimity of patriotic
enthusiasm was complete.”355 As noted by Olivier Ihl, the unveiling of the statue was the
boldest initiative of the organizers who sought to unify the nation, specifically under the
republican banner while avoiding explicit references the Revolution which might have
created controversy. A military parade through the city of Paris commenced after the
inauguration of Clésinger’s statue. The use of a military parade as a means to celebrate
the Republic was an important symbolic representation of the regime’s power and the
353
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parade route itself testifies to the organizers’ avoidance of provocative sites of
commemoration for the Revolution of 1789. The parade consisted of a torchlight
procession of mounted republican guards, cavalry, and military bands that departed from
the butte Montmartre, reaching the Place d’Étoile by the Avenue du Bois-de-Boulogne
then completing the march down the Champs-Élysées.

Figure IX.356
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This path evaded the notorious sights of the 1789 Revolution, including the Place de la
Bastille at the corner of rue Saint-Antoine and Boulevard Beaumarchais. Yet the living
memory of the Commune would certainly have been recalled both in the choice to
commence from Montmartre and in the route along the Avenue du Bois-de-Boulogne
where burials, executions, and cremations of Communards took place for weeks after
May 1871. Moreover, the sites for fireworks displays, designated by the Minister of
Interior, included the Bois-de-Boulogne and Montmartre as well as Place d’Italie, where
insurgents of the June Days of 1848 were famously captured and Place du Trône, a
notorious site of execution by guillotine during the Reign of Terror.357 All of these “lieux
de mémoire,” however, were implied and certainly not made explicit. With the main
events of the celebration taking place in the capital city’s conservative center, the
memory of the Revolution was indeed muted at best.358
In 1878, forging a republican body politic was the primary, and ultimately
successful, objective for the organizers of the national celebration and many aspects of
the day’s celebration were foreshadows of quatorze juillet which became the official
national holiday in 1880. Thus while references to the Revolution were oblique, and
phrygian bonnets officially forbidden, the historical flag of republican France, the tricolor
was everywhere, on buttons, hats, umbrellas, and hanging from windows in every district;
they festooned the entire city, an image preserved by Claude Monet in two paintings
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inspired by his impression of the day.359 At night the fireworks directed over the
fountains of the Tuileries Garden were immense; even while the Palace, irreparably
destroyed during the Commune, was “kept out of sight behind a vast orchestra stand.”360
As the Paris correspondent for the Times of London reported, “Montmartre… [had] never
been so thronged and excited since it was the theatre of the Commune outbreak.”361
While the central location for the celebration was the Champ-du-Mars, each
arrondissement was instructed to create a celebration tailored to the whims of their locale
at their own expense.362 Despite it being illegal, the Marseillaise was sung throughout the
day, “in open defiance of MacMahon,” who boycotted the entire celebration.363
The decisions of MacMahon and many other conservatives to publicly boycott the
celebration reflect their failure, on the eve of their demise, to effectively gauge the public
mood. More than two million people participated in the fête in Paris, and the conspicuous
absences of MacMahon and other monarchists “arguably rendered [them] even more
unpopular with the greater part of the electorate thus precipitating their electoral defeat
and MacMahon’s own resignation on 5 January 1879.”364 The republicans, on the other
hand, carried the day and continued to ascend to the highest political offices of the nation.
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The overwhelming successes of the Universal Exposition and the Fête du Juin 30
symbolically marked the political turning point that had already occurred in May and
October of the previous year. After 1878, calls for more festivals and commemorations
were frequent and republicans began to celebrate the revolutionary past with unbridled
passion, relying on the media to spread this atmosphere throughout the nation. June 30
did not become an annual celebration, however, for “no such new and arbitrary date
could stir passions the way revolutionary journées could, and no journée had advocates
as insistent as those for July 14.”365 But before they could preside over the first
celebration of quatorze juillet in 1880, the republicans had to continue making electoral
gains, working all the while to cement a French identity that was explicitly republican
and founded upon its revolutionary heritage. This was a risky undertaking because of the
competing claimants to that heritage, including the partisans of the Commune and the
revolutionary Left. The battle over this heritage, like the battle for the Republic’s
survival, was fought “on the terrain of symbol and ritual.”366 This was the safest course
for all sides; “after all, on what better terrain [could they] challenge authority and address
the public without at every turn winding up in jail?”367 Events like the Universal
Exhibition and the Fête du 30 Juin offered the republicans much-needed opportunities to
present an appealing image to the populace as they struggled to establish their strength.
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As Philip Nord asserts, “the republican [political] culture—with its myriad public
rituals, rich iconography, and statue mania—may have acquired the patina of a cherished
and consensual national patrimony,” but it “was improvised, the outgrowth of skirmishes
between republicans and the party of order.”368 Indeed, the republicans were involved in
a multi-front battle. They had to fight the monarchists, largely during the early and mid1870s, over the survival of the Republic. At the same time, the different republican
factions were at odds with one another regarding what type of regime they wanted to
build. Would the Moderate ideal of a liberal government prevail, or would the Radicals
successfully implement a social-democratic approach? Furthermore, even as the threat to
the Republic’s existence waned following the conservatives’ electoral defeats between
1876 and 1879, new problems emerged. As the chapters below will reveal, the conflicts
among the republican groups only intensified after the reentry of the revolutionary Left
during the height of the Crisis of 16 May. The Left loudly proclaimed its impatience with
Moderate-Radical cohesion and the politics being played with Communard amnesty,
which had been campaigned upon and proposed just as often as it had been denigrated
and rejected. Before such issues could be resolved, however, the Republic still needed to
be made republican. It is this endeavor that the next chapter examines.

368

Philip Nord, The Republican Moment, Op. cit., p. 205.

191

CHAPTER 4: THE REPUBLICAN TRIUMPH
Between 1876 and 1879, the republicans gained political control of the Third
Republic. The elections resulting from the 1877 Crisis of 16 May gave voters the
opportunity to definitively demonstrate their allegiance to a republican system of
governance by reaffirming their approval of the republican majority in the Chamber of
Deputies. In spite of the conservatives’ heavy repression of the republican campaign and
the absence of a truly secret ballot, the republicans were able to defeat their monarchist
rivals.369 The Crisis of 16 May illuminates the success of mainstream republicans in
earning the support of a majority of the voting population. It also reflects the waning
influence that the specter of the Commune had in terms of the conservative hold on the
Third Republic. The republican campaign was effective because it presented the group as
a cohesive party of order that would safeguard the social and political status quo and
secure France from foreign entanglements. Traditionally, this was a role ascribed to
conservatives. Indeed, the Moral Order government’s campaign employed the same
message, but the republicans were the ones who successfully leveraged it to capture the
confidence of the voting majority.
This chapter focuses on the influence of the Commune’s legacies during the Crisis
of 16 May and the subsequent campaign politics of the October 1877 election. It reveals
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an important shift in public perception: by 1877, the association of republicanism with
revolution did not translate into an electoral victory for conservative politicians. In
addition, it shows how the mainstream republicans defeated their monarchist rivals and
established the Moderate republican regime. They built their victory upon a prominent
display of party unity and a careful integration of the Republic’s revolutionary heritage
into their narrative. The temporary unification of the Moderate and Radical factions was
the result of their perception of the election’s dual significance. To begin with, the
Republic’s survival, or at the very least the power of its parliament, was in jeopardy.
Secondly, defeating the government’s candidates at the polls would hasten the demise of
the Moral Order regime. In order to coalesce for victory in this important race, the
republicans muted their differences—which meant absolute silence on the issue of
Communard amnesty.
During their campaign, the conservatives attacked the republicans as harbingers
of revolutionary violence and social upheaval, and for being “friends of the Commune.”
This message was an integral part of their appeal to voters and necessitated a rebuttal
from the republican camp. However, the republicans had to tread lightly; their claims to
the revolutionary heritage and their perceptions of the era’s gains were controversial and
potentially divisive. To meet this rhetorical challenge while maintaining their campaign’s
unity, the republican candidates chose to embrace the elements of the Republic’s
revolutionary roots that divided them the least: universal suffrage, constitutionalism, and
the defeat of clericalism. This choice, while tactically sound, facilitated the Moderates’
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accession to power at the expense of the Radicals. After all, the party was focusing its
efforts on privileging and publicizing the Moderate narrative of the revolutionary legacy.
The Crisis of 16 May is usually described in relation to the defeat of French
monarchism, its long-term consequences for presidential powers of dissolution, and the
declining political influence of the Catholic political contingent.370 However, as historian
Guy Thuillier correctly points out, the historiography of the Third Republic generally
neglects studying the Crisis itself.371 The analysis of this chapter agrees with Thuillier’s
assessment that the origins of the Crisis were rooted in the Moral Order’s gross
miscalculation of the voting majority’s allegiance and priorities, which gave its rivals an
opportunity for political gain. It also concurs with Thuillier’s related assertion that the
Crisis arose out of a tacit agreement among political leaders “not to soothe, not to
minimize [the political] problems, [but] to raise them.”372 Yet this chapter diverges from
Thuillier’s analysis on an important point that sheds new light on the Crisis’ long-term
consequences. While contemporaries may have argued that the Crisis was without cause
(i.e., constructed), the notion that “the government lived, more or less, at peace with the
Chamber” is misleading.373 This chapter reveals the impact of a proliferation of problems
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that were surfacing at the time—ones that went well beyond Church-State conflicts,
which many scholars, including Thuillier, overvalue in terms of locating the Crisis’
origins. In doing so, they underestimate the power of these other issues, particularly the
continued political relevance of the Commune. The legacies of the Commune greatly
informed the rhetoric and machinations of the Moral Order government, both before and
during the Crisis.
The first section of this chapter provides a narrative analysis of conservative and
republican actions in the years and months leading up to the Crisis of 16 May, 1877.
After a brief comparison of republican and conservative image-making and agendas at
the middle of the decade, it offers an analysis of the Moral Order’s pre-1877 cultural and
political tactics. The construction of the Basilica of the Sacré-Coeur, for instance,
exemplifies the duality of the Moral Order’s approach to combating the growing
popularity of republicanism. This section clarifies that the Moral Order government’s
sanguine cultural initiatives were, in fact, efforts to conserve France’s traditionally
religious social and political character as part of its long-term restoration agenda. Yet
these endeavors operated alongside political maneuvers that reflected pessimism. The
government feared its republican adversaries and attempted to weaken them through legal
suppression, harassment, and character assassination. After the 1876 republican electoral
victory, political repression became the primary tactic of the Moral Order, largely in
response to the growing popularity of the Radical republicans and their persistent (and, to
conservatives, repugnant) calls for Communard amnesty.
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The second section analyzes the political impasses that culminated in the fall of
two Ministries and precipitated the Chamber’s 1877 dissolution. It relies largely upon
parliamentary and editorial debates, which reveal that the specter of the Commune and
the republicans’ revolutionary heritage were key weapons that the Moral Order
government wielded to undermine the authority of the Chamber’s republican majority.
This section demonstrates that the parties’ competing versions of the Commune’s
legacies and the politics of Communard amnesty were integral components of the
parliamentary vicissitudes that triggered the Crisis of 16 May.
The chapter’s third section analyzes the Crisis and the subsequent campaigns for
the October 1877 Chamber elections. It incorporates private interviews and recollections
of the leading politicians of the time to reveal the atmosphere of mutual hostility and
mistrust that pervaded the political arena after May 16th. The section’s examination of the
October election investigates the different parties’ voter appeals from multiple sources. It
focuses mainly on the campaign rhetoric of the conservatives and the republicans, in
which schisms over the Republic’s revolutionary heritage and the ghost of the Commune
loomed large. Correspondingly, this section utilizes sources that reveal popular political
contempt for the Moral Order government, often registered on city walls through graffiti
and the manipulation of official campaign posters. These reflect the powerful momentum
that popular opinion could generate on its own; regardless of pleas for calm and order
from the republican campaign, these dissidents were intent upon sending a loud message
to the conservatives. One can also find significant campaign rhetoric in the Chamber
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debates that took place during this period, which were frequently published in their
entirety and therefore widely available to the public.374 The primary purpose of many
such debates and speeches was to galvanize voters, especially after the 16th of May. They
were designed with the forthcoming elections in mind, and should be read as campaign
rhetoric as much as legislative addresses and exchanges. The section concludes with a
brief analysis of the outcome of the republicans’ victory in October 1877 and their
consequential moves to further erode the royalists’ authority and political power.
This chapter makes clear that the significance of the Crisis of 16 May extends
beyond the decline of political relevancy for royalist conservatism. It shows that this
decline was itself affected by factors relating to the origins of the Crisis—factors that
have not previously been considered. The catalysts of the Crisis are intertwined with
controversies surrounding the Paris Commune’s political legacies and the Republic’s
revolutionary heritage. Its outcome—namely, the defeat of the monarchists—
demonstrates that the Right could no longer attain victory by invoking the Commune as a
negative campaign tactic. The parliamentary republicans retained their control of the
Chamber in October 1877 because the majority of French voters identified with their
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message of order, stability, and peace, and had ceased to equate republicanism with
revolution and disorder.

Before the Triumph: Mounting tension between conservative and republican
factions
Republican unity, which was loudly proclaimed during the campaigns for the
October 1877 elections, was not simply the product of responding to the conservative
challenge. It was used by Opportunist republicans, who led the campaign, to cast the
radical edge as an abating part of the movement. To effectively meet the challenge from
the monarchist-Right, Opportunists and Radicals glossed over their differences and
generated a campaign that focused solely on agendas that all republicans could support:
the primacy of universal suffrage, free press, laicization, etc. Communard amnesty and
any other issues that divided republicans were muted.375 This strategy sustained the
republican electoral mandate, but it also simplified the way in which this period is
discussed and analyzed by contemporary scholars; particularly the marginalization of the
Commune as an important political motif throughout the 1870s.376
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During the 1870s, memories of the Commune were indelible parts of the fabric of
the young Republic. As the previous chapters have described, its legacy was inscribed in
the pages of social-scientific journals, negotiated in popular photographs and historical
monographs, and lingered in public monuments and national celebrations. While each of
these “realms of memory” could, and often were, used for various political agendas, the
Commune also occupied a prominent place within the political arena par excellence. It
was referred to, debated, denigrated, and used so much, in fact, that it is not hyperbolic to
argue that it was one of the most prolific points of reference throughout the decade.
As republicans gained seats in the National Assembly through by-elections during
the early 1870s, the political battle between republicans and monarchist-conservatives
intensified. Within these contests for power, conservative politicians ceaselessly
propagated an image of republicans as revolutionaries; in an attempt to assimilate
republicans to the Communards and thereby raise national fears of revolutionary action
brewing in Paris. For example, in the Chamber debates of May 4, 1877, Gambetta
accused the French clergy of a lack of patriotism, rhetorically asking “today search,
examine the horizon, pass the French episcopate in review! Where is Monseigneur
Darboy?” to which Paul de Cassagnac responded: “You killed him!”377 This exchange is
illustrative primarily because it was well known then, just as it is by historians today, that
Gambetta not only did not participate in the Commune, but he also consistently eschewed
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the event and the actions of its partisans. At the same time, Gambetta’s own reference to
Msgr. Darboy, Paris’ Archbishop who was killed as a hostage during the last days of the
Commune, is itself evidence of the ubiquitous referencing of the Commune in political
dialogue. During the campaign for the October 1877 election, conservatives proudly
propagated their support of clericalism and traditional social hierarchies and, as
evidenced by their campaign messages, pinned their hopes on the notion that voters could
be induced to vote for Moral Order candidates because of this conservatism and the
assimilation of republicanism with the specter of social upheaval and political violence.
The Moral Order’s campaign messages were loaded with references to the Commune and
the prospect that voting for the republican side would herald a return of that revolutionary
menace. Despite their best, or most dubious, efforts in October 1877 and again in 1879,
the majority of voters rejected their excitations. While a nation-wide rejection of political
violence and general condemnation for the Commune remained, the republicans had
successfully convinced the voting majority that they were the new party of order and
peace and the strongest bulwark against political and social disorder.
The republicans never disavowed their revolutionary heritage and by the mid1870s they were clarifying what that meant to their constituencies and explicitly
propagating the idea that the revolutionary era was over and therefore the notion of such
threats emanating from the republicans’ (whether Moderate or Radical) was nothing more
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than reactionary hyperbole.378 For example, in 1872, Léon Gambetta, the leader of the
Moderate republican faction in the Assembly, asserted that glorious (as opposed to
defeated and humiliated) France was “revolutionary France, that emancipatory France,
pioneer of the human race, that France of a marvelous activity and, as they say, that
France, mother to the universal ideas of the world.”379 Similarly, when running for a seat
in the Chamber in 1876, Georges Clemenceau, the leader of the Radical republican bloc
in the Chamber, told his target constituency in Montmartre that “the aim we set ourselves
is to complete the great renewal of 1789;” which he specified to mean the reestablishment
of “social peace through the development of justice and social progress.”380 Among
republicans, this was an innocuously general assessment of the Revolution’s goals and
the ideals that should inform the republican enterprise by the mid-1870s.
The very act of referencing 1789 as a harbinger of ideals that the new Republic
should uphold, in terms of comportment and initiative, validated conservative’s fears of
republicans as revolutionary and the need to combat the insidious electoral appeal of
republican politicians. Chaffing under the growing consolidation of the Third Republic,
monarchists worked to reverse what they saw as the socially dangerous gains made by
republican revolutionaries since 1789. In the 1870s this meant an unwavering
condemnation of the Commune of 1871 and efforts to assimilate the Commune with
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republicanism in general. The effort to construct the Basilica of the Sacré-Coeur, for
example, designed as an expiatory monument in light of the of the “sins” of the
Communards and, more implicitly, the secular and republican agenda, was in line with
their condemnation of the event and a promotion of the religiously conservative society
they sought to protect against their contemporary republican political rivals.381 But before
the monarchists in the National Assembly could make progress, they needed to displace
the new Republic’s most ardent, if unlikely, champion, Adolphe Thiers.
Thiers’ fall from power came on the heels of his success in securing the last
reparations payments to the Germans eighteen months ahead of schedule which meant an
early departure of German occupation forces. This heightened Thiers’ national popularity
to the chagrin of legitimists and intransigent Orleanists who did not seek to follow in his
embrace of the Republic. Thus, as soon as his political cache proved unnecessary vis-àvis the German occupation and his political popularity too dangerous to his political
rivals, he was isolated on the Right by steadfast monarchists and on the Left by Moderate
republicans who now perceived an opportunity to take his place; the Radicals, who never
ceased to revile the leader of the 1834 repression of the Lyon silk weavers and, more
recently, the Bloody Week massacres, remained silent as Thiers buckled under political
pressure.
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Marshal MacMahon, the commander-in-chief of the Versailles troops during the
Commune’s suppression, became President on May 25, 1873, the same night that Thiers
resigned. The immediate catalyst for Thiers’ resignation came from a vote of noconfidence, following a ministerial crisis, which was carried by only 14 votes, all of them
from Moderate republicans.382 However, the event was long in the making due to a series
of political stalemates involving taxation, military service, and decentralization of power.
Political intrigue was the fundamental root to what many contemporaries referred to as
MacMahon’s legal coup. By 1873, Thiers’ conversion to republicanism (albeit highly
conservative) was considered a primary threat to the monarchists’ efforts to subvert the
Republic; accordingly he needed to be outmaneuvered in order for a restoration to have
any hope of success. Thiers’ May 1873 resignation was hailed by monarchist politicians
and their supporters as a first step in this direction. Indeed, as described by British
journalist and witness to the Franco-Prussian War and the Paris Commune, Ernest
Vizetelly, in the winter of 1873 – 1874 Parisian high-society pontificated about and
celebrated the notion of an impending restoration on a near-nightly basis: “…many
Royalist houses which, under the Empire, had entertained very little, were now well to
the front. Paris was infinitely invaded also by Counts and Barons who had formerly dwelt
in the provinces, but had hastened to the capital in the hope of witnessing the Kings’
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restoration.”383 Vizetelley similarly describes that even after the passage of the 1875
constitution, “the world of the salons, the clubs, and the Bois still clung to the hope that
France would soon have a monarch. Although the Republic was now definitely
constituted it was only the masses that took it au seriex.”384 Yet in an era of mass politics,
the under-appreciation of the last clause was fatally impactful for the politicians of the
Moral Order. On the heels of their 1873 parliamentary victory, MacMahon’s Moral Order
regime began to pursue political and cultural endeavors in line with their long-term goals
with an eye toward conservative populism.385
The task of building the Basilica of the Sacré-Coeur, which towers over
Montmartre today, was one of the first initiatives taken up by MacMahon’s government
of the Moral Order. This monument is the physical manifestation of French Catholic,
royalist, and anti-revolutionary sentiments that the Revolution of 1789 ignited among
adherents to the cult of the Sacred Heart.386 From the beginning, the Basilica was a
conservative rejoinder to the French revolutionary era broadly and the Commune most
acutely; its value as a cultural weapon in a political battle whose outcome depended on
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the allegiance of the voting public was acutely appreciated. A religious revival had begun
to take hold of Catholic France after 1871 and with MacMahon in power after 1873, his
regime pursued strict censorship and social controls along with the official sanction and
patronage given to the Catholic contingent; not only as a result of the regime’s
conservative sympathies, but pointedly in an effort court a conservative constituency.
Patronizing the construction of the Basilica of the Sacré-Coeur provided a fortuitous
opportunity by which to give the Moral Order agenda physicality and to encourage a
reconnection between the patrie and its Catholic and monarchical roots.
The cult of the Sacré-Coeur was bound up with the campaign to restore a
Christian Monarchy; hence the natural alliance between proponents of the Basilica’s
construction and supporters of the Moral Order. The long history of the Basilica’s
construction, which was ultimately the result of mostly private funding and religious
populism, is an example of the multi-faceted impact of the Moral Order’s defeat and the
social and cultural transitions necessitated by the republican Republic’s triumph. Indeed,
Jonas is correct to assert that “it is difficult to imagine such a church being built on that
site and on such a scale outside of the special circumstances” of the period of the Moral
Order. However, this is not only because the “Church of the National Vow encapsulates a
moment in the 1870s when France was overwhelmed with the sense that only massive
and collective moral failure could explain its fall,” but also because the Basilica was a
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cultural tool used by the Moral Order to symbolically combat republicanism’s popular
appeal.387
On June 29, 1873 30,000 people including 50 members of the National Assembly,
journeyed to the Butte Montmartre and vowed to build the Basilica on that site. On July
23rd the Assembly voted in favor of building the expiatory monument, as a national
endeavor. However, by spring of 1875, when the inaugurating stone was ready for
placement, republicans were gaining electorally, not in spite of their anti-clerical stance,
but, in-part, because of it; and the Radicals were specifically mounting a resistance to the
on-going project. By 1875, the growing opposition to the monument was so hostile that
the Pope intervened by declaring the day of the inauguration an international day of
dedication to the Sacred Heart for all Catholics everywhere; nonetheless, because of the
political climate, the ceremony was muted and forty years would pass before the
monument was finally complete.388 The controversy over the Basilica’s construction
encouraged the Moral Order to increase their use of more direct methods to combat the
growing appeal of republicanism.
MacMahon’s regime heralded a conservative turn that was not confined to the
symbolic realm of political expression. In fact, the Moral Order’s impact on French
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politics and society was extensive. E.B. Washburne, the American Foreign Minister in
France, described the Moral Order’s assumption of power, in terms remarkably similar to
Vizatelley, as “not only a political but a social revolution… all the Reactionists and
Royalists who had been in the bush for the last three years, came out of their retreat to
retake their places in society.”389 Upon his election, MacMahon outlined the mission of
his regime: “with the help of God, the devotion of our army [which he had recently been
in command of]…, and the support of all loyal citizens, we shall continue the work of
liberating our territory and of re-establishing moral order in our country.”390 They moved
with haste.
In the first month of MacMahon’s presidency, some twenty prefects were
dismissed or replaced by men loyal to the new regime and over the course of the year,
repressive measures accumulated quickly, as did individual persecutions. One prominent
means of announcing the conservative agenda of the Moral Order regime was to overturn
prior rulings of clemency for some high-profile Communards. This was a manifestation
of the Moral Order’s anti-revolutionary stance but it also provided the opportunity to
rekindle conservative passions which might translate into electoral gain especially when
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such revocations of commutation were publicized and directed against well-known
figures.
On August 10, 1873, Henri Rochefort’s case concerning his involvement with the
Commune was re-opened. Originally sentenced to deportation for life, Hugo successfully
pleaded to Thiers that his failing health and illustrious literary career should translate into
his sentence being carried out within France. In 1873, Hugo again pleaded on Rochefort’s
behalf in the press and in person to Duc de Broglie—a fellow member of the Academy
and MacMahon’s Prime Minsiter—but to no avail. Instead Broglie revoked Thiers’
clemency, much to the acclaim of the conservative press and he was deported to New
Caledonia.391 Similarly, Broglie took advantage of the Empire’s press laws, leading to the
Radical Deputy Arthur Ranc’s prosecution for having briefly participated in the
Commune. In light of Ranc’s recent election to the Assembly for Lyon, his death
sentence probably had more to do with political exigency and conservative image
projection than his brief participation in the Commune.392 The regime then moved on to
other measures to curtail Republican political messaging by forbidding any lauding of the
revolutionary past, banning celebrations of 14 July, and purging busts of Marianne from
town halls throughout the nation.393 In spite of these tactics, republic candidates
continued to win political favor. The 1874 by-elections resulted in the entrance of another
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sixteen republicans to the National Assembly, along with six Bonapartists, and only one
monarchist.
By 1875, the republican surge was becoming an alarming trend for the
monarchists. Between 1872 and 1875, there were sixty-five by-elections with nearly each
one going in favor of the republican candidate. Moreover, these elections demonstrated
that republican electoral strength was no longer based solely in the large industrial cities
and town, but rather that it had also taken root in provincial and rural areas, regions that
as recently as 1870 and 1871 had supported Bonapartists and Imperial plebiscites and
monarchist candidates. The successive republican victories and the unexpected uptick in
Bonapartism led monarchists, heretofore persistent in delaying the promulgation of the
Republic’s constitution, to fear that deferring the constitution any longer might mean a
return to Bonapartist populism or a more radical Republic and one that would be more
difficult to subvert in the future.394 The Republic’s constitution narrowly passed on
January 30, 1875.
The consolidated Republic’s first general elections were held in February and
March 1876. During the campaign, republican messaging consisted of an electoral appeal
that combined “a promise of small property to all, a reasoned progress, a secular [but not
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a-religious] and self-governing future.”395 Just as critical as the message, was the
republicans’ grassroots tactics, which became the standard in campaign strategies
henceforth.396 This enabled republican politicians to simultaneously campaign for office
and to promote the Republic’s solidification to rural constituencies. The efficacy of this
type of grassroots campaigning was validated when the votes were cast. Once again,
republicans demonstrated their growing national-popularity, obtaining 360 of the 532
seats in the Chamber and 93 of the 225 elected seats in the Senate; thus, their majority in
the Chamber was complete and they made serious headway in the Senate.397
Conservative anxiety over the growing appeal of republican candidates reached a
frenzied state after the 1876 elections.398 As described by Auguste Laugel, “the panic is
great in the conservative world…people are alarmed, they see the country on a rapid
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descent towards Radicalism which nothing can stop.”399 Moderates made up the
overwhelming majority of the republican victories. However, in their writings and public
pronouncements, the monarchists still seeking to subvert the Republic, made no
distinction between the rival republican factions.400
Following the republicans’ 1876 victories in the general elections, MacMahon
and his ministers moved their offices from Versailles to Paris. The political calculation
behind this decision is irrefutable. In Paris, the historic epicenter of revolutionary and
republican politics, MacMahon took up residency in the Élysée Palace while requiring
the legislative bodies, where republicans were gaining seats, to maintain their offices and
sessions in Versailles. Moreover, MacMahon maintained martial law in 42 of France’s 90
departments, making it easier for his regime to control its opponents’ voter outreach. This
meant that “republican newspapers all over the country were either suppressed or their
sale forbidden on the street;” and public officials and newspapers were suspended merely
for braving attendance to a republican rally or reporting on the speeches of prominent
republican figures.401 For example, Lucien Verdet, a Municipal Councilor in the town of
Oyonnax was prosecuted by the regime for having delivered a eulogy at a civil
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(republican) funeral.402 Such repressive measures hardly stemmed the tide of growing
republicanism among French voters or the resolve of their elected representatives.
Despite a conservative Presidency and a conservative majority in the Senate, the
1876 elections were unmistakably an expression of republican allegiance among the
majority of voters. Under the circumstances, MacMahon appointed a republican Prime
Minister, Jules Dufaure, a solid republican in 1876 but a man who had previously served
as a minister under Louis-Philippe. It was hoped, by the men of the Moral Order, that
Dufaure would be able to temper the supposedly radical element of the lower house.
Instead, Dufaure fell from power just nine months later following a Chamber vote of noconfidence.

Into the Deluge: Origins of the Crisis of 16 May
From the beginning to the end, Communard amnesty issues plagued Dufaure’s
ministry. Radicals in the Senate and Chamber pushed the issue the furthest which only
increased the government’s concern that the nation was slipping into the hands of
Commune supporting revolutionaries, a characterization that they ascribed to republicans
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as a whole.403 During the campaign for the February elections, Radicals ran on a platform
that included promises to bring forth an amnesty. Holding true to their campaign
promises and personal convictions, on March 21, 1876 Victor Hugo and F.V. Raspail
simultaneously introduced amnesty bills in the Senate and Chamber. At the same time, a
petition in favor of amnesty began circulating in Paris and surrounding areas. In a truly
grassroots effort, large shops in Belleville and Ménilmotant invited customers to sign it
“en masse,” as did flower vendors, and at private parties, invited guests were presented
with the petitions.404 By May 8, 1876, police agents reported that one signature gatherer
on Avenue Parmentier asserted that he had overseen the gathering of between 21,000 and
30,000 signatures.405 Even if such figures were inflated, the grassroots activism on behalf
of Communard amnesty was significant enough to merit numerous reports between
police agents and the Prefect and demonstrates a growing popular support for amnesty.
In Versailles, both the Raspail and the Hugo bills were rejected, nearly
unanimously in the Senate and by 392 to 50 in the Chamber. While the Senate’s
conservative majority might explain the rejections, the Chamber’s decision was more of a
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reflection of the Opportunists’ attempt to distinguish their political moderation vis-à-vis
the Radicals and also to appear conservative enough to maintain their budding alliance
with liberal-minded Orleanists. Having elected Radical republicans who had largely
campaigned on bringing forth an amnesty, their constituencies were furious. As described
by one police agent, “the rejection of the amnesty law has caused a stir of artificial
emotions in the popular neighborhoods, probably prepared by the leaders. I judge by
induction of what was happening in the cafés of Montmartre and the Batignolles where
discussions were very [lively] and threatening…; [moreover,] constituents of Gambetta
have organized a private meeting in which he will be invited to come and explain his
abstention on the vote for amnesty…if he declines it will be considered a lack of faith and
the [meetings delegates] will invite voters to suspend the mandate given to him.”406 This
was not the last time the amnesty issue would arise for the Moral Order and menace
Dufaure’s ministry.
In the hopes of ending a controversy that divided the republicans, on May 26,
1876, Louis Gatineau introduced a bill for the cessation of Communard prosecutions.
This was not the amnesty that the Radicals had promised, but a compromise between the
far Left and a large contingent of the Republican Union, Gambetta not included.407 The
Gatineau bill became the catalyst to Dufaure’s resignation which illuminates the extent to
which Commune-related politics were politically impactful during the 1870s.
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The government had promised a similar bill prior to May 1876; with the notion
that this should be considered in relation to Gatineau’s proposal, the issue was put on
hold until the fall. In the interim, Radical Deputies such as Raspail, Clemenceau and
Blanc began to recoil from their colleagues in Gambetta’s moderate-dominated
Republican Union especially after the rejection of Hugo’s and Raspail’s amnesty
proposals. This division is an important fact to consider because it validates the argument
that the Commune was the major fault-line between the Opportunists and the Radicals in
the 1870s and because it bellied the Moral Order’s attempts to essentialize all republicans
into the Radical pro-Communard camp, thereby hoping to reignite allegiance to the
conservative regime.
In June 1876, MacMahon wrote a letter to the Minister of War that detailed his
position on Communard tribunals. In this letter, he advised not a cessation of
prosecutions, but a withdrawal of their exposure to the public: “I think that we ought to
let all acts connected with the fatal insurrection of 1871 fall into oblivion.”408 The letter
was published the following day in the Journal Officiel and was accompanied by a
“presidential decree dated June 24, of pardon, commutation of sentence, or reduction of
penalty for 87 Communards.”409 MacMahon’s attempt to take matters into his own hands,
while the Chamber awaited debate on a bill covering the same issue, raised an issue of
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legislative encroachment by the President; thus began the constitutional controversy
culminating in Dufaure’s fall from power and the Crisis of 16 May.410
In response to the publication of MacMahon’s letter, many Republicans, led by
Raspail, joined together to submit a motion of interpellation to the government on July 3.
Gambetta’s controversial moderation, and break from his earlier radicalism, was
displayed in full when, on July 4th he ascended the tribune before Raspail’s interpellation
proposal could be debated, and diverted the Chamber’s attention to another matter.
Gambetta viewed Raspail’s motion as something that might precipitate the Chamber’s
dissolution, an event he perceived the republicans were not ready for. 411 As a result of
Gambetta’s filibuster-like response, “by the time Raspail got to the floor to speak in
behalf of the interpellation, the Deputies were exhausted [and] voted without debate to
postpone any discussion of the interpellation until a committee report on the Gatineau bill
had been submitted.”412 Between the rest of July and the fall of 1876, the Radicals
increased their demands for the Gatineau bill and continued to stump for a general
amnesty. Their efforts included privately lobbying republican politicians, attacking the
government’s policies in Chamber speeches, and reaching out to the voting public
through the publication of articles and pamphlets in support of amnesty for the
Communards.
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The Radicals’ tactics were consequential. To take a broad view, they contributed
to growing popular support for amnesty and Radical republican electoral success; and for
the moment, they prompted Gambetta to finally take a public stand on the issue of
amnesty although not the one they had hoped for. By the fall of 1876, Gambetta’s
Belleville constituency was chaffing under his opportunism. On October 26, 1876 he
spoke before a gathering organized by the electoral committee of the 20th arrondissement.
His appearance was greeted with shouts of “Vive l’Amnistie!” While affecting an
empathetic tone he unequivocally denounced any support for a general amnesty denying
“that the Commune had any political significance, [and maintaining that it had been] ‘a
sort of convulsion of misery, famine and despair.’”413 However, he concluded his speech
by calling for a strengthening of republican unity to meet the challenge of “the worst
recrudescence of the reactionary party since 1815.”414 In this speech, Gambetta exposed
his antipathy for a general amnesty in 1876 but he did go on, given the reality of popular
support, especially among his own constituents, to reverse his position on the Gatineau
bill after a compromise was reached.415 Dufaure, however, was not persuaded. At the
Chamber’s opening session on November 3 he delivered a speech in favor of
MacMahon’s executive prerogative in addressing the on-going prosecutions. This was far
more than an issue regarding Communard prosecution; this was a matter of the
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Republic’s locus of power. Gambetta’s post-compromise support, then, should be viewed
in light of the impending constitutional crisis and the republican challenge to the Moral
Order’s position on executive authority.
On November 6, 1876 the Chamber voted in favor of the Gatineau bill by more
than a two-thirds majority.416 By the time the bill reached the Senate, Dufaure had
modified his position; speaking before the Senate he argued in favor of the bill, stating
that the Council of Ministers “could not complain if the chambers insist upon giving
adherence to the principles which have been expounded in the letter of the President of
the Republic.”417 On December 1, 1876 the Senate rejected the compromise on the
Gatineau bill. Dufaure resigned after a vote of no-Confidence by the Chamber. Clearly,
Dufaure was caught in the middle of a hostile debate that centered on the locus of power
under the Third Republic; he had failed in his mission to navigate safe passage for both
himself and the government.418
The political impasse regarding the fate of the Communards, legislative privilege,
and executive power was now reaching a fever pitch. Republicans in the Chamber and
Senate were united against any further encroachments on legislative power and deeply
committed to combatting what many assumed was a pending coup d’état. Outside of
Versailles, however, the Radicals were increasingly intransigent regarding their stance on
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the Commune. For example, in 1876 the Parisian Municipal Council, dominated by
Radicals, voted in favor of including 30, 000 francs to the 1877 budget “for the aid to the
families of political prisoners.”419 This was perceived as alarming evidence of the
growing confidence among Radical politicians and their subsequent willingness to be
more assertive. In the meantime, MacMahon needed to appoint a new Prime Minister and
with the Chamber’s republican majority having issued a warning of no-confidence should
a minority Council be chosen. As a result, MacMahon selected a Council nearly identical
to the one he was replacing by choosing Jules Simon as the new Prime Minister.
Between Simon’s December 1876 appointment and his May 16 resignation,
Radical-republican politics ratcheted up the anxiety and stiffened the resolve of the
politicians of the Moral Order and their supporters to stamp out republicanism by any
means. Once again, the Commune was exerting its posthumous influence. Despite the
ministerial crisis that came as a result of the Gatineau bill, MacMahon’s letter, and
Dufaure’s resignation, Communard deportations continued as late as December 28, 1876
and so too did the Radicals’ denunciations of the Moral Order government. On January 1,
1877, L’Homme libre printed an article written by its editor, the Radical Deputy, Louis
Blanc, in which Blanc championed the cause of amnesty stating “we could not let these
holidays pass without thinking with emotion of the victims of our civil discords, the
cessation of whose afflictions has not been dependent upon us…the apostles of a
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relentless policy... continue to seize without pity the humblest soldiers of an insurrection
which almost belongs to history.”420 Henri Rochefort, having by then escaped from New
Caledonia and living in Brussels, was “writing [pro-Amnesty articles] regularly for Les
Droits d’Homme,” a newspaper owned by two radical members of the Parisian Municipal
Council, in which he unabashedly “hurled insults at MacMahon in the name of the men
of March 18.”421 That year, the anniversary of the proclamation of the Commune was
celebrated not only in Paris but also in “several of France’s industrial cities with
clandestine banquets and meetings.”422 For the exiles, these moments validated hopes that
they might soon return home, for MacMahon and the politicians of the Moral Order the
events were proof that radicalism and revolutionary sentiments were penetrating too
deeply and must be considered imminent threats to their conservative agenda.
The issue of amnesty was an omnipresent political factor in the days and months
prior to the Crisis of 16 May. Indeed, during this period, “every sitting of the Chamber of
Deputies verged on riot…and whatever the topic of debate, sooner or later the attacks
took up the subject of the Commune.”423 As Prime Minister, Simon was charged with
providing a balance between a hostile Chamber dominated by republicans and an ultraconservative government. But tensions continued to mount, and in Versailles, broader
issues soon displaced the problem of amnesty. Simon’s task proved impossible. Despite
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divisions between the republican factions—most acutely over the fate of the
Communards—they were united in defense against the Moral Order and, like their
enemies on the Right, the republican camp was on edge; they were preparing to fight
against a possible coup d’état or at least the Chamber’s dissolution. This unity was
greatly enhanced by the same issues that precipitated Simon’s resignation only five
months after coming to power: clericalism and press controls.
Clericalism, which had already been a key division between republicans and
monarchists, became an acute issue for the French government in January 1877, when the
Italian chamber passed a bill that empowered the Italian state to prosecute priests that
were agitating on behalf of the Pope and the restoration of his powers in Rome.424 In
France, militant Catholics organized Catholic Action committees and petitioned
MacMahon to use any resources at his disposal in order to liberate the Pontiff. Simon
intervened by dissolving the committees and directing the prefects to repress the petitions
that menaced domestic and international peace. Many republicans, including Gambetta,
considered this an opportunity to publically strike out against the political influence of
the French clergy and simultaneously the dangers of the Moral Order’s clericalism in
terms of diplomatic relations and the maintenance of peace on the continent. By finding
common cause with the Italian state and Bismarck’s Germany, republicans had another
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source by which to validate their claims to be the true party of peace.425 With this
opportunity in mind, republican deputies from all factions met on April 30 th and
unanimously decided to interpellate Simon’s Ministry on what other measures it would
take to curtail clerical activism.426 Between May 3rd and May 4th the Chamber debated on
the interpellation.
On the first day of the Chamber debates Simon defensively asserted that the
majority of French bishops were acting with moderation and counseled against any
further suppression of their action. He added that if necessary, the government would call
the episcopate to order, using all the powers that the Concordat provided. This was not
enough for his republican colleagues, especially the Radicals who openly denigrated the
continuation of the Concordat itself. In Gambetta’s May 4th speech, he likened clerical
agitators to Moral Order politicians exclaiming “we are in the presence of an army which
has a general [the Pope] and which maneuvers as disciplined armies do;” citing the
clerical infiltration of high society and government offices, he famously concluded
“clericalism! There is the enemy!”427 Immediately after the speech the Chamber voted in
favor of repressing clerical agitation via the interpellation by 304 to 113.

While the Italian state was seeking to limit clerical influence, so too was Bismarck’s Germany.
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On the heels of this political defeat, Simon was isolated again when the Chamber
opened discussions on a potential alteration of the 1875 law dealing with press
offenses.428 Republicans wanted to assure jury trials rather than summary jurisdiction for
all press related offenses, with the tacit understanding that juries had a better track record
of acquitting. The Moral Order viewed this potential change as another step on the
Chamber’s radical path. In these sessions, Broglie defined radicalism in neo-Burkian
terms as “the spirit which seeks to make of the Republic not only a form of political
government, substituting the election of the head of State for heredity, but also the
instrument and the symbol of a great social transformation…, the spirit which wants the
Republic to have as a necessary complement and natural consequence the suppression of
all the great institutions which the past has bequeathed to us, and which are the honor of
our history.”429 The monarchist anxiety over the growing influence of republican’s
revolutionary ideas—whether real or imagined—must be understood in terms of the
government’s role in the Crisis of 16 May.
Simon, having promised the President that he would not support any changes to
the 1875 law, opposed the republicans in the Chamber. On May 15, the votes on the press
bill were tallied; the proposed change was affirmed by 377 to 51. Simon had no choice
but to record the Chamber’s decision and pass the bill to the Senate. That evening
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MacMahon wrote a scathing letter to his Prime Minister, although it neither asked for nor
“demanded Simon’s resignation, as everyone assumed, and technically he did not dismiss
him; the letter’s preemptory tone made Simon’s continuation in office difficult, if not
impossible.”430 The following day Simon resigned; thus began the Crisis of 16 May.

Aux Urnes Citoyens! The Crisis of 16 May and the campaigns for the October
elections
The news of Simon’s resignation reached most the Ministers and Deputies of the
Chamber while they were taking part in the funeral procession of Ernest Picard. That
night, some 300 Deputies met at the Grand Hôtel; upon arrival, they were greeted by
hundreds of people whose presence solidified the republicans’ hopes for popular
support.431 During the meeting, Gambetta, flush with popular acclaim, introduced the
motion for a collective republican response to Simon’s resignation and the impending
formation of a new Ministry and/or dissolution of the Chamber; it was voted on without
debate and passed unanimously.432 After the meeting, as Gambetta was exiting the
building, Blanc leaned in to ask where he would be sleeping that night. 433 The political
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climate leading up to this night was hostile and chaotic; with memories and personal
experiences of 1851, many feared that this was the beginning of a coup d’état.
In the months, and even years, leading up to the Crisis of 16 May, many
republicans anticipated and propagated that the government of the Moral Order was
preparing for a coup d’état that would end the Republic for good. This was an inversion
of the Moral Order’s argument regarding republicans and their revolutionary agenda;
however republican fears regarding a potential coup were not unreasonable. In November
1873, with no apparent successor in sight, a “proposition of the reactionary elements in
the Assembly [moved] to prolong MacMahon’s powers and term of office to seven
years…after a heated debate, it was carried on November 19, 1873, by a majority of
sixty-six.”434 Many republicans saw extending the President’s powers and term, in
conjunction with the early purges of prefects and mayors, as a circling of the wagons
around the President’s goals and policies including restoration. The conservative press
increased republican anxiety. For example, La Défense Sociale et Religieuse, attacked
Simon as being weak in the face of radicalism and accused the republicans of
shepherding a return to “religious and political Jacobinism, atheism and the Commune,”
concluding that the government had “a legitimate right of resistance.”435 Such rhetoric
exposes the assimilation of the revolutionary-republican identity and validates the notion
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that MacMahon’s regime might have been gearing up for a coup, an act that had
significant historical precedent. Simon’s 1877 dismissal coming so soon after Dufaure’s,
“was regarded everywhere as [the] veritable coup d’état” that seemed to have been long
in the making.436
Anxiety over the President’s preparation for a coup led republicans to take
precautions. Despite some republicans who attacked him as being nothing more than
MacMahon’s pawn, Simon himself had, “already removed most of the prefects of the
Moral Order”437 by the spring of 1877. Similarly, Gambetta monitored the political
sentiments of the military very closely, in light of MacMahon’s relationship with that
body. Despite the laws designed to de-politicize the institution, the military’s role in past
revolutionary circumstances was not underestimated.438 In February of 1876, on the eve
of that year’s republican electoral victory, a memorandum was prepared for Gambetta
that detailed the political leanings of the French military.439 Knowing that the officers had
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rallied to the Empire in 1851, the quest to secure this information by Gambetta was
certainly an attempt to gauge their attitudes should a new a coup be attempted. More than
half the generals were counted as anti-republican but Gambetta and his associates
remained cautiously optimistic about the role of the military, should such an event
transpire. On May 1, 1877 Gambetta remarked to a police agent that he monitored the
army’s political sympathies closely and although he admitted to the anti-republican
sentiments of the majority of officers and colonels, he insisted that new appointments
were making inroads.440 His sureness was bolstered by a supreme confidence in the
French voters that he assumed would rally to defend the Republic based on recent
electoral successes and the republican press campaigns.
The republican press was equally combative in propagandistic denunciations of its
enemy’s intentions.441 Republican journals charged the Moral Order with plotting to
subvert the constitution and the Republic but maintained the same confident tone that
republican politicians expressed themselves. For example, in January 1877, Hugo’s
Radical republican journal, Le Rappel, confidently registered a foreshadowing rebuke
against the Senate, a body the Radicals had opposed creating in 1875: “let the Senate
continue as it has begun if it likes…for the day of revision will come for it as the day of
dissolution has come for the Assembly whose shadow it is. If it is stupid enough to be
contrary to the country and offend all that is modern France, it will not kill the Republic,
440
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it will commit suicide.”442 MacMahon’s impulsively written letter and Simon’s
resignation on May 16th therefore merely set in motion a collision course.
On May 17th, as the Deputies arrived to take the train from Saint-Lazare station to
Versailles, they were again greeted by an immense crowd. The spectator seats in the
Chamber of Deputies were packed and the police and military presence was conspicuous.
Gambetta was the first to ascend the tribune and began his highly publicized speech by
introducing the republican motion to make ministerial responsibility to the parliamentary
majority explicit citing that this was the aim of the constitution of 1875 and will of the
voting majority.443 Throughout his speech, Gambetta highlighted the national public
sentiment against the President’s actions, thereby holding up the democratic intention of
the Republic’s constitution and recalling the popularity of republican politicians at the
polls, both of which were to become key components in the Republican campaign for the
October election.444 The President was accused of having a ready-made government
already formed and seeking to return France to the ancien régime.445 In concluding his
characteristically passionate appeal Gambetta warned:
With the Constitution in hand and the country behind you, ask whether it
is the intention to govern with the Republican party in all its shades or if,
on the contrary, by recalling to power men who have been three or four
times rejected by popular vote, it is intended to impose on this country a
dissolution which would mean consulting France anew… if the decision is
for dissolution we shall go back in confidence to the country that we
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know, that we appreciate, who knows that it is not us who are troubling
peace at home and disturbing it abroad. I repeat that the country knows
that it is not us, and if dissolution occurs, a dissolution that you
engineered, that you caused, take heed lest it become angry…[and] the
country say: Dissolution is the prelude to war! Those who had such an
object in mind would be criminals!446

Therein, Gambetta casually rebuffed the notion that all republicans held radical and
revolutionary sentiments; in fact, he inverted the accusation by citing that it was the
partisans of the Moral Order who were gunning for revolutionary change and that in
doing so they could be deemed criminals by the French people. He upheld republican
claims to being the party of domestic and foreign peace vis-à-vis the monarchists. His
forecast that dissolution might become a declaration of war was dangerously
provocative.447 Dangerous, but also effective; contained within his speech were nearly all
of the components of the republican campaign when dissolution did come and elections
were held that October, including a clarion call to defend the Republic.
The dissolution was not immediately declared. After Gambetta’s speech on May
17th, the Chamber voted on the republican motion passing the interpellation by 349 to
147. That evening, the President held his usual weekly reception at the Élysée Palace
which Washburne attended to gauge which groups would make a supporting appearance.
He was struck by “great disproportion of military men, whose glittering uniforms were
seen by thousands… [and] a large number of the class who had not been there before, the
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Legitimists and Bonapartists, who crowded in to offer their congratulations to the
President… [and] many members of the Diplomatic Corps, all of whom seemed to regard
the situation as one of extreme gravity.”448 The following day, MacMahon announced the
appointment of a new Ministry composed entirely of men on the extreme-Right, with
Broglie, again chosen as Prime Minister. This was “a ministry whose sympathies were
with the clerical and monarchical tendencies of government, and which were in every
way opposed to liberal tendencies,” and thus entirely contrary to the sentiments of the
majority of the votes as reflected in the most recent elections of 1876.449 The Senate’s
support for the Chamber’s dissolution was essential, consequently, four out of nine, were
Senators.
The composition of the new Ministry was just what the republicans had expected,
but still the dissolution did not come. Instead, Oscar Bardi de Fourtou, the new Minister
of Interior took the tribune to read a defensive message from the President regarding his
actions of 16 May and then announced the prorogation of the Chamber until June 16 th
(the maximum length that was allowed for such an action by the constitution), citing the
intent of letting passions cool. This was a play for time intended to prevent the Chamber
from introducing an immediate motion of no-confidence in the Broglie Ministry and to
provide a period during which resources could be martialed after the hasty decisions that
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had precipitated the Crisis. Thereafter, republican unanimity was as unmistakable as their
historically grounded rebuttal. Republican Deputies repaired to the Hôtel des Réservoirs
straightaway, “like their predecessors who went to the Tennis Court in 1789.”450 At this
meeting the Deputies drafted a manifesto directed to the voters of France. It called for the
same calm reception to the President’s decree that prevailed when Thiers was
outmaneuvered in May 1873. It then framed the terms of the forthcoming republican
campaign; the Broglie ministry and MacMahon were labeled the “government of
combat” and sternly denounced for rejecting the republican will of the national electorate.
363 Deputies signed the manifesto, which henceforth was popularly referred to as
the “Manifesto of the 363.” In the declaration, the republicans strategically placed their
constituencies on the defense and the onus of rebuffing MacMahon’s machinations on
their shoulders. According to the manifesto, the government was rejecting their votes and
thanks to universal (male) suffrage, they were empowered to thwart such machinations
by exercising their rights at the polls. This cast the vanquished republican Deputies as
defenders of the population whose rights and expressed will were being trampled. For
example they wrote: “France wants a Republic, she said so in February 1876… the nation
will rise [to demonstrate] through its coolness, its patience, [and] resolve, that an
incorrigible minority cannot snatch the government for itself.”451 The manifesto also
pointed out that the decision negatively impacted business interests and thereby also
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jeopardized the success of the upcoming Universal Exposition. This was a type of
rhetoric traditionally derived from conservative messaging and demonstrates the
moderate tone of social, political, and economic stability that republicans were projecting
by the mid-1870s.452 With the confidence that would become a republican-campaign
hallmark they continued: “regardless of the national community’s anxieties France will
allow neither deception nor intimidation, it will withstand all provocations, all
challenges.” The manifesto concluded with a direct appeal to the voters:
As for us, your representatives, we now come into direct communication with
you, we urge you to decide between the political reaction and adventures that
suddenly puts into question everything that was so painfully won for six years,
and the wise, firm, peaceful, and progressive policies that you have already
consecrated. Dear citizens, this new test will not last long: in five months, France
will speak; we have the certainty that it will not fail. The Republic will emerge
stronger than ever by the popular ballot, the parties of the past will finally be
defeated….France will face the future with confidence and serenity.453

With these messages republicans, led in the 1877 campaign by the now solidly Moderate
Gambetta, were transforming their image away from being the party of movement and
radical change to being the party that would safeguard the political and financial status
quo.454
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On the same day, after the regular Senate session, all the republican Senators met
and unanimously voted to issue a declaration of support for the republican Chamber,
denouncing the government’s actions on 16 May and the composition of the new Cabinet
as contrary to the voting majority’s desire. The statement firmly asserted “we will not
join any enterprise against republican institutions.”455 These declarations of republican
solidarity and denunciations of the government’s actions, especially at a time of
“profound national peace,” became the essential mantra of republican campaign
messaging.456
Between the publication of the Manifesto and the June 16 reconvening of the
Chamber, the campaign to elect a still un-dissolved Chamber was well underway.
Republicans and their monarchist enemies remained undeterred in their mission to
politically annihilate each other.

The month of prorogation was opportune for the

republicans, it gave them a chance to prepare for the debates that would ensue after the
Chamber was re-convened in June and, more importantly, it enabled a month of
republican campaigning while the Deputies still enjoyed parliamentary immunity. This
fortuitous month witnessed a renewal of their grassroots campaigning as republican
Deputies and Senators went directly to the voters encouraging and animating supporters
in reunion and banquet toasts throughout the nation. Their pronouncements were
subsequently published in republican newspapers under the title Parliamentary
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Protestations.457 At the same time, republican voters reached out to their representatives
by writing letters and sending addresses to their Senators and Deputies thereby mirroring
their representatives’ unity and commitment to the political process.458 This reflects the
confidence of these voters in the Republic’s representational capacity and an ability to
take advantage of its channels of political communication.
On the other side of the campaign, the Moral Order regime stepped up its
repressive measures. As Minister of Interior, Fourtou “ordered a watch on cafes and
cabarets where meetings were held and instructed the prefects to be severe in their
licensing and control of newsvendors.”459 Purges continued and at a quicker pace in order
to reverse Simon’s appointments: “62 prefectural changes were made within 24 hours and
within the month 484 prefects and sub-prefects, 184 magistrates, 83 mayors and 381
justices of the peace were replaced.”460 Fourtou was effectively stacking the deck on the
government’s side so that when dissolution occurred they could proceed with the legal
harassment of republican campaigners that was to become a hallmark of their campaign.
The monarchists, however, were much more divided than the republicans; many hoped to
avoid dissolution which a supremely confident Gambetta was now gunning for.
Before the Chamber reconvened, Washburne was granted an interview with
Gambetta, the “acknowledged leader of the Republican party in France”461 On the subject
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of dissolution, Gambetta boasted that he “had no fears…he felt the utmost assurance as to
what would be the result of new elections… [insisting that] republican opinion was then
so deeply rooted in every part of France that nothing short of a perfect reign of terror
could overcome it, and this was beyond the power of the government to produce.” 462 In
reference to Fourtou’s efforts to suppress anti-government sentiments in cafes and other
public spaces, Gambetta laughed stating “to want to stop Frenchmen from talking is like
wanting to stop Americans from taking action.”463 Gambetta concluded the interview by
predicting the Moral Order’s defeat and its impact:
Taking everything into consideration, the coup d’état of the 16th of May
will have profited the country. Its immediate effect, it is true, is to strike
down at one blow the great material and business interests of the country.
The loss to France will be fifty millions of francs per day, but, on the other
hand, it will give to the French people a solemn opportunity to affirm, in
profound peace and in a quiet and orderly manner, its determination to live
under republican institutions, by calling for a new election. The marshal
would, in fact, submit himself to the verdict of the nation. If he is ready to
abide by its decision, the republicans are; if the people support him, we
will submit. But we do not fear such a result. Never has a more general
and unqualified condemnation been passed upon any government than that
which the French people will visit upon the unwarrantable policy which
the irresponsible advisors of the marshal have induced him to pursue.464
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Washburne’s interview with Gambetta was followed by one with Thiers. Thiers agreed
with Gambetta’s remarks and stated that “as to the dissolution…, it was the wish of all
those opposed to the coup d’état of the 16th of May that it should take place, as they were
desirous of trying titles with the MacMahonists before the country.”465 On June 16th the
Chamber was reconvened and Fourtou took the tribune to read a message from the
President wherein he once again defended his actions on May 16th and then announced
the intention of dissolving the Chamber. Since the 16th of May, all debates in the
Chamber and from the politicians sitting in Versailles were not simply points of debate
within the walls of government but were, more than ever, designed to be heard and acted
upon by voters with the pending elections in mind. Hence, when the announcement of
dissolution was (finally) pronounced, it was greeted by vociferous denunciations by
republicans in the Chamber, who, despite having privately confessed to wanting the
dissolution, now struck a defensive chord, hoping to induce the electorate to follow suite.
The announcement of the intent of dissolution, however, could not stave off the debate on
the motion for interpellation which was also scheduled for that day.
In the presence of a crowded Chamber, Fourtou took to the floor to defend the
government against the Chamber. In his speech, he committed a serious campaign
blunder by stating: “the men who form the government today were elected in 1871 and
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formed a part of the National Assembly of which it can be said that it was the pacifier of
the country and the liberator of the territory.”466 At once, Gambetta jumped to his feet
and, pointing to Thiers, decried “There! There is the liberator of the territory!”
Thereafter, according to Washburne, “an estimated three hundred deputies were on their
feet, all pointing to M. Thiers, clapping their hands and cheering…during the whole
demonstration [Thiers] never moved a muscle.”467 At that moment, Thiers’ alliance with
the Republican campaign was sealed and, thereby, the republicans’ association with
national liberation. The interpellation debate lasted for another three days and on June
19th the republican motion of no-confidence passed by 363 to 158. Republican solidarity
was confirmed and on June 22, so was the Chamber’s dissolution, when the Senate
affirmed MacMahon’s request by 150 to 130 votes. The government did not announce the
dates for the elections until late August, but campaigning was already long-underway.
The Moral Order’s campaign was plagued by a lack of ideological and tactical
coherence, a fundamental underestimation of the political agency of ordinary voters, and
the depths to which republican political, social, and cultural ideals had penetrated the
political orientation of the national electorate.468 At the time, however, this was not
perceived by Broglie who was now charged with leading the conservative camp to
electoral victory. Submerged within the conservative camp were Legitimists, Orleanists,
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Bonapartists, and although unsolicited, clericals; all of whom, in varying degrees,
abhorred electoral politics.469 Moreover, their constituencies were unprepared for the type
of political battle being waged. Broglie was right to assess that “people [strolling down
the Champs Élysées] would be made for a coup d’état rather than for the effort we are
going to ask of them.”470 He was a legalist, like MacMahon, meaning he wanted to avoid
the type of extralegal measures of repression that some conservatives were demanding471
not because he perceived a permissive campaign would lead to a conservative victory, but
because he saw the campaign as the first round of a longer struggle. Instead, what
occurred was a type of legal harassment. As described by Camille de Meaux, a staunch
supporter and cabinet minister of the Moral Order government, “we did not claim to
change the legally established regime; we proposed only to employ all the means at our
disposal to defend and maintain the endangered social order.”472 Accordingly, republican
campaigners and politicians, despite taking pains to avoid provocation, were repeatedly
harassed under the laws whose parameters were stretched to the limits of interpretation.
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University Press, 1992 regarding the disunity among royalists and their ultimate failure in bringing forth a
restoration. Broglie advised that clergy not be mobilized to support the conservative campaign because it
would only assist to energize republicans who were stumping on the issue of clerical agitation.
Nonetheless, the clerical contingent were outspoken in their support of the government’s candidates, much
to the embarrassment of the campaign itself.
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For example, throughout the campaign, conservative journals including Le Figaro, Le Pays, and La
Defense Sociale et Religieuse repeatedly insisted on such action as did his fellow-ministers; Fourtou and
Caillaux specifically advocated that Broglie work with them to inhibit universal suffrage. See Grubb, pp.
293 and 316.
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Meaux, p. 316. Meux also famously remarked, after the October elections, that “we were monarchists
and the nation was not.”
469

238

Hence the government’s administrative purges during the month of prorogation and the
rampant prosecutions that ensued after dissolution was announced.
The conservative’s lack of ideological coherence created a campaign which was
presented in two ways. On the one hand, it was presented as a defensive battle to protect
the nation from a revolutionary menace, which most voters did not perceive they needed
protection from and which MacMahon’s constitutionally questionable actions on 16 May
had undermined from the beginning. On the other hand, the campaign became a dual
between two competing figure heads: MacMahon and Gambetta. MacMahon was an ideal
presidential candidate in 1873, when monarchists still held the majority within the
National Assembly and castigations of republicans as revolutionaries still met with
electoral success. However by 1877, this was no longer the case (as the October elections
would soon make clear) and MacMahon’s image as a military leader and unquestionable
conservative was little competition for Thiers’ and Gambetta’s popularity and the
republican campaign’s ability to intimately engage voters. MacMahon was an awkward
public speaker and, more often than not, he appeared to disdain the very people whose
votes he needed in order to win the battle.473 It is one thing for a candidate to be
unknown, still another for him to be disliked, but in an election that is based on universal
(male) suffrage, it is potentially fatal for a candidate to be perceived as one who is

See Grubb, p. 309. Grubb’s chapter on this election, « The Campaign » provides an excellent description
of not only the awkwardness of MacMahon and Broglie on the campaign trail, but also the manner in which
the government’s legal harassment of the republican campaign and its supporters backfired on the
conservative campaign. It made the “government’s strictures seem all the more arbitrary and indefensible;”
a fact that alienated voters and lends validity to Grubb’s insistence that “the Right lost the elections as
much as the Left won them.” See pp. 303 and 306.
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contemptuous of an integral segment of the French constituency, let alone the popular
outreach required to win their votes.474 As a result, propaganda supporting MacMahon
reverted to, on the positive side, upholding his military record, and negatively on
Gambetta’s supposed radicalism and a play on national fears of revolutionary ferment by
maintaining their rhetorical assimilation of republicans with the Communards.
In campaign posters and pamphlets distributed nation-wide, MacMahon’s
candidates were rarely presented as positive choices. Instead, the republican opposition
took center stage in negative attacks with MacMahon’s candidates upheld as bulwarks
against social dissolution and another Commune; the antithesis of the messages
emanating from the republican campaign. For example, in a two page pamphlet written
by Alphonse Karr, the celebrated conservative journalist and one time editor of Le
Figaro, voters were urged to question the integrity of Thiers and Gambetta and their
recent alliance; Karr then posited: “suppose [the republicans] are the winners in the
election—the most advanced and corrupt will throw the others out of the window, as has
always taken place in similar circumstances” concluding by warning voters of the peril
that would befall the nation should republicans emerge victorious. He asserted that if they
did not vote, or did not vote for MacMahon’s candidates, then it was not Thiers,
Gambetta “nor even M. Naquet whom you deliver to France…it is in Vallés, Cluseret,
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The rampant prosecutions of republican journalists, candidates, and campaigners only compounded this
perception of the President and the men he was campaigning for, a fact that the republicans capably
exploited in their own propaganda.
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and Pyat, etc., that you will entrust our destiny.”475 These messages were repeated in
other departments throughout France.
On the first day of voting, October 14, voters in the department of Tarn-etGaronne were greeted by a front page advertisement that was full of familiar messages:
If you want Peace, Order, and Stability; vote for the candidates of the
Marshal…the 363 surely lead you to war because they are the candidates
of the Revolution and the candidates of Bismarck….
You have a choice
Between the candidates of Gambetta, the madman, the 363, the
republicans who promise a violation of the constitution, a change in the
established order of things, Amnesty, Disorder, War, or the candidates of
MacMahon who assure Stability, Order Peace, Prosperity. Hesitation is
not possible and no abstentions, without weakness, without division, you
will vote for the government, for the candidates of the Marshal.476

This piece highlights an important commonality between the monarchist and republican
campaigns. Both struck a defensive chord, foreshadowing the domestic and diplomatic
perils that would come should their opponents be victorious. For example, the German
position was used by both sides, in different ways. Republicans often reminded their
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Alphonse Karr, « Aux électeurs: Appel en faveur du Maréchal de Mac-Mahon, » 2 page election
pamplet of 1877. Source found in the Bibliothèque Nationale, Françoise Mitterrand (BNF). Thiers’
republicanism was questioned by reminding the reader that he had killed many republicans « in the streets
of Paris » in 1832 and again in 1871 ; Gambetta was criticized for not only being a friend to the
Communards but then abandoning them to “hide” in St. Sebastian. Simon and Hugo were held up to similar
scrutiny. The precedents that Karr used, when referring to the most advanced / corrupt factions taking the
lead after a victory, was the case of the Montagnards versus the Girondins in 1793. In fact, contained within
this brief appeal were nearly all of the campaign scare tactics used by the conservative at the time including
an unabashed warning of murderous reprisals that would certainly ensue should the republicans be
victorious, and this time without the Prussians to stop them.
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APP Ba 579, “14 Octobre, Élections législatives générales,” File 400, piece 474. According to Goguel,
who credits the information in carte no. 4 to Maurice Sorre, 45-52.5% of registered voters in Tarn-etGaronne selected MacMahonist candidates on October 14 th; in 1876, only one conservative candidate was
voted in this department. Goguel highlights that his 1877 figures are derived from those published in
October, therefore prior to the numerous invalidations that would later ensue.
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voters of the Catholic contingent contained within the conservative camp and warned of
the probability of the war that would ensue if the MacMahonists were successful: France
would go to war against Italy and Germany in defense of the Pope and surely would be
defeated in this two-front battle. Conservatives highlighted, in this poster and others,
France’s unique position as a democratic Republic surrounded by hereditary monarchies
and the diplomatic disadvantage that the nation subsequently faced. In this manner, the
republicans were accused of being aligned with Bismarck (because of their common view
of the Pope’s position and Russia’s intervention in the Balkans) and the conservatives
were accused of plotting with the Kaiser to subvert the nascent Republic.477

The

common root of such messages is that each side vied for the role of protector to the
Republic’s stability.
After Thiers died in September, the conservatives exploited the moment to
highlight that he was the only tempering force within the republican camp and his passing
should signal that the republicans will be more radical, even revolutionary, upon their reelection. For example, the Moniteur du Cantal declared:
M. Thiers is dead! M. Gambetta is condemned! …If you want the
Commune with Gambetta and his followers, that is to say the amnesty of
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Bismarck himself did vie for the republican victory: on June 18 he instructed Bülow, the German
foreign minister, to “mobilize the German governmental press in such a way as to convince the French
electorate that it would be choosing war if it voted for Broglie and his colleagues…on September 6 he told
his ambassador in Paris, Hohenlohe, that it would be necessary ‘to assume a somewhat menacing attitude’
while the French elections were in progress…’on 11 October…Bismarck’s own paper Norddeutsche
Allgemeine Zeitung..., declared that Italo-German negotiations then in progress were tending towards a
mutual agreement in case the two countries found themselves faced by a clerical and therefore aggressive
France after the general elections.” Bury, p. 437; internal quotes from Prince Chlodwig HohenloheSchillingsfuerst, Memoirs of Prince Chlodwig Hohenlohe-Schillingsfuerst, ed. F. Curtius, Vol. II, London
1906, p. 198.
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the criminals, the incendiaries and ‘fusillards’, the closure of the churches,
the removal of all officials…the terror with drownings like those of
Carrier and the guillotine…vote for the 363!478

Thus, right up to the end, the Right upheld their warnings of the republicans’
revolutionary intent and Communard support; to avoid dissolution of the social and
political status quo, or worse, a return to the Reign of Terror, voters were urged to vote
for the government’s candidates. But their campaign remained fraught with problems,
mostly stemming from disunity.
On July 3rd the government announced it would adopt official candidates; this
immediately turned badly for their campaign. In the first instance, this was a trademark
policy of the Second Empire, one in fact that Broglie had opposed, and moreover, far
from assuaging conservative disunity, it increased it. When the official candidates were
announced in late July, 240 of the 490 candidates were Bonapartists, 125 were
Legitimists and the rest declined affiliation. With the majority of slots going to
Bonapartists, republican castigations of an impending coup could be propagated with
even more plausibility. By the late nineteenth-century, conjuring fears of an impending
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This was originally published in the Moniteur du Cantal, then republished as proof of the conservative
camp’s hyperbolic campaign, by the République Français, September 23, 1877. The reference to
Gambetta’s condemnation was in regard to the government’s prosecution of him for defamation by
delivering a controversial speech in Lille in which he stated “when France has spoken with her sovereign
voice, believe me, Gentlemen, it will be necessary to submit or resign.” The Républic Française was
similarly prosecuted for having published the speech. He and the manager of the newspaper were sentenced
to three months in prison; they appealed and the appeal was still awaiting a hearing when the elections
occurred and the new Cabinet, formed in December, dropped the case. This is another incident in which the
repressive measures taken by the government backfired; the public at-large was vocally sympathetic to
Gambetta and the newspaper during the September hearings. See Gambetta, Discours, Vol. VII, pp. 207 –
230 for the complete speech delivered on August 15, 1877.
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coup could motivate the electorate as much as the threat of revolution; indeed, even more
so as evidenced by the Moral Order’s defeat that October.479 The official list led to bitter
in-fighting among conservatives that resulted in many Orleanist candidates and others
grouped vaguely as “conservative” to disaffect from the united effort in order to run
independently.480 Thus the conservative campaign dissolved into stop-gap measures
designed to repress republican messages and harass republican supporters.
It is well known among historians of the 1877 Crisis that during the summer
campaign even stricter enforcement of press restrictions and public assembly were
“enforced in a blatantly partisan manner.”481 This led to the government seizure of some
72 brochures; the prosecution of 421 persons for press offenses; the closure of 2, 067
drinking establishments; and the prohibiting or dissolution of 344 societies, masonic
lodges,

agricultural

committees,

among

other

associations.

Moreover,

2,227

condemnations were carried by the correctional courts of which 424 were for libelous
offenses to the President, 415 for outrages to public authority, 165 for printing ‘false
news’, 216 for minor offenses involving booksellers, 114 for ‘seditious cries’, and the
closure of 2,218 cafes; all of which were outside of Paris which reflects the importance of
the provinces not only in terms of the pending electoral votes but, broadly, for the
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Indeed, as pointed out by Grubb on p. 316, the appointment of men such as Paul de Cassagnac, Rouher,
Raoul Duval, Janvier de la Motte, and Maupas, republicans were handed an excellent source of evidence of
the government’s intention of overturning the Republic as it was these men, more than most, who were
“outspoken proponents of reaction and hatred of the Republic.” This also made the Right’s campaign
professions to want to save the Republic from Radicals and revolutionaries seem just as suspicious as 16
May and the June dissolution.
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See Grubb, p. 316.
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retention of this area’s more conservative influence on national politics.482 However,
government agents did take care to suppress propaganda in Paris as well and some of
these efforts have been preserved for historians in the Archives of the Prefect of Police.
During the campaigns for the October election, negative campaign propaganda
was rife from the conservative and republican camps, but the political atmosphere outside
of campaign and newspaper offices and beyond the walls of government was also
contentious; indeed, it was vitriolic. It has been said that the cafes of nineteenth-century
France were “the parliaments of the people,” and in numerous ways this assessment is
absolutely valid.483 The research for this dissertation has distilled an addendum: the city
walls were their Official Journal. The Archives of the Prefect of Police in Paris contain a
copious amount of public opinion registered in the form of graffiti, the manipulation of
official campaign posters, and hastily drawn scraps of paper pasted to windows and
storefronts. Therefore, in addition to what Susanna Barrows tells us about the crude
laments against the Moral Order campaign in drinking establishments, the city walls also
speak volumes.484 It is telling, although unsurprising, that among the cartons labeled

See ADS D4U9, cour d’Appel for trials between May and November 1877; APP Ba 884, dossier 1,
Minister of Interior’s (Fourtou) letter to prefect of police, November 14, 1877 regarding the absence of café
closures in Paris and Maurice Block, Dictionnaire de l’administration française, Second Edition, BergerLevrault, Paris 1881, p. 229 for the closure of the 2,218 café closures in the provinces during the campaign.
483
Haine, p. 10. In 1851, Alexis de Tocqueville “dreaded that ‘the parliament of the people’ might literally
take over the National Assembly.” Honoré de Balzac first referred the cafes as “parliaments of the People”
in his 1844 novel Les Paysans. Under the Third Republic, Gambetta referred to them as “salons of
Democracy” and the epitaph has been sustained by contemporary scholars of French sociability including
Suzanna Barrows who used the label as the title phrase for her chapter in Drinking: Behavior and Belief in
Modern History: “‘Parliaments of the People’” Op. cit., this chapter is particularly focused on the period of
the Crisis.
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“Placards Injurieux/Obscène” the fullest is the one containing graffiti found, removed, or
covered up by the police in 1877.
That year, the vast majority of the insults were directed at the politicians of the
Moral Order and especially toward MacMahon. It might be assumed that the
comportment of the Moral Order constituents did not lend itself to such crude expression;
but during the years prior to the Crisis of 16 May, in fact up until 1876 there was a
veritable even battle being waged on city walls in un-publishable print between royalists,
Bonapartists, and anti-Communards on one side, and partisans of 1871 on the other. It
could also be argued that the disproportionate amount of sedition in 1877 was reflective
of the political crisis itself especially given the disparity between pro-republican versus
pro-conservative postings that the file contains. However, vitriolic laments were scrawled
on city walls by supporters of MacMahon’s regime as well, indeed some were explicitly
violent such as “I hope to see the republicans facing the guns,” but comparatively, these
were far and few between.485 This reflects the repression of pro-republican appeals during
the election and ultimately the majority that voters would give to republicans that
October and should, therefore, be interpreted as a rudimentary source of pre-election
popular opinion polling specifically because of the inconsistency between 1877 and the
previous years.

APP Ba 579, file 163000 “Élections Générales à la Députation 1877” piece 85, police report of July 28,
1877.
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The venomous attacks on MacMahon and the Moral Order government were
prolific. In Paris these messages were found not only in the working class neighborhoods
of Montmartre and Belleville, but also in the affluent areas of the city’s center. For
example, on May 20th one police agent found strips of paper affixed to presidential
posters in support of MacMahon and his recent actions in Versailles that read “Lies and
Lying” and on another presidential poster plastered against the national library, a note
read “Mac-trop-Con”.486 Nor was it uncommon to find such derisions posted as
caricatures:
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APP Ba 477, « Placards Injurieux / Obscène, » 1875 – 1895, file Année 1877. These were found in the
second arrondissement and promptly removed. Mac-Trop-Con, can be translated as a play on MacMahon’s
name: “Mac-too much of an asshole” and/ or “too stupid, dumb, idiot, jerk, etc.”
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poster: “Nose of a valiant soldier, loyal to the sword, Monday, October 15, 1877.” The caricature is of
MacMahon with Sedan appearing as a blemish on his over-sized nose in reference to MacMahon’s
blundering leading to the Emperor’s capture in September 1870.
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Some messages were found keyed into plank fences that called MacMahon a traitor. In
fact, it was common to find Moral Order posters, especially those featuring his image,
defiled by hand written notes calling him “Duc de Sedan” and “Assasin”; in posters that
featured the images or signatures of MacMahon, Broglie and Fourtou next to each could
be found “imbecile, canaille, and vieux béta!”488 As the summer progressed the
exclamations became more violent with the scrawling of statements such as “Mort à
MacMahon” and musings that MacMahon should have died instead of Thiers.489
The republican campaign was insistent that their supporters display the utmost
calm and legality. This fact, coupled with the haste with which most of these messages
were obviously written means it is safe to assume that the republican campaign had no
part in these defamations and that they were organic expressions of political discontent
posted by individuals acting on their own initiative:

APP Ba 477, « Placards Injurieux / Obscène, » 1875 – 1895, file Année 1877. Vieux béta, in reference
to Fourtou, can be read as « old idiot » it was also common to see him referred to as an old shark: « vieux
requin ».
489
Ibid.
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“Down [with] MacMahon”490

The impact of such activism cannot be properly determined; yet it was an important act
of popular sedition that should be taken into consideration in order to understand the
political moment in its entirety. These messages illuminate the fact that while the
republican campaign rhetoric maintained an argument based on reason and a generalized
defense of the revolutionary heritage, popular venom could take on a momentum all its
own.
A key example of this divergence between official campaign propaganda and
popular initiatives is that while the republican campaign itself was mute on the issue of
amnesty, the population could not be muzzled. That year, for example, supporters of the
Commune and its survivors risked prosecution of sedition to publically observe the
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anniversary of le Semaine sanglante by prominently displaying placards, such as this, in
their café and store windows.

491

Some (more violent) messages, such as “manger de sang,” similarly inferred a sustained
backlash against MacMahon for his suppression of the Commune. These sources reveal
the ongoing defiance of Commune sympathizers. They also indicate that, for some, the
election precipitated by 16 May did not revolve around monarchical restoration, the perils
of foreign war, or defending the Republic’s institutions and constitution. Rather, certain
voters viewed it as an opportunity to avenge the blood-letting of May 1871. While this
differed from the republicans’ perception of the election, it nonetheless benefited them
that October.
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The republicans’ campaign for the October 1877 elections was informed by their
successful bids in February 1876. In both elections, republicans conducted a centrally
organized grassroots effort that was carried out mostly in the provinces. The common
theme of the republican campaign was defense of political and individual liberties and the
republican majority that voters had only recently elected. In their propaganda,
republicans embraced their revolutionary roots while maintaining that the era was over
and the Republic should be celebrated as the Revolution’s triumph. Never throughout the
existence of the Third Republic was republican unity so evident and so prominently
proclaimed. They presented themselves simply as “the 363”, whose numbers they sought
to increase; their watchwords being peace, liberty, and prosperity.
Republican candidates were able to propagate an image of being peace-keepers
because of Thiers’ association with national liberation; because republicans had been
steadfast against French involvement in the East, not least of which included the most
recent Russo-Turkish War (which began that April); and because of their refutation of the
Pope’s entreaties, which itself guaranteed peace with its southern neighbor.492 Submerged
within such self-assessments was the insistence that should a foreign war occur, it would
necessarily be disastrous for the newly reconstituted and recovering nation. Thereby, the

See Chrastil, pp. 286 – 288 regarding the attempts made, from the Moral Order and republican camps, to
“convince voters that they represented the side for peace.”
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republicans claimed to be the most patriotic candidates, preoccupied as they were with
sustaining France’s reemerging status among great nations.493
Republicans adroitly portrayed conservatives as violators of the 1875 constitution
by ceaselessly denouncing MacMahon’s appointment and campaign defense of a
minority Cabinet and his dissolution of a Chamber that clearly held the majority of the
nation’s allegiance. In this way, conservatives were accused of being the true party of
revolutionary action. For the first time in modern French history, the republicans
successfully (as evidenced by their retention of the Chamber’s majority in that October’s
election) reversed the historical rebuke against republicanism as a harbinger of foreign
and domestic conflict and henceforth persistently campaigned as the protectors of
domestic and international peace and the party of political order and social stability. 494
Republican’s solicited votes through campaign propaganda that appealed to
voters: domestic and foreign peace, patriotism, defense of the Republic and its recently
elected representatives, liberty, and financial prosperity. In one campaign piece, for
example, republicans cleverly highlighted their opposition to clericalism by offering a
civic catechism which at the same time reinforced their message that a vote against the
republicans was a vote against the nation citing that war would be the unavoidable
outcome:
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Numerous campaign posters, for instance, foreshadowed the negative impact that a conservative victory
would mean on the forth coming Universal Exposition.
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After 1877, this image was projected most vociferously against Socialist candidates, whose factions
were perceived more than any other groups of the revolutionary Left, as the primary political threat to
republicans; exempting, of course, the alarm generated from the politically heterogeneous Boulangists.
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Why are you a republican? I am a republican because my interest, truth,
[and] patriotism command me…Why does patriotism command you to be
a republican? Because the Republic alone can guarantee peace, and a new
war today would certainly be the ruin of all and perhaps the ruin of
France. What are the events that could lead to a war? First the return of the
Empire, Second the restoration of the Monarchy. Why would the return to
the Empire lead to war? …. Because Napoleon III’s successor, to remain
on the throne, would need to seek a new adventure, revenge for Sedan.495

The piece goes on to describe that under a restoration, whether Legitimist or Orleanist,
the new monarchy would come to the Pope’s aid against Italy and Italy would align with
Germany “against us.” The section ends with the person stating “I conclude that any man
who loves his country and his family, who wants to work in peace will not see his house
and field devastated by invasion [and his] children devoured by war, must defend the
Republic by his vote…”496 In this piece, then, all of the republican scare tactics related to
a restoration and the peril of a foreign war are present as well as the equating of
republicanism with patriotism.
In other campaign materials, they took on the association between republicanism,
revolution, and social decline, which was so integral to conservative propaganda.
Moderate and Radical republicans had quite divergent views regarding the Republic’s
revolutionary heritage and which periods of the revolution (i.e., which gains) should be
solidified. Yet, during the 1877 campaign, each faction evidently deemed unity
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APP Ba 579, File 163000, piece 72, « Petit Catéchisme Électoral, 1877. » The republican motto:
“Liberty, Equality, Fraternity,” was printed at the top of this poster.
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paramount to success. During the campaign, Radical insistence on Communard amnesty
fell silent just as all other divergences between Radical and Moderate republicans were
glossed over. In this way, the republican camp did not try to disassociate their image
from the revolutionary heritage, as asserted, by Rachel Chrastil. 497 On the contrary, they
played up their revolutionary origins and insisted that with the advent of the Third
Republic the most general (or seemingly innocuous) gains should be safeguarded and
enjoyed. In Gambetta’s final electoral address, for example, he declared that at stake in
the election was “both the existence of universal suffrage and the very future of the
French Revolution and the principles it had promulgated for the world.”498
In one of their cheekier pieces, the republican camp re-wrote the lyrics to the
Marseillaise and distributed the new anthem via posters, pamphlets and published their
new song in republican journals. The revised anthem began:
Debout! cités républicaines,
Le jour du vote est arrivé !
Tressaillez, collines et plaines :
L’étendard du people est levé ! (bis)
Un ciel d’azur, plein d’espérance,
Nous promet un heureux destin ;
La voix puissante du tocsin
Annonce l’éveil de la France !
Refrain

Chrastil, pp. 283 – 284. While Chrastil is specifically referring to their disassociation from the
Revolutionary wars, she also states they sought to distance themselves from the “revolutionary fervor of the
Commune.” It is true that by muting calls for amnesty during the 1877 campaign, the 363, including the
Radical contingent, were seeking to separate their image from the most recent and volatile revolutionary
outburst, in no way were the republicans disavowing the efficacy of the revolutions and the revolutionary
gains made throughout the nineteenth century.
498
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Aux urnes, citoyens !
Marchons, républicains !
Marchez, marchons avec fierté.
Vive la Liberté !499

In a more formal fashion, a six-page pamphlet titled “Simple Réponses au Manifeste
Électoral Présidentiel” was published and nationally distributed. It contained the
reprinted words of the well-known journalist John Lemoinne, and was used as a direct
assault against the notion that the Revolution(s) should be condemned and that the
republican association with that history constituted proof of their ongoing revolutionary
intentions:
Patience our day is coming! It comes. Before a month, the French
people…will have the opportunity to respond…when they wake in the
morning…[should the Moral Order candidates be victorious] they will
wonder what year we are in…was the French Revolution an invention of
historians and novelists? Are we under Louis XIV, who said: “I am the
state” or under Louis XV, who said: “After me, the deluge!”…Immortal
epochs of 1789, of 1830, of 1848, of 1870, indestructible protests of
liberty for all against the power of one, are you fables?

In this piece the gains of the revolutionary era are described in these terms:
Through all of the revolutions which have for a century repeatedly
changed the face of France, at the bottom of all the changes of government
and dynasties, there was a constant idea, persistent, unchanging: the

APP Ba 579, folder 163000, piece 226, Joachim Ferran, “La Marseillaise de 1877.” At the end of the
three-page song sheet the reader is informed that copies can be found in “all libraries and the offices of all
republican journals throughout France.”
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country’s desire [is] to govern itself. That is to gain and ensure that
freedom, which is the heritage of all citizens….500

These words underscore the defensive and broadly national tone taken by the 363
Deputies in June. In this piece and others, the republicans proudly took ownership of the
revolutionary heritage while casting it as inclusively as possible; appealing not simply to
republican partisans, but to “all French citizens” who were beseeched to protect what
“they” had, “for nearly a century” been fighting for.501
Such a populist assessment of the Revolution’s partisans was, of course,
unqualified. However, by embracing that heritage and pointing out the 1876 Chamber
majority, the Moderate-led campaign could simultaneously defend against negative
attacks from the conservative candidates and remind voters that a majority of them had
not only elected the revolution’s progeny, but, thereby, positively affirmed this
assessment of the revolutionary era, including its closure. In this way, one of the most
important and contentious elections in French history, should also be viewed as
contributing to the Moderate-republican narration of the revolutionary era, the Third

APP Ba 579, folder 163000 1877 General Elections, piece 227, “Simples Réponses au Manifeste
Électoral Présidentiel » John Lemonnie is quoted from Journal des Débats, September 20, 1877. It was
common practice for republicans to omit 1871 from the list of inspiring revolutionary moments; at the same
time the omission was not made in the minds of many radicals, only overlooked in favor of the exigencies
of the moment.
501
Ibid. The republican campaign piece concludes with this patriotic insistence: “French [citizens]! The
country is waiting with full confidence for the manifestation of your sentiments. After many trials France
wants stability through the maintenance of institutions, order within liberty, peace in the Republic and
through the Republic. You assure us of these gains. You will hear the voice of the national conscious which
does not address itself to any party, but to all the French guided by a love of their country.”
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Republic as the triumphal conclusion of that period, and the permanent and (so far)
irreversible binding of the image of the nation to that of a Republic for the first time in
modern French history.502
In October 1877, voters came out in support of the republican politicians who had
staked their claim on defending the Republic and thereby, according to them, domestic
and international peace, prosperity, and social progress. As the first day of voting
approached, “the clerical and Bonapartist newspapers published anarchist manifestos that
were generated by the Crisis with accompanying comments intended to terrify the voters
and prove to them that the only way to escape the petrol of the Communard was to vote
for the candidates of MacMahon; Le Gaulois, among others, printed the manifesto in
large letters adding a facsimile of the official stamp of the French Federation [that read]
‘those citizens who vote on Sunday against the Marshal will be committing the crime of
Lèse-Patrie.’”503 Nevertheless, the republicans were immensely successful, winning 317
seats to the monarchists 199.504 On the first ballot alone, republicans gained a clear
majority with only fifteen of the total 531 contested seats requiring a second vote. The
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importance of the election to the national constituency was registered by the voter
turnout: 80.6%, a six point rise from the February 1876 election; in fact, the largest
number since 1848.505 In Paris, only one conservative candidate won, the Orleanist
Touchard. The conservative warnings of the revolutionary calamity that would follow
upon a republican victory were apparently unpersuasive and unfounded.
During the campaign, Gambetta had repeatedly asserted that after October Mac
Mahon must either submit to the national will, by designating a majority cabinet, or admit
defeat by resigning. In the immediate aftermath of the October votes, Mac Mahon did
neither. In fact, initially, he and his ministers continued the fight, despite a growing
national outrage against them. The Union National du Commerce et de l’Industrie
(UNCI), mobilized a demonstration of 1,800 business men in Paris in protest,” when
MacMahon refused to meet with them, “the UNCI sparked further business protests
against the Rochebouët ministry.”506 On December 5th and 6th, “petitions began to pour in
from the provinces [with] textile towns—Elbeuf, Lille, Lyon, Saint-Etienne-[taking] the
lead, in a matter of days the petition campaign had engulfed the entire nation.”507
According to police reports, Parisians waited anxiously on the electoral results from the
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provinces; after the results were known, rumors of a conservative coup circulated and
there was wide-spread derision against MacMahon, voter suppression, and illegal
voting.508
The rumors about a possible armed coup that MacMahon might lead, following
the elections, were fueled by his reluctance to respond to the clear electoral mandate. As
Nord points out, “only now [referring to the petition drives], after having considered and
rejected plans for a military action, did MacMahon capitulate.”509 It was not until
December 13th that MacMahon relented, re-appointed Dufaure and a new ministry was
formed, one that was reflective of the republican majority in the Chamber. His
submission came not only because of the nation-wide petitions denouncing his
intransigence after October, but also because of the continuation of support that
republicans were enjoying. On November 4, 1877, the partial renewal of the departmental
General Councils was voted (based on universal male suffrage) and republicans won 113
seats, Broglie himself lost his bid in the department of Eure. The electoral tide had
definitively turned in the republican’s favor.
In the first days of the new Chamber’s convocation, the usual formalities ensued
of verifying the powers of those recently elected, Grévy was named the new President of
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the Chamber, and Gambetta was, once again, named president of the Budget Committee.
It was clear from the start that the campaign against MacMahon’s presidency and the
conservative Ministry continued. During that first week, the republican Deputies voted to
create a Committee of Eighteen; it was given the power to act on behalf of its members
and deliberations were secret.510 On November 12th the Committee of Eighteen,
represented by Albert Grévy, introduced a resolution for the establishment of a
Commission of Enquiry into the charge that the government had exerted illegal pressure
upon the elections since 16 May.
Over the course of the ensuing debates, Broglie, who was initially re-appointed
Prime Minister by MacMahon, rose to defend the government. Ferry, arguing in favor of
the Enquiry, “delivered a sweeping indictment of Broglie, Fourtou, and all
MacMahonians ‘for having played with the Constitution, with public peace, and the
patrie itself… [asserting that their actions between 16 May and the October elections
should and must be investigated, and that the Enquiry was justified] by the need to
expose for posterity and history the criminals.’”511 Broglie and a significant number of
voters saw things differently. Indeed, the republicans won, but their victory was not a
landslide and Broglie relied on this knowledge when he defensively asserted:
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You have succeeded in seducing the frightened masses from their dearest
interests of security and family…I do not know if that is what someone
called the other day the emancipation and virility of universal suffrage:
what I do know is that there are 3,600,000 Frenchmen who have not given
in to that deviation and who are happy to find still standing the powers that
were there before, remaining to protect them against the despotism of a
new Convention. And now vote or do not vote your inquest, call or do not
call your interested witnesses: as the Government, we protest in the name
of the law: as citizens, we deny the validity of it before the equity of
history and the justice of the county.512

People had come from all over France to witness these exchanges, which terminated in a
vote in favor of establishing the Commission of Enquiry and a condemnation of the
government by 312 to 205. Still refusing to submit, Broglie turned to the Senate, asking
that his Ministry be confirmed. Instead, the Senate cited that, constitutionally, they could
only affirm a second dissolution, and while it did not vote on whether they would
approve or disapprove of the Enquiry, the Senators did vote in favor of officially
recognizing the Chamber’s decision. The following day Broglie and his ministers
resigned.
On November 23, 1877, MacMahon replaced the Broglie Ministry with one that
consisted of many non-parliamentary officials and the staunchly conservative, but
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obscure, General Gaëtan de Rochebouët, was named Prime Minister.513 Gambetta chided
that it was a Ministry of spite with no future.514 The Chamber refused to pass a budget,
and instead on November 24th, carried a vote of no-confidence in the new Ministry. On
December 13th, under the weight of state-wide petitions, daily derision in all of the
republican journals, the Senate’s faltering support, and electoral reality, MacMahon reappointed, the conservative republican, Dufaure, who accepted on the condition that he
be able to choose the Ministers of War, Foreign Affairs, and Navy. MacMahon initially
resisted but soon found he had exhausted his resources. The Presidents of the Chamber
and Senate urged him to choose a ministry reflective of the republican majority and the
latter, D’Audiffret, specifically informed him that the Senate would not support a second
dissolution or the dispersal of parliament by force.515 This ended the Crisis of 16 May in
logistical terms.516 Dufaure was appointed as Prime Minister, he was given full power to
appoint his own ministers, and the Chamber confirmed his cabinet. The final blow to the
Moral Order regime came in a letter that MacMahon was forced to sign on the condition
of Dufaure accepting the nomination. It was written by three members of the Ministry
“and formally approved by Gambetta:”
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The elections of 14 October have once again demonstrated the country’s
confidence in Republican institutions. In conformity with parliamentary
rules, I have formed a Cabinet chosen from the two Chambers and
composed of men who are resolved to defend and maintain the institutions
by sincere application of the constitutional laws. The national interest
requires that the current crisis [be] abated…the exercise of the right of
dissolution…cannot be erected into a system of government. I thought it
was my duty to make use of this right and I accept the country’s response.
The constitution of 1875 established a parliamentary Republic… These
principles, derived from the constitution, are those of my government. The
end of this crisis will be the beginning of a new era of prosperity. All the
public powers will contribute to its development. The agreement brought
about between the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies which is now
certain of regularly attainting the end of its term, will enable the
completion of the great legislative labors demanded by the public interest.
The Universal Exposition will soon open; trade and industry will take off
again, and we shall give to the world fresh proof of the vitality of our
country.517

This was an embarrassing admission of personal defeat, but more importantly, it was a
statement that set a precedent for a weak executive and at the same time confirmed the
authority of the legislature. Henceforth, no other president of the Third Republic dared to
dissolve the Chamber, despite the constitutional power to do so. For the republican
majority, MacMahon’s acquiescence definitively concluded the republican triumph and
confirmed the success of their years of establishing a non-revolutionary republican
constituency, as reported by Le Temps, Gambetta’s interpretation of the end of the Crisis
was one of pride and contentment on these terms:
How should I be dissatisfied when I see so grievous a crisis so happily
ended? It is the first victory gained by the legislative power over the
517
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proceedings of personal power, and that without any revolution, riot, or
even disturbance. That is a new event in our history and all due to
Democratic institutions. If you are not satisfied, you are very hard to
please.518

With the Dufaure Ministry in place, but before the Senate elections of 1879, republicans
moved quickly to consolidate their power and ferret out politicians of the Moral Order
and their supporters.
Just five days after becoming Minister of Interior, Marcère began to politically
repress the Moral Order by replacing (via dismissal and retirement) eighty-two prefects
and initiated a public works program to boost business interests and subsequently retain
their support with the forthcoming Senate elections in mind. To address the nation-wide
outrage against voter suppression and harassment, almost seventy elections were
invalidated citing cases of local administrative or clerical manipulation and, significantly,
the by-elections, Vaucluse’s most notably, resulted in republican victories. 519 On January
5, 1879, Senate elections were held and for the first time, republicans acquired a majority
in the upper house: 66 of the 82 open seats were won by republican candidates. Elections
for municipal councils the next day resulted in more republican victories. On January
30th MacMahon resigned. Jules Grévy became the first solidly republican President on
February 4, 1879, and Gambetta was appointed President of the Chamber.
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In terms of French political history, a significant consequence of the republican
victory in 1877 was its effect on the solidification of the French and republican identities.
During the Crisis, voters were inundated with appeals that either proclaimed or denied
that the republicans harbored revolutionary intentions. But the conservatives’ fear-based
campaign was to no avail. In October 1877, the majority of voters demonstrated their
agreement with the republican campaign message that the nation’s order, stability, and
peace were safest in republican hands. This was a remarkable moment of transition for
French republicanism and the definitive point at which the Moderate republican regime
took hold. After the Crisis, the battle between monarchists and republicans gave way to
an intensified rivalry among Opportunist, Radical, and Socialist republicans, with each
faction relying on competing narratives of the republican victory and divergent
estimations of the work still needed to be done to complete the Revolution’s triumph.
The Commune was a ubiquitous point of reference for conservative politicians
within the Chamber and editorial debates leading up to the Crisis of 16 May, and it
featured prominently in the campaigns for the October 1877 elections. Raising the specter
of revolution and social instability was the conservatives’ desperate attempt to mitigate
the republicans’ growing national appeal. The failure of this approach reveals that
attributing violent, revolutionary intentions to mainstream republican politicians was no
longer an effective campaign strategy for conservatives. Despite this shift in public
perception, however, manipulating the legacies of the Commune remained a powerful
political tool. Disputes over its partisans’ amnesty continued to cause great division
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among republicans. These were formative motifs in the political arena in which the
Moderate republican regime emerged, and they created a weak spot that its enemies
would exploit to challenge its leadership.
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CHAPTER 5: REIGNITING THE REVOLUTIONARY FLAME
The revolutionary Left returned to the French electoral arena during the Crisis of
16 May. Although the party did not place its own candidates on the ballot for the October
election, it worked to persuade republican voters to reject the claims to leadership of “the
363.” The Leftists claimed that the Moderates had betrayed the Revolution’s legacy—that
the primary focus of the 363 was not to ensure the Republic’s survival, but to safeguard
their control of it. After the republican victory in October, the Socialists took an even
more aggressive stance. They began campaigning for office as alternatives to the
mainstream republican factions in 1878. The Socialists’ platforms centered on amnesty,
and while they did not achieve great electoral success, they did win significant symbolic
battles that alarmed and consequently influenced the new Moderate republican
government.
By January 30, 1879, the Moderate republicans had firm political control of the
Third Republic on both the national and the local levels. Once in power, they worked to
solidify their mandate through pork-barrel legislation and laicization, and they continued
to use cultural initiatives for national republican aggrandizement. As the previous
chapters have described, this goal was at the core of their civil funerals, their
commemorations, and even their election campaigns. Such occasions were steeped in
symbolism and served a dual purpose. Not only did they bring electoral success, but they
also propagated a post-revolutionary image of republicanism in which the Republic
represented the triumph of the revolutionary era. The Moderates used these rituals and
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events to cultivate a faithful voter base in order to ensure their Republic’s longevity.
Defining republicanism and narrating the revolutionary era, however, were no simple
tasks. The Moderates had to contend with the competing accounts of the Radicals and the
revolutionary (but not anti-republican) adherents of the extreme Left, particularly the
Socialist factions.520 Each of these groups held different perspectives on both topics and
all of them proclaimed themselves to be the true progeny of nearly a century of
revolutionary action and intent. These battles over the Republic’s character and claims to
the Revolution’s heritage were inextricably linked to the legacies of the 1871 Commune
and intensified after the republicans came to power. This chapter examines these
republican schisms in the realms of amnesty-related politics and political culture between
1877 and 1880, revealing how these battles influenced the formulations of republican
political identities and the solidification of the Moderate republican regime.
The first section examines the revolutionary Left’s opposition to the campaign
efforts of the 363 during the summer of 1877. It relies on sources as varied as
parliamentary debates and revolutionary manifestos. The section shows how the Crisis of
16 May generated a caustic rebuke of the leadership of mainstream republicans by the
extreme Left. This analysis is uniquely informed by an investigation of the 1877 summer
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campaigns from the perspectives of the Communards in exile and the revolutionary
circles that began to reach out to voters during this election for the first time since the
Commune’s defeat.
The second section analyzes the Opportunists’, Radicals’, and Socialists’
competing visions of the social and political character that the Republic should assume
after the republican consolidation of power in 1879. These disputes were subsumed into
wider conflicts over the Moderate Republic’s relationship to the revolutionary past and
the Paris Commune’s place in that history. This section focuses specifically on the
political agendas that depended upon these divergent assessments of the revolutionary era
and their use in contemporary politics.
The third section provides an analysis of the electoral gains that the Socialist
candidates made between 1879 and 1880. These men generally ran on amnesty-based
platforms and urged voters to elect representatives whose policies would reflect the needs
of their particular social and economic classes. Such campaigns, including the multiple
bids to elect Blanqui, widened and intensified popular support for a general amnesty to a
far greater degree than the Radical candidates had achieved. Likewise, they enabled a
conterminal propagation of revolutionary doctrines and appeals to action, the galvanizing
effect of which is seen not only in Socialist electoral victories but also in the militant tone
on display at the 1880 Congress of Marseille.
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The chapter draws to a close by examining the emergence of Commune
commemorations, the strike wave of April–May 1880, and the continued electoral
conquests of the revolutionary Left. These developments made the rekindling of
revolutionary passions undeniably palpable. The section concludes with the implications
of the Freycinet Government’s electorally motivated decision—at the insistence of
Gambetta, who until that spring had painstakingly avoided the amnesty controversy—to
propose a general amnesty for all of the Communards, regardless of the nature of their
convictions.

Republican Schism: Repercussions of 16 May
The republicans’ “campaign of the 363,” which took place during the summer and
fall of 1877, spurred a deepening hostility toward the parliamentary republicans among
their rivals to the Left: the intransigent amnesty proponents, the Socialists, and the
Commune partisans. These groups claimed that the unity on display between the
Opportunists and the Radicals ran deeper than the exigencies that 16 May had
precipitated—that these republican politicians were, in reality, indifferent to the plight of
the working class and to the survivors of the Commune. The Communards living in exile
and the new far Left groups forming in France were leery of the long-term political
intentions of the 363 and critical of their performance to date. The efforts of these
detractors apparently made little difference in the outcome of this election, in which the
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republicans emerged victorious. They do, however, demonstrate a surge in antipathy for
the united front that the republican politicians seeking election were presenting, as well as
the circulation of a different political discourse by activists of the far Left. Prior to 1877,
the differences between the Moderates and the Radicals were widely acknowledged,
often to the credit of the latter. Once they secured electoral victory, however, the two
groups became far less vocal about their quarrels. The far Left viewed the 1877 battle
between the monarchists and the republicans as a chimera; they argued that both the
conservatives and the mainstream republicans of all stripes were opportunistic
dissemblers. To them, both of these camps had nothing to offer working-class voters
other than empty promises and continued exploitation.
The fate of Communard amnesty was pivotal to the support, or lack thereof, of the
far Left’s opposition to the 363. In Chamber debates leading up to the Crisis of 16 May,
the majority of republicans, with Gambetta in the lead, met conservative accusations of
being pro-Communard revolutionaries by denouncing rather than empathizing with the
Commune and its participants, much to the dismay of the exiles and their supporters in
France. During the summer election, the banished Communards wrote extensively about
their disapproval of what they deemed to be republican cowardice and hypocrisy. They
derided the Radical republicans’ 1876 promises to voters that they would seek an
amnesty, stating that Gambetta’s remarks on June 16, 1877, revealed the truth: “the
majority [of republicans in the Chamber] has not only not amnestied the Commune, but it
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has excoriated it!”521 Le Travailleur, for example, published the following rebuke from
Communard exiles in Geneva:
[Y]ou must be told that even those who voted congratulations to the Army
after the massacres in Paris now commend the Commune to the young
people, all the while deploring its excesses. They know that this is the only
way they can get many votes in the cities. A declaration doesn’t cost them
anything. They on occasion proclaim themselves Socialists if that is what
they have to do.522

After the republican triumph between 1877 and 1879, Left-wing opponents of the
Moderates and Radicals consistently derided the republican majority’s abandonment of
the amnesty issue upon coming to power, as well as their inaction on less controversial
liberties.
The treatment of the nascent French labor movement, which was severely
suppressed during the summer of 1877, further elevated this tension. The first national
labor conference was held in Paris in October 1876. A month later, Jules Guesde returned
to Paris from exile and immediately resumed his journalistic activism. He founded
L’Egalité in November 1877, on the heels of the republican victory. As new labor unions
formed in the early part of the decade, the movement appeared poised to emerge as a
viable alternative to mainstream republicanism for working-class voters.523 The Crisis of
16 May curtailed all of these activities. Labor leaders and journals were persecuted, the
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government dissolved all unions in July, and workers rallied to defend the Republic by
voting for the 363.524 Nonetheless, proponents of the far Left sustained their opposition to
the mainstream republicans campaigning under the 363 banner. Henceforth, they used
their derision of the politicians of the 363 to distinguish themselves in the eyes of French
workers and voters.
In July of 1877, during the height of the campaign period, one of the most
thorough attempts to discredit the republicans came from a group that labeled itself the
“Radical Socialist Republicans” in the form of a manifesto written directly “to the
republican voters of France.”525 This text pointed out all of the factors that the group
believed should diminish the mandate of the 363. In the first place, the Radical Socialist
Republicans argued, it was the policies “and excessive concessions” of the 363 that had
led to the Crisis of 16 May; “under the pretext of saving the Republic, they [had] helped
with the advent of the current government,” and their success in the October elections
would “only lead to the weakening and perhaps ruin of Republican France.”526 They went
on to argue that “the 363 [had] ignored their promises, especially about the amnesty,
freedom of the press, assembly and association, the reduction of military service, the
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voluntary suppression of the religious budget, etc.”527 The group dismissed the campaign
promises and rhetoric of the 363 as mere artifice, and asserted that the greatest point of
unity among these politicians was their universal abandonment of the principles upon
which they had once campaigned. The time had come, they declared, for republican
supporters to make a different choice in October:
They do not feel the need to coalesce to pass laws they promised to vote
on and repeal those that are contrary to the freedom of press, [and]
assembly… they did not raise an affirmative vote on civil liberties… [but]
these are the least of our legitimate claims; considering that they have
trampled humanity, and one of the most glorious principles of democracy,
[by] rejecting the amnesty they promised, mostly in professions of faith to
the voters. Considering that all of these concessions can lead us to a
catastrophe [to] which the events of May 16 would be [only] a
prelude,…those who by their weakness led to this brilliant result “the
dissolution of the Assembly” should not merit the white siege of voters,
despite their discourse and compelling appeal called “the Manifesto of the
363”…. Considering that the policy [of concessions and moderation] has
outlived its results and proofs, all citizens are entitled to demand serious
guarantees of those who have failed in their duties and commitments….
Considering that no matter what, the rest, the name of the President, the
institution is always the same, personal power, by the sole fact of its
existence which was [always] fatal to the Republic and to France, may
recover more alive and more menacing. [We] invite all citizens, by way of
justice and truth, to [accept] the view that it is not enough to vote for the
363 to win the Republic, but to replace those who are not really
Republicans…with others who actually are. In doing so, the number of
Republicans elected will be the same and we will have [steadfast]
representatives, instead of having a majority that make concessions fatal to
democracy and the social cause…. The Democratic Republican Socialist
of the Seine estimates that based on these principles, France will make a
big step toward the triumph of law and thereby capture the freedoms
necessary for a republican nation, because it will be able to strongly affirm
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that to the people alone belongs the right and the duty to give orders and
never to receive. Long live the democratic and social Republic!528

This manifesto contains most of the primary arguments that the far Left and the Radicals
would use against the Opportunists after 1877, and that the Radicals would employ to rise
to power in the decades that followed.529 As they battled one another, the Socialist and
Radical candidates of the 1880s and 1890s would echo these far Left demands: full
freedom of press and assembly; broad civil liberties; annulling the Concordat and
enacting a complete separation of church and state; reducing military service from five to
three years; ending the exemption from military service for members of religious orders;
and eliminating the Senate and the Presidency.530
The Radical Socialist Republicans’ attacks against the 363 were themselves
disparaged by other far Left groups, who argued that manifestos such as this did not go
far enough. The contemporary anarchist leader James Guillaume, for example, lauded a
different manifesto that presented a more extreme stance. It was written by Paul Brousse,
published in September by anarchists associated with the “French Federation of the
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International,” and posted “clandestinely in the principal cities of France.” 531 This
manifesto asks:
What purpose is served, workers, [by] knocking down the government of
curés and dukes, if you install in its place the government of lawyers and
the bourgeoisie? Consider that among those who you would bring to
power, there are men whom your fathers placed [in control] in February
1848 and these men shot your fathers in June. Remember that among the
men who you would vote for in October are those who shot your brothers
in May 1871! No, if the barricades [are set up] in public places, if [the
conservatives] are victorious, it should not be to ensure governments, but a
principle; not men, but the Commune!532

This manifesto, then, was much more direct not only in its support of Communard
amnesty, but also in its defense of the Commune. It focused on denouncing the
mainstream republicans’ historical betrayal of the social revolutionary cause, rather than
their legislative failures under the Third Republic. These writings reveal that the Crisis of
May 16 and the events that precipitated it spurred the far-republican-Left to distance
themselves from the label “republican,” not because of the form of government that it
represented, but because the mainstream republicans had neglected the working class and
had placed the Republic’s very existence in peril.
Guillaume bitterly recalled the manifesto of the Radical Republican Socialists,
which was published by the Bulletin de la Fédération Jurassienne, and the anarchist
backlash against it. Its detractors derided the manifesto as the work of “pretend
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Socialists” who were not “even as advanced as the radical bourgeoisie of
Switzerland…[but, nonetheless, made] the pretense of speaking on behalf of the Parisian
proletariat.”533 Based on the content of the earlier manifesto, this reaction was more a
case of Left-wing rivalry than a critique of the principles that the Radical Socialist
Republicans had espoused. Evidently, both groups had reached the limits of their
tolerance for the political status quo of the mainstream republican politicians. Despite the
government’s severe efforts to repress their voice, the far Leftists seized this election as
an opportunity to reach out to working-class voters, replacing their earlier denouncements
of the monarchists with systematic critiques of the republicans.
The Crisis of 16 May and the elections that followed ignited an explosion of
impatience with and hostility toward parliamentary republicans among partisans of the
far Left. According to the Left-wing manifestos, these republicans were largely
responsible for their own predicament because of their willingness to acquiesce to
conservative demands, despite having promised their constituencies otherwise.534
However, this extreme view ignored the fact that republicans did not control the Chamber
until 1876, and had yet to win a majority in the Senate. It disregarded the numerous
amnesty proposals that several Deputies and Senators, including Brisson, Raspail, and
Hugo, had already introduced. This level of zealotry illuminates the far-Left’s
exasperation, ignited by the Crisis of 16 May, regarding the republican gains that had
533
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preceded the Crisis of 16 May and the republican actions following the party’s victory
that October. While such manifestos did not lead to any electoral gains in 1887 for the
political hopefuls who signed them, they do show that the far Left viewed the Crisis of 16
May as the final proof that moderation and opportunism had failed to produce the results
its proponents had pledged and had actually endangered the Republic itself.
Although 1877 was truly a mainstream republican triumph, the Crisis energized
the revolutionary Leftists, many of whom began to appeal to voting workers, urging them
to reject the republican’s disingenuous promises and reminding them that, due to
universal (male) suffrage, they were an important source of political power. Beginning in
1877, they argued that mainstream republicanism had outlasted its usefulness. It had
helped create a Republic, but had fallen well short of the social-democratic principles of
the Revolution.
In the aftermath of the republican victories of 1877–1879, republican politics
flourished in the legislative assemblies and in French political culture. All republican
factions registered their agendas with greater insistence and confidence. For the
Moderates, this meant pursuing their bedrock initiatives, such as laicization and freedoms
of the press and public assembly, more forcefully. Similarly, the Radicals sustained their
growing electoral momentum by increasing their demands that the Republic follow a
social-democratic path.535 At the same time, the Crisis and the establishment of the
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Moderate republican regime in 1879 triggered the opposition of the Socialists.
Emboldened, they began to position themselves as the most socially committed
republicans and to insist on the need for distinct political representation for the French
workers and progressive peasants. The issue of amnesty, which the Radical republicans
had championed for nearly a decade, passed into the hands of Socialists; with it went a
growing number of working-class votes.
The Socialist factions honed their arguments against mainstream republicans
during the 1877 elections. Their denunciations of the 363—most vociferously of the
Radicals for abandoning their principles to join this unified campaign—continued after
the republican victory. The clarion call of the renascent Socialists was for a general
amnesty, but they also embedded within this message an important claim to political
legitimacy based on their assessment of the revolutionary heritage and contemporary
political exigencies. They appealed for amnesty not in terms of forgiveness, which the
Radicals advocated, but in terms of characterizing the Communards as the truest
republicans: real patriots who had been willing to die to in order to defend the young
Republic against its monarchist enemies. On November 18, 1877, Jules Guesde published
the first issue of his Socialist newspaper L’Egalité. His inaugurating article was one of

assembly was re-established in 1881; labor unions were sanctioned in 1884. Laicization became a
cornerstone of the Moderate and Radical platforms beginning in the 1880s and culminating in the first
years of the twentieth-century. Moreover, republican-initiated cultural events and pork-barrel legislation
were pursued with renewed vigor after the 1877 victory. The Universal Exposition of 1878 and the
expansion of France’s rail services are both examples of republican political and cultural efforts, after 1877,
sustain their electoral mandate. Sowerine, p. 31, and Maurice Agulhon, Marianne into Battle, Op. cit., p.
171.
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the first attempts to propagate this line of reasoning among a national electorate. Guesde
applauded the triumph of legislative power over executive activism, but took the
opportunity to point out that the Deputies were now, more than ever, capable of reopening “France to the Frenchmen who, six thousand leagues from their homeland,
beneath the jailers’ clubs, [were] paying for their crime of not having believed the
Republic safe in the hands of men who, on two occasions, had tried to strangle it
violently.”536 If they did not do so, he implied, the Deputies would prove their hypocrisy
on the issue of amnesty.
Thus, the 1877 elections intensified the rivalries among the Moderate, Radical,
and Socialist factions. They clashed over their competing claims to the revolutionary
heritage and their divergent views about the character that the established Third Republic
should assume. These groups vied for the support of solidly republican constituencies in
order to acquire political power and to promote their assessments of the revolutionary
past and the Republic’s fulfillment (or lack thereof) of that era’s goals. The realms of
symbolism and political culture remained the primary battlegrounds in this contest.
Republican triumphalism, so clearly on display at the Universal Exposition, included the
unveiling of Clésinger’s Une statue de la République and Marcère’s sanctioning of the
singing of the La Marseillaise during the presentation of the piece. Such moments
exemplify the mainstream republicans’ efforts during this time to shape the French
culture according to their view of republicanism. In the midst of this rivalry, the
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Moderates and, more acutely, the Radicals were also waging electoral and politicalcultural wars with Socialist factions. As the following sections and the final chapter
explain, these conflicts would inform legislative outcomes and test the loyalty of
republican constituencies.

Contesting the Republic’s Character: Is the Revolution Complete?
The disputes between claimants to the French Revolutionary heritage were
grounded in contestations over a liberal versus social democratic Republic, political
representation, and a debate over whether or not the Revolution was complete at all. For
the Opportunists, the liberal Republic, which solidified after January 30, 1879, was the
ultimate manifestation of the Revolution’s triumph. Accordingly, nothing further needed
to occur: laicization could now be carried out, universal (male) suffrage was secure and at
the same time limited to the election of the Chamber of Deputies; moreover, they were
loath to acknowledge, let alone alter, France’s social reality and hierarchies through
legislative initiative. In essence, they settled comfortably within the conservative political
scaffolding created by the 1875 constitution including the existence of, and limited
suffrage for, the Presidency and the Senate.537
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According to the Radicals, the Third Republic fell short of the goals that men and
women had died trying to realize over the course of the past century. They sought to
transform the Republic into one that had a social-democratic character and sought to
initiate legislation that would mitigate the social inequities that they deemed dangerous to
the healthy life and future of the republican nation. They did not, however, seek to
enforce social equality like the Socialists and, much like the Opportunists the Radical
resisted the idea of class-based political divisions. The Radicals did not propagate any
need for revolutionary action. In fact, they concurred with the Opportunists that the era
should, definitively, be deemed over because of the strength of the Third Republic.
Instead, they sought institutional and constitutional revisions such as administrative
decentralization and the abolition of the Senate, and legislative activism for political and
social ailments, such as the creation of an income tax and legal protection for workers.
During the late 1870s, the Socialists found common cause with the Radicals in
terms of the desire to affect a social-democratic comportment for the Republic. Like the
Radicals, they advocated against the existence of the Senate and the Presidency.
However, they continued to advocate revolutionary action to bring these changes about.
While it is certainly true that the Socialists often worked within the Republic’s
institutions and annually campaigned for office rather than constructing barricades, their
support for future revolutionary action was never wholly abandoned even as it became a
rhetorical political device grounded in strike-action, non-violent and symbolic protest and
transformed into calls for a parliamentary revolution. Submerged within the divergent
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perspectives of the revolutionary past and its legacy for the Third Republic was the
controversial memory and legacy of the Paris Commune, to which each faction,
Opportunists, Radicals, and Socialists alike, ascribed significance.
The Paris Commune was the product of numerous and competing political and
social agendas.538 Yet, by 1880 the Commune was widely understood to have been a
Socialist revolutionary event despite the fact that it had only scant Socialist
representation.539 This narrative inaccuracy was made possible, in part, because of the
Commune’s vagueness in terms of a unified agenda and clearly articulated doctrines.
These factors, combined with the conservatives’ insistence that the Commune had been a
Socialist revolution, and the formal adoption of socialism among many of the
Communards during their years in exile, meant that when Socialists laid claim to the
Commune’s legacy, their assertions were uncontroversial.

538

See Edwards, p. 293; Henri Lefebvre, La Proclamation de la Commune, Gallimard, Paris 1965, pp. 136138 and p. 394; See also Peter Starr, Commemorating Trauma: The Paris Commune and its Cultural
Aftermath, Fordham University Press, New York 2006, pp. 22-26.
539
This characterization was first described by Karl Marx while the Commune was in existence and was
supported by French Socialists themselves; but on a nation-wide scale, it was initially understood as such
because of the 1871 report of the Commission of Inquiry into the causes of the Commune which asserted
that its partisans had been influenced by the spread of socialist ideas which subsequently led to the law
banning membership in the International for French citizens. In the 1970s a revision of this assessment
emerged. For revisionism on the Commune’s socialist origins, see; Edwards, pp. 9-10 in which he carefully
describes the Commune as “too short to carry out any permanent measures of social reform, [but] long
enough to create the myth, the legend, of the Commune as the first great workers’ revolt…which was to
inspire Communists, Socialists and Anarchists alike in the period up to and even after the Russian
Revolution of 1917.” In Insurgent Identities: Class, Community, and Protest in Paris from 1848 to the
Commune, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1995, Roger V. Gould provides this assessment:
“Examination of patterns of insurgent participation reveals that the [Commune] depended crucially on the
neighborhood-based solidarity of residentially recruited National Guard battalions…class was not a very
important dimension of collective identity between March and May of 1871,” pp. 154-155, Gould’s
emphasis. In The Paris Commune, Op. cit., Robert Tombs provides an in-depth description of the basis (or
lack thereof) of the claim that the Commune was a socialist uprising, see pp. 78-80 and 91-98.

283

Throughout the 1870s the Commune was a contentious point for republican
claimants to the revolutionary heritage. For Opportunists, struggling to project a
moderate and peaceful political image against conservative propaganda that assimilated
all republicans into a category of militant revolutionaries, the Commune was an event
that they never ceased to denounce and above all tried to distance themselves from.
Radicals, such as Hugo, Clemenceau, and Lockroy, on the other hand, had been
participants in the Party of Conciliation during the event and the sole proponents of a
general amnesty until the mid-1870s. They would not disavow their earlier, wellpublicized, perspectives on the Commune’s origins and its place within their
revolutionary narrative. As a result, the Socialists competed with the Radicals, more than
any other group, in terms of taking ownership of the event’s narration and incorporating
it into that of the revolutionary era.
Incorporating the Commune into their account of the revolutionary legacy was
designed to help validate Radical and Socialist competing claims to being the most
legitimate political representatives of the working class. The Radicals’ narration of the
Commune and its place within the French revolutionary tradition began during the event
itself, propagated most effectively by Camille Pelletan and Victor and François-Victor
Hugo, mainly through the Hugo’s Le Rappel, which maintained publication throughout
the Paris Commune and was the most widely read journal of the far Left during the
1870s. According to the Radicals, the Commune was an anachronistic event fueled by
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“sentiments of affronted nationalism and ardent, popular republicanism.”540 That is to
say, Radical republicans sympathized with many of the stances that the Commune’s
leaders took but, drawing upon lessons from the past century and especially of the
Second Empire, they abhorred the violence of the Commune as counterproductive,
indeed, threatening to the survival of the Republic which the Communards claimed to be
protecting.
F.V. Hugo, who articulated, better than anyone, the idea of the Commune as an
anachronism, and the intention of the Radicals after the event was suppressed, described
the Radical agenda for the 1870s and 1880s most succinctly: “Let us remember that our
ancestors were innovators…they were the offspring of their own inventions…Let us
follow their example not by imitating them…[but through the creation of a] new politics
[that will mitigate] the great social and economic problems which our fathers did not
resolve.”541 With these perspectives in mind, The Radical republicans worked during the
Commune to conciliate the forces between the Central Committee and Thiers’
government in Versailles and afterward repeatedly initiated amnesty proposals. This
duality—not participating in the event, but also working to amnesty its partisans—
became problematic for the Radicals’ narrative and agenda after the Socialists entered the
mainstream political fray after 1877. The tension between celebrating the revolutionary
past, while not perpetuating its legacy, was an especially difficult factor for Radical
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republican politicians whose emphasis on popular sovereignty and social concerns were
often at odds with their disassociation from the Jacobinism, mired as it was, in the legacy
of the Terror and popular insurrection.
For the Socialists, however, the two prospects were not necessarily mutually
exclusive, even while they were gaining entry into the parliamentary political arena.
Judith Stone points out that Hugo’s journal, Le Rappel, sought to appeal “to that socially
heterogeneous political category of Parisian republicans which associated students, young
professionals, and small retailers, as well as artisans and workers [and its articles] called
for the unity of the ‘people’ as opposed to the interests of a particular class.”542 This is
also true for Radical politicians and yet completely antithetical to the Socialist agenda.
The point is an important one because it was the cornerstone of the Socialist
denunciations of the Radical politicians beginning during the Crisis of 16 May and
between 1877 and 1880 it was deeply enmeshed in their appeals for a general amnesty.
This is not considered by Stone, yet it greatly enhances our understanding of the
formation of political identities and formal political parties in the last decades of
nineteenth-century France; in other words much earlier than the emergence of the
powerful SFIO. With respect to the Radicals, however, Stone is right to assert that “the
securing of the amnesty was linked to issues of how republicans should remember and
how they should forget so as to secure the stable future of the Third Republic.” 543
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Consequently, as the momentum for amnesty began to mount after 1877, the Radical
Republican and journalist, Camille Pelletan, described the Commune as “a movement of
Parisians who were hardly revolutionaries and whose clearest objective was municipal
liberty, [something which the Radicals continued to advocate for]; desperation,
patriotism, and the circumstances of a terrifying year had driven the Communards…. [It
was an expression] of collective madness brought on by extreme deprivation.”544 This too
was antithetical to the Socialist account of the event and their arguments in favor of
amnestying its participants.
The Socialist politicians who used electoral politics in order to drum up a popular
mandate for a general amnesty described the Paris Commune as a Socialist-led revolution
whose partisans were not simply engaged in saving the new Republic from its monarchist
enemies but in creating the type of government through which a social-democratic
Republic would necessarily take shape. Far from describing the Communards as
misguided and desperate, the Socialists, along with all other groups of the revolutionary
Left, heaped praise upon them as conceptually sophisticated, patriotic, and democratic.
Rather than excusing their actions, the revolutionary Left argued that they should be
honored and respected and that an amnesty should come not out of mercy, but rather as
reparation of the injustice meted out to these French heroes since May of 1871. By laying
claim to the Commune’s legacy and articulating its narrative as romanticized story of
working class heroism and political maturation, the event came to transcend the context
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of 1871 and became a contemporary symbol and foundation myth of working-class
consciousness and independence. During their electoral campaigns, based on amnesty-led
platforms, Socialist politicians assimilated the conditions and desires of the French
working-class of the late 1870s with those of the Communards in 1871; they projected an
image of an on-going struggle that a general amnesty would greatly assist not conclude.
Such appeals are readily apparent in the articles of Le Prolètaire and L’Egalité before and
after the Senate elections of 1879 and in reference to the numerous amnesty bills
presented in the same year that republicans consolidated their political control of the
Third Republic.
Socialist Amnesty-Campaigns and Their Appeal
Communard amnesty was an issue that haunted politicians of the Third Republic
throughout the 1870s. In the nine years between the suppression of the Commune and the
1880 amnesty, thirteen amnesty proposals were made.545 An important factor in their
rejections was the idea of pardon. A Commission on Pardons had been set up in June of
1871 and was repeatedly asserted as the solution to the amnesty problem by monarchist
and conservative republican Deputies of the National Assembly, even while moderate
republican journalists denounced the body as a conservative juggernaut. 546 The
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promulgation of the 1875 constitution meant a dissolution of the Commission on
Pardons, but the general support for using pardon as a means to address the issue of
amnesty was underscored by the constitutional law of February 25 – 28, 1875 which
established that the executive, without restriction, would have the sole right to grant
pardon but that an amnesty could only be enacted by legislation, in other words by
majority support, a majority that was non-existent in 1875.
Beginning in 1876, Radicals approached the amnesty problem through electoral
campaigns used systematically to drum up popular support for a general amnesty.547
However, their stumping for amnesty was not a nation-wide endeavor. In an effort to
expand the provincial Radical-republican base, this tactic was pursued only in Paris and it
met with limited success. During these elections, Radical candidates ran in opposition to
the Moderates, led by Gambetta. Support for a complete amnesty became a requirement
for Radical senatorial candidates when the Radical Republican members of the Seine’s
Electoral College drew up their platform which in essence was identical to “Laurent-
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Pichant program” that demanded an end to martial law and the passage of a general
amnesty.

In contrast, Gambetta insisted that voters reject the Radical candidates

precisely because of their amnesty-based electoral campaigns, reasoning that “the
triumph of extremists in Paris would perhaps cost the Republican party twenty
nominations in the provinces.”548 The Gambettist position won out and, for the majority
of the men elected, pardon rather than amnesty became the standard approach to the
issue, meaning a retention of the stigma of criminality anti-Communards had linked to
the event, no restoration of civil rights, and no recognition of the atrocities committed by
the Versailles government, especially during the last week of fighting. On January 30,
1876 only fifteen Radicals were elected to the new Senate and republicans as a whole
remained the minority.
In the race for the Chamber, the Moderates maintained their antipathy toward the
Radicals, despite monarchist accusations that the factions were one in the same. Yet the
Radicals stepped up their insistence on a complete amnesty, hoping that the nature of
popular voting for the lower house would be to their advantage. This defining feature of
Radical republicanism was still confined to candidates in Paris and these politicians were
mostly rejected. Republicans won a majority in the Chamber; however, of the 371 seats
won by republican candidates only 98 were held by Radicals, an inconsequential figure
for republican bloc voting and subsequently quite decisive in terms of the diminished
prospect of passing a general amnesty in the near future.
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In 1876 Communard-amnesty was not a popular issue. To safeguard the 1875
constitution and thereby the Republic itself, mainly by winning the votes of the provincial
electorate was the priority most validated by the election results. Yet Radical candidates
and their supporters laid important groundwork for the passage of the general amnesty
just four years later. Amnesty was given priority of place in their electoral appeals,
which necessarily kept the issue in the forefront of politics during the mid-1870s, just as
their journalists and the amnesty proposals introduced in the National Assembly had done
in the early 1870s. Moreover, it was during the 1876 elections that the enduring label
“Opportunist” was first used, by Henri Rochefort, in a pejorative reference to Moderate
republicans, specifically in relation to their stance on the amnesty. 549 In the 1876 Senate
race, Victor Hugo published an address to fellow senatorial electors in which he
championed the Communards as republican patriots, a characterization that began to gain
traction with voters after 1877 and an important factor in the growth of popular support
for the amnesty.550 Moreover, the adoption of the Laurent-Pichant program by the
Radical Republican members of the Seine’s Electoral College, was a landmark move in
the history of the amnesty because it was the first time such a pronounced position was
required in order for a candidate to be considered by delegates to the electoral college.
For candidates running for seats in the most conservative preserve of the new French
Republic, the assertion was a bold move to make in 1876 and, having broken that ground,
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they could not retreat without losing a significant measure of integrity in the eyes of their
constituents.
In 1876 voters affirmed their support for the Republic and the reservations
regarding Communard-amnesty. While committed amnesty-supporters such as Blanc,
Clemenceau, Barodet, Brisson, and Benjamin Raspail won their coveted seats they were
already well-known figures, a factor that influenced their success probably more than
their vocal support for amnesty might have helped or hindered it. Conversely, Emile
Acollas, a relatively unknown candidate who was popular among the Communards but
not a participant in the event, made general amnesty the cornerstone of his campaign to
the Chamber of Deputies from the VIth arrondissement of Paris and he lost, in a
landslide, to Denfert-Rochereau a Moderate Republican who was equally outspoken
against a general amnesty. Thus even in Paris, simply supporting amnesty was not
enough to achieve electoral victory and could in fact lead to defeat. This reality changed
dramatically after the 1877 republican triumph, stemming directly from the Crisis of 16
May.
The Crisis of 16 May muted all amnesty support on the part of Radical politicians
as they closed ranks behind the banner of the 363 in order to defeat their common—
monarchist—enemies. This was opportune for the nascent French Socialist groups who,
during the summer of 1877, began to mount resistance against the republicans,
Opportunists and Radicals alike. After the republican triumph of October 1877, Socialist
groups within France determined that universal suffrage, so strenuously emphasized and
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lauded as the true source of political power by mainstream republicans, would be used
against these politicians as a tool to strong-arm them into passing an amnesty. By
tenaciously campaigning for national and local offices, Socialist candidates made
amnesty into a populist issue among working-class voters to a much greater degree than
the Radicals had been able to. In the short-term, this led directly to the passage of the
1880 amnesty and in the long-term their campaigns began a trend of defection from
mainstream republican candidates, thereby expanding the Socialist component of political
representation, especially on the local level. This expansion was deeply influenced by
their co-optation of the Commune’s legacy as the salient event used to validate their
claims to the revolutionary heritage.
In 1878, Socialists undertook a nation-wide effort to elect figures to political
offices at all levels of political power and insisted, like the Radicals had done before
them, that a vote for their candidates was a vote for Communard-amnesty, and unlike the
Radicals, a validation of the event itself. The Radicals’ failure to actualize their amnesty
promises and their pronounced union with the Opportunists after 16 May meant that by
1878, the Socialists candidates could, with some validity, denounce their commitment for
amnesty as nothing more than campaign rhetoric without integrity. By doing so, the
Socialists enjoyed—albeit initially slight—electoral success, enough at least to alarm
their republican rivals. The progressive success of the Socialists in making amnesty their
prerogative and with that a more populist issue than ever before, can best be glimpsed in
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the case of the numerous campaigns to elect Auguste Blanqui in nearly every election
after 1877.
In 1878, Blanqui was serving a life sentence in the prison of Clairvaux; his most
recent condemnation having been directly related to his association with the Commune.
This conviction along with his unmarred status as an uncompromising, well-known, yet
vaguely doctrinaire revolutionary meant that he could be adopted by the socialist
leadership as the most poignant figure in their battle for amnesty. In January and again in
July of 1878 Blanqui was run as a Socialist candidate and journalistically supported by
Jules Guede’s journal, L’Egalité. Initially this was an effort to secure his personal
liberation but by the spring of 1878 his candidacies were permanently married to the
notion that a vote for Blanqui was a vote for complete amnesty.551 The 1878 campaigns
were dismal failures in terms of securing his election let alone his release from prison;
however, by the summer of 1879 their efforts produced astounding results that effectively
alarmed the Opportunist and Radical republican leadership culminating in Blanqui’s
release and within less than a year the passage of a near general amnesty for the
Communards.
The significance of the failed 1878 bids is in the narratives that emerged from the
campaigns. In the January effort to elect Blanqui as a Deputy from Bouches-du Rhône,
Blanqui as a figure head for the renascent Socialist movement emerged: “in order to
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enable universal suffrage to amnesty the old Socialist fighter.”552 Blanqui was not a
Socialist, despite his deep ties with the movement’s leaders, and the amnesty being
referred to would extend far beyond his personal liberty. After Blanqui’s candidacy was
announced as a replacement for the recently deceased Denfert-Rochereau in Paris’ VIth
arrondissement L’Egalité asserted “to vote for Auguste Blanqui means to protest
effectively in favor of an amnesty, so ardently desired, so long in coming;” moreover, the
paper argued that a “vote for Blanqui was a vote for the ‘social revolution.’” 553 Blanqui
only won 618 votes against Hérrisson’s 8,931 but the electoral results were, to reiterate,
less important than the impact that this third electoral bid had on the voters themselves.
On June 25, 1878 constituents of Gambetta’s district of Belleville unanimously
affirmed a resolution adopted by voters at a similar meeting held on June 5 to run Blanqui
in every election possible until he was elected and added the assertion that “Blanqui’s
candidacy is a striking declaration in favor of full and immediate amnesty.”554 Moreover,
just days before the election, voters in Paris’ third arrondissement pledged to support
Blanqui in the following terms “in the face of the refusal by those who have been elected
to enact a general amnesty, it is the right and the duty of the voters to amnesty piecemeal,
individually, all victims of the tricolored reaction.”555 This is a remarkable statement for
constituents who less than a year before had rallied to the 363 and their tricolor banner
despite their pronounced disengagement from supporting or even discussing the amnesty.
L’Egalité, March 10, 1878.
L’Egalité, May 19, 1878 and Joughin, p. 165, footnote 32.
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It illustrates the impact of the Socialist narrative that emerged from the Crisis of 16 May;
an influence that was becoming apparent in regard to working-class voters. Nonetheless,
the chasm between amnesty support and electoral victory was still wide as evidenced by
Blanqui’s defeat in that election. In less than a year, however, the bridge seems to have
been built.
The campaigns to elect Blanqui to the Chamber as a Deputy from Bordeaux
between April and September of 1879 demonstrate the pervasion of the Socialists’
growing appeal stemming directly from their unabashed reverie for the Commune, their
unmitigated stance on the amnesty and the failure of Opportunist and Radical republicans
in power with respect to properly gauging public opinion on the Commune and support
for its partisans’ repatriation. In April of 1879, the Republican Union candidate, editor of
La Gironde, and close friend of Gambetta, André Levertujon was forced into a run-off
against Blanqui, even while the latter was still in prison. On April 20th, Blanqui won the
second ballot with 6,801 votes against Lavertujon’s 5,330.556 During this campaign,
amnesty was, more than ever before, a defining issue. The Chamber had only recently
passed a much derided partial amnesty and Blanqui’s candidacy was billed as “an act of
reparation, an act of justice and humanity, it would not only be a candidacy of principle,
but would also and above all be a candidacy of protest against the grimace of amnesty
which the Government has just voted for the men whose greatest crime was to have been
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vanquished in defending the interests of the people.”557 The Chamber of Deputies
subsequently disqualified Blanqui’s election by a vote of 372 to 33 citing his
incarceration, but at base was a mounting resistance from Opportunist and many Radical
republicans against the rise of Socialist political rivals. Blanqui was subsequently
released, largely because of the work of Clemenceau, and ran again in the Bordeaux
election set for August 31st.
Blanqui’s freedom negated his acute appeal as a martyr, just as the republican
government’s toleration of the far Left’s anniversary pilgrimages served to blunt their
ability to stir support for revolutionary action.558 In August, he ran against the Radical
republican, Adrien Achard whose candidacy was billed as a struggle against “the
empirical theories of Socialist revolutionaries.”559 Achard was an official candidate of
Gambetta’s Republican Union which threw their entire weight behind his campaign.
Nonetheless, Blanqui won 3,929 votes against Achard’s 1,852; a majority but not large
enough to prevent a second ballot. During the campaign for the second ballot, Achard
was once again held up as the candidate that would safeguard the Republic “against the
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revolutionary Socialist principle.”560 On September 14, Achard won by a slim margin:
4,703 to Balnqui’s 4,542.561 Thus, by the summer of 1879, it required four elections
before Blanqui could be defeated; this was a pronounced transformation from his 1878
bids. His celebrity cannot be ignored as a factor in his electoral popularity but neither
should it be overestimated.
Blanqui conjured sentiments of hostility and fear as well as reverie depending on
the audience and the fact that he won more than once in what had, theretofore, been a
solidly, albeit Radical-leaning, republican region against the likes of well-known
republican candidates indicates the growing electoral appeal of the revolutionary Left in
the aftermath of the 1877 political crisis, the establishment of amnesty as a populist issue,
and the electoral backlash against its use as a partisan political tool. While the Blanqui
campaigns were being carried out, republican politicians struggled to control the growing
impact that the amnesty problem was having in the political sphere.
By January of 1879 it was becoming clear to republicans in power that the
initiative for the amnesty was slipping out of the Radicals’ hands into the preserve of the
revolutionary Left, with the Socialist groups in the forefront of the movement. With this
shift, amnesty became more than an end-goal for its new proponents, it was now a tool by
which Socialists could win elections and allegiance to mainstream republicanism could
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be diminished to the benefit of more intransigent groups of the revolutionary Left.
Because of the prolonged nature of the amnesty campaign, the perception of republican
failures culminating in seize mai, and the post-1877 republican suppression of their Leftwing political rivals, the extreme Left began to articulate an unapologetic revolutionary
doctrine on a massive scale. In their electoral campaigns, publications, and political
speeches, they demanded a complete revision of the Third Republic wherein major
industries would become nationalized, property would be collectivized, and extreme
democracy would be ushered in by dissolving the Senate and/or making every branch of
the government subject to universal suffrage. The republican mismanagement of the
amnesty issue, after their takeover of power, intensified and inadvertently assisted the
efforts of the extreme Left.
Following the 1879 Senatorial elections, Dufaure’s government narrowly dodged
a vote of no-confidence and responded with a bill that would extend the possibility of
pardon for those convicted in abstenia and the possibility of restoring their civil rights.562
On the heels of this proposal, the Radical leaders, Blanc and Hugo introduced two new
bills for complete amnesty with two Opportunists, both of whom had a history of
supporting general amnesty already, lending their support.563 On February 11 the new
Waddington Government introduced a partial amnesty bill that privileged the executive’s
share of power by designating that anyone pardoned (an executive prerogative) would
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automatically come under the jurisdiction of the partial amnesty.564 To these proposals
was added, on February 17, the report of the committee on the Dufaure bill, read by
Louis Andrieux, a representative of the republican majority in the Chamber; that is to say,
an Opportunist member of Gambetta’s Republican Union. Amnesty was clearly a pawn
of partisan power jockeying and none of the bills alleviated the hostility of the
revolutionary Left or their growing constituencies.
The competing proposals were not defended in a manner designed to rehabilitate
the Commune or to strip away the official condemnation of the Communards. On the
contrary, each of them preserved the republican government’s disapproval of
Communards’ actions and, save the Hugo and Blanc bills, retained the option of limiting
their civil rights. Moreover, none of the characterizations of the Commune, which were
expressed in the various defenses, aligned even close to that which the Socialists and
other revolutionary groups were espousing with progressive and impactful success among
their working-class targets. Without surprise, the Blanc and Hugo bills were defeated and
the Andrieux bill passed overwhelmingly with support coming from the Opportunist
majority, but also, from the Radicals.
The passage of the March 1879 partial amnesty bill was designed to end the
growing social unrest stemming from the amnesty controversy; instead it greatly
intensified hostilities and brought the longevity of personal political careers into
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jeopardy. In the arguments supporting the bill, the Government asserted that its intention
was “to wipe out…the memories of the past…, to which a new era, calmer and happier, is
going to succeed.”565 The Commune was described as “that revolt which history will
never amnesty” and the recipients of the partial amnesty designated as “those of our
fellow citizens who—misguided men rather than criminals—lent their hands, without
being entirely aware of what they were doing, to this crime of lèse-patrie.”566 Those who
deserved the government’s “mercy and forgiveness” would be pardoned and then,
perhaps, amnestied. In this way the criminal label gave way, but to one equally
unfavorable in its patronizing characterization of the Communards as naive and/or
misguided pawns, driven by the desperate context of the Prussian siege, rather than a
comprehensive political intent.567 At the same time, those excluded by the bill were
deemed master criminals, whose condemnation was deserved and their repatriation
considered a dangerous prospect: “the leaders and the principal authors of the crime,
[would continue to share in the] just reprobation which remains attached to the
Commune.”568 In this way, the republican majority that passed the partial-amnesty bill
failed to take seriously the intentions of the partisans of 1871 and more importantly,
failed to properly gauge popular opinion of the event in 1879.
The partial amnesty bill became law on March 5, 1879 and was almost
immediately denounced by the Socialists, some Radicals, and the Communards
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themselves—amnestied and excluded alike. Far from assuaging the social discord that the
prolonged amnesty problem had created, the partial amnesty opened the way for much
more hyperbolic denunciations of republicans in power. When the amnestied deportees
and exiles began to return in the fall of 1879, their emaciated physical state and the
stories they had to tell made the government’s half measure appear all the more
inadequate. As a result, the partial amnesty, which passed largely because of arguments
that cited public sentiment did not favor a full amnesty, made the Government’s opinion
of the national mood appear out of touch. Just two months later, Blanqui’s election in
Bordeaux was invalidated by the Chamber, the two decisions, the March 5th bill and
Blanqui’s invalidation, combined with and the repression of other Socialist candidates
and Socialist journalists that came during the Summer and Fall of 1879, ratcheted up the
Socialist hostility toward parliamentary republicans to a fever pitch and served to validate
their denunciations of the so-called “tri-color reactionaries” in the eyes of their target
constituents.
In the May, while the Chamber was deciding upon the validation of Blanqui’s
election, Ernest Roche wrote a series of articles asserting “the people have nothing to
expect from their those who govern them…it is much less the question of a man than of a
principle: is the expression of the people’s will to be respected?”569 Going further a
petition to President Grévy was circulated within Parisian workshops that announced
Blanqui as a true republican and denounced the republican regime for abandoning its own
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principles: “to keep the elected Deputy of Bordeaux, this pure Republican, in the
dungeons of the Republic for one instant longer would be a flagrant violation of all the
laws of justice and humanity, an insult to universal suffrage, a betrayal of your
Republican antecedents.”570 When the invalidation passed, Le Prolétaire listed the twelve
Deputies of the Seine who had voted against Blanqui and added “we’ll see in 1880 [sic]
how many of these twelve survive the election.”571
Thus the Socialist pleas for justice and respect to the voters’ will became
warnings of electoral but also revolutionary recourse. Prudent Dervillers, for example
wrote “if after this action annulling and declaring illegal the free and spontaneous
manifestation of Bordeaux, the workers persist in believing in the efficacy of the ballot, if
this technique must always remain the only lever by the aid of which they hope to
transform their status as wage-slaves into that the free possessors of their strength and
work, it will be in order to doubt the intelligence of the people and the liberation of the
great human family…to make an exact accounting for themselves of the forces which the
Revolution has at its disposal” the voters of Bordeaux will return Blanqui once again in
the 1881 general election.572 By 1879, according the Socialist opposition, the actions of
the republicans in power betrayed their class-bias and their willingness to betray their
revolutionary heritage in favor of retaining individual power.
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Parliamentary republicans were denounced on three points in particular. The first
and most acute was for violating the people’s will: Blanqui’s electoral invalidation
figured prominently and was joined by the invalidation of other Socialist candidates and
Communard recipients of the March 5th partial amnesty in October of 1879. The second
point was the accusation of flagrant hypocrisy in their partisan distribution of justice: the
lack of retribution to the men of 16 May (Broglie, remained in the Senate, for example)
vis-à-vis the amputated justice represented by the March 5th bill figured prominently and
was subsumed in denunciations of the partisan prosecution of press and assembly
offenses, which were recognizably akin to the political machinations of the Moral Order
government. Some examples of the republican government’s partisan repression include
the circular sent by Le Royer, Minister of Justice, to the procurators-general that gave
them immense discretionary power to arrest anyone suspicious of or verified to have
denounced the government and to send “to the courts all speeches, writings, or citations
which might appear to you to be contrary to the law and subject to repression.”573 As a
result, Emile Chausse and Alphonse Humbert were arrested on October 20th and 23th,
1879 (respectively).574 Humbert, who had recently been elected to the Municipal Council
from the XVth arrondissement of Javel, was sentenced to six months in prison and a fine
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of 2,000 francs for “outrage to justice and apology for acts designated crimes” largely
stemming from a speech he had given at the funeral of Captain Gras, a recently pardoned
Communard, who died just days after returning to France. Furthermore, Humbert’s
election was subsequently annulled on the technicality that he had not satisfied the six
months residency required by any candidate.575 The newspaper La Marseilaise was
similarly prosecuted and its editor was imprisoned for one month and fined 5,000 francs
for reprinting Humbert’s speech. That Fall several mayors of the Midi were removed
from office for having participated in meetings organized around Blanqui’s postinvalidation speaking tour.576
The third most frequently raised charge was that of duplicity: supplicating for
working-class votes by promising to enact total amnesty and then failing to pass any of
the bills that were introduced. Against such machinations, the Socialists urged workers to
vote against the Opportunists and the Radicals; not against the Republic but in favor of
the Social Democratic Republic that only they could generate. The Marseilles Congress
of October of 1879 and the subsequent foundation of the French Workers (Socialist)
Party were the direct consequences of the government’s blunders and the manifestations
of the in-roads that Socialist leaders were trying to make among the working-class voting
demographic.
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Part of the growing appeal for Socialist candidates was based in the expansion of
their narration of the Revolutionary era to include the 1871 Commune and their tandem
absorption of event as a foundational moment in their movement. Just after the Chamber
passed the partial-amnesty bill in February, A. Levy, writing for Le Prolètaire declared:
“since you force us to it—we will restore the historical truth; we will rub the noses of the
reactionaries of 1871 in the messes they have made…By your selfish policy, you foment
unrest and revolution.”577 These statements encompass the entire focus of the Socialists’
electoral and amnesty campaigns resulting from the March 5th law. With the Government
and the republican majority in the Chamber and Senate continuing to characterize the
Commune as a criminal event and ceaselessly pointing to the atrocities committed by the
Communards without recognition of the blood-letting caused by the government in
Versailles, the quest to “restore historical truth” became paramount, in speeches and
publications the Socialists worked to rehabilitate the Commune, in doing so they
propagated a new narrative and one that specifically privileged themselves and their
constituencies.
In their electoral appeals and journalism, Socialists described the Commune as the
heroic struggle of the French “proletariat” against the bloody suppression of
“bourgeoisie”. While the Communard intention of saving the Republic against a
monarchist or Bonapartist restoration was sustained, the event, under the Socialist
narrative, was above all hailed as the great awakening of the French working class. This
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enabled Socialist leaders and politicians to construct a mutual identification between the
on-going sufferings of the non-amnestied Communards with the plight of the French
working-class: both victims of “bourgeois” treachery and both subject to the mercy of
“pretend republicans” whose betrayal of their insurgent roots must not be forgotten by the
true heirs of the revolutionary tradition. By assimilating the two identities, the persecuted
Communard and the subjugated worker, Socialists began to create an in-group bias that
helped to launch them into political relevancy after the Commune and before
industrialization and serious economic decline. The rooting of French Socialism during
the late 1870s and early 1880s should be understood as akin to the nationalization of
republicanism as pursued by the Opportunists and Radicals: a fundamentally emotional
phenomenon generated by cultural and electoral political activism with the legacy of the
Commune operating as an integral and, by its prominence, a unique, factor of constituent
engagement.578
The Socialist narrative was significantly validated by the Communards
themselves among whom the partial amnesty backfired most prominently. Far from
assuaging hapless participants in the 1871 Commune, the March 5th law generated disgust
and hostility from recipients and the excluded alike. Letters denouncing the
condescension of the government’s offer of mercy poured into France from the exiles and
the deportees. Before the partial amnesty passed, Jules Joffrin wrote a letter from London
See Stone, p. 88, where she describes the “emotional nature” of the Radicals’ commitment to “create a
deep and passionate commitment to the Republic” which was expressed most clearly through cultural
politics occurring “outside daily parliamentary negotiations, administrative actions, or even electoral
campaigns.”
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that was subsequently published by Le Prolétaire arguing that “it is monstrous that
citizens like Trinquet, Dacosta…and so many others remain in penal servitude, and for
the fact alone that these citizens waged implacable war against the Empire and do not
understand a Republic which differs in no respect from monarchy.”579 After it passed, the
exiles in London and Geneva responded with three similar attacks: denouncing the
government’s condemnation of the event, expressions of Communard-solidarity with
many of the partial-amnesty recipients refusing to accept the government’s offer, and
calls for tactical cohesion among amnesty supporting voters in France.
Elisée Réclus, for example, who during the legislative debates on the partialamnesty bill, was held up as the quintessential embodiment of the deserving recipient of
the proposed bill, refused the offer when it came. Indeed, Réclus wrote that “I would be a
vile man if my first word was not a word of solidarity, of respect, and of love for my
companions in exile, and for those more heavily struck than I who still people the prisons
or cells of New Caledonia…”580 Similarly, Rochefort described the partial amnesty and
the appeals on his behalf as “a dose of castor oil [taken by] the sick man…but they feel
sick at their stomach.”581 Armand Moreau went even further by declaring “no one has the
right to bind me…I repulse any sort of compromise.” And when he was pardoned
nonetheless he wrote of his acceptance in the following terms: “let them be aware of the
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fact that between them, the Versailles, and us, the Communards, there are 35,000
dead.”582
The exiles also reached out to voters in France. From London, Emile Landrin
wrote that the exiles “expect nothing from the men who hold forth at Versailles, but
everything from the workers. And you, workers… you who constitute power, would you
betray our expectations?”583 In Geneva the exiles adopted a resolution to reject the partial
amnesty and remain in exile describing the government’s decision and its
characterization of the Commune as “corrupting overtures;” the resolution passed by a
vote with 55 of the 72 refugees in favor and the text was sent to New York and all major
European cities “and to all Republican newspapers in France and abroad.”584 That May a
number of letters written by an exile in Genevea and also published in Le Prolétaire, laid
out the generally accepted agenda for amnesty supporters in France and recipients of the
partial amnesty: “continue what some have begun so well, to undermine the Opportunists
and to lift the masks with which these political comedians have covered themselves since
the Revolution of September 4, 1870…the amnestied of March 5 will be the pioneers of
the Revolution and the precursors of those whom Opportunism has just been endorsed for
the votes of Republican-Socialists by excluding them from the individual pardon.”585
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The exiles of New Caledonia were just as indignant. Like the socialists in France,
their anger stemmed from three points in particular, the negative characterization of the
Commune imbedded within the law and emanating from the debates, the fact that
amnesty for the pardoned would be granted on a case by case basis and subject to the
government’s arbitrary authority, and the republican betrayal, especially on the part of the
Radicals because of their campaign promises and their continued manipulation of
working class sympathies. Louise Michel, for example denounced the work of her friends
in France seeking to have her included as a recipient of the March 5th bill by writing to
President Grévy: “I categorically disavow not only the step taken by Madame Célestine
Hardouin, but also all those which could be made or have been made on my behalf by
wrongly inspired men. I envisage no other return to France except that which would bring
back all those who have been deported and all those who have been transported in
connection with the Commune, and I will not accept any other.”586 Nathalie Le Mel
responded similarly: “I would have been happy to see my country again and all the
affections which I left behind there, if my friends had enjoyed this same satisfaction.”587
Having been at the mercy of Radicals until 1877, in terms of amnesty, the
Socialists were a welcome transfer of leadership in the campaign for amnesty. Moreover,
while it is true that the Commune was not a Socialist revolt or the great awakening of the
workers that Socialists would later describe, eight years in exile had impacted the
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political identity of the Communards. Louise Michel claimed to have converted to
anarchism en route to New Caledonia, and Paule Mink remained a militant Socialistfeminist until her death. For the exiles in London, in close association with Karl Marx
and his colleagues that brand of Socialism left an indelible mark much like Mikhail
Bakunin influenced the exiles of Geneva. Upon their return to France in 1879 and 1880,
many of the Communards took a place within the various internationalist groups, thereby
validating the revolutionary factions’ pre-amnesty claims to have been in the van guard
of the Commune all along. Following the passage of the partial-amnesty, the exiles in
London formed a Committee of the Excluded designed to publicize the names of the
Communards excluded from the March 5th bill and also to raise relief funds on their
behalf. Subscriptions for aid the amnestied and non-amnestied were already in circulation
throughout France and, like the electoral campaigns, these subscriptions were designed to
aid the Communards while also propagating the issue of amnesty among French voters.
The Socialists responded to the partial amnesty with calculated intransigence that
met with electoral success. Blanqui’s election in Bordeaux came just a month after the
passage of the partial amnesty, having only received 618 votes in a Parisian election less
than a year earlier, his vote tally of 6,801 in Bordeaux that April was certainly influenced
by popular hostility to the partial amnesty which the Socialists took care to generate and
maintain. During that campaign and especially its invalidation, Socialists denounced
republicans in power as out of step with popular opinion and in violation their own longcherished valuation of universal suffrage. The Socialists’ campaigns for political office
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and a general amnesty were greatly assisted by the presence of the returning
Communards. On October 12, 1879 Dr. Marmottan Bouteiller a former—albeit
conservative—elected member of the Commune, running on an amnesty platform, was
elected to the Municipal Council for the Les Basins district; Alphonse Humbert also a
former Communard was elected to the Municipal Council of Javel; Louis Garel won a
seat in the Municipal Council of Lyon on October 26; and in Lille Chéri Dumez who ran
as a “Socialist Worker” on an amnesty platform won a seat in the Departmental General
Council against a “reasonable” republican candidate.588 The Socialists were clearly
gaining traction among voters, especially in their bids for local offices. At the Marseilles
Congress of 1879, the relationships between the renascent Socialist movement, the
surviving Communards, and the amnesty controversy became unmistakably clear.
On October 20, 1879 the Marseillaise Congress opened with a unanimous vote to
take the name “Socialist Workers’ Congress.” This set the stage for the more militant
orientation taken by this Congress, a gathering that was also more politically focused in
comparison to the one held in Lyon the previous year. The over-arching concern of the
Congress’ delegates was the creation of a workers’ political party, not anti-republican,
but one intended to provide French workers and peasants political representation that was
more dedicated to their needs and concerns than either of the mainstream republican
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factions.589 It was hoped that such a party would lead to a separation between republicans
and these constituents and enable a re-orientation of the Third Republic to one that was
more social-democratic. This was a serious concern, especially for the Opportunists who
had worked, since 1871, to forge a unified republican political party. However, by 1879,
the lack of social progress, partisan political repression, and the failure to pass a general
amnesty after years of electoral promises, had made it clear to the Socialist delegates, the
Congress’ majority, that a workers’ party was necessary and mainstream republicans,
including the Radicals, should no longer be trusted to prioritize the needs of France’s
most socially and economically vulnerable constituents.
Unlike at the Lyon Workers’ Congress of 1878, amnesty figured prominently at
Marseilles.590 Whereas in 1878 the need for labor representation was acknowledged it
was similarly understood that the Congress’ concern was for labor relations a theme they
divorced from politics as though the two issues were mutually exclusive. Moreover, the
delegates of the Lyon Congress resolved that labor candidates would yield to republican
candidates should the Republic’s survival be at stake and not only was amnesty not on
the agenda, but when it was introduced nonetheless, the item was quickly voted as out of
order precisely because it was considered a political matter. At the Congress of Lyon in
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1878, there remained willingness to yield to Radical republican candidates and their
platform because of the proximity of the Congress to the Crisis of 16 May. By 1879, with
the Republic firmly in controlled by the republicans, the chasm between these groups had
widened significantly and the collegiate tone was entirely absent.
Jean Lombard delivered the opening speech of the Marseilles Congress which
was the first time the Commune was invoked. The intent was to underscore the same
narrative, propagated throughout France in the months leading up to the Congress, that
the Commune was first and foremost a rising of the workers to demand social and
economic redress, and staking of a claim to the Republic declared on September 4. As
described by Lombard, the Commune’s defeat “did not make the social question
disappear in the tomb were thirty thousand of our brothers lie sleeping.” 591 The agenda
for the October 27th meeting was the consideration of “Direct Representation for the
Proletariat in Elected Bodies;” in each of the speeches delivered in favor of founding a
new workers’ party, the three main denunciations of the Opportunist regime were raised
and the Radicals were held up to unrelenting scrutiny on the basis of their frequent
deferment to their moderate colleagues. The failed partial-amnesty and the partisan
repression being perpetrated by the governing Opportunist majority and sanctioned far
too often by the Radical minority figured prominently within supporting arguments.
Several speeches delivered at the Congress on the 27th are particularly illustrative
of the arguments made against the sincerity of mainstream republican politicians in their
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claims to be reliable representatives of “the people” and the need to form a separate
workers’ party in order to revise the Republic along the lines of the Revolution’s socialdemocratic ideal. At the core of each of the supporting speeches was the issue of defining
what republicanism meant and the manner in which the Third Republic should be
oriented. Eugène Bestetti, a recipient of the partial amnesty and a delegate from the
Parisian Chamber of shoemaker syndical, denounced Gambetta as the “high priest of
Opportunism” and then singled out one of the three sources for Socialist hostility to
mainstream republicans, that of duplicity:
What do we see as the elections draw near? Our enemies, the bourgeois
cunningly approach the workers…[extending] a velvet hand to them; we
have proof of it not only as I have said with reference to Sieur Gambetta,
but also by the example recently furnished us by the recanting of the
363…They all, having accepted full amnesty in their platforms, or
promised to vote for this great question of humanity, have deceived their
constituents by the pretty promises in their professions of faith; promises
which have ended up with the refusal to vote a full and complete amnesty
and n the enactment of what we are all familiar with—that bastard
amnesty which repatriates one part of the victims of military courts and
excludes the other, whom they condemn to die beneath the calcinating sky
of New Caledonia…Ah! It is true that they have amnestied [those]
criminals of May Sixteenth.592

To the charge of duplicity, Balthazar Solomon, delegate of the workers of Chambery,
highlighted the use of amnesty as a political pawn. For example, Solomon asserted
“universal suffrage is a revolutionary principle that the bourgeoisie has seized, with its
usual skill, and made accessible to all the needs of its cause…The Chamber of Deputies
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will, at present, refuse to give us a full amnesty, in order to accord it to us on the eve of
its dissolution, or of its separation, exclusively to force an election and to hold it on the
very principle of plenary amnesty.”593 The solution Solomon offered was to “conquer all
electoral offices, conquer universal suffrage. Let us by all means possible achieve the
revolution in parliament…Citizens [addressing men and women], if, as we hope, the
Congress accepts our resolutions, we can affirm, according to [our sources], that if the
elections are held” in 1880 we can count on 90 electoral victories, if they are held as
expected in 1881, “we can rely on a Socialist majority in Parliament. That day the
Revolution will have made a big step and our demands will no longer remain a dead
letter.”594
Fourniere’s speech was the most celebrated and also the most damaging to the
Radicals’ image. During the course of his address Fourniere singled out Hugo and Blanc
referring to them as “pretend radicals” citing Blanc’s letter of denunciation for the
Commune in the Journal Officiel in August 19, 1871, he then charged “And Monsieur
Louis Blanc today runs after these dear amnestied whom he has insulted and reviled…
[and added] now this harmful man wants to remake himself a political virginity and place
himself at the head of the Socialist party.”595 Fourniere ended his speech with a rousing
plea for workers to rally to the Socialists so these elected officials can clear a path by
which “this old shack called the social structure” can be destroyed “and if there is
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resistance, the soldiers will be ready to march under the banner of equality, and then woe
to the reactors, [from] whatever side they come…Let us prepare to demolish everything
in order to build society anew…Long live equality through the social revolution!”596
Picking up on the theme of a parliamentary revolution, Ernest Roche defined the
Republic in revolutionary terms and expressed the necessity for a sincere Socialist
candidate. According to Roche, he “would prefer to send to the Chamber a bourgeois
revolutionary like Blanqui then an Opportunist worker like Tolain…the Republic is the
political form that assumes the revolutionary idea. It is [very] important that the candidate
be a candidate of principle…”597 After laying out the basic agenda for the direction he
envisioned the Socialist movement should take, Roche followed up with this is not a
program “but the march of the Revolution.”598 Roche was followed by Antoine Bic, who
reinforced the mantra that mainstream republicans had compromised too many principals
in the name of the Republic, but in reality as a means to safeguard their personal power.
For example Bic asserted: “the Tartuffe has doubled as a Rodin…formed a union of the
Left, not to have a majority whose effort would benefit the workers, but to conserve the
monarchist’s prerogatives to the detriment of their republican electors. From this
union…the 363 was the majority” many of whom, he reminded the audience, had
promised during the Crisis of 16 May and on the eve of the October 14 elections “a
plenary amnesty, the indictment of the Ministry of 16 May, and many other reforms that
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we are still awaiting, [and instead] have let the crime of December 2 be perpetuated [and]
perfected by the Government of M. Thiers.”599 In conclusion, he pleaded “in the name of
our sufferings…I ask you to take into consideration [the formation of a distinct workers’
party]…and soon we will march under the banner of the Socialist Republic.” 600 Each of
these appeals made the Socialist agenda clear: to generate a social-democratic Republic
through the electoral conquest of a political party that would be markedly distinct from
either of the republican factions. Such a party would, as Radical delegates to the
Congress pointed out, necessarily splinter the already fractious republican camps. This is
something which the republicans in power, especially the Radicals, viewed as mortally
dangerous to their own prerogatives and perhaps even to the Republic. Yet these
defensive arguments in favor of republican unity had been in circulation even before
becoming the cornerstone of their political campaign following the Crisis of 16 May and,
according to the Socialists, such defensive measures which, they argued, provided no
tangible benefits to the workers and the peasants had long since lost their validation.
Between the close of the Marseilles Congress and the special fall session of
parliament, the Government continued its futile efforts to root out Socialism by
prosecuting the movement’s leaders. Just as before, these steps only calcified the
revolutionary-Left’s intransigence and bolstered their popularity. On November 4
Humbert’s election was invalidated. In a matter of days, when the General Council of the
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Seine passed a resolution in favor of a general amnesty, it was immediately annulled. On
November 6 Achille Leroy was arrested for having published a brochure titled “Urgent
Social Reforms” that contained his poem The Song of the Proletaire, he was ultimately
convicted for having, in this poem, insulted officers of the French army. On November
22 two Italian Anarchists who had been involved with the organization of the Marseilles
Congress were expelled from France which generated vociferous denunciations from the
Socialist presses.
Socialist leaders and more importantly, working class voters met the
Government’s repressions following the Marseilles Congress with outrage. A mass
protest meeting was held at the Salle des Ecoles on November 30, while the
Government’s special session was being carried out, during which a resolution was
passed indicating that the on-going repressions were only serving to make the movement
more militant: “there is nothing to hope for from peaceful progress.”601 When the fall
session opened, the Radicals, having been denounced so completely during the Marseilles
Congress, took a pronounced oppositional stance against the Government and their
Opportunist colleagues. As a result of the success of Socialist and amnestied candidates
at the polls, and the caustic condemnation of the such seemingly impeccable leaders such
as Blanc and Hugo at the Marseilles Congress, the Radicals in parliament determined
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they “would not accept any platform in common [with the Government or parliamentary
Opportunists] which did not have full amnesty as the first item.”602
Louis Blanc intended to introduce a bill for plenary amnesty but even before the
session’s opening the Waddington Government dug in and vowed to resist any further
steps toward amnesty. The Fall session was marked by serious partisan divisions
stemming from the growing popular demand to enact a general amnesty and rooted in
republican defensiveness, especially on the part of the Radicals, against their castigations
by the Socialists and the Socialists subsequent electoral bids. All of this culminated in the
December resignation of Waddington and a shuffle within the Ministry. In less than a
year, a general amnesty was proposed, by the Freycinet Government, and passed for all
but 14 participants in the Commune.
This was the direct consequence of the apparently growing working class support
for an amnesty, but also, because this support was generated by factions that also
preached the efficacy of violent insurrection barring an unsuccessful parliamentary
revolution. Indeed, the Socialists were showing signs of becoming more and more
influential among voters of the working class and they had an eye fixed on the peasants
as well; the upswing of electoral success for Socialist and amnestied candidates, the
formation of the Federation of the Party of Socialist Workers, which came directly from
the proceedings of the 1879 Workers’ Congress, and the expressed agenda to politically
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defeat republican supporters of the partial amnesty, in the general elections of 1881 were
each cause for concern, taken together it was becoming a perfect nightmare for
mainstream republicans. Having worked, since 1870, to secure the Republic’s survival
and their own positions of leadership, parliamentary republicans, including the
Opportunists and the Radicals, viewed the uptick in Socialist victories in local elections
and the working class attendance at Socialist rallies and banquets as threatening enough
for Gambetta himself, for whom the term Opportunism was coined, to declare in favor of
amnesty as a means by which to directly undercut the popular élan of the increasingly
united Socialist factions a unity that was forming in reverse proportion to the dwindling
coalescence of republicans in government.
During the time between the November special session and Waddington’s
resignation, the Radicals in the Chamber took a significant accounting of the draconian
repression meted out by Waddington’s regime, measures which they only forcefully
opposed after their own condemnations by Socialists at Marseilles in 1879. On December
4, the Waddington Ministry won a vote of confidence. On the heels of this failed
interpellation, Lockroy introduced another motion of interpellation, this time against the
Minister of Justice “on the application of the law on amnesty.”603 During the speeches in
favor of the interpellation, Lockroy charged that “the law has not been carried out in the
sense in which it was voted.”604 Furthermore, he accused the Government of playing
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“politics after your fashion the day you allowed the Duc de Broglie to return,
indemnified, to the Senate.”605 He then took account of why the amnesty continued to be
resisted by asking “what is the material danger? You wouldn’t dare say seriously that [it
is] fear of a revolution!” No, Lockroy answered rhetorically, and contended that “it is the
spread of wrong doctrines that you want to prevent…. [The Ministers were acting, in the
interests of the regime they wanted to protect] as customs inspectors for the French
mind.”606 Indeed, he continued, the true intention of the partial amnesty was to
“exclude…not the men who are guilty, but those who have political influence…those
who one day or another could canvass for a political mandate” but the people, charged
Lockroy, have not been convinced that their exclusion is necessary.607 On the contrary,
because of the on-going resistance, “a current in favor of the amnesty has gathered…, and
you are letting it gather, letting it grow stronger up to the eve of the municipal elections,
the very eve of the general elections.”608 Clemenceau followed Lockroy in support of the
interpellation.
Clemenceau highlighted Blanqui’s invalidation and that of Humbert’s as evidence
that the Government was operating out of fear, personal and political, and that their
measures were contrary to republican principals, not least of which was a sustained belief
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in the importance of respecting universal suffrage. He echoed the Socialists’ charges
against all republicans, including the Radicals, emanating from the Marseilles Congress
arguing that the Government’s vow to never forgive and forget the Commune was
dangerous. “I am telling you that if you forget nothing, your adversaries will
remember!”609 Moreover, by continuing repressions against the Socialist press and
leaders, the Government only validated the Socialist denunciation against the moral
integrity of the Republic itself.610 Returning to the amnesty, Clemenceau concluded “If
you had enacted the amnesty—the real amnesty, like that which the Convention adopted
a few months after Quiberon-you would have taken a truly Republican step, a step which
only the Republic is strong enough to accomplish…But on this point, as on others, you
have lagged behind the monarchy.”611 The interpellation motion failed and the Socialists
continued to make electoral in-roads, demonstrating the validity of Lockroy’s and
Clemenceau’s claims and increasing the anxieties of parliamentary republicans in regard
to their mandates after the 1881 general elections.
This fear was not baseless. As highlighted by L’Année Politique, even more
serious than the recent elections of Socialist candidates in Paris, “is that other
constituencies are following [the capital city’s] example. In Lyon an amnesty [recipient]
M. Louis Garel was elected to the Municipal Council. In Lille, even in the quiet country
of Flanders, an election to the General Council ended with the defeat of a reasonable
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republican candidate by the appointment of a Socialist Workers’ candidate who naturally
inscribed plenary amnesty on his program.”612 As Lockroy’s interpellation motion was
being debated, voters at a meeting in Sèvres chose Hippolyte Bouffenoir subsequent to
his acceptance of a platform that bound his mandate to supporting full amnesty.
Moreover, a by-election for the Chamber of Deputies was being held on December 21
and at Orange, a recipient of the partial amnesty, Maurice Lachâtre was invited to run,
but declined in favor of Humbert, following the latter’s recent invalidation. In both cases
the conduct of the republican Government and amnesty were conspicuously prominent
issues.
By February 1880, during the Parliament’s regular winter session, continued
resistance to amnesty was viewed, even among the moderate Republican majority, and
ultimately Gambetta himself, as matter of mortal consequence for the Republic. Its
passage on July 11, 1880 was ultimately insisted on by Gambetta as necessary for the
survival of the Republic but under this veneer Gambetta’s personal political survival and
his effort to retain republican parliamentary unity was clearly a priority. 613 On January
22, 1880, Blanc introduced, as intended, the newest bill for plenary amnesty. Blanc
explained the need to pass the amnesty in humanitarian terms but also political survival:
“to put an end as soon as possible to those prolonged sufferings…, [and] to cut short
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without delay a dangerous situation.”614 Similarly, in supporting arguments, Blanc
rhetorically asked “Is it not so that [the partial amnesty] has provoked some terrible
agitations? Is it not so, that it has provoked demonstrations at the polls of such a nature as
to move public opinion profoundly?”615 Then, he declared that the Communards were
sincere republicans; this is an image that Socialists had been projecting throughout their
campaigns. This assertion was a remarkable one to be made in the Chamber because by
identifying the Communards as republicans, it opened the door to incorporating the
Commune into the narrative of the republicans’ revolutionary era. Following this
characterization, Blanc posited “is it therefore in order to save the Republic that you do
not want these republicans here?”616
Antonin Proust joined Blanc and picked up on the theme that supporting the
amnesty was politically expedient for republicans and the Republic. According to Proust,
“in the eyes of the electorate, that is in the eyes of universal suffrage, [amnesty] has
acquired [a new] importance.”617 Proust went on to analyze amnesty in terms of the
Republic’s international standing: “do you think it is good for the Government of the
Republic to create the impression of a government which is so little master of its present
that it still needs recourse to the regime of proscription?”618 He then forewarned that the
longer the Government delays the passage of a complete amnesty, “the bigger the
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difficulties will become.”619 Proust pointed out that he himself had a history of voting
against amnesty, citing it was “always tied up with the question of the stability of the
Government” but now, in 1880, he supported it because the amnesty had become “the
cause of the Government” to which he later added “I recognize that [the Government] has
the power to raise the question when it shall judge it opportune” indicating that that time
was now.620 Therein, Proust spelled out the truth of the amnesty’s final passage; it was
carried out at the most opportune time, as decided by the leading Opportunist, Gambetta.
While Blanc’s bill was being debated and ultimately rejected, Socialist agitation
was on-going, taking place in the pages of their newspapers, at voter rallies,
neighborhood fetes, benefits to aid the non-amnestied and orphans of the Commune, and
welcome receptions for the partial-amnesty recipients.621 At the polls most workers
continued to demonstrate a preference for Radical republicans, but these candidates also
steadfastly claimed to support amnesty, all the more so since this had been the one factor
all observers could agree upon with regard to the Socialists electoral victories. This
ability to retain dominance of the working class vote indicated that with adroit political
maneuvering the nascent Socialist movement could be successfully repelled and the
mainstream republican positions saved.622 That is to say, working class support for the
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Socialists, their narratives of the Commune, and their demands for a social revolution,
were increasing but could be blunted without recourse to anti-republican machinations
such as press restrictions and mounting electoral invalidations. If the republicans in
parliament could reclaim the prerogative of the amnesty, theirs and the Republic’s moral
integrity could be salvaged and thus their political mandate secured for the future.
When Blanc’s amnesty bill was rejected in February the voting returns were
notable in terms the impact of the amnesty controversy on parliamentary coalitions.
While only 47 members of the Republican Union voted against the Blanc bill, 73,
including some of Gambetta’s closest political allies, joined their Radical colleagues in
supporting it. Gambetta abstained from voting. However, the time was rapidly
approaching, and he understood this well, when the Government, would have to take the
matter into its own hands in order to mitigate the traction that revolutionary political
factions were having as a result of their fostering of the cult of the Commune, which had
demonstrated success at the polls and seemed to presage an politically unstable if not
violent near future for the young Republic. The commemorations of the March 18
proclamation of the Commune and Bloody Week combined with a wave of strikes that
May worked paradoxically to both heighten these fears but also provide the political
space through which the Government could take mitigating action.

fact that republican Deputies such as Madier de Montjau, appreciated completely. See Chamber of
Deputies, Annales, session ordinaire 1880, Vol. II, p. 17 for the electoral returns and ibid, pp. 177-178 for
Madier de Montjau’s speech regarding amnesty’s role in Gent’s election.

327

Long Live the Social Revolution
The March 18, 1880 celebration of the proclamation of the Commune was
celebrated throughout France more energetically than ever before. Five banquets were
held in Paris alone and they were joined by similar celebrations in the provincial towns of
Cette, Bordeaux, Marseilles, Béziers, and Reims. The Socialist’s absorption of the
Commune’s legacy and their domination of the cause of amnesty, by 1880, was made
clear by announcements that these banquets were being held “to the triumph of the
proletariat” and by declarations such as the one expressed by the Workers’ Syndical
Chambers and the Group of Revolutionary Collectivists at Reims: “by refusing to enact
the amnesty, those who govern us have just proved, once more, that if the worker wants
to enjoy the Revolution, he must count only on himself.”623 At these gatherings, the
humanitarian imperative was hammered upon, but this was a familiar theme.
commemorating the proclamation of the Commune had been on-going since 1872, led by
radical republicans, most notably Greppo, in an attempt to drum up financial charity for
the refugees and their families always based within humanitarian (that is to say
charitable) appeals. What was unique in 1880 was the contemporary political
considerations that dominated the commemorative gatherings.
During the March 18 celebrations, there were repeated calls to vote out of office
the amnesty’s detractors, propaganda heralding the efficacy of the social revolutionary
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agenda, and the advancement of the notion that far from a failed uprising, or the end point
of the Revolution, the Commune was the dawn of a new revolutionary era. At the
gathering organized jointly by the Committee on Propaganda of the Workers’ Union, the
Central Socialist Committee for Aid to the Amnestied and non-Amnestied, and the
Committee on festivals of the Syndical Union of the Workers of the Seine, the audience,
estimated be up to twenty-five hundred persons heard such cries as “it is disgraceful to be
represented by the Deputies of Paris who cowardly abandoned us” and “Down with
Gambetta!” the latter of which drew enormous repetition form the crowd. 624 March 18,
however, merely set the pace and announced the direction that popular politics would
take over the next three months. On April 4th another demonstration of the revolutionaryLeft’s unity took place at Père-Lachaise cemetery on the anniversary of Gustave
Flourens’ death which ended in multiple arrests and the consequent denunciations of the
republican regime. Then there were the strike waves of early May which culminated in
the first-ever openly commemorated anniversary of le Semaine sanglante on May 23,
1880.
In April and May of 1880 forty thousand workers were on strike in Lille, Roubaix
Tourcoing and Armentières.625 At the same time in Reims, some seven thousand weavers,
whose strike had begun in late April, had succeeded in closing nearly all the spinning and
weaving mills. By the middle of May, dyers, carpenters and bakery workers joined the
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spinners and weavers. The proliferation of workers that went on strike that Spring, the
length of their strikes, and the solidarity they displayed were a result of the work of the
revolutionary Left, the Socialists most specifically, who, through the cult of the
Commune, had acquired a galvanizing hold on French labor.626 As described by Perrot, in
the case of the strikers in Reims, the striking workers carried tricolor flags and planted
liberty trees.627 In other words, they were not militant and not anti-republican.
Nonetheless, the Government’s overwhelming use of force dispersed the strikers and
sufficiently demonstrated the commitment that would be required by labor
demonstrations, but it also provided more fodder for denunciations by socialist
candidates.628 That spring hostility of the strikers and the revolutionary Left was growing
and this was steeled by the on-going returns of the pardoned and the amnestied which
coalesced in the organizing of the commemoration of le Semaine sanglante.
The initial intention for the May 23rd demonstration was for workers to gather at
Place de la Bastille and then proceed to Père-Lachaise cemetery where a red wreath
would be placed at the eastern wall where some of the last of the Communards had been
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shot and buried. This symbolically tied the Commune to the Revolution of 1789.629
Should there be a wide attendance, the organizers were convinced it would demonstrate
the unity of the Socialist factions in terms of opposing the liberal Republic, their counternarrative of the revolutionary era, and thereby demonstrate the power they could exert in
the contemporary political arena. The first proponents for commemorating the
Commune’s “martyrs” were the Socialist groups in Paris who, at a meeting on April 24 th
adopted a resolution that set the intended tone: “We are of the opinion that the workers,
in honoring their dead, honor the principles which guided them in their social vindication
and which must guide the Socialist Workers’ Party in the coming of its liberation.”630 It is
no surprise that the Socialists were invested in the idea of commemorating not merely the
proclamation of the Commune but its brutal defeat because this would help to infuse the
worker-Communard imagery with an emotive disdain and bitterness that the
commemoration of the Commune’s proclamation did not. Nor is it surprising that the idea
was initially formulated during the commemoration (and suppression) of the death of
Flourens, as a move by which to demonstrate the sustainment of the movement despite its
physical suppression by authorities.
The roots to the May 23 commemoration were the edification of the workers in
regard to the brutality that the bourgeoisie was capable of meting out along with the
perceived propagandistic value for the cause of amnesty and the election of Socialist
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Workers’ Party candidates who could carry out the social revolution by capturing power
through the polls. The legacy of this day lies in the symbolic show of revolutionary unity
that the commemoration continues to impart.631 In 1880, this unabashed political agenda
signaled to the Government, the need to end the demonstration before it could begin. The
government’s preparations for the Sunday commemoration were taken seriously.
Following the declared intention to commemorate the day openly, the Freycinet
Government issued a statement that it was proscribed and warned that force would be
used if necessary. Having recently witnessed what force could mean to the Republican
regime, many groups withdrew their support.
The public commemoration of la Semaine sanglante on May 23, 1880, was a
solemn affair for the thousands that braved attendance at this first publically honored
observance of the anniversary of la Semaine sanglante.632 The police seemed, according
to police and press reports, to have greatly outnumbered the commemorative mourners
and thereby greatly deflated their intended impact of the demonstration. Nonetheless, as
Rebérioux points out, the first public commemoration was intended to be confrontational,
not necessarily physically, but symbolically; as a show of unified force and

This legacy can be seen in both the popular front’s march to the Mur in 1936 and the march to the Mur
by François Mitterrand and Georges Marchais in 1973 the year after the announcement of the Common
Program.
632
Rebérioux does not give any figure for the numbers in attendance. Le Figaro, which was the only
mainstream press to provide a detailed report on the day’s events, claimed two million persons were present
at Place de la Bastille, Stewart Edwards, p. 10, writes “25,000 had responded, despite police attacks, to the
socialists’ appeal for the first demonstration at the ‘Wall’ of the Père-Lachaise cemetery;” yet he provides
no source for this figure.
631
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determination.633 The event underscored the scission between the Socialists and the
Radicals which had been prominently on display at the Marseille Congress and
demonstrated by their divergent response to the government’s interdiction of the
commemoration.634 In contrast to the Socialists, the Radicals acquiesced to the
Government’s interdiction and abstained for participation as they had originally intended
to do; citing the familiar argument that nothing should be made available as fodder for
parliamentary resistance to the amnesty. As a result, the numbers of participants were
greatly diminished. Yet this day began a tradition which was, at the time, an integral
symbolic gesture for the renascent socialist movement in terms of revising the legacy and
memory of the Commune and demonstrating unity among revolutionary groups in
opposition to the repressive republican regime.
Throughout the 1870s the day had been observed by Commune sympathizers and
survivors but 1880 was the first time a public commemoration had been announced and
organized which reflects the contemporary political climate of revolutionary impatience.
The political message of the day was perfectly represented by the first of the participants
to arrive on the scene. Two men, one carrying a bouquet of immortelles and the other a
bust of the Republic donning the red Phrygian cap approached the center of Place de la
Bastille and circled the July Column mournfully. The layers of symbolism represented by
this opening act would not have been lost of the “curiosity seekers” nor the participants.
633

According to the Paris correspondent of The Standard (London), May 24, 1880, p. 5, the number of
participants was sufficient enough to conclude that “the insurrectionary army is much stronger than is
generally imagined.” Or, indeed, admitted.
634
Rebérioux, “Mur Des Fédérés,” Op. cit., p. 621.
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The immortality of the martyrs and their cause represented by the traditional funerary
flowers; the quest to forge a social republic, as announced by the Phrygian capped bust of
Marianne; the choice to meet at the Place de la Bastille united the legacy of the
Commune with the entry of “the people” in the Revolution; and the mournful circling
around the July Column could be read as an homage not merely to the dead of the
Commune, but to the martyrs of the July and 1848 revolutions who were buried below.
The mainstream press all but buried the day with scant, one paragraph, accounts nuzzled
safely between headlines of parliamentary actions and foreign affairs.635 When it was
described at length such as in Le Figaro it was done in a bizarre mixture of mockery and
patronizing empathy, which privileged the conduct of the police in reverse proportion to
that of the participants.636
The participants in the May 23 commemoration were armed with wreaths and
bouquets of red and yellow immortelles and, prior to the day, the dominant Socialist press

Outside of Le Prolétaire and L’Egalité, only Le Figaro gave a detailed and reflective account. See, for
example, Le Temps, May 23 – 24, 1880, wherein on the 23rd there is only mention that a demonstration
would occur and on the 24th only the events at Place de la Bastille are narrated; see also La Presse, wherein
the event is announced on the May 23, 1880 publication and there is no mention of the day on the 24 th; Le
Petite Parisien, M. Andrieux’s paper, provides only one paragraph of narration on May 24, 1880; and
Journal des Débats Politiques et Littéraires, May 24, 1880 which placed their one paragraph narration of
the day conspicuously close to the electoral results for Blanqui’s first ballotage in Lyon.
636
Le Figaro, May 24, 1880, an example of the mocking tone the report takes: “On s’attendait à un drame,
c’est presque une comédie que nous allons raconteur.” However, there is genuine sympathy for some of the
visitors to Père-Lachasie, typified by this passage: “Un peu plus loin une femme vêtue de noir donnant le
bras à un jeune garçon d’une douzaine d’années, et distribuant des immortelles rouges aux passants, est
invitée par les gardiens de la paix se retirer. Elle refuse. Trois fois on l’éloigne, trois fois elle s’obstine à
revenir. Finalement on l’arrête. Le pauvre enfant la suit en pleurant. Elle se retourne, et du ton du père des
Horaces, lançant son fameux : « Qu’il mourût ! » Je te croyais un homme. Va-t’en ! Un seul incident
vraiment touchant. Quelques minutes après trois heures deux vieillards, le mari et la femme s’approchent
du chemin du ronde. La femme tient une main cachée sous son tablier de toile bleue. A une moment elle
sort cette main qui tient une couronne, la dépose doucement sur une touffe d’herbes, puis elle repende le
bras de son mari, et s’en va. Pauvres gens ! Leur fils a du mourir là.”
635
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organs declared the peaceful intentions for the day with statements such as
“demonstrations ought to keep a peaceful character” and “the more we are revolutionists
… the less we could lend ourselves to skirmishes without meaning and without
objective.”637 Nonetheless, the men and women who gathered at Place de la Bastille were
met by troops garrisoned at each street connected to the roundabout and, depending on
the personalities of the officers they came into contact with, the participants were, more
often than not, forced to surrender their wreaths and flowers and several were arrested
when they resisted and their flowers were torn apart. The dominant perception of the day
in the mainstream republican and conservative press was in-part similar to the Socialist
accounts. While Le Temps, La Presse, and Le Figaro praised the police for showing
restraint, they also sustained the Socialist claim that their presence was overwhelming
vis-à-vis a relatively calm and somber crowd.
On route to Père-Lachaise, those in the procession were heard shouting “Vive la
Commune!” and, without prompting, the crowds of witnesses repeated the cry. This was
Belleville, mourning, unrepentant, and rapidly defecting to Socialist politicians. Once at
the cemetery, the participants were granted entry but here too, ten more arrests were
made and wreaths of mourning confiscated, following several hours wherein participants
furtively tried to lay their immortelles along the Wall, some even tying them to nearby
trees, only to dart away once noticed by the police who were instructed not to let the

Le Prolétaire, May 15, 1880 and L’Égalité, May 23-26, 1880; in reflection of the outcome of the day
L’Égalité asserted that it was the police not the mourners that provoked confrontation and then referring to
grandeur of Thiers funeral cited that if anything this had been a provocation to riot.
637
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participants come into contact, and certainly not pronounce in front of, with the Wall
which was still pierced with bullet holes.
In the days following the demonstration, the Socialist press denounced the heavyhandedness of “gardiens de la paix;” insisting once again that such a show of force and
the interdiction itself were akin to monarchist machinations and surpassing of the Second
Empire’s repression of public assembly.638 They were joined by the Radicals when the
Municipal Council of Paris passed a motion of interpellation against the Prefect,
Andrioux, and Clemenceau issued an interpellation proposal against the Minister of
Interior.639 The Government steadfastly defended their conduct and nothing came of these
denunciations and motions. However, the day had hosted another monumental event, the
first placing of Blanqui in a by-election held in Lyon. These events, combined with the
March 18 commemoration of the proclamation of the Commune, the memorial
demonstration for Gustave Flourens in April, and the strikes of May were undeniable
evidences of the infiltration of the Socialist narrative that cast the Commune as the great
awakening of the French workers, and demonstrations of the growing support for
Socialist candidates and platforms. Moreover, although Blanqui lost in the second ballot,

See the Le Prolétaire, May 29, 1880 article “The Proletariate Cannot Disarm”, in which J.B. Clément
not only assimilates the Republican government with the Second Empire, but also, accuses the Government
of provoking a riot during the May 23 demonstration: “A demonstration was to have taken place…, and
these same men rushed to avail themselves of the practices of the Empire. They needed a riot… [Hence]
they instructed their chief turnkey (Andrieux) to prepare one for them.”
639
At the same time that the Municipal Council was symbolically interpellating Andrieux, ten Deputies of
the Seine, led by Clemenceau, issued a motion of interpellation for the Minister of Interiorbut this too came
to nothing; Clemenceau’s speech generated only 28 votes of support for the intended interpellation. See
Chamber of Deputies, Annales, session ordinaire 1880, Vol. VI, pp. 473-77 and pp. 482-483 on the roll call
vote. This gesture was also reported by Le Temps, May 30, 1880.
638
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the sigh of relief was incomplete and short-lived. The republican candidate, Ballue, who
defeated Blanqui, had also run on a platform demanding full amnesty and on June 13 th
the Socialists won a significant victory when the Communard Trinquet, who was still
serving a hard labor sentence in New Caledonia, placed first to represent Gambetta’s
Belleville constituency in the Parisian Municipal Council, and, significantly, he won he
won against an Opportunist candidate that Gambetta himself campaigned for.640
Trinquet’s victory was a significant one for the Socialists, even more so than
Blanqui’s might have been. Trinquet, unlike Blanqui, was a member of the Commune
and one of the few workers to have been elected, he was also among the last of the
fighters in the twentieth arrondissement that he represented. During his trial Trinquet,
unlike some of his co-defendants, was unrepentant; rather, like Louise Michel, among
others, Trinquet, the shoemaker, stood by his actions and flaunted his convictions
asserting that as an elected member of the Commune, “I have paid for [my actions] with
my person; I was on the barricades, and I am sorry I was not killed there…I am an
insurgent; I do not deny it.”641 By 1880, Trinquet was the embodiment of the ideal
Socialist candidate, as described by Roche, at the Congress of Marseille, and a
Communard hero. Thus, Trinquet’s victory that June symbolized a victory for the
Communards specifically and for the Socialists in general. His election provided
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See Alice Bullard, Exile to Paradise: Savegrey and Citizenship in Paris and the South Pacific, 1790—
1900, (Jurists: Profiles in Legal History), Stanford University Press, Stanford 2000, p. 244. Trinquet won
37% of the votes on the first ballot, on June 20 th; he won a clear victory (2358) against his opponent,
Letalle (1897). See Le Figaro, June 21, 1880.
641
Lissagaray, History of the Commune of 1871, Op. cit., p. 334. Trinquet was subsequently sentenced to
hard labor on the island of Noumea.
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evidence that their campaign for amnesty, which relied upon the election of their
candidates as a means to force the parliamentary republicans into passing the amnesty
was still viable as of the Spring of 1880. Furthermore, because he won the day after the
Freycinet introduced the government’s bill for full amnesty, every side viewed his victory
as proof that Socialist candidates were gaining traction with voters even beyond the issue
of amnesty.
The Crisis of 16 May stimulated the reentry of the Socialists into republican
electoral contests. Thereafter, they grew more strident in their condemnations of the
Moderate regime and the parliamentary Radicals. The thrust of the Socialists’ rebukes
stemmed from their competing claim to the revolutionary heritage and their negative
assessment of the contemporary regime’s accomplishments and agendas. By 1878, the
Socialists began to regularly put forth candidates who embodied the social-democratic
movement and were well-known participants in social revolutionary events. Their
victories were of great symbolic importance.
By 1880, the Socialist bids for representative power were intricately bound to the
party’s mutual identification with the Commune and the revolutionary heritage. In order
to stay politically relevant in the lead up to the general elections of 1881, they needed to
demonstrate that an amnesty would pass only through their efforts at the polls and the
righteous march of revolutionary justice that the Socialists alone could ensure—not
through bourgeois benevolence and humanitarian impulses. In this brief amount of time,
the Socialists had become an alarming force in the national political scene. Their power
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stemmed less from quantifiable electoral success than from their symbolic electoral
triumphs and the threat their growing appeal posed to the Moderate republican regime.
The government’s sensitivity of this danger led to a dramatic about-face on the issue of
amnesty in June 1880, as well as heightened efforts to promote a persuasive Moderate
narrative of the revolutionary past and to project the idea that the revolution was
complete. In this way, the Socialists and the Commune’s political legacies influenced the
solidification of the Moderate regime.
While the Socialists toured the country giving speeches and staging mass
demonstrations and commemorations in which they denounced mainstream republicans
as betrayers of their revolutionary heritage, the Opportunists and the Radicals were hard
at work, as well. They undertook important symbolic and legislative action to
demonstrate their commitment to the legacy of the Revolution and to uphold the Third
Republic as its successful embodiment. By establishing strong links between the
Republic and the most powerful emblems of the revolutionary tradition, they were able to
domesticate the revolution’s legacy and assert their more measured account of the era’s
history and successes.
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CHAPTER 6: A REVOLUTION COMES TO PORT
The Socialists relied on two major issues to position themselves as a vociferous
alternative to mainstream republicanism, especially vis-à-vis the Radicals, by 1880. One
of their most effective tactics was promoting their counter-claim to the Revolution’s
heritage by establishing a close relationship with the Commune’s narrative and legacies.
But their ability to call into question the Republic’s responsiveness and sensitivity to
working-class concerns was equally important. Failures on the part of mainstream
republicans, most prominently with respect to Communard amnesty, made such
allegations viable in 1880. The Moderates’ revolutionary identity was vulnerable to
attack for a number of reasons: the politicking surrounding the amnesty question; the
republican repression of the revolutionary Left through press and assembly restrictions
and election invalidations; and the continued political influence of the monarchist-Right,
even after the Crisis of 16 May. At the end of the 1870s, the legacy of the revolutionary
era continued to evoke immense feelings of pride among voters, especially in workingclass and progressive-rural constituencies, which translated into political capital for
committed republicans. Thus, the Socialists’ budding appeal was worrisome, not
necessarily because of their electoral gains between 1879 and 1880, but because their
successful use of such memories had the potential to increase their power in the near
future. The Socialist message sustained the option of violent insurrection and explicitly
called for a parliamentary revolution that would bring a social-democratic orientation to
the Third Republic. In light of the revolutionary era’s history of fratricide and rapid
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political reversals, the Moderates did not underestimate the threat that the Socialists
represented.
This chapter focuses on the Moderate government’s response to the re-emergence
of the revolutionary Left, particularly the Socialist factions, as a representative alternative
to mainstream republicanism. This response included strategic legislative and symbolic
gestures that were designed to dampen any new revolutionary fervor. The first of the
chapter’s two sections begins with a brief analysis of Gambetta’s reaction to Trinquet’s
election. Léon Gambetta was arguably the most influential political leader in the spring of
1880, and Trinquet’s victory in Gambetta’s district of Belleville was a symbolic blow to
Gambetta’s prestige. Moreover, it was a worrisome show of Socialist influence in the
very region where the Commune had originated. The focus of this section then widens to
an examination of the passage of a near-general amnesty on July 11, 1880, and
demonstrates that the Freycinet Government’s decision to propose this legislation was
directly related to contemporary political concerns. Chief among these were the desire to
undercut the Socialists’ political appeal by removing their most popular position and an
eagerness to end the republican divisions over the amnesty controversy.
The next and final section of this chapter focuses on the official legitimization of
the Revolution’s most meaningful symbols. The government’s decision to move the
parliamentary chambers back to Paris, the designation of La Marseillaise as the national
anthem, and the first celebration of quatorze juillet were all undertaken with specific
goals. Through these efforts, the republicans sought to announce the Third Republic’s
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triumph, to establish the closure of the revolutionary era, and to rebuff the revolutionary
Left’s denunciation of mainstream republican leaders as betrayers of the heritage they so
loudly proclaimed. This section devotes the majority of its attention to the official
recognition of quatorze juillet as a national holiday in 1880, with the earlier symbolic
legitimizations incorporated within this analytical framework. These acts had a
domesticating effect on the Revolution’s legacies. At the same time, they validated the
image of the Third Republic as a representation of the era’s triumphs, because their
emergence as national emblems came from mainstream republican initiatives. As this
section reveals, one must examine these symbolic steps within the context of the
paramount contemporary political rivalries and situations. They were not merely the
natural consequences of the Third Republic’s consolidation, but part of the reason for its
success. By closing the revolutionary era, which quatorze juillet explicitly was designed
to symbolize, the mainstream republicans took a significant step towards the assimilation
of the once mutually exclusive identities of France and the Republic. In the long term,
these acts of domestication facilitated the process of national republican aggrandizement.
In the short term, they significantly diminished the growing appeal of revolutionary
political factions at precisely the time when the most celebrated “heroes” of their
movements, the Communards, were returning to France as citizens, with all of the rights
that status conferred.
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The Republican Absorption of Revolutionary Revival
Based upon the events that followed Trinquet’s first placing in the ballot of June
13, 1880, it is clear that the Opportunist majority, led by Gambetta, deduced that popular
support for Socialist candidates, and their tacit propagation of the need for social
revolution, required direct action. The immediacy with which the amnesty’s passage was
pursued after June 13th was inspired by the impending general elections of 1881.642 Even
before Freycinet proposed the amnesty on June 19th, Gambetta, in an effort to draw as
much preliminary parliamentary support as possible remarked during a private meeting
on June 16th that passing the amnesty before the general elections was a “political
necessity.”643 It would, Gambetta argued, settle the matter and thereby “clear all the
sentimental phraseology of all species of Socialists away from the terrain of the general
elections, so as to bring into focus the true platform of the various parties.” 644 This
statement along with Freycinet’s arguments before the Chamber, on June 19th, illuminates
the republican deduction that Socialist candidates were successful solely because of their
outspoken campaign for a general amnesty and by removing the issue they could stop the
revolutionary movement’s progressive penetration into French political life while at the

See C. de Freycinet, Souvenirs, 1878—1893, Delagrave, Paris 1913, pp. 133-135 for Gambetta’s
attempts to convince the Prime Minister of the amnesty’s political imperative in the days leading up to the
June 13th election and pp. 136-137 for his decision to support Gambetta’s pleas for a plenary amnesty
subsequent to June 13th.
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L’Année politique, 1880, p. 243. This was a meeting that took place in Freycinet’s office at the Quai
d’Orsay; the presidents of the Chamber and Senate were present along with fifty other parliamentary
leaders including past supporters and rejecters of amnesty bills, Hébrard, director of Le Temps and a
former senator who supported the Andrieux bill and Jean Casimir-Perier who delivered the opposing report
on Blanc’s 1880 amnesty proposal. See also, Le Figaro’s account of this meeting, published on June 18,
1880.
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L’Année politique, 1880, p. 243.
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same time absorbing the popularity that amnesty supporters were apparently enjoying at
the polls.
When Trinquet won on June 20th, the Socialist press went wild and their analysis
validated the Opportunists’ deepest concern. According to L’Egalité, Trinquet’s success
verified that “in M. Gambetta’s arrondissement, the voters have declared themselves not
only for the amnesty, which the Government—its hand forced by events—has just rallied
to, but moreover for the Revolutionary-Socialist ideas which the name of this worker, a
former member of the Commune, and in a penal colony for eight years, represents.”645
For the Opportunists, passing a plenary amnesty forthwith was paramount as a means to
restore the faith of working class republican voters, not least of which included
Gambetta’s Belleville constituency, moreover, it might also assuage the accusation that
the once revolutionary force of the republicans had gone over to the side of repression
and reaction. By becoming the amnesty’s most fervent parliamentary proponents, the
Opportunists would vindicate the republican narration of the revolutionary past as
complete and, it was hoped, mitigate republican factionalism and the defection of
working-class voters to Socialist candidates and thereby revolutionary doctrines.
This impetus was readily perceived by all political opinions as summarized
succinctly by Le Figaro: “it is positively Gambetta who today has the appearance of
having bestowed the amnesty upon France…he is monopolizing the popularity of [the
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issue and thereby] getting rid of the little war which was being waged on this question
against his Opportunism, [and reconquering] Belleville, which was half lost.”646 Indeed,
the moderate republican majority sought to capture the political capital to be gained by
passing the amnesty. Not only to maintain their electoral dominance, but also to suppress
the penetration of revolutionary sentiments within working class constituency so as to
maintain the liberal orientation of the Republic. They did so at the same moment when
the Socialists were reveling in their most important victory and purposefully on the eve of
the first republican celebration of the Revolutionary era’s triumph, and thereby
conclusion.
On the day before Trinquet’s June 20th election, Freycinet proposed the
Government’s plenary amnesty bill to the Chamber of Deputies. This came after
numerous

closed-door

meetings

between

Gambetta

and

Freycinet

and

with

representatives of the various parliamentary political coalitions. Le Temps, keeping
abreast of these political acrobatics and the stakes in play with the Government’s motion,
also completely revised its stance on the issue and began their own propaganda campaign
designed to illicit its readers’ support for the general amnesty in such a way as to be
favorable to the image of the moderate majority. 647 As a result of these factors, the

Le Figaro, June 20, 1880. During the Chamber’s debate on the amnesty bill Paul de Cassagnac made a
similar argument that Gambetta only recently became the amnesty’s most ardent champion because “he
knew perfectly well that his popularity was tied up with the outcome of this question” which if he did not
assume personal responsibility for “a barrier [would go up] between him and his constituents.” See
Chamber of Deputies, Annales, session ordinaire 1880, Vol. VIII, pp. 204-210 for Cassagnac’s speech.
647
Le Temps director, Hébrard, had supported the partial amnesty as a Senator in 1879, but it was precisely
because of its limitations. It was a significant transition of opinion for this conservative republican
646
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mainstream press imbedded the news of Trinquet’s election alongside more in-depth
articles in which the amnesty proposal of the moderate republican government was
analyzed at length. In the articles, the moderate narration of the amnesty’s final passage
was formulated with the conclusion that it was the sage and wise decision of the
republican moderates to “erase the last traces” of nearly a decade of political divisions
surrounding the issue. In this capacity, the mainstream press began to both prepare the
nation for the amnesty’s imminent passage and narrate its success to the favor of
mainstream republicanism vis-à-vis the revolutionary factions.648
The articles in Le Temps, Le Petit Parisianne, La Presse, and even Le Figaro,
some of the most widely circulated newspapers in France, were recapitulations of the
arguments in favor of the bill that had been pronounced during private meetings with
parliamentary leaders and by Freycinet before the Chamber on June 19. In repetition of
the bill’s explanatory memorandum, the mainstream press maintained a general
condemnation of the Communard as criminal and the amnesty was considered as an act
of clemency, not one of justice, which the Socialists had been agitating for. According to
the popular journal La Presse, this was lamentable considering the determination of the
Radicals (the article, tellingly, made no reference to the Socialists efforts) over the past

newspaper to begin publishing numerous articles in support of a general amnesty, “without limitations” just
a year later. On the day of Trinquet’s election, Le Temps described the amnesty as a republican imperative,
citing the forthcoming national holiday as the perfect occasion on which to grant clemency, because of the
historical precedent associated with granting such measures on days of national celebration and because
“would not it be better to let some time elapse between the return of the Commune’s leaders and the
[general] elections of 1881?” Le Temps, June 20, 1880.
648
Ibid.
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nine years and also “it was perhaps not necessary to say that the exiles who [will] return
to France have committed heinous crimes” that they can be dangerous and that the police
might need to quell unrest, such statements, especially in an explanatory memorandum,
smacked of government belligerence and besides, “everyone knows that the police will
perform as before the amnesty [and] imprison citizens who disturb the public
tranquility.”649 On the contrary, according to Le Temps and President Freycinet, it was
specifically the pacified composure of Paris during the May 23 commemoration coupled
with “the good sense of the people of Lyon in the recent election” that they were
attempting to safeguard by taking the matter of amnesty into their own hands; in other
words, the Government was honoring the will of the people because of their comportment
and apparent respect for the Republic’s laws and institutions.650 Accordingly, “the
intransigent policy cannot claim any great part in this…result” because it was precisely
the population’s rejection of intransigence that inspired the Government’s necessary
confidence prior to proposing such a sweeping clemency.651 Thus, despite the
inconvenient fact of Trinquet’s popularity in Belleville (along with the other socialist
victories of 1879—1880), the amnesty was becoming assimilated with mainstream
republicanism.

La Presse, June 21, 1880, “Amnistions le Cabinet”
Le Temps, June 21, 1880. See also Chamber of Deputies, Annales, session ordinaire 1880, Vol. VIII, pp.
147-148. In Freycinet’s opening remarks before the Chamber on June 19 th he cited “the unshaken calm of
the Parisian population in the presence of seditious indictments [the commemoration of la semaine
sanglante]…, the elections as Lyons, which was the triumph of legality, … and the nearness of the national
festival of 14 July” as being propitious to the promulgation of a general amnesty.
651
Le Temps, June 21, 1880. See also Le Petit Parisien, June 21, 1880, « La victoire de l’opinion » in
which the author similarly contends that it was the French population, “by its attitude, its calm, [and] its
perseverance, [that] has vanquished the last hesitations of an undecided Ministry.”
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The republican press’ analysis of Trinqut’s victory was sparse, and often spun in
such a way as to validate the government’s decision to take on the passage of amnesty as
a means to undermine the Socialists, especially before the 1881 general election. As
analyzed by Le Temps, Trinquet’s election was “proof that amnesty was only a pretext”
for the Socialists’ revolutionary agenda, “the proof is that after the filing of the amnesty
proposal [his] candidacy was maintained.”652 Similarly, Le Petit Parisien asserted that it
had initially abstained from commenting on Trinquet’s victory because of the delicate
situation presented by the Government’s amnesty proposal which had the effect of
“changing everything” and subsequently, the journal argued, Trinquet’s election, which
had the goal of “opening the government’s eyes” to the popularity of amnesty, is now of
little significance; thereby obscuring the duality of the Socialist’s campaigns in
popularizing the cause of amnesty but also encouraging a class-based political orientation
for working-class voters. Then the article shifts the focus back to the amnesty which is
presented as a republican cause and argues that Trinquet’s success might have an adverse
effect of the bill’s passage, that it was unnecessary and concludes by pleading to “all our
friends, all who have in their hearts the amnesty’s success, all those who [have been]
fighting with us for several years” for this purpose, “to not give [the credit of] this joy to
the enemies of the Republic.”653 In this way, republican journalists recast the Socialists’
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Le Temps, June 21, 1880.
Le Petit Parisien, June 21, 1880. The front page of this edition was emblazoned, in large black letters:
“Le Projet d’Amnistie”. The article on Trinquet’s election was comparatively minute and dominated by
considerations of the amnesty bill. The short article began in the bottom right hand corner of the first page,
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amnesty-campaigns as unnecessary and perhaps even dangerous for the new bill’s
passage, the success of which, it was maintained, had nothing whatsoever to do with the
efforts of these revolutionary factions.
Two of the most common journalistic reflections on the Government’s amnesty
bill were also two of the most important in terms of repairing the Opportunist image. The
first, which has already been hinted at, was that introducing the plenary amnesty was
evidence that the republican regime respected popular opinion. This was an important
assertion in light of the 1879—1880 election invalidations and incidents of repressing
public assembly rights, which the Socialists had zealously publicized. 654 Thus even while
prefacing that “we cannot applaud [the Government’s motion]. It is what it should be. It
is as we requested…repeatedly,” La Presse went on to acerbically state “it is good that
the Government publicly recognizes that it has a duty to yield to [public] opinion. It is
good that it yields and undertakes” by this show of obedience to always in the future act
in “reflection of the national will.”655 The other journalistic commonality was that the
credit for the bill’s introduction should be understood as belonging solely to the
Opportunist majority. For example, Le Temps began its analysis on the bill by stating “the
Government, in making this decision was obedient to political considerations it was hard
to ignore…the amnesty is a measure that interests the highest degree of public order;”
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and “It is the thoughtful, far-sighted, republican majority, which has made a total
amnesty, without distinction or exclusion, possible. It is therefore, not to the Radicals, but
to the moderates [Opportunists] that the men of 1871 owe their return to France.”656
These statements were sometimes moderated by references to a new found republican
consensus on the efficacy of general amnesty; more often than not, these claims to unity
were pronounced by the Opportunists, none more so than by Gambetta himself.
On the eve of Trinquet’s election Gambetta gave two speeches. One was in PèreLachaise in support of his protégé, Latelle, in which Gambetta was ominously shouted
down by cries of “Vive Trinquet! Vive l’Amnistie!” The second speech had, tellingly,
nothing whatsoever to do with his preferred candidate, but rather was one in support of
the amnesty. This was Gambetta at his political best, already deftly maneuvering past the
foreseen failure of his candidate; positioning himself at the helm of the amnesty’s
imminent passage. Speaking before Bellevillois workers who had taken it upon
themselves to make a free and secular primary school in their neighborhood, Gambetta
praised their efforts as being consistent with true republican values but the bulk of his
speech was clearly intended to capitalize on the amnesty bill so as to mitigate the ongoing defection of his constituency to revolutionary candidates:
My dear fellow citizens…I have saved the best memories of the times we
spent together. You have already learned the good news. I will confirm it.
The amnesty was proposed to the Chambers by the government…One is
often faced with difficulties that are not always understood. You know that
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I can count on obstacles, but once I take a step forward, I never go back. It
was [because of] respect for legality that the conviction was made [so]
gradually in the mind for the issue of amnesty, and it will always be so for
all progress. Remember there is always one thing that all sincere
republicans must have in their heart to observe: that is respect for the law.
(Applause coupled with shouts of Vive l’Amnistie!) A long time ago we
would have had the amnesty, if on both sides, one had shown oneself to be
wiser and more skillful. But what good is it to recriminate? Resume your
games and welcome together once again the Republic.657

Gambetta’s speech ended amidst cries of Vive la République! Vive l’Amnsitie! Vive
Gambetta! His message of republican respect for law and order went over well with this
crowd, as did his vague reference to the possibility that amnesty could have passed earlier
had its proponents engaged with more skill, and even casting off a nearly decade long
battle by rhetorically asking something that could be read as “why grumble?” Such
statements flew in the face of the Socialists’ and the Communards’ descriptions of misery
and depravity they had suffered over the past nine years and by which they were
beginning to enjoy electoral success.
Because the amnesty was coming, and no one abreast of parliamentary politics
expected the government’s bill to fail, the emotion-laden hostility toward republican
machinations surrounding the issue was effectively beginning to dissipate. Not enough to
prevent Trinquet’s success the following day, but without a doubt it had a stabilizing
effect within working-class communities to the favor of mainstream republicans,
especially the Radicals. Its coinciding with the first celebration of the national holiday
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was an important factor in that stabilization. Indeed, prior to leaving the ball, Gambetta
took the opportunity to underscore the intended impact of the general amnesty coinciding
with the first celebration of the national fête, at least in terms of the audience before
which he was pronouncing:
I could not leave without saying…I am charmed and grateful for the
welcome you have given me. The celebration today is only a prelude to
the fête of 14 July. You will celebrate [that day] with even more
enthusiasm [when] you greet those who reenter the country and there will
be no space in the heart [except] feelings of brotherhood and unity. The
[national holiday, which will] confuse the people, the army, and the
government in a common brotherhood, will be a truly national party and
affirm that France is ready to resume its role in the history of the progress
of the working world, because it must not be forgotten that our fathers,
who were conscious of the role for France, did not [simply] proclaim the
rights of citizens, but the rights of Man.658

This statement, which prominently proclaimed the Third Republic’s revolutionary
origins, was clearly intended to inspire the Bellevillois constituency’s confidence in the
mainstream republican agenda as were the amnesty’s ultimate passage and the first
national celebration of 14 July.
Domesticating the Revolution’s Legacy
On July 11, 1880 a near-general amnesty passed for those convicted of crimes in
relation to the Commune.659 During the Chamber and Senate debates over the
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Government’s bill the amnesty was described by proponents in political terms as
necessary in order to close a divisive chapter in the Republic’s short history, as an
expression of confidence in the young Republic, and “a pledge that the Government feels
itself in a position to spike any attempt at disorder…[a] policy of moderation, wisdom,
and firmness which—to the present—has guaranteed the moderate regular progress of
our republican institutions.”660 It was deemed necessary to remove the issue as a potential
stumping point before the 1881 general elections and, according to Gambetta, as a means
by which the true political platforms of the myriad factions could come to lights. In
reference to Trinquet’s election Gambetta remarked that it was an example of the
amnesty’s ability to strengthen the power of an otherwise marginal political faction:
amnesty “is the last tactic of a party whose sole and indispensable weapon you are going
to shatter in its hand.”661
Gambetta’s assessment was that by removing amnesty as a rallying call for the
Socialists the working class would remain—or return to—the mainstream republican fold
and that to be most effective, it needed to be enacted before the July 14 celebration. On
that day, the Republic’s new tricolor flag would be distributed to the republican army “in
front of the country itself…, in front of the Executive, in front of the nation represented
by its faithful mandataries [sic], in front of [the] Army…, you must close the book on
these ten years and put the tombstone of forgetfulness on the last traces of the
660

Chamber of Deputies, Annales, session ordinaire 1880, Vol. VIII, pp. 201-202. This quote is from the
Chamber’s Committee report.
661
For the full transcript of Gambetta’s speech before the Chamber, see Chamber of Deputies, Annales,
session oridnaire, 1880 Vol. VIII, 210-214.

353

Commune… [and make unequivocal] that there is only one France and one Republic.”662
This was a direct attack on the competing agendas for the Republic’s orientation and an
unapologetic declaration of political intent to transcend republican and revolutionary
discord through symbolic acts that consigned one revolt to oblivion and celebrated a
singular narrative of the Revolution’s triumph and the Republic’s heritage. In this manner
Gambetta was insisting that the amnesty, combined with the national holiday, would have
a unifying effect on the national conscience; it would begin a new era of republican unity
and mitigate the factionalism that characterized not simply the past ten years of the Third
Republic but nearly one hundred years of republican schisms. Immediately following
Gambetta’s speech the vote was taken; the Government’s general amnesty bill passed
with 312 votes from all members of the Republican Union, all Radicals, and even some
Bonapartists, including Cassagnac; the 136 nays came, as was expected, almost entirely
from the monarchist and Bonapartist camps.663 The bill then passed to the Senate where
things turned sour.
During the Senate debates, the monarchists attacked the bill along with the
designation of July 14 as the national holiday by assimilating the atrocities committed by
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the revolutionaries in 1789 with those of the Communards of 1871.664 In defense of the
bill, Freycinet continued to hammer on the theme of the amnesty’s political imperative
reminding the Senators, in words remarkably—if not ironically—similar to Lissagary’s
that “in all of the big cities and in much of the countryside, [and] the Departments of the
Midi, hardly an election has been held without the question of an [of amnesty] having
been put to the voters by the candidates.”665 The Senate was unmoved. When it came to
the vote on the amnesty bill, the Senate rejected it by 133 to 145. After several rounds of
negotiating amendments it ultimately passed the Bozerain amendment, which granted
amnesty to everyone excepting those convicted of arson or murder. This version was
quickly rejected by the Chamber. The substitute bill that was finally settled upon by both
Houses granted amnesty to “all individuals convicted of taking part in the insurrectionary
events of 1870 and 1871 and insurrectional events [thereafter] who are or will be, before
July 14, 1880, subject to a decree of pardon, [and thenceforth they] will be considered
amnestied, with the exception of individuals” condemned to death or forced labor “for
crimes of arson or murder.”666 The law provided amnesty for these latter individuals in
cases where their sentences had, before July 9, 1880, been commuted to “deportation,
detention, or banishment;” it also specified that this amnesty applied to the qualified
whether they had paid for their crimes or not and those that had paid would not receive
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restitution.667 This was the most sweeping grâce the Communards had and would ever
receive with only 14 individuals excluded. For this very reasons it was denounced almost
immediately by enemies of the government.
The amnesty bill that became law on July 11, 1880 was based on the condition of
prior pardon and it was not a general amnesty for all participants in the Commune.
Whereas the monarchist and Bonapartist press accused the Government of bowing to
revolutionary forces, the revolutionary Left accused the government of trying to ignore
them.668 During the Senate debates, for example, Le Figaro published a long article
oozing with reactionary fear that the forthcoming amnesty was giving Socialist
revolutionaries in France and the Communards soon to return, moral encouragement that
will naturally lead them “to engage in physical revenge [for the Commune’s defeat] and
to seek the realization of their [revolutionary] program by violent means.”669 The article
concludes with the politically wounding assertion that “in the last year, the
demonstrations that have occurred should have made [the republican majority] think
[like] the conservatives, but this has not been the case, as we have already seen, the
republican press associates with the revolutionary press and the Socialist committees fuse
with the Republican committees to praise and celebrate the heroes that burned Paris and
shot the hostages.”670 Conversely, for the Socialists, the amnesty law was a mutilation of
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justice and an infuriating insult to their impact given the verifiable influence that their
efforts had made, through their commemorative demonstrations and at the ballot box, on
the promulgation of the law.
The revolutionary Left had spent a considerable amount of time and resources to
rehabilitate the memory and legacy of the Commune which, because of their association
with the event and its survivors, lent an important amount of political capital to their
candidates and thereby their political agendas. For the Socialists the promulgation of the
law validated the workers’ engagement and illuminated the real power they could wield
against bourgeois politicians and the efficacy of the socialists’ doctrines. The Socialists’
amnesty campaigns were having a galvanizing effect on the French working-class
electorate and reorienting their political identities to one founded in class. By the
condemnatory terms under which the amnesty passed and by the singular credit given to
the parliamentary republicans, the revolutionary Left correctly deduced that passing the
amnesty was nothing more “than a campaign maneuver” of the Opportunist majority; but
they were optimistic.
Due to the long delay during which parliamentary leaders had played politics with
the lives of the men and women in exile, the republicans in power, according to the
Socialists, had shown themselves to be without morality and principals. The law’s 1880
passage was, consequently, deemed beneficial because “as long as the amnesty had not
been granted, there was common ground between bourgeois Radicalism and proletarian
Socialism, and a clean, sharp separation between the two classes would not otherwise be
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possible at the time of the elections…[but now] we are going to be able to go to the ballot
box with one exclusive concern: to liberate, to amnesty the nine million French wage
slaves locked up in the penal colonies of capitalism.”671 Therein, the Socialists also began
their campaign for 1881 by retaining the Communard-worker assimilation and equating
the necessity of the former’s amnesty with that of the latter’s.
The Socialists’ optimism regarding the 1881 general elections was perhaps
purposefully overstated and, in hindsight, naïvely optimistic. The galvanizing effect of
their amnesty campaigns and the defection of previously solid republican constituencies
to Socialist candidates was, despite republican efforts to claim otherwise, precisely what
Gambetta and the majority of parliamentary republicans sought to thwart by taking over
the amnesty’s passage.672 Yet the June 30th article in Le Figaro picked up on an important
problem that mainstream republicans were seeking to overcome. Because of their
electoral successes and attendance estimates at their rallies and meetings, it was apparent
that the amnesty was gaining progressive popular support and that through the Socialists’
activism, the characterization of the Commune and the assimilation of the Communard’s
sufferings to that of the French workers had found a welcome reception among a
significant constituency. The republicans could not afford to ignore this source of
political capital any more than they could neglect the growing appeal of revolutionary
doctrines that asserted the primacy of social divisions which was in direct confrontation
L’Egalité, June 23, 1880.
Le Temps, June 19, 1880, “Journée Parlementaire du Jeudi 17 Juin ”. See also, Chamber of Deputies,
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which he advocates for the amnesty by asserting “the nearness of the national festival of July Fourteenth.”
671
672

358

with the Opportunist’s unrelenting denial of such chasms. Furthermore how could
republicans welcome back unrepentant Communards and, at the same time, mitigate the
potential fill-up these men and woman might give to revolutionary factions? By removing
the Socialists’ “indispensable weapon” and immediately following that act by the staging
of the Republic’s first national holiday with the specified intent of unifying the nation
around the liberal Republic they controlled.
The 1880 inauguration of quatorze juillet meant the monopolization of the Third
Republic’s foundation narrative by mainstream republicans and particularly the
moderates’, at a most opportune time. Just over a year before the next general election,
celebrating the new national holiday was an event through which to engage the populace
in republican patriotic nationalism in a way that celebrated popular political participation,
the triumph of the Republic, and above the others, the first component to the illogical
republican motto: “Liberty”.673 July 14, 1880 was an official assertion of republican
national identity founded in “a common understanding of the past, embodied in a set of
political rituals and symbols and a distinct and relatively coherent representation of recent
French history—in other words [it was the inauguration of] a common memory.”674 The
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collective memory parliamentary republicans were seeking to generate on 14 July 1880
was one of revolutionary republican unity, wherein the distinction between the Republic
and France collapsed just as, they hoped, the day would have a mitigating effect on the
recent appeals for sharper class and political divisions.
In this respect, the day, like all other instances of republican cultural activism—
emanating from the republican camps—Opportunist and Socialist alike—looked
“forward, not backward.”675 During the day’s celebration in 1880, parliamentary
republicans were indeed looking forward, to the 1881 general elections.676 In “Bastille
Day: From Dies Irea to Holiday,” Christian Amalvi focuses significant attention on the
day’s meaning with respect to the discord between republicans and monarchists, which
was at a fever pitch following the passage of the first of the Ferry laws and the correlating
expulsion of the Jesuits.677 According to Judith Stone, this is done at the expense of intrarepublican tensions surrounding the day’s official designation.678 Yet they both give a
cursory consideration to the first official celebration of 14 July in 1880 as a cultural
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device for mainstream republican political hegemony vis-à-vis the renascent
revolutionary Left. Similarly, Philip Nord describes the celebration of quatorze juillet, the
official recognition of la Marseillaise, and the elevation of the Phrygian cap to the status
of official symbol in terms of “skirmishes between republicans and the party of order”
without consideration of the political battle republicans were engaged in by the
revolutionary Left, nor a reflection that by 1880 moderate republicans were the party of
order, an identification that French voters validated in October 1877.679
These choices are made because of the persistence of the narrative that in 1879—
1880 “apart from the conquests of a few town halls, the various brands of Socialism
scarcely counted on the political level. The workers and progressive peasants remained
loyal to the Radicals”680 However, this truth is only assured in historical hindsight by the
knowledge that in 1881 the moderate’s triumphed at the expense of the Radicals and most
certainly the Socialists. The electoral results certainly demonstrate that in the fall of 1881
the Opportunists were successful but the reason for their success was partially, yet
crucially, the result of their political and cultural engagement with the Socialists,
especially in regard to the Third Republic’s revolutionary heritage and the narration of
the era’s closure.
Between 1879 and 1880, the Socialists had demonstrated progressive electoral
success based on amnesty platforms and provocations to forge a social-democratic
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Republic, by revolutionary force if necessary. The notion that Socialists “scarcely
counted on the political level” ignores the contemporary political reality that they had
significantly impacted the politics of amnesty and that while, at that time, workers and
“progressive” peasants maintained an electoral affinity to the Radicals, the Socialist’s
élan was growing, not abating, and their denunciations of the Third Republic as merely a
bourgeois triumph and their calls for class-based political representation were being
propagated on a national scale and were in direct opposition to the image of republican
social harmony that the Opportunist regime projected. Contemporary politicians,
therefore, took them quite seriously as a political threat whose importance might continue
to increase unless it was impeded. While there would be another fête nationale prior to
the 1881 general elections, because of the polarizing actions taken by the government in
relation to the extreme Right and Left between 1879 and 1880, this was the year in which
it was most necessary to unequivocally assert the triumph of the (Opportunist) Republic
and the end of the revolutionary era.
In the spring of 1880, when the Raspail bill was introduced, republicans were
facing reinvigorated intransigence on both extremes of the political spectrum. On
February 27, 1879, just after the republican political takeover, the first of what would
become known as the Ferry Laws were adopted. During the parliamentary recess in the
spring of 1880, the Government superseded the conservative Senate and passed the
decrees of March 29th, enabling the enactment of Ferry’s bill including the controversial
Article Seven by which unauthorized religious orders—most notably the Jesuits—were
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given notice that they were to be expelled from France within the next three months.681
These acts served to intensify and militarize Catholic opposition to the Republic, which
would naturally benefit the monarchists in 1881.
On the opposite end of the political spectrum, the Socialist’s amnesty-campaigns
had begun to make serious in-roads within France’s working class electorate. While
confiscating the prerogative of passing the amnesty undercut the acuteness of the
Socialists’ appeal, the condemnatory language embedded in the law and on display
during the parliamentary debates and the years of delay and politicking over the issue
might not be readily forgotten by working-class voters whose affinity with the
Communards was being cultivated by the revolutionary Left. A mutual identification that
did not cease to be propagated after 1880 and, in the campaigns leading up to 1881,
voters would be constantly reminded of such machinations by the politicians and
journalists of the extreme Left and the returning Communards themselves. In effect, by
June of 1880 when the Senate confirmed the decision to designate 14 July for the nation’s
holiday, the mainstream republicans, but especially the Opportunists who held the
majority, were quite aware that their hold on power might be subject to revocation in a
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little more than a year because of the polarization of opinion resulting from the
confluence of the anti-clerical educational reforms and the politics surrounding
Communard-amnesty.
The 1880 inauguration of quatroze juillet, then, should be understood in the
context of these acute political controversies, but also in terms of the broader campaign to
narrate the Third Republic as the triumphant manifestation of the Revolution’s success
and the end of the revolutionary era. Le Siècle, reflecting on the day’s success, asserted
“it is necessary that the Revolution has reached its natural coronation, the Republic; it is
also necessary that the Revolution has victoriously crossed the uncertainties and storms
that surround the birth of all new regimes, that it has reduced its enemies to impotence,
that it feels itself strong in the present, and sure of the future. That hour has arrived.”682
The overwhelming show of popular support for the holiday and thereby the Republic in
1880 was validation of this claim. Indeed, only the national holiday, whose relevance and
potency had sustained after nearly a century of revolution and reaction could meet this
narrative need on a nation-wide and particularly emotive scale in which the French
population were not only witnesses to the Republic’s propaganda, but, because of the
directive that festivities be organized on an incredibly local basis, were also unwitting
propagators, both to themselves and to enemies of the regime.683
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July 14, 1880, was the apogee of a series of republican efforts taken after their
assumption of power to solidify allegiance to the Third Republic generally, and
mainstream republicanism specifically. That same year, “Marianne, wearing her Phrygian
cap, took up residence at the Hôtel de Ville (which was still under reconstruction); her
name has been synonymous with the Republic ever since.”684 Earlier, and more
importantly, on July 23, 1879 Article 9 of the 1875 constitution was repealed and the
chambers moved back to Paris from Versailles. This move is typically described as
indicative of the sense of security felt by the Government regarding the Republic’s
longevity and their ability to subdue any disturbances originating in the revolutionary
city. For example, Joughin writes that it “showed the republican majority less beset by
fears of the people than before.”685 The theme of confidence is similarly found when
Stone writes “by 1880 regular elections had taken place, republican majorities were
returned, and the National Assembly had left Versailles for Paris.”686 Furthermore, Furet
rests his assertion that “the French Revolution was coming into port” on a comparison
between the hostile crowd forcing such a move in October of 1789 and “the deputies and
senators [of 1879 who] followed the same route…as representatives of the people.”687
However, while the government might have been confident that it could meet challenges
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arising from the revolutionary capital, the decision was certainly an offensive move
aimed at preempting revolutionary foments and a means by which to strengthen, through
symbolism, popular allegiance to the revolutionary legacy and the contemporary
majority’s mandate.
During the Senate debates on the bill, Jules Simon explicitly articulated this point
whilst debating an intransigent opponent of the bill: “you (Buffet) believe, and you
continually say that if we go to Paris, the threat of revolution becomes greater; we, on the
contrary, think that when we shall be in Paris, the threat of a revolution will be less.” 688 It
was not that the republicans were assured that another revolutionary outburst would not
occur, but rather, that being in Paris would prevent it. The bill’s (mostly) Legitimist
opponents frequently highlighted the Revolution of 1789, especially the journées of
1793, and they raised the specter of the Commune, in their arguments against the bill,
pointing out that the government’s absence from the capital had never mitigated the
escalation of revolutionary hostility, in fact, it potentiated it. Furthermore, by moving the
government back to Paris, Simon had argued earlier, “the last traces of the year 1871
will…be effaced.”689 With the military detail designated to safeguard the chambers,
especially their presidents, the government would be able to safely, and more effectively
gauge popular opinion while, at the same time, striking a pose of confidence and
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accessibility which was profoundly important in terms of the Republic’s representational
and democratic image.690
The 1879 decision to officially recognize the revolutionary hymn, la Marseillaise,
as the national anthem enabled the same authentication of republican homage to the
revolutionary tradition. This too had the deflating effect that officialdom necessarily has
on the power of popular insurgent symbolism. Thus, the once revolutionary emblem, or
rallying cry, was drained of its potential to insight rebellion, let alone revolution. In “La
Marseillaise,” Michel Vovelle asserts “it is perhaps rather facile and superficial yet
nonetheless legitimate to conclude that the official adoption of the song as France’s
national anthem, as the private property of the Third Republican bourgeoisie and official
music suitable for any occasion, deprived it of the distinctive flavor it once possessed for
the masses.”691 Yet his conclusion “what began as a revolutionary battle cry had become
an instrument of national pride in the Age of Imperialism,” while incontrovertible,
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neglects another meaningful consideration that this was precisely what the Republicans in
power were seeking in undertaking such official recognitions.692
In the last years of the 1870s, the memory of the Revolution sustained deeply
emotional and partisan perspectives, particularly in light of the Paris Commune. There
were numerous claimants to the Revolution’s heritage, including the extreme Left,
factions of which continued to incite revolutionary action to fulfill what many saw as the
Revolution’s unfinished goals and denounced the Third Republic as nothing more than
the triumph of the bourgeoisie. Officially sanctioning and executing the national holiday
was an important step to take in conjunction with the move back to Paris and the official
adoption of la Marseillaise. Each of these moves were carried out with contemporary
political rivalries in mind and with the imperative of symbolically signaling the end to the
revolutionary era in a way that privileged the mainstream republican narrative of the
Third Republic’s origins and domesticated the memories ensconced in these symbols to
undercut their potential to sustain contemporary revolutionary movements.
These official sanctions enabled parliamentary republicans to sustain the
contemporary social capital associated with a revolutionary heritage and at the same time
project an image of a post-revolutionary political reality at a time when the revolutionary
Left was beginning to enjoy a broader base and on the eve of the Communards’ return. In
legitimating such symbols, mainstream republicans were motivated by the desire to
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sustain the allegiance of not only moderate and conservative republican voters but
reacquire the unflinching support of French working class. This is not to say that July 14,
1880 was simply a cynically contrived manifestation of republican campaigning. In fact,
it was homage to the Republic’s heritage in the sincerest and most universal sense
possible and an official recognition of the day’s commemoration which republicans had
been observing semi-clandestinely since 1872, but its contemporary political utility was a
paramount consideration for all parties involved in its emergence, in that year
specifically.
Quatorze juillet’s duality as a commemoration of the storming of the Bastille in
1789 and the 1790 Fête de la Federation meant that the designation of this holiday
enabled the celebration of the Revolution’s supposed democratizing and also unifying
legacy. This biformity provided the space in which, it was hoped, Moderates could
engage in the day’s revelry without fear that it was a celebrating insurrection,
conservative opinion might be made more amenable toward the Republic, and workers
could take part in the commemoration of an event they identified with more readily than
any other that marked the republican calendar of commemoration.693 These intentions are
evident in the organization of the day’s main events: the military’s review, oath of loyalty
to the Republic, and distribution of flags at Longchamps, and in the popular
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neighborhood celebrations that were independently organized according to the tastes of
the local residents and accompanied by fireworks displays ignited from six locations in
the capital city alone.
The military emphasis announced the Republic’s character of order and stability
and recalled the revolutionary union of the “army and the nation [which] have only one
heart and one soul,” the distribution of the tricolor flags symbolized the army’s role as
defenders of “the honor, territory, and laws of the French Republic,” and the oath of
loyalty made that explicit.694 This was an important factor for the regime in power. Not
only did it honor the revolutionary role of the national army, but it symbolized the
military’s loyalty to the Republic, even over the objections of many officers, and at time
when monarchist and religious opposition to the Opportunist regime was acute.695
The government’s decision to have the departments and even the arrondissements
organize their celebrations independently gave symbolic expression to the Revolution’s
democratic legacy and demonstrated allegiance to the Republic as manifested on a local
basis which, when taken together, became national and seemingly organic. This image of
14 July had been asserted by Gambetta as early as 1872 when he described the storming
of the Bastille as something undertaken by soldiers and workers, bourgeois Parisians, and
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provincial peasants standing together in “moral Federation.”696 The Radicals keenly
supported this aspect; they were insistent that the holiday promote a mood of social
harmony and an underscoring that July 14, 1789 marked the beginning of popular
sovereignty, just as July 14, 1880 symbolized the Third Republic’s commitment to this
revolutionary achievement. Such a focus was in line with the Radical’s broader
democratizing agenda and a means by which to rebuff Socialist denunciations that they
were betrayers of the Revolution’s social and democratic legacy. Contemporaries keenly
understood this. Writing in La Justice, the day after the Chamber approved the Raspail
bill and three days after Blanqui’s defeat in Lyon, Ernest Roche made this point and the
direct correlation between the amnesty and the fête nationale explicit: “the best way to
celebrate the anniversary of this immortal date, when the people of Paris, in a sublime
burst of political genius and patriotism, opened the era of democracy, is precisely [by]
proclaiming the plenary amnesty. Without it, we decreed the public rejoicings in vain…;
the painful memories of the past will still hover over the great republican city that for
centuries [has] shed its blood for national emancipation, for justice, for popular rights.”697
The purposeful conjunction of the celebration of the storming of the Bastille with
the amnesty of the Communards was carried out with doubly propitious intentions. The
confluence meant an implicit incorporation of the Commune into France’s revolutionary
history, yet one that acknowledged the Commune as the era’s tragic and misguided
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bookend. Contrary to the preemptory castigations of the conservative-Right, neither the
amnesty nor quatorze juillet celebrated insurrection especially not that of the
Communards.698 As intended, the dominant narrative of the amnesty remained one of
clemency and fraternal forgiveness. Moreover, just as June 30, 1878 had an aspect of
forgetting a recent crisis, the conjunction of the celebration and the amnesty was designed
to facilitate an obfuscation of the violent and divisive Parisian uprising and 10 years of
national discord regarding fate of survivors and the event’s legacy. The amnesty was
meant to end an incredibly contentious controversy that had plagued the Third Republic
since the spring of 1871 while the celebration of the Revolution’s triumph on July 14,
1880 was designed to herald a new chapter for modern France. The new era would be one
in which its republican governance was supported by not only urban and traditionally
republican strongholds, but also by la France profonde, unified in allegiance to the Third
Republic which the national celebration would symbolize. This might mitigate
conservative and revolutionary opponents of the regime and, should the day be
extensively embraced, it would demonstrate to the regime’s antagonists, extensive and
socially diverse allegiance to the Third Republic and, by association, the Opportunist
regime.
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The 1880 celebration of quatorze juillet was an immense success in terms of
wide-spread participation and the conveyance of the precise homage to the Great
Revolution that the republican organizers were seeking to impart. In compliance with
official directives, every arrondissement and canton took part in one form or another. The
entire city of Paris was bathed in the tricolor, Municipal busts of Marianne were
prominently displayed, and plaster mock-ups were paraded through cantons like a
cherished saint by local celebrants throughout France. Dancing, drinking, and revelry, in
general, went on well into the early hours of the morning and this, not the disturbances
many had feared, had echoes in the provincial towns. The most grandiose celebrations,
however, took place at Place de la Bastille (naturally), but also at the new Place de la
République, which was inaugurated on that day along with a plaster mock-up of the
forthcoming “Monument to the French Republic.”699
The monument and the place perfectly embodied the political agenda for the day’s
celebration. The Morice brothers had narrowly won the 1879 Municipal Council contest
against the recently amnestied Communard sympathizer, Jules Dalou, whose more leftistinspired and Phrygian-capped Marianne appeared without the qualifying olive branch
extended so prominently by the Marianne of the Morice brothers’ monument.700 The
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Morice brothers’ statue was surrounded by the republican trinity and bronzed renditions
of the revolutionary events between 1789 and 1792, thereby displaying precisely the nonradical phases of the revolutionary era that the government sought to emphasize in
1880.701 Moreover, “the only unconventional element,” the lion in the foreground,
guarded nothing more than the ballot box, i.e., the sole source of popular political
expression that the liberal Republic would officially recognize.
The Place de la République is conveniently situated in the heart of the workingclass East Paris. According to Maurice Agulhon, the choice of place for the statue “could
be justified if need be by arguing that the monument would then be as close as possible to
the Republic’s most ardent defenders,” the people of the working-class neighborhoods.702
However, as with the other symbolic steps described above, this should be understood as
an attempt to edify this constituency, at this particular time, in terms of civic
comportment. The working classes, especially in the capital city, were actively being
supplicated to by the factions of the renascent revolutionary Left to reject the Republic in
its liberal orientation, and not without electoral consequences. Choosing this site for the
statue underscored, to this population, in particular, the Republic’s respect only for

September 21, 1889, the same year as the Revolution’s centennial but on a date specifically
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legality in terms of popular political expression, symbolized by the lion guarding nothing
more than the ballot box. This meant that the Opportunist government’s symbol of the
Republic’s triumph, and the revolutionary gains it would safeguard, would be
prominently displayed on this day and forever thereafter at ground-zero in the battle over
the Revolution’s legacy and contestations over the type of Republic it gave rise to.
Because of the confluence of this celebration of the Revolution and the return of
some of the Communards, there was heightened fear that the day could end in violence
and that any “troubles in the capital might have echoes in provincial cities.”703 As a
result, police surveillance was prolific, yet just as with nearly all other moments of
potential insurrection, the crowds were not menacing, in fact they were jubilant. Indeed
the day “may be said to have opened the belle époque.”704 In the republican press
(naturally) but also in police reports the day was an overwhelming success in terms of
popular participation. Not only was there an outpouring of popular revelry, but also the
crowd “had policed itself with good taste and tact.”705 La République Française noted
that the two million people of Paris participated without disturbance” and Le Siècle
described its admiration that despite conservative fears the Luxembourg Palace had not
burned and “the people of Paris and the four or five thousand citizens drawn from all the

703

APP Ba 471, pc. 921, Rapport du cabinet, 13, July 1880. As described in chapter one, this period
witnessed remarkable and persistent anxiety over “crowd” participation and comportment in politicalcultural events.
704
Rearick, Pleasures of the Belle Époque, Op. cit., p. 3.
705
APP Ba 471, pc 305, Le Siècle, July 16, 1880; see also Le Rappel, July 17, 1880.

375

departments have been so prodigious in their calm, good sense, and political wisdom.”706
In fact, French society projected exactly the image that the Government had hoped for
leading the Journal des Debats to conclude “the Republic is established, and is so
uncontested that people no longer bother to acclaim it: the passionate acclamations of
yesterday were a defense and even a war cry that today has no reason.” 707 This is not to
say that dissonance had disappeared under the tricolor banner of the republican nation,
there were many that held the day’s celebrations in contempt. However, incidents of
symbolic counter-narration and dissidence by monarchists and partisans of the
revolutionary Left were sporadic and easily subdued.708
At the Place de la République police reports of a gathering of some 2,000 persons
include details about various groups of youth parading with Phrygian caps and holding
red flags yet shouting, without the qualifiers of “social” or “democratic”, “Vive la
République!” Other youths adorned in tricolor flags and touting banners announcing
themselves as “Les Enfants de Montmartre” climbed on to the plaster statue and with the
favor of the audience sang the la Marseillaise with overheard shouts of “Vive la
Republique ! Vive l’Amnistie ! ” There were several recorded shouts of “Vivre la
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Commune!” and Le Figaro described the singing of seditious songs by men in the 17th
arrondissement “smelling of petrol,” a tellingly descriptive report from this conservative
journal. For the most part, by their non-menacing presence and participation alone, these
groups were yielding to the official narrative of the Revolution’s triumph and, thereby, to
the Republic in 1880.709
Each of the factions of the revolutionary Left, including the Socialists, had called
on their supporters and target constituencies to boycott the day in remembrance of those
fallen at the hands of the, self-congratulatory, Republic in 1871. On the day after Raspail
introduced the bill, A. Le Roy wrote “we (the proletariat) have nothing to commemorate
except our defeats, and the two most recent [and] most painful ones we owe to the
bourgeoisie.”710 Guesde and his followers within the Parti Ouvrier very publically
boycotted the day citing that “Its Bastille’s were still to be taken.” 711 Leading up to this
decision, on July 5th, the Socialist Committee for Aid to the Amnestied and NonAmnestied held a private meeting during which a counter commemoration was planned.
The organizers, including Perrin and Nathalie Le Mel joined Guesde and Labusquière to
advocate against a boycott and in favor of a counter-commemoration “since it had been
the proletariat which took the Bastille, [thus a] Socialist fête on July 14” should be carried
out. In case, a boycott or a counter-demonstration, retribution for the repression of the
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May 23 commemoration of Semaine sanglante was repeatedly asserted as a primary
motivating factor.712 The meeting adopted a resolution that a wreath be carried to PereLachaise and laid at the Mur des Fédérés. The Workingmen’s Union of the Seine
formally boycotted the day, in contrast to the more conservative Union of Workers’
Syndical Chambers.713 As explained by A. Levy, “our adhesion had necessarily to be
made dependent upon the voting of the plenary amnesty [however,] the softness of the
Deputies and the duplicity of the Government” ushered in a mutilated justice and then
condescended to stage this national commemoration; “being bourgeois, they are
trafficking in the proletarians’ right. And they invite us to their fêtes!”714 As Joughin
bluntly states, “words, in short were all that the Socialists could use on this July 14 th.”715
Indeed, there was no widespread boycott, no massive [or even moderate] counterdemonstrations. The local Socialist committee of the twelfth arrondissement might sell
red carnations, a few red flags might have been unfurled, Trinquet’s lithograph might
have sold for 25 centimes, but all of this was drowned in the republican effervescence on
display throughout France on that day.716 Moreover, the neighborhoods who had so
deeply supported the Commune—Belleville, Montmartre, Batignolles, etc., displayed
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some of the most jubilation of all and were joined in their revelry by some of the recent
returnees.717
Not only did Commune sympathizers participate in the day’s celebrations but
some former Communards did too, thereby lending their celebrity to buttress the
Republic’s revolutionary origins while also requisitioning the Commune’s place within
that heritage. Henri Rochefort, who arrived in Paris on July 12 to an enormous reception
at the Gare du Nord, was certainly not forgiving of the nearly decade long exile he had
endured and he was estranged from most of his former political allies who had abstained
from the Commune, most notably, Gambetta. However, while Rochefort founded the
aptly titled L’Intransigeant on July 14, 1880, its first publication was full of positive
descriptions of national holiday and Rochefort himself did not boycott the day, even if he
did not seek to participate in any official capacity. This was akin to most of the recent
returnee’s actions in regard to the celebrations thereby enabling the validation of the
republican projections of national concord and affability. Gambetta went to great lengths
to propagate this image, thereby positioning himself in such a way as to absorb as much
political capital associated with the returnees as possible without alienating more
moderate and conservative republican constituencies. Thus it was that on July 14, 1880,
André Gill’s banner that depicted Gambetta shaking hands with a recent returnee was

717

For these sporadic counter-demonstrations, see Joughin, p. 480.

379

hung, pointedly, across the rue Rochechouart in the ninth arrondissement.718 Indeed, the
same man who in 1871 refused to enter the capital city to help mediate a resolution
alongside Clemenceau, Gambetta, who for nearly ten years avoided the controversy
inherent in the amnesty, who, as late as 1879, abstained from voting on the amnesty,
emerged in the summer of 1880 as the man who brought the amnesty719
On July 14, 1880, Gambetta delivered the following address to his Belleville
constituency:
It is not a discourse I want to address to you; it is the expression of my
thanks, of my recognition for the admirable organization of this festival,
which encloses with dignity the series of patriotic rejoicings of our
immortal Paris. You understood, and you understood it all unanimously…
that after ninety-one years of persistent fight, one day finally was to rise
for the fatherland, a day where, in a unanimous momentum, all the
French…would come together from one end of the territory to the other,
and acclaim, indissoluble, France and the Republic. And it is here, on
these heights which one so often denounced with the apathy or the fear of
ignorant fellow citizens, which it was advisable to give the spectacle of the
immense congress of the population of Belleville abandoning itself, in the
middle of order and the most perfect calm, to the joy which fills up all
hearts. It is Belleville in effect, that it was advisable to give the brightest
refutation to these diatribes, to these perfidies, which has overpowered us
for ten years, and which always announces the end of the week [as] the
fall of France and the government that we have created; a government
which, from now on is established on the consent of all the French
people….720
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This statement might easily be interpreted as Gambetta’s rhetorical projection of a united
France, one in which the Republican and national identity were indissoluble. Such a
conclusion would be salient but also superficial. At work in this speech was not only a
projection of unity and republican triumphalism, but also an assertion that, with the
amnesty and with the commemoration of quatorze juillet, social harmony reigned
supreme. The Communards were no threat, their misguided indiscretions had been
forgiven, they were repatriated citizens of a welcoming Republic and Belleville, home of
the Commune’s most ardent defenders, was at peace with itself and more importantly
with the Republic as it was in 1880. In this speech, as in so many others, Gambetta
perfectly embodies the political acrobatics involved in the Third Republic’s national
aggrandizement and the machinations behind their cultural efforts to forge national
republican unanimity via the demystification of the revolutionary tradition.
Such maneuvers were not ignored by the Leftist opponents of the republican
regime. However, their failure to garner more than a handful of victories in 1881 signifies
that while such machinations might have kept militant hostilities enflamed, they were
validated as efficacious for the nation writ-large. The fête nationale did mark the
beginning of a new era in modern France, an era that historians often refer to as the
period when the Third Republic was consolidated; an era of social harmony and
republican national unity made possible by the amnesty and the celebration of the
Revolution’s success as embodied by the liberal Third Republic. Anticipating the day’s
success, the moderate republican journal, Le Petit Parisien, supported the liberal imagery
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and intent for quatorze juillet by highlighting the juxtaposition of the amnesty and the
national holiday as the determining factors for the apparent end of the revolutionary era
and dawn of national republican unity:
The desire of France was that the date 14 July served as the final point to
the history of 18 March, and that the national solemnity which prepares
itself, is marked by a great law of appeasement and harmony, recalling the
union of all the French on the Champ de Mars of 1790.721

In this way moderates implicitly sanctioned the identification of the Commune as part of
the era ignited by the Great Revolution while at the same time paying homage to
republican concord of 1790 and, according to their view, of 1880. Le Siècle was
positively elated in its conclusions of the day’s success when it described the celebrations
of July 14, 1880 as having “the most beautiful character and deepest significance…no
more families in mourning, no more traces of our discords! What divided us so
profoundly is forgotten. Today the Republic really comes into its own.” 722 The
outpouring of patriotic republican nationalism on display throughout France on July 14,
1880 exceeded all expectations, which enable the memory of that day in 1880 to be one
of a new dawn, wherein the Commune was officially forgiven and thereby drained of its
defensive appeal, and republican national unity was the paramount recollection.
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It was within this context of liberal republican triumphalism that most of the
Communards returned after July 1880. While Rochefort arrived on July 12 th, there were
many, including Benoît Malon and Jules Vallès, who returned on the national holiday,
thus literally entering amidst the Third Republic’s most self-congratulatory hour. After
July 14, more surviving ex-militants began to return, and to take their place within French
society, culture and politics, as citizens of the Third Republic. The conservative journals,
without surprise, published tracts filled with gloomy predictions about the Communards’
return. Conversely, the Republican newspapers still sailing on the popular spirits of
quatorze juillet highlighted the union of all French citizens, which the amnesty and the
national holiday were meant to symbolize. Yet the returning Communards were not
wholly reconciled to the Republic that had persecuted and imprisoned them for nearly a
decade. Most still clung to their earlier ideals and many endeavored, once again, to affect
revolutionary change.
Numerous returnees became leaders in the Radical-Left, Socialist, Blanquist, and
Anarchist circles that began to re-acquire momentum, and this time immutably, with the
economic depression of the 1880s and 1890s. Louise Michel, for example, returned from
New Caledonia only to spend the rest of her life in and out of prison due to her continued
engagement in radical politics. Others, however, sought to use the contemporary situation
to bring change from within. For example: Charles-Ferdinand Gambon returned from
Switzerland to win election as a Radical candidate to the Chamber of Deputies in 1882;
Henri Rochefort was elected to the Chamber as a Blanquist in 1885; Paschal Grousset

383

won election as a Socialist Deputy from the 12th Arrondissement in 1893; and Félix Pyat
returned from London to become a Republican Deputy in 1888. The amnestied exCommunards entered a new political culture, one in which the Republic had triumphed,
and the mainstream of politics were moderate but solidly republican, sagely working to
solidify the assimilation of national and Republican identities, most notably in the realms
of laicized education and republican patriotic political culture.
The Communards returned to France with a level of popular and political
celebrity that often benefitted republican and of course Socialist politicians; this was the
case whether the returnee was reconciled to the Republic or not. One such occasion was
provided in September 1880, by the return of one of the most famous of the
Communards, Louise Michel. Thousands of people were present when her train arrived in
Saint-Lazare station, among them were Henri Rochefort, members of the Chamber of
Deputies including Clemenceau and Louis Blanc, and former Communards including
Oliver Pain and Gustave Arnold.723 Upon her arrival she was publically embraced by
Rochefort and Clemenceau and after a brief speech to the crowd was driven to the home
of family in Montmartre. Journalists and police surveillance reports describe the crowd as
peaceful, nearly all of them sporting red boutonnieres and other than random shouts of
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could still lend legitimacy to the Republic. Michel would go on to spend the rest of her life in and out of
French prisons and self-imposed exile due to her ardent support of anarchism. The friendship between
Michel and Clemenceau was genuine but it would be naïve not to also acknowledge the political
opportunity that by 1880 he and others would derive by taking part in honoring her return in a very public
fashion sure to gain the political approval of their working class constituents.
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“Vivre l’Amnistie! Vivre la Révolution Social!” the participants were generally in good
spirits.724
Serving as proponents of the various amnesty bills but also taking part in these
celebrated returns even publicly embracing these revolutionaries, helped politicians such
as Clemenceau and Louis Blanc to maintain their political credibility among workingclass voters. Thousands of people came out to celebrate the Communards upon their
returns and banquets and parties given in their honor frequently accompanied the arrivals.
The crowds that these returns generated provided an audience eager to hear the speeches
of the Communards, which were often accompanied by ones given by the politicians and
party leaders that had come to greet them. The political clout that the Commune and the
surviving Communards held among the working class, especially in the capital city, was
well-understood by politicians seeking to represent them in national and local
governments. Political parties of the far Left were (and remain) by far the most fervent in
their claims to the Commune’s heritage but republicans, Opportunists and Radicals alike,
also drew on its potency, either through individual relationships or by their association
with the amnesty, which after 1880, even Gambetta could claim.
None of the advocates for the amnesty and quatorze juillet were naïve to the fact
that these events set the stage for the 1881 general elections. The timing of these moves
meant that when the first of the amnestied returned, they did so amidst a celebratory
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mood of national fraternity and faith in the existing Republic’s institutions as displayed
by the vast majority of French voters. In less than a year, these voters would be called
upon to choose whether to safeguard the mandate of the leaders who granted the amnesty,
who gave them the national fête, and who were ushering in the era of free and secular
education; versus the those who were calling for revolutionary action in order to
emancipate the proletariat, a category of persons who were neither dogmatic in such selfdescriptions nor entirely amenable to the idea of constructing and perhaps dying on a
barricade for causes that, in light of the amnesty’s passage might also be achieved
through peaceful means. Moreover, without the amnesty, there was no issue that
generated even remotely the same level of emotional resonance as the return of loved
ones and heroes could.
In 1881, the voters chose to maintain a Moderate republican majority, electing
only one socialist to the Chamber.725 In the municipal elections, the Radicals sustained
their hold on local power.726 These races have “not gotten the most ink, they do not seem
marked by any major conflict and are distinguished by a great calm.”727 After all, the
Moderates had followed a largely uncontroversial path during the year between the first
celebration of quatorze juillet and the first election on August 21, 1881. However,
important changes were afoot in France during this time—ones that were carefully
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designed to influence electoral outcomes. On June 30, 1881, the Moderates safeguarded
free assembly through a law that permitted public meetings prior to authorization or the
formation of a committee. On July 28, 1881, they took another step toward secularization
by abolishing the requirement of denominational declarations by cemeteries. And on July
29, 1881, the press restrictions of the Moral Order period, which the republicans had used
so freely against their revolutionary rivals in 1879 and 1880, were lifted. These
developments greatly assisted the Moderate republicans in preserving their power by
strengthening the legitimacy of their heritage. On the eve of the general election, the
Moderates were able to demonstrate a commitment to uncontroversial republican values.
Similarly, during the July 14, 1881, celebrations—a mere month before the elections that
would secure their legislative control—they were, once again, able to use these values to
proclaim that the Third Republic embodied the Revolution’s triumph.
This combination of symbolic festivity and strategic legislation enabled the
republicans to quell the rising appeal of revolutionary groups and played a key role in
maintaining the Moderates’ mandate in 1881. Indeed, during the 1881 election
campaigns, terms like “revolution” and even “socialism” were downplayed; the dominant
theme of the Left (including the Socialist Left) was that of institutional reform.728

See Prost, pp. 32-33 wherein he describes that within his sample two candidates are given as “Radical
Socialists” do not mention the words socialists, collectivist, or communist in the text of their program. This
can be understood as the Radicals’ absorption of the nascent popularity for socialist doctrines, yet carried
out with a taming effect. See pp. 38-39 where he describes the virtual absence of the term revolution,
parliamentary or otherwise. While there were surly intransigent candidates, not represented in Prost’s
sample that might have employed such terms they were, based on the elections’ results, rejected. See also p.
41 where he describes the frequency of juridical themes emanating from the Left-wing republican camp
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Whereas the Socialist speeches and electoral addresses of 1879 and 1880 commonly
asserted the efficacy of revolutionary action, the party’s candidates favored reform-based
terminology in 1881. These linguistic choices reflect the Socialists’ assessment of their
target constituency’s mood. Prior to the amnesty, the working classes were beginning to
engage with revolutionary political factions and vote for their candidates; in 1881 and for
several years thereafter, this zeal gave way to contentment with reform.729
Mainstream republicans, Opportunists, and Radicals alike were successful in
domesticating the Revolutionary tradition without creating dissent among republican
voters, regardless of their factional preferences. The celebration of quatorze juillet
beginning in 1880 encouraged individual and community participation, which validated
the mission to bind the national and republican identities under a patriotic tricolor banner.
Thus, while Leftist factions like the Guesdists and the Blanquists were urging
revolutionary action to subvert the liberal Republic, the Moderate majority was
symbolically and legislatively proving its commitment to the French revolutionary past.
The republicans were forging a future in line with revolutionary goals while glossing
over the multiplicity of revolutionary perspectives that emerged from the events of 1789.
By 1880, a revolution had, in fact, come to port: the liberal revolution. While the

and asserts that “in short, the grand theme of the Left was that of institutions” including the Senate and the
appointment of senators.
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See Berlanstein, pp. 156, where he describes the dominant historical understanding that it was not until
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to gain 17 seats “compared to 14 for the Radicals” in the Chamber elections of 1893; and p. 162 where he
similarly describes how not until 1912, “did the SFIO fully replace radicalism in the bannlieu.”
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Radicals still stressed the need to fulfill the Revolution’s social and democratic impulses,
they did so within the context of existing institutions and never questioned the universal
resonance of symbols like la Marseillaise and Bastille Day for all republican-minded
citizens. For the Radicals, there was no question that the Third Republic was the
triumphant (if incomplete) manifestation of the Great Revolution. Yet the factions to the
left were hard at work spreading competing emblems. By 1880, other anthems, such as
La Carmagnole, had begun to replace la Marseillaise as a rallying cry among French
workers, just as the red flag was displacing the tricolor and other “holidays” were
eliciting deep emotions and political sentiments while quatorze juillet faded in
significance.730
The 1881 victory of Gambetta and his cohorts should then be understood as one in
which the domesticating influence of the Third Republic’s official adoption of
revolutionary symbolism played an important role. This tactic was particularly useful for
courting the working class vote. The Socialists were targeting this group at the end of the
1870s, with some alarming successes. Yet, in 1881, the vast majority sustained the
mainstream republican mandate. The symbolic initiatives and republican legislation that
the Moderates undertook between February 1879 and July 1880—most prominently, the
near-general amnesty of 1880—managed to tame the revolutionary impulses that had
begun to resurface.
730

For the displacement of La Marseillaise by La Carmagnole, see Perrot, pp. 161-162. For the
replacement of the tricolor with the red flag among workers see Perrot, pp. 165-166. For the diminished
emotional resonance for quatorze juillet see Rearick, Pleasures of the Belle Époque, Op. cit., pp. 19-22;
Amavi, “Bastille Day: from Dies Irae to Holiday,” in Nora, Op. cit., pp. 117-118 and135-136.

389

In essence, the republicans warded off revolution by celebrating the revolutionary
era as complete. For Gambetta and his followers, this meant a delicate balancing act
between embracing the Republic’s revolutionary origins and downplaying its radical and
violent phases.731 Thus, quatorze juillet, as presented by the government in 1880,
commemorated the pre-Radical phase of the Revolution. The holiday lauded “the
philosophy of the subjective rights of individuals and the forward march of historic
reason toward a positive age,” and the Moderates strengthened this message through
laicization and the embrace of open political expression via freedom of the press,
freedom of assembly, and universal suffrage.732 The Moderates also buttressed their
claims to the revolutionary heritage by consecrating the Revolution’s most cherished
symbols: la Marseillaise; a government seated in Paris; the storming of the Bastille; the
republican army; the tricolor; and even the Phrygian cap, which was so politically toxic
immediately following the Commune’s defeat. Touting a revolutionary legacy and
incorporating the era’s symbolic touchstones into the daily lives and emotive world of the
populace was a winning strategy. It domesticated the renascent appeal of the
revolutionary-Left as embodied by the Socialists’ progressive successes, and made the
call for rebellion increasingly anachronistic in terms of contemporary logistical reality.
This domestication was therefore influential in maintaining the Moderate majority; the

See Furet, Revolutionary France, Op. cit., p. 526 where he asserts that for Gambetta and his followers “it
was necessary to base political action on both 1789 and the criticisms of 1789.”
732
Ibid.
731

390

widely accepted verdict among the French people was that the Third Republic was the
Revolution’s triumph made manifest.
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CONCLUSION
On May 1, 1890, Jules Guesde and thousands of other anarchist and Socialist
leaders, celebrities, and adherents took part in France’s first May Day celebration. They
envisioned the day as a spectacular show of working-class solidarity, and most of its
organizers and participants wanted the demonstration to be a peaceful one. Nevertheless,
the specter of a working-class uprising seemed to be alive in this manifestation, sparking
fear in royalists and republicans alike that the event would descend into violence. Ten
days prior, Louise Michel had remarked to an interviewer: “There is no good
‘demonstration’ without me.”733 Michel and a small segment of the day’s supporters,
such as the anarchist militant Sébastien Faure, hoped that the occasion would ignite the
next revolution. Officials suspected that such people would take steps to make this dream
a reality. Thus, Michel and Faure sat in jail during the event, having been preemptively
arrested the week before.
Despite the anxieties of the new men of order, the platform of the 1890 May Day
demonstration was succinct and reformist: securing the eight-hour work day. Yet Sadi
Carnot’s government had just survived the test of General Boulanger and was still
grappling with militant strike waves and the influx of Socialist Deputies following the
general elections of September–October 1889. In this context, May Day seemed to
portend the birth of the next Commune. The government’s repressive attempts to deter
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violence harkened back to the Commune’s suppression. In the weeks leading up to May
Day, police surveillance agents fanned out, transcribing conversations in working-class
cafes, intercepting mail, and infiltrating syndicate meetings, all in an effort to gauge the
mood and intentions of likely participants. On May Day, the Bourse de Travail, the
Banque de France, and the Stock Exchange were all closed. The Senate remained open
but under heavy guard, with 38,000 troops garrisoned in Paris (the highest number since
the Commune), and all twenty commissariats sent hourly reports to the Préfecture de
Police.734 Clearly, the government was geared to quell violence, but the day disappointed
conservative alarmists and contemporary witnesses, such as Edmond de Goncourt, who
were craning their necks to watch the next Commune erupt. Throughout the event, the
crowd displayed “perfect tranquility,” and by 2 p.m., the delegates of the May Day
Committee had peacefully delivered their petitions to the Chamber of Deputies. 735
Imbedded in the images of the day were the speakers’ appeals to formal political
channels, the organizers’ emphasis on non-violence, and the tranquility of the crowd.
While the next May Day celebration would witness violent cataclysms emanating from
its anarchist participants, the annual event never triggered the next Commune that
contemporaries, conservative and republican alike, were still bracing themselves to meet.
The first May Day in 1890 and the republican regime’s excessive show of preemptive
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force demonstrates the degree to which the ghost of the Commune and its legacies
continued to affect the Republic’s political landscape, even nineteen years after its
crushing defeat. As this dissertation has shown, much of the Republic’s ability to weather
such storms stems from the manner in which the Third Republic was established and
defined during the 1870s.
Disputes over the fate of the Republic and its character were being negotiated
throughout the early Third Republic and were influenced significantly by the legacies of
the Paris Commune. These conflicts manifested themselves in parliamentary debates and
legislation, electoral campaign messaging, monument constructions, and national
festivals. During the 1870s, the Republic’s survival was tenuous and vulnerable to attacks
from many sides. Despite the standard historical assessment, this was not a “strangely
silent decade,” nor did the defeat of the Commune vanquish “powerful Left-wing
critics.”736 While granting that the decade’s political schisms influenced the Monarchists’
decline in political relevancy, this dissertation has shed significant light on a different
facet of the period: the effect of the memories Commune in the context of rivalries
between Moderate, Radical, and Socialist republicans. The Commune’s legacy was
submerged within battles over the meaning of the Republic and its relationship to the
revolutionary era’s heritage. These disputes had an impact on republican factional images
and voter appeals, and influenced electoral outcomes.

736

Susanna Barrows, Distorting Mirrors, Op. cit., p. 8.

394

The trauma of the Paris Commune and its brutal suppression left an indelible
mark on France, with legacies that emerged from the ashes in Paris while fires still raged.
These ideas immediately informed and validated the social science and medical
communities’ assessments of working-class discontent and spurred efforts to prevent any
further revolutionary outbursts by pinpointing the Commune’s pathology and the
maladies of political and social dissidence. Similarly, the Commune’s harsh defeat helped
to encourage provincial confidence in the Republic. Yet it also created a backlash among
devotees of the Commune and significant segments of the population who either
sympathized with its partisans “from a distance” or were not ideologically entrenched in
either the pro- or anti-Commune camps.737 In September 1871, the Radical republicans
introduced the first of thirteen amnesty proposals, touching off a nearly decade-long
campaign on behalf of the exiled Communards. This movement, like the legacies of the
Commune and its suppression, stirred significant controversy and had a noticeable impact
on French politics, culture, and electoral outcomes. As pro-and anti-Commune
perspectives consolidated, they informed long-term assessments of the event.
Contemporary politicians understood that such memories had an impact on public
opinion and electoral allegiances. They could reinforce contempt for the event, validate
its severe repression, and rebuff the amnesty of its partisans through efforts like Eugene
Appert’s photomontages and Maxime du Camp’s narrations. Conversely, they could use
images like those of Bruno Braquehais and narratives like those of Alphonse Lissagaray
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to mitigate the view that the Commune was a working-class frenzy and to generate
empathy for its partisans, support for their amnesty, and electoral gains for those
advocating on their behalf.
The mainstream political factions appealed for votes by promoting opposing
accounts of France’s revolutionary past and fashioning strong post-1871 images. The
primary battlefields for these endeavors were cultural projects, such as monument
constructions and national celebrations, and campaign politics. Throughout the decade,
political rivalries permeated cultural initiatives, including the rebuilding of the Vendôme
Column and the Universal Exposition of 1878. These enterprises presented a recovered
and united image of France. They helped to raise the Republic’s international profile and
undercut the macabre and potentially embarrassing tourism that focused on Paris in ruins.
Moreover, they served as ripe opportunities for voter messaging and factional
propagandizing.
This dissertation sheds light on the correlation between the Commune’s legacies
and competing political claims to the revolutionary tradition and heritage, as well as the
incorporation of these motifs by politicians who used culture and symbolism to attract
electoral support. For example, the Moderate (or Opportunist) republican response to the
Socialist renaissance of 1879—1880 included the passage of a sweeping amnesty (for all
but fourteen of the Communards), the official adoption of la Marseillaise, the
government’s move from Versailles back to Paris, the embrace of Marianne with her
Phrygian cap, and the designation of quatorze juillet as the Republic’s national holiday.

396

All of these actions were politically motivated. They were not simply the natural
consequences of the republicans’ victory over their monarchist rivals in 1879, but an
important part of the Moderate republican strategy. The Moderates took these particular
steps at this particular time as a result of the electoral rivalries that existed between
opposing republican groups on the eve of the 1881 general elections. Each was designed
to project the Moderate Republic’s triumph and, implicitly, the closure of the
revolutionary era. The official incorporation of the Revolution’s most powerful symbols
was a purposeful ploy to rebuff the Socialists’ denunciation of mainstream republican
leaders as betrayers of the revolutionary heritage, which called their leadership into
question. This strategy helped the Moderates to retain their mandate in the 1881 general
elections and to brace themselves against the potential political purchase that the
returning Communards might provide to the Socialist candidates.
The conclusions of this dissertation open many new paths of analysis regarding
the opening decade of the Third Republic. The startling, if ephemeral, uptick in
Bonapartist electoral success during the mid-1870s is a contextual component of this
dissertation’s inquiry. However, this paper does not comprehensively analyze the
Bonapartists’ political and cultural machinations in the same depth as those of the
monarchist and republican groups. This choice is related to their rapid decline after the
middle of the decade, especially following the death of the Prince Imperial in 1878. A
different investigation could be made of the political rhetoric embedded in the
Bonapartists’ stance on Communard amnesty and the Republic’s relationship to the
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revolutionary past. Such a study would be a welcome counterpoint or complement to this
dissertation’s exploration of the republicans’ electoral success. It might produce, for
example, a more comprehensive understanding of the degree to which the Bonapartist
resurgence was related to concurrent projects like the rebuilding of the Vendôme Column
or the commission of Fremiet’s statue of Joan of Arc. Chapter Three touches upon this
topic, but mostly in relation to the factions on which this study focuses: the monarchists
and the republicans.
Further examination of the Commune’s influence on provincial voter appeals
would produce great insight into how, if at all, characterizations of the event were altered
to accommodate the political proclivities of constituencies as diverse as workers in Lyon
and Catholics in the Midi. The research on the conservatives’ electoral appeals during
their campaigns following the Crisis of 16 May reveals that their rhetoric largely
revolved around characterizing the republicans as Communard sympathizers. The
conservatives consistently warned French voters that a victory for “the 363” meant a
return to the violence and social upheaval of 1871. Yet this strategy did not yield a new
conservative mandate in the Chamber, as they had hoped. Apparently, the majority of the
voters discounted these dire warnings, even in the provinces. A study focusing on how
republicans, especially the Radicals, presented their opinions of the Commune and the
legacy of the revolutionary era to provincial voters would greatly flesh out the scope of
the political influence of these issues on the establishment of the Third Republic. The
same exploration of the various Socialist groups would be of similar benefit.
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The renaissance of the Socialist movement during the late 1870s was rooted in the
legacy of the Commune and its impact on republican politics and divisions. The decade’s
amnesty debate is a strong manifestation of this relationship. According to Susanna
Barrows: “By the mid-eighties…strikes, demonstrations, and anarchist terrorism were
patent signs of disaffection…. Politics in these years was measured not only by the ballot
box or by the affairs of Parliament, but also by the ‘street’ and by the crowd.”738 This
dissertation demonstrates that such tactics were at work as early as the 1870s; actions in
the street, diatribes overheard in cafes, and scribbles on city walls speak volumes about
popular sentiment in those years. Systematically tracing such political behavior and
seditious messaging outside of Paris in the wake of the Commune would greatly
strengthen the modern understanding of popular politics, the political influence of the
Commune’s legacy, and the Commune’s larger impact during this extraordinary decade.
By 1880, the Socialist movement had acquired a new foothold in French politics.
To expand its base, the party relied on other symbols than those that official recognition
had domesticated. Its use of the red flag, the Carmagnole, and Mur des Fédérés, where a
different pantheon of heroes had been buried, reveals that the modern Socialists played
upon the legacies of the Commune to build a more resonant image. Because the populace
generally assumed that the Commune had been a Socialist revolution, memories of its
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severe repression lent a “halo of martyrdom” to the resurrected Socialist movement.739
Such emblems engendered an emotive appeal that, during the 1870s and the early 1880s,
proved more powerful than political appeals that were grounded in Marxist rhetoric,
scientific socialism, and the evils of bourgeois capitalism. After the 1870s, the Socialists
had enough electoral power that they no longer needed to rely so viscerally on the
Commune’s legacy.
For the duration of its hold on power, the Moderate republican regime continued
to vacillate between repression and the politics of exclusion, on the one hand, and
liberalization and tolerance, on the other. This dissertation illuminates the political
influence of the Commune’s legacy on the republicans’ rise to power. This effect is
evident in their post-1880 initiatives, as well. It played a role in the passage of the free
press law of July 1881 and, conversely, the government’s preemptive suppression of the
May Day of 1890—a public but peaceful event that revolved around the desire for an
eight-hour workday.
In the decades after the Republic solidified, the Radicals maintained their tenuous
alliances with both the Opportunists and the Socialists. The Moderates continued to
pursue limited republican reforms, such as eliminating lifelong senate terms while
preserving the upper chamber, and secularizing the school system while sustaining the
Concordat. In other words, they upheld the most general and specifically liberal

See Etienne Ginestous, Histoire Politique de Bordeaux, Op. cit., p. 82 where he describes Blanqui’s
release from prison as having removed his halo of martyrdom.
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revolutionary legacies while at the same moving inexorably into the colonial pursuit of
international power and grandeur. Such discordant political machinations of these
“children of the Revolution” display the continued influence of the Commune’s political
legacy and the debates that surrounded it, as well as the extraordinary political and
cultural precedents set in the first decade of its wake.
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